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Most models of property rights assume they are supplied by the state on demand 
from society. Property rights are strong when state institutions enforce the law. The 
strength of state institutions in the provinces determines how well property rights will be 
enforced on the ground. The penetration of state institutions from the capital city to the 
provinces is a part of long state building processes. These processes pit centralizing elites 
against local notables who want to protect their authority and privileges. In the West, 
state building processes took centuries; in post-colonial states like Algeria and Tunisia, 
these processes have occurred over the last fifty years, and have occurred unevenly 
This dissertation asks why property rights are relatively strong in Tunisia, and 
why they are so weak in Algeria. To answer this question, it focuses on the development 
of local political and state institutions in the years immediately following independence. 
At independence, rulers in both states used their anti-colonial nationalist parties to 
buttress the state-in-formation. Their ability to do so, however, was conditioned on the 
development of those parties during the colonial period, and affected their rural state 
 ix 
building strategies. The choices they made in the first decades of independence defined 
the parameters of local-national relations and the degree to which they can implement 
property rights on the ground. 
Using the Neo-Destour Party, which had developed into a mass-mobilizing 
movement by independence, the Tunisian state was able to project authority into the 
periphery. In return for vertical mobility opportunities, party cadres enforced national 
legislation during the early state building period. Property rights are strong. In Algeria, 
authority collapsed when close to a million European settlers fled in 1962. The French 
excluded Muslims from the political and economic sphere fearing they would subvert the 
foundation of the colonial system: strong settler property rights. At independence, the 
new regime had few cadres to staff the new state institutions, and an amorphous 
nationalist movement. The regime chose a two-tiered state building strategy. From the 
top-down, it placed its few cadres for the central and provincial administration. Its 
bottom-up strategy was to form a new set of party-administrators that could act as proxy 
agents on the ground through the municipalities. The top-down, bottom-up powersharing 
agreement turned on its side, however, as local notables infiltrated the local party 
organizations and municipalities. The party-administrators entered alliances with 
notables, creating localized political arenas independent of Algiers. Subsequent efforts to 
run land and property reform through the municipalities were undermined by these 
alliances, and have been since. In Algeria, property rights are nationally legislated, but 
they are enforced according to local dictates. Property rights are weak. 
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PART ONE:  STATE BUILDING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The Anecdotes: Projecting State Policy: Property Rights from Capital 
to the Provinces 
Officially, the three Maghrebi states have similarly functioning property rights: on 
paper, it takes 47 days for an Algerian or Moroccan businessman to register a tract of 
land on the local cadastre; in Tunisia it takes 39.1 In late October 2007, however, French 
automobile manufacturer Renault abandoned plans to build a car plant on the outskirts of 
Algiers, choosing instead neighboring Tangier, Morocco. Negotiations collapsed 
following three years of failed efforts to identify and purchase a suitable tract of 
industrial land.2 Citing the same reasons, the Emirati development group Emaar 
announced it was freezing five major infrastructure projects in December 2007, while 
investing more than seven billion dollars in similar projects in Morocco and Tunisia.3 
While the official number of days required to set-up shop is similar between 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, doing business in the three states is very different. In 
overall rankings of property transactions in 183 countries, the World Bank’s Doing 
Business study scores Tunisia a modest, but respectable 59th place; Morocco at 123rd; 
Algeria falls into the bottom quintile, at 160th.4 Such are the wide variations in the costs 
of doing business in the developing world. And they are a heavy burden: with the Renault 
withdrawal, Algeria lost 800 million dollars in direct foreign investment, thousands of 
                                                
1 World Bank. 2010. Doing Business 2010. http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings 
2 El Khabar, 14 November 2007. “Renault a négocié pour installer une usine de montage en Algérie 
pendant trois ans sans résultat;” Jeune Afrique, 18 November 2007. “Pourquoi Renault n’a pas choisi 
l’Algérie;” L’Expression. 25 November 2007. “Révélations sur l’installation de l’usine Renault au Maroc: 
Comment des Algériens torpillen leur pays.” 
3 L’Expression, 8 December 2008. “Il y a un climat malsain.;” Emaar Media Centre, 24 October 2005; 27 
November 2005; 15 April 2006. (http://www.emaar.com/MediaCenter/PressReleases) 
4 World Bank. 2010. Doing Business 2010.  
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jobs, and access to cheap, locally produced vehicles; the Emaar Group had proposed over 
25 billion dollars of investments – approximately 80% of Arab investment in the country, 
and touted as the investment of the century.5 The lack of a clear and transparent property 
rights system cost Algeria 26 billion dollars in 2007. Alone, these two projects amounted 
for nearly a quarter of Algeria’s 2006 GDP.   
The problem is not a question of industrial zoning and investment laws.6 Under 
pressure to loosen regulations to encourage foreign investors, an Algerian economic 
reform team led by former Minister of Privatization and Investment Promotion (MPIP) 
Abdelhamid Temmar structured the 2006 commercial real-estate law with built-in 
provisions to encourage foreign direct investment.7 In conjunction with the Public 
Domain Authority, the MPIP offered parts of the public domain land portfolio to foreign 
operators investing significant amounts of fixed capital. Once approved, the law 
stipulated that the process take 47 days, as the paperwork circulates through the 
administration. In theory, the process was straightforward. In practice, Renault closed 
negotiations after three years of failed efforts to regularize land promised by the national 
authorities. A failure on the ground, the MPIP law was abrogated in 2008.8 The problem 
was neither a question of private property or good faith. National real-estate policy exists 
                                                
5 L’Expression, 08 December 2008. “Il y a un climat malsain.” 
6 Reflecting on the developing world in general, Meszaros reminds us: “Were legislation the key, then the 
diversity of social and legal practices…would not be so wide.” George Meszaros. 2000. “Taking the Land 
into Their Hands: The Landless Workers’ Movement and the Brazilian State.” Journal of Law and Society. 
27(4): 517-541. 
7 Ordonnance n˚ 06-11 du 30 août 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et 
Populaire (JORA), available at: http://www.joradp.dz. The ordonnance offered 20-year concessions with 
the possibility of outright privatization at the end of term. JORA. Also see: http://www.foncier-
finance.gov.dz. 
8 Loi n˚ 08-14 du 20 juillet 2008 halted all land transactions – public and private – pending application of 
Ordonnance n˚ 08-04 du 1 septembre 2008, which replaced privatization with long-term leasing 
concessions. JORA online.  
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– it simply cannot be implemented.9 The legal rules are very clear, though on the ground, 
property rights are weak: the Algerian state cannot implement its own reforms (Henry 
and Springborg 2001: 121-125).  
A prominent political sociologist once remarked: “The impact of state policies 
devised in the capital city may be quite different from that anticipated from the scholar 
looking only at the scope of public policies undertaken” (Migdal 1988: 248). Perhaps the 
scholar had Algeria in mind: as one moves from the capital to the provinces, the problem 
of enforcing property rights on the ground becomes more acute than the political 
headache posed by squatters.10 Local business interests are able to subvert decisions 
made at the top. In 2008, SNASCO, a Saudi construction firm, signed an agreement with 
the Ministry of Housing to build a luxury business and community complex on a coveted 
twelve hectare piece of real-estate just east of the Oran Sheraton Hotel. While the 500 
million euro project received a green light from the Presidency, local developer 
opposition has prevailed to date: unable to get the necessary municipal paperwork to 
begin digging, the building site has been transformed into a informal rubbish heap.11  
Topsy-turvily, local notables are also able to dictate to the top from the bottom. 
Cherif Athmane, a well-known Orani hotelier, club proprietor, newspaper owner, 
                                                
9 ECCI, an Emirati real-estate investment company, and Total, a French petroleum corporation, have 
experienced similar problems. See: Tout Sur l’Algérie, 30 July 2008. “Algerie: un projet géant français 
Total bloqué depuis 5 ans;” Tout Sur l’Algérie, 04 March 2009. “Dounia Parc: comment le gouvernement 
s’apprête à offrir un terrain de 2 milliards d’euros à l’émirati EIIC.” 
10 A phenomenon remarked by a number of scholars. See: Joel S. Migdal. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak 
States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press); Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds). 1994. State Power and Social Forces. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Jeffrey Herbst. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative 
Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Catherine Boone. 2003. 
Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
11 Gulf News, 16 August 2008. “SNASCO launches Dh2.2b mega project in Algeria.” Tout sur l’Algérie. 
08 November 2009. “Le projet immobilier du saoudien Snasco à Oran remis en cause.” 
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building promoter and local notable,12 has spent the better part of a decade developing 
plans to build a luxury high-rise apartment complex no more than two kilometers west of 
the SNASCO project, abutting the Zabana Bridge. A national planning commission led 
by then Oran governor Abdelkader Zoukh and composed of urban planners and 
geological engineers refused a construction permit request in 2005 citing unstable soil 
conditions. The incident sparked a conflict between the entrepreneur and Wali.13 
Abruptly thereafter, the governor was transferred to Medea province – less than a year 
after his appointment to Oran.14 Zoukh’s replacement15 approved the project in 2007, 
though it is unclear that the composition of the soil had significantly changed. Shortly 
after construction began in 2008, a major thoroughfare that parallels the southern 
periphery of the construction site partially collapsed, severing a major fiber-optic cable 
that provides Internet services to Western Algeria.16 Following a series of similar 
accidents, creating worries of structural damage to the bridge, construction was halted for 
geo-technical reasons in 2010. The existing structure was demolished in late 2010, to be 
rebuilt several meters away from the road and bridge on the same plot of land.17  
 
                                                
12 Athmane owns a local daily, three major hotels and high-end nightclubs, several manufacturing 
factories, and a construction company. I once witnessed the clientele of a restaurant popular with the Orani 
business and political elite stand in deference upon Athmane’s arrival. In order of local importance, more 
than twenty men paraded to his table to embrace him.  
13 Wali is the official term for and Algerian prefect or regional governor. 
14 Lahouari Addi. 2006. “En Algérie, du conflit armé à la violence sociale” Le Monde Diplomatique. 
(April). While Addi hints the decision to transfer Zoukh was the president’s alone, Oranis believe Zoukh 
asked to be transferred. The occult power thought to surround local business interests has generated three 
unverifiable variations of the story. The first is that shortly after the dispute unknown bandits kidnapped 
Zoukh’s daughter only to release her twenty-four hours later. In the second, Zoukh believed he was victim 
to black magic. In the final story, Zoukh was shot in the shoulder while inspecting trash pick-up. Whether 
or not any of the stories is true is less interesting than the fact that Oranis have generated so many 
variations of the tale. 
15 Tahar Sekrane is from Sidi Bel Abbes, a forty-five minute drive southeast of Oran.  
16 El Khabar. 21 May 2008. “L’Ouest du pays sans connexion internet.” 
17 La Tribune, 10 May 2010. “Les petits opérateurs exclus du foncier industriel;” Liberté, 14 September 
2010. “Projet immobilier de la résidence Zabana.” 
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Photo 1.1: Résidence Zabana, November 2010, Oran, Algeria 
 
Source: Author’s Photo. 
 
President of the National Assembly, Abdelaziz Ziari recently summed the 
government’s frustration. Commenting to Minister of Housing Noureddine Moussa 
shortly after the parliament voted a new law regulating property markets that he hoped 
local power-holders would not obstruct implementation of the law, “as usual.”18 
                                                
18 Le Soir d’Algérie. 18 January 2011. “Le voeux de Ziari.” 
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Chapter One: The Institutional Origins of State Capacity in Algeria and 
Tunisia 
The role property rights play in development has been extensively researched. 
Strong property rights provide the institutional basis for economic development (Feder et 
al. 1988; Place and Hazel 1993; Mauro 1995; Alston et al. 1996; De Soto 2000, 2001; 
Feld and Voigt 2003) by assigning rights that define ownership, use, and transferability 
of an asset (Eggertson 1990: 34-35). Though implicit throughout the literature, 
surprisingly very little has been written on property rights enforcement19 – the keystone 
of strong property rights, and an important indicator of state capacity. Studies in the 
extensive framework of property rights theory focus on origins, whether the aggregate of 
micro-level contracts or economic lobbying. Property rights develop from the ground as 
the aggregate of micro-level contracts or economic lobbying and are generalized upward 
to the national level. State-centric literatures too have focused on the fiscal and property 
rights origins of the state. States need resources and will therefore create property rights 
to stabilize extraction costs, whether unilaterally or in a Hobbesian social contract. As 
states reinforce their effective capacity, enforcement trickles downward.  
In both theoretical traditions, enforcement is assumed and framed as a process 
initiated at either the micro- or macro-level. Underdeveloped is the corridor that binds the 
two: an explanation of how national decisions are relayed, implemented, and enforced at 
the local level or how local institutions can block national priorities from the bottom. In 
their own terms, the property rights theory and state-centric literatures are hard pressed to 
explain how or why “the gap between formal law and prevailing customs reflects a much 
                                                
19 For a recent exception, see: Stephen Haber, Armando Razo and Noel Maurer. 2003. The Politics of 
Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-
1929. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 18-40. 
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wider inconsistence between the national institutions of the central state and local, 
informal power relations” (Christensen 1994: 659) – gaps that Guillermo O’Donnell calls 
“brown areas” (1993: 1360-61). Why is the Algerian government so ineffectual in 
enforcing its own property rights policy (and why is the Tunisian regime relatively so 
efficient)? Why are Orani local entrepreneurs able to sabotage nationally designed 
projects at the local level? Why are local operators like Cherif Athmane able to project 
their private interests into the national political sphere? 
Engaging this lacuna (and these literatures), and following the call to “constantly 
look back and forward between the top reaches of the state and local society… [to] see 
how the organization of society, even in remote areas, may dictate the character and 
capabilities of politics at the center” (Migdal 1988: xvii), this dissertation looks at the 
development of and relationship between the intermediary institutions linking local actors 
and the state in Algeria and Tunisia to explain variations in policy enforcement. While a 
major focus is placed on property rights theory and land reform20 in the colonial and post-
colonial periods, this thesis is not about property rights per se. Rather it studies the 
political and institutional origins of state capacity and policy enforcement and the 
political consequences of institutional development in Algeria and Tunisia. Centering on 
the development of representative assemblies21 and party institutions at the local, 
regional, and national level, this study shows how the timing and sequence of 
                                                
20 As I discuss at the end of this chapter, a great deal of focus is placed on land. Land is a useful case. Land 
reform was a decolonization priority engaged almost immediately after independence in both states. 
Nationally symbolic, land is also a highly localized and fixed asset. See: Jeffrey A. Frieden. Debt, 
Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
21 By representative assemblies, I mean elected national, regional, and local assemblies during the single 
party era, where state and party functions overlapped: municipal councils, regional assemblies, and national 
parliaments. Their development marked an early decision to create a “participatory state,” structured by the 
single party. 
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development22 and links between institutional layers conditioned local-national relations 
by generating an incentive structure23 that encouraged either a national view of politics or 
created localized focal points.  
History matters. Colonial legacies shaped the magnitude of political and 
economic costs required to overcome resistance encountered when rewiring state and 
society in the post-colonial era. The colonial situation also abetted or precluded the 
development of mass-mobilizing nationalist parties (Moore 1970).24 Borrowing from the 
state-society relationship (Migdal 1988, 2001; Kohli 1990; Migdal, Kohli and Shue 
1994), this study shows that the ability of ruling elites to harness these parties through 
independence significantly determined the initial post-colonial state-society balance of 
power and relationship that followed.25 This relationship limited rulers’ institutional 
choice-sets when deciding what types of institutions to create during the state building 
processes (North 1979, 1981, 1990; Levi 1988; Bates 1987; Boone 2003). It also affected 
timing and sequencing:26 rulers created representative institutions once spatially 
congruent party structures were in place (or being organized.) 
                                                
22 Timing and sequencing are important concepts to Historical and New Institutionalism. Whereas the 
former focuses on how institutions emerge from and are embedded in temporal processes, the later focuses 
on how institutions defined the mechanisms that coordinate political and economic behavior. For a 
discussion on the distinction between timing and sequence in the two variations, see: Kathleen Thelen. 
1999. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science. 2: 369-
404; Paul Pierson. 2000. “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes.” Studies 
in American Political Development. 14(Spring): 72-92. 
23 Defined in Appendix B. 
24 Defined in Appendix B. 
25 In Tunisia, the mass-mobilizing party Neo-Destour party endured colonization and had virtually created 
a nation by independence. In Algeria, the independence movement’s reduced size and clandestine 
organization did little to create a nation out of the disarticulated Muslim population by independence. In 
1962, national leaders not only had to create a state, they also had to create a nation. See: Clement Henry 
Moore. 1965. Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government. Berkeley: University 
of California Press: 8-40; Mounira Charrad. 2001. States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial 
Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Berkeley: University of California Press: 17-27. 
26 Would they local and national institutions in tandem or prioritize one level before another?  If levels 
were temporally prioritized, then what would be the lag before the creation of the next level up (or down?) 
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Leaning on the insights of Historical and New Institutionalism (North 1981, 1990; 
Jansen 1983; Levi 1988; Steimo, Thelen and Longstreth 1992; Thelen 1999, 2000; 
Firmin-Sellers 2000, 2001; Pierson 2000a, 2000b; Whiting 2000; Charrad 2001), this 
study shows how the sequencing of de-concentrated institutional development defined 
local-national relations and hence the ability to enforce policy from the top and the 
capacity to subvert it from the bottom. Sequencing patterns affected local politicians’ 
vertical mobility and localized material accumulation opportunities. The parameters of 
those basic incentive structures generated different political focal points, amplifying or 
minimizing the principal-agent problem between local and national actors. 
Extant local, regional, and national party organization permitted the tandem 
development of local and national representative assemblies in Tunisia shortly after 
independence. Vertical mobility opportunities for local elites encouraged participation in 
the regime’s policy implementation process while limiting localized material 
accumulation strategies: the national arena was the political focal point. A relatively 
contained principal-agent problem abetted strong policy enforcement at the local level. In 
Algeria, municipal councils and party structures were created five years after 
independence and functioned autonomously for more than a decade before the regime 
created a national assembly and organized a national party congress. Lacking 
mobilization opportunities during this period, municipal assemblies became the focal 
point of politics. Horizontal linkages between elected officials and local notables placed a 
premium on material accumulation strategies – especially after the regime decided to run 
the Agrarian Revolution through the municipal councils – intensifying the principal agent 
problem between top and bottom. Subsequent vertical party and representative institution 
development did little to radically change the local-national framework: by this point, 
local interests were too embedded and vertical mobility between levels and material 
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accumulation opportunities in the new National Assembly too limited to have a 
significant behavior modifying effect. 
The local-national frameworks set into place shortly after independence affected 
the state’s ability to implement property rights reform as well as other nationally-defined 
policy or political initiatives run through the representative institutions or managed by 
party structures at the local and regional level during the early stages of the single-party 
period. Later changes in the structure of the national economy further modified the 
intensity of localized politics by changing local fiscal extraction requirements or by 
expanding or contracting the importance of the state in the local economy. Lacking 
significant institutional change to modify material accumulation or political mobility 
opportunities, the transition to semi-authoritarian multiparty politics has amplified local-
national legacies by attenuating or intensifying the localized struggles over power and 
wealth. 
 
The remainder of this chapter presents the organization of this thesis. 
























































































































Chapter Two discusses the theoretical basis of the study. Parts 2.1 and 2.2 
highlight how contractual, demand and supply-side property rights models treat origins 
and enforcement mechanisms. Outlined in Part 2.3, naïve contractual models define 
property rights as the aggregate of market place contractual transactions (Demsetz 1967; 
Alchian and Demsetz 1973). Discussed in Part 2.4, sophisticated demand and supply-side 
tacks insert politics and the state. Demand-side models center on the ways social forces 
lobby the state to define property rights (Olson 1966, 1982; Krueger 1974; Buchanan et 
al. 1980), whereas supply-side models focus on state output. In return for taxation, rulers 
define property rights (North 1979; Davis and North 1991; Levi 1988; Joireman 2000). 
Unspecified in the contractual, demand, and state-provision models is the manner in 
which property rights are transferred from the marketplace as local and private goods to 
the national level as public goods and/or vice-versa. The state does not exist in 
contractual models, is assumed in demand-side models, and held static in supply-side 
models. Enforcement mechanisms are underdetermined. Borrowing from the state-society 
relationship and Historical and New Institutionalism literatures, Part 2.5 lays out the 
theoretical argumentation behind the summary discussed above.  
Part Two of this thesis looks at local-national relations and property rights in the 
pre-colonial era. Chapters Three and Four show the center-periphery struggles over 
authority that dominated the pre-colonial (Chapter Three) and colonial period (Chapter 
Four). Defining property rights was a central point of contention between local elites and 
centralizing authorities in both periods, as the Ottoman regencies and French colonial 
authorities sought to expand their fiscal receipts by expropriating the rights to define the 
use of property from local elites. Colonial institutions were built from foundations laid by 
Ottoman state building experiences. In Tunisia, “[t]he French grafted onto the existing 
Tunisian administration features of the French bureaucracy” (Charrad 2001: 116). The 
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beylical institutions had already asserted control over much of the countryside, whereas 
limited Ottoman control over the Algerian countryside, and the dissolution of those 
institutions immediately following French invasion in 1830 left the French with no local 
interlocutor by which it could engage a rebellious population. Colonial domination over 
the countryside, and the creation of a land market was hyper-violent. The policies settlers 
imposed on colonial authorities to control local land markets, in turn, would affect how a 
new generation of indigenous elite would engage political and economic space, 
ultimately defining the contours of the nationalist movements in both polities. Chapter 
Four looks at the colonial period in Algeria and Tunisia, and sets the stage for the rest of 
the study. It underscores varying colonial effects on the two states: the disaggregation of 
Algerian society and inability to create a national movement, and the unification of the 
Tunisian people under a centralizing Protectorate regime and mass-mobilizing anti-
colonial party, the Neo-Destour.  
Part Three of this thesis focuses on early processes of state building in Algeria 
and Tunisia, looking at the regime’s local level state building strategies. Chapter Five 
highlights the role the local level Neo-Destour party branches, guided by a national 
organization that offered promotion opportunities in both party and representative 
institutions, played in abetting regime development in Tunisia: where the party was 
strongly implanted, the regime organized municipal elections; where colonial-era 
municipalities did not exist, the regime developed party branches before administrative 
state building; and where local actors opposed the Neo-Destour, as in Béja and the South, 
the regime imposed heavy-handed land reform to break the opposition’s material basis. 
When land reform was generalized, local party branches and council members assisted 
Ministry of Agriculture cadres despite the unpopularity of the program among party rank 
and file. Only at the apex of the cooperative movement did local interests conflict with 
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national strategy, though ironically it occurred at the highest level: the regime’s backbone 
came from the coastal Sahel region, and it was a group of Saheli ministers and highly 
ranked party officials that ultimately convinced the President to stop the program, once 
their political and economic interests were directly implicated: their political support and 
a part of their material wealth came from regional olive oil production and producers.  
Colonial-era party institutionalization and the vertical mobility opportunities 
offered to local level elected officials and party members have abetted the regime’s 
efforts to strengthen local capacity over the last fifty years. 
Chapter Six focuses on state development in Algeria. The lacking party and 
administration, the state had little control over land or the provinces until the 1967 
municipal elections created an organizational and incentive framework for local elites. 
Tandem party institutionalization and state building blurred the lines between politics and 
administration. Lacking vertical promotion opportunities and an institutionalized national 
party to give direction, the newly organized local political elite formed horizontal 
alliances with local notables and strongmen. As in Tunisia, the socializing land reforms 
of the 1971 Agrarian Revolution were unpopular at the base. Unlike Tunisia, where local 
party and elected officials enforced unpopular decisions in the hopes of promotion, in 
Algeria the local political elite collaborated to subvert national policy. Attention is placed 
on how municipal council members assisted landed elites in the village of Maghnia and 
Oran in avoiding nationalization – accounting in part for the more than one million 
hectares of land disappeared from municipal land registers by 1973.  
Local party structures developed without tandem development in national 
coordination until 1979, when the party organized its second post-colonial national 
congress (after a fifteen-year moratorium). While it would be factually incorrect to assert 
that no national organization existed, higher-up coordination did not have an organic link 
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with the base. At the same time, the regime turned a blind-eye to the development of 
local party-patronage networks in return for continued local level stability. With 
expanded budgets thanks to high oil prices, these networks anchored themselves within 
the local political arena.  
Building from the framework developed above, Chapter Seven traces the 
development of property and localized party politics in Oran, Algeria from the 
independence period to present. It is divided into two sections. The first section focuses 
on party formation during the immediate post-independence period. It underscores the 
difficulty national party leaders had in forming party structures and nominating / co-
opting a local party elite from scratch in Oran. Here, the local party machine captured 
representative politics, ensuring a high turnover rate in the municipal council. Political 
focal points are local and the party machines more or less autonomous: policy 
incongruent with local interests is not systematically applied on the ground. 
The second section explores localized politics in Algeria since the transition to 
multiparty politics after the October 1988 riots. It underscores how the party-patronage 
system functioned in Oran when the FLN was out of power – from the 1990 to the 2002 
municipal elections, and places specific importance on how these reforms affected local-
national relations during the last decade, especially since 2003. A political anomaly 
occurred that year: the FLN supported its Secretary General, then Prime Minister Ali 
Benflis, in opposition to incumbent President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in the 2004 
presidential elections.  
Lacking a nation-wide apparatus to organize the vote, the regime sought to take 
back the ruling party. Instead of seizing the party from the summit, the President’s allies 
sought to subvert the party via the base. Within a month of the FLN decision to support 
the Prime Minister, a splinter movement called the “Redressers” began a campaign to 
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take back the FLN apparatus via the party base, not the national leadership structure. Led 
by pro-Bouteflika FLN party cadres who had been evinced from the Central Committee 
and Political Bureau during the 8th Party Congress, the “Redressers” attempted to seize 
the local branches and regional Federation headquarters manu militari. The incursions 
split local party branches and Federations into opposing camps. At the nexus of local and 
national party organization, regional party commissioners had to negotiate rival claims at 
two levels. At the national level, they were torn in their allegiances with party Secretary 
General Ali Benflis and President Bouteflika. At the local level, the picture was more 
complicated: pro-Bouteflika supporters, divided into a number of mutually antagonistic 
clans, opposed the pro-Benflis camp within the same party branches and regional 
Federations. 
Bouteflika won the elections, though the “Redressers” were unable to capture a 
majority of regional Federations. Werenfels (2007) notes that the intensity of the 2004 
campaign and election represented a divided first order elite – the military. She (2007: 59, 
67) and Liverani (2008: 127) note that national level fissures penetrated to second (FLN 
and RND political bureaux, for example) and third order elites (press, civil society). 
Viewed from a macro-level perspective, one might say that elite fractionalization at the 
upper echelons of power fissured down to the local level – that the series of events were 
determined uniquely from the top.27 Using that same logic, one would have expected the 
local level problems to evaporate following the return to consensus (Bouteflika’s second 
and third mandates): top-level stability would trickle down to the second and third order, 
and certainly to the local level.  
This is precisely not the case. The focus various FLN factions at the national and 
local level placed on the mouhafedha in 2004 was not ephemeral. The local level fissures 
                                                
27 Here, I’m not saying the Werenfels and Liverani used a macro-level perspective. 
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that grew out of the national level struggle in 2004 have had a profound impact on the 
management of Algerian political life since – at least in as far as the FLN is concerned.28  
The struggle over the mouhafedha in at least nine Wilaya has festered and grown worse 
since 2004,29 affecting the organization of the substitute 8th Congress held in January 
2005, subsequent restructuring of FLN local kasmat and mouhafedha, as well as the 
designation of party lists for the 2007 local, regional, and national assembly elections. 






                                                
28 Here, we are not concerned with simple electoral list squabbles, which occur in most parliamentary 
systems that operate via party lists, but rather enduring problems. 
29 El Watan. 22 December 2008. 
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Chapter Two: Economic Model of Property Rights: Founding 
Definitions and Origins 
Neoclassical theory is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe 
policies that will induce development (North 1994: 359). 
 
Property rights do not exist in neoclassical economic theory; as Harold Demsetz 
puts it: “[i]n the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role” (1967: 347). 
Neoclassical Robinson Crusoe assumes that marketplace transactions occur fluidly 
according to the laws of supply and demand, transaction costs are nil, and externalities 
(factors that affect the market, but are external to the laws of supply and demand) do not 
exist. Using contracts as a foundation, work by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz 
toward an economic model of property rights would serve as the baseline for future 
studies. 
 
2.1 Contracts and Externalities: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property Rights 
In 1965, Armen Alchian defined property rights as “a method of assigning to 
particular individuals the ‘authority’ to select, for specific goods, any use from an 
unprohibited class of uses.” Harold Demsetz elaborated, noting that property rights are a 
formalized set of expectations that affect the decision-making process of actors in a 
marketplace transaction (Demsetz 1967: 350-353). The two laid the foundation of the 
contractual model of property rights, arguing that marketplace actors create property 
rights to protect their assets and to ensure smooth transactions (Demsetz 1967; Alchian 
and Demsetz 1973). At the micro-level, property rights are simply a contractual 
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agreement between one or more actors: property rights are the contract.30 Property rights 
qua property rights originate at the macro-level,31 when individual contractual rules are 
aggregated into marketplace rules (Demsetz 1967: 354-359; Alchian and Demsetz 1973: 
22-27).  
The theory claimed to be dynamic by explaining the origins and evolution of 
property rights as a function of externalities. Externalities are sets of events outside of 
day-to-day, marketplace expectations,32 such as sudden increases in factor prices, or new 
technological advancements (Demsetz 1976: 350). Property rights internalize 
externalities by working them into the rules surrounding how one can hold and transfer 
an asset (the contract), and hence affect the decision-making process of a market 
transaction (ibid: 348). Property rights are modified at two levels with the introduction of 
new externalities. At the micro-level, contractual models change when the gains of 
internalization outweigh the costs of externalization, or “when actors are guaranteed a 
payoff at least as large as under the status quo” (Weimer 1997: 11). At the macro-level, 
property rights change when a hard core of marketplace actors reach similar contractual 
conclusions by minimizing costs and maximizing benefits (Demsetz 1967: 354-359).  
                                                
30 Early contractual writings probably did not anticipate “prisoner’s dilemma” problems. Coordination 
between contractual parties is assumed to be effortless at the micro-level. Later works would posit a neutral 
third party arbiter to solve for significant coordination problems – civil society, police, or the state. 
31 Here we mean property rights defined by Alchian. Again, at the micro-level, property rights are simply 
the contract that defines the obligations of each party participating in the transfer of a good or service. 
32 R. C. O. Matthews (p. 906) defines transaction costs as “[t]he costs of arranging a contract ex ante and 
monitoring and enforcing it ex post, as opposed to production costs, which are the costs of executing a 
contract.” R. C. O. Mathrews. 1986. “The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth.” Economic 
Journal. 96(4): 903-910. For an overview on transaction costs and externalities, see Ronald H. Coase. 
1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics. 3(1): 1-44; and Carl J. Dahlman. 
1979. “The Problem of Externality.” Journal of Legal Studies. 22(1): 141-162. 
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This contractual model is the baseline for the vast literature on property rights to 
follow.33 Alchian and Demsetz framed the property rights debate in 1973, suggesting to 
economic historians three types of research questions:  
(1) What is the structure of property rights in a society at some point of time? (2) 
What consequences for social interaction flow from a particular structure of 
property rights? and, (3) How has this property rights structure come into being 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1973: 17). 
They took the call seriously. First, documentation of historical and primitive property 
rights has led to an exponential growth of knowledge in the literature. Second, there is 
general agreement that property rights promote investment and growth by defining 
contractual relations (Williamson 1975; North 1981; Taylor 1987; Leblang 1996; De 
Soto 2000). Third, we now have a repertoire of externalities, or range of factors that 
historically have played a role in property rights reform: these include, but are not limited 
to relative changes in factor prices triggered by changes in agricultural commercialization 
(North and Thomas 1970; Bazel 1997), colonialism (Davis and North 1971), education 
(Ruttan 1978), population growth (North and Thomas 1977; Pingali and Binswanger 
1986; Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994), norms and ideology (North 1981, 1990; Guillet 
2000), or technological effects on the costs of exclusion (Anderson and Hill 1975).  
 The contractual model’s assumptions that externalities trigger property rights 
change are widely accepted. The most significant changes in North African property 
rights occurred following colonization and decolonization. As discussed below, however, 
the model underspecifies the mechanisms that abet property rights enforcement. Lacking 
such tools, the literature focuses on the wrong questions. 
                                                
33 Furbotn and Pejovich date the literature to the early 1960s, with the writings of Alchian and Demsetz. 
Furubotn and Pejovich. 1972. “Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature.” 
Journal of Economic Literature. 10(4): 1137-1162. 
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2.2 EXCLUSIVITY IN THE CONTRACTUAL MODEL 
In 1775, Jean-Jacques Rousseau traced the evils of modern society to the 
discovery of property as an exclusive, alienable asset. A year later, Adam Smith 
celebrated the beauty of the invisible hand in guiding smooth, marketplace operations – 
the logical route to wellness and economic utopia (1776). The unlikely thread binding the 
two is the role property rights play in guaranteeing exclusive rights to ownership, use, 
and transfer of an asset: to Rousseau, exclusivity is violence, to Smith it is invisible.34   
The rights of ownership, use, and transfer of property are part and parcel of the 
contractual model of property rights, and are the foundation of contemporary economic 
thought. A market place transaction between two or more people “specifies a property 
right…in essence, defining what belongs to one actor or group of actors, precisely to 
exclude the public from having rights over that asset” (Haber et al. 2003: 21). Exclusivity 
defines the degree to which contractual rights protect the asset holder from a range of 
externalities, including extra-contractual interference by other individuals, groups, or the 
state.  
Exclusive rights are critical to a modern economy at two, inter-related levels. 
First, exclusive rights are intimately linked to scarcity and value. The interaction of 
supply of and demand for exclusive assets creates the basic pricing regime of any 
economy. Second, exclusive rights affect an owners’ discount rate of the future. A low 
discount rate of the future is critical for any asset to be used as a fixed investment, which 
is the basis of modern economic growth (Bates 1989; Snider 1996). Lacking such 
conditions, the long-term, strategic planning required for significant capital investments 
                                                
34 Others commented on the tension between the two. For a critical assessment of the material, political, 
and social violence created by the invisible hand of the market see: Karl Polanyi. 1944. The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press; Timothy 
Mitchell. 2002. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
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is impossible, and the “hidden architecture of capital,” as De Soto so eloquently puts it, 
ceases to exist (De Soto 2001). 
While the concept of exclusivity is the lynchpin of a definition of strong property 
rights, the way the concept has been framed is possibly the Achilles heel of the 
contractual model. This, for two reasons: first, the broad contractual model frames and 
(reduces) exclusivity as (to) “private property;” second, “exclusivity” is conflated with 
“enforcement.” This unnecessarily blurs the lines between the legal and the real; between 
the de jure and the de facto. As such, the literature focuses on law; and policy 
prescriptions are limited to market or legal reform.  









Alchian and Demsetz use exclusivity to frame their discussion on the strength of 
property rights, commenting that: “The strength with which rights are owned can be 
defined by the extent to which an owner’s decision about how a resource will be used 
actually determines the use” (Alchian and Demsetz 1973: 17). They propose that: “The 
significance of which rights exist can be appreciated by contrasting situations in which 
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understanding strong and weak property rights, the authors create a binary model. 
Individually held, private property reflects strong property rights, whereas collective or 
state ownership: “describes a bundle of rights which include the right to use of a scarce 
resource but fails to include the right…to exclude others from using the resource” (ibid.) 
Figure 2.1 presents a rough approximation of the contractual model’s treatment of 
exclusivity and property rights.  
To be sure, without exclusivity, property can be usurped by anyone, and there are 
no property rights (Bromley 1991; Hafer 2003). But the model, internalized by much of 
the subsequent literature, falls hostage to ideal-types and maxims: variation is binomial 
and rests between instances with property rights and instances with none.35 Normative, 
the sub-argument might read: any restriction on an individual’s ownership, use, or 
transfer of a property is considered an impediment to exclusivity, and without full 
exclusivity, there are no property rights.36  
While it is true that modern economies based on private property empirically 
outperform those with pronounced collective or state-owned holdings (Leblang 1996; 
Levine 2005),37 ex ante, the link between strong property rights and private property is 
indeterminant (Hann 1993; Firmin-Sellers 1995; Hankey, King, Janos 2002; Lanjouw and 
Levy 2002). As the historical and contemporary cases below demonstrate, exclusive 
                                                
35 Possibly, this comes from Alchian’s 1965 normative definition of property rights, which give “particular 
individuals the ‘authority’ to select, for specific goods, any use from an unprohibited class of uses.”  
36 For an analysis on how normative biases of the property rights in the economic literature have created 
distortions in the legal policy arena, see Daniel H. Cole and Peter Z. Grossman. 2002. “The Meaning of 
Property Rights: Law versus Economics?” Land Economics 78(3): 317-330. 
37 The debate on the role of private versus collective property and economic performance is still open for 
“traditional economies.” See Shem Migot-Adholla, Peter Hazel, Benoit Blarel and Frank Place. 1991. 
“Indigenous Land Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?” World Bank 
Economic Review (5): 155-175; Thomas Basset and Donald Crummey, Eds. 1993. Land in African 
Agrarian Systems. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press; and Sarah Gavian and Michael Fafchamps. 
1996. “Land Tenure and Allocative Efficiency in Niger.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
78(2): 460-471. 
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rights may be found in any number of property regimes, whether property is individual 
and private, collective, or state-owned. 
The first case presents an historical situation where a collective property regime 
protected exclusivity better than private property. The sixteenth century Ottoman 
invasion of North Africa sparked property rights change. As the Ottoman Turks displaced 
the Hafsids in Tunisia and a number of rival kingdoms in Algeria, consolidating power 
and land into the the public domain (‘ardh al-bey), titled private property, or melk, 
became subject to political or economically motivated seizure. Unlike melk, land placed 
into religious endowments, or hubus, and which granted usufruct rights to specified 
collective family lineages or religious institututions, retained its legal integrity (and 
exclusive rights conferred to specified beneficiaries to exploit this land). Hénia notes that 
during the first hundred years of Ottoman rule, significant portions of Algerian and 
Tunisian land shifted from the private melk system to the collective hubus system (Hénia 
1999: 357-358), as property owners sought to protect their exclusive rights. The process 
repeated in the mid-nineteenth century, with the arrival of European interests (ibid.)38 
Islamic jurisprudence and religious norms created strong property rights for hubus land, 
while property rights for titled and private melk were weak. Property rights changed as 
externalities modified the calculus of property holders, but in ways unanticipated in the 
contractual model: exclusive rights associated with private / individual holdings were 
weakened while exclusive rights remained strong for religious /collective properties.39  
                                                
38 Discussed later, in Chapter Two, we shall see that the French, unlike the Ottomans, did not respect the 
legal integrity of the hubus property system. 
39 And thus confirming Davis and North’s “colonization as externality” model of property rights change 
(1971). Christelow shows that during this period a rise in land prices led to a proliferation of legal cases 
over land rights in the local courts, confirming North’s argument that property rights also change with 
relative factor prices suddenly shift. Allen Christelow. 1985. Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial 
State in Algeria. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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The cases of Tunisian land grants made during the Beylical (1574-1956) and 
Republican (1957-present) periods reveal strong exclusive rights under a state ownership 
regime. By the mid 17th century, the Ottoman regents had seized and integrated vast 
stretches of land into the public domain. Select parts of this vast holding were distributed 
to key allies in the form of land grants, or iqta. Though still part of the public domain, 
recipients retained exclusive usufruct rights (Hénia 1999). The process is similar to the 
long-term land leases created by Tunisian presidential decree in 1982. In return for 
modest rents, parts of the public domain are leased to farmers who retain exlusive 
production and exploitation rights (Cherif 1999; King 2003). Contrast these relatively 
strong, exclusive rights with contemporary events surrounding the withdrawal of Renault 
and problems Emaar face in Algeria. In Algeria, the state is unable to secure exclusive 
rights to produce and exploit land it currently retains in the Domaine Privé de l’État. 40 
The point is that exclusivity is a private good, meaning that the rights of an 
individual, collective entity, or state to use a property can be excluded from other, non-
defined individuals or entities. Notwithstanding the rare case of the open frontier41 or “the 
commons,”42 exclusivity is a private good in all property regimes, whether private, 
collective, or state-owned.43 Extracting this (normative) position on types of property that 
                                                
40 Following the French model, Algeria and Tunisia have different types of state-owned property: “Domain 
Privé de l’État” and the “Domain Publique de l’État” Property in the former is that over which the state can 
define and transfer exclusive rights to private individuals. In the latter, property is state owned, but the state 
is forbidden, in most cases, to use the property for exclusive purposes.  These properties are considered 
“public property” and must be held and used exclusively for public use.  
41 In North Africa, frontier land was called Mawlat. Before the Ottoman incursion, the land belonged to he 
who worked it. Such land could be appropriated by anyone who could proved to have made substantial 
improvements / investments (crops, building, public works). The Ottoman changed this regime, beginning 
in the 16th century. Henceforth, mawlat belonged to the ardh al-bey (state property). 
42 We are hard pressed even to view the commons as a situation with no exclusivity. The commons are 
generally organized around a local, moral economy, with clearly delineated control over access to shared 
resources. Perhaps only frontier societies reflect situations of zero property rights. See: Elinor Ostrom. 
1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
43 To be sure, Demsetz (1967) hypothesizes three categories of property rights: private, collective, and 
state-owned. He discounts state-owned property from his argument altogether, and spends three pages 
 25 
leads to a dichotomous model, we might schematically view exclusivity along a 
continuum, as in Figure 2.2.  
 










At the right end of the continuum, property rights are strong where there is high 
exclusivity: a defined individual or group has rights excluded to others. Hubus property 
in Ottoman Algeria and Tunisia were highly exclusive, and belonged to a strong property 
rights regime. Conversely, when exclusivity is low, property rights are weak. While 
exclusivity was high for hubus property during the Ottoman era, melk, or private property 
was easily expropriated. Exclusive rights were weak. And, while the contemporary 
Algerian state has strong property rights on paper, its ability to grant Renault a track of 
                                                
proving the natural, if not teleological, evolution from collective property to private property. More 
circumspect, a recent analysis argues: “…with the exception of socialist economies, property rights are first 
and foremost specified in nearly all property rights systems as private goods.” Stephen Haber, Armando 
Razo, and Noel Maurer. 2004. The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, 
and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 21. This tension 
has generated a whole sub-literature on property rights formation over common-pool resources. See 
Olstrom. 
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industrial land was limited by counterclaims from peasants and squatters who had 
occupied the land. Exclusivity is low and property rights are weak. 
The examples used in Figure 2.2, highlight a more important problem to the 
contractual model of property rights. In each of the cases, exclusive rights to the 
ownership, use, and transfer of property are clearly specified by existing legislation. 
Asset holders have full, legal rights to use the property freely, within their specific 
property regime. And yet two of the four cases fall at the weak end of the continuum. 
While a contract, the rules of the market, or the state may legally provide exclusive 
property rights on a particular type of asset, legal and exclusive rights are not always 
enforced. The capacity to enforce the real exclusivity of property rights is the sine qua 
non of a functioning property rights regime, regardless the law, regardless the property 
structure. As the melk property holder in the 16th century discovered, and as Renault 
belatedly realized in 2007, lacking real enforcement mechanisms, legal, exclusive rights 
are only worth their weight in paper. In other words, an asset holder’s exclusive rights to 
a property exist if and only if they are enforced.   
Adam Smith’s invisible hand did not anticipate problems associated with 
exclusivity – exclusivity was assumed, as in the contractual model. Rousseau’s 
pessimistic vision of society was based on the violence associated with exclusivity. 
Continuing on this excursus in political theory, Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right (1821) leads us into the next section, which discusses enforcement. Dividing stages 
of development between family, civil society, and the state,44 Hegel argues that property 
qua property only becomes such as Man appropriates assets outside of the individual, 
family setting; when notions of property value, and property exchange create a 
contractual market. The contractual market defines civil society. Possession and 
                                                
44 Hegel was specifically discussing the scope of Human association. 
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appropriation are not enough to guarantee property rights, however, as Hegel argues that 
a priori, nothing prevents an entrepreneur unilaterally defecting from the terms outlined 
in a contractual operation. The difference, for Hegel, between appropriation, property, 
contracts, and crime is the development of institutions that can adjudicate and enforce 
legally binding decision.45 Hegel called for the state.46  
 
2.3 ENFORCEMENT IN THE CONTRACT V. ENFORCEMENT IN PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The contractual model argues that exclusive rights are private goods, specified 
during the negotiation process between two or more individuals. The contract internalizes 
a range of possibly externalities to protect those exclusive rights, including the 
transaction costs that protect contracting parties from default or theft (Williamson 1985). 
Enforcement of those rights is assumed to be a function of exclusivity, and is not a 
regular point of discussion in the contractual model. From the literature, we can 
nevertheless infer that enforcement occurs via two inter-connected mechanisms: 
informed selection and self-regulation. In the first, private operators, efficient in 
calculating the costs and benefits of a transaction, eschew unfavorable or uncertain 
contractual obligations (Demsetz 1967: 354-358). Here, enforcement mechanisms apply 
before the contract: enforcement is incumbent on the restraint of private operators, who 
foreseeing possible default, desist from engaging in a contractual operation.47 In the 
second, the contract is said to entail some description of how property disputes will be 
                                                
45 Hegel conceived of a police force within civil society, but the substantive legitimacy of the police 
required the state. 
46 Writing in 1840, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon declared: “Property is theft.” Surely he was referring to state 
enforcement of property rights – he later claimed property rights were a liberty that protected the individual 
against the state. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. 1966 [1840]. Qu’est-ce que la propriété: ou Recherches sur le 
principe du droit et du gouverement, premier mémoire. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion; 1997 [1863]. Théorie 
de la propriété. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
47 The economic literature refers to the time and energy spent in informed selection as “bargaining costs.” 
 28 
resolved between the contracting sides. Enforcement is internally regulated by the terms 
of the contract.  




































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   



















       Low                                                       High 
  (Micro-level)                                        (Macro-level) 
  Number of Market Operators 
 
That individual property owners are better able to identify and internalize the 
range of possible externalities that might jeopardize a marketplace exchange than do 
collectivities or the state (Klein and Leffler 1981) is an intuitive argument.48 At the 
micro-level, economic exchanges are frequently repeated between contractors, and 
defectors are easily idenfied. As Hegel anticipated, this assumption is difficult to 
maintain as we move from the individual to the market place / village and state levels. As 
we increasingly add the number of operators in a market, exchanges are more likely to be 
one-shot games and individuals increasingly anonymous: the costs of gathering 
information increase, as shown in Figure 2.3.  
                                                
48 Hence the bias for privatization and private entrepreneurship. 
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At the macro-level, market interactions require more information, lower 
transaction costs, and higher enforceability than the local market can provide (Bates 
1989: 8-9; North 1991; Greif 1993; Firmin-Sellers 1995; Snider 1996). In anonymity, 
characteristic of large markets of scale, the incentives to cheat or defect are greater than 
in small, local markets, where defectors can be easily identified and punished by the 
community.  
Now, imagine the second sub-argument: contracts contain self-regulating 
enforcement mechanisms. At the micro-level, property holders enforce their property 
through private policing mechanisms.49 This is because as property becomes more scarce 
(valuable), so increase the risks of theft. The wrinkle lies in how exchanging parties settle 
disputes once a contract has been signed and the terms of the exchange are violated. Sui 
generis, we are not explained how this is so. The mechanisms are underspecified at the 
micro-level. And barring rare cases of soft persuation, reputation, repeated games or local 
moral economies, it is difficult to see how enforcement can be guaranteed without resort 
to force at the macro-level, characterized by market place anonymity and one-shot games. 
Taken to the extreme, enforcement washes out of the model; at best, it is a second order 
issue (Riker 1988; Riker and Sened 1996).50  
                                                
49 In reverse order, the literature on the commons discusses technological limits and variation social 
organization as limited to explain why some property simply cannot be enforced. For a good overview, see 
Ronald Johnson and Gary D. Liebcap. 1982. “Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the 
Fishery,” American Economic Review 72(5): 1005-1022; Gary Liebcap. 1978. “Economic Variables and 
the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights.” Journal of Economic History. 38(2): 
399-458; and Elinor Ostrom. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
50 Reprint of William H. Riker and Itai Sened. 1991. “A political theory of the origin of property rights: 
airport slots” American Journal of Political Science 35(4): 951-961. In Lee J. Alston, Thráinn Eggertsson, 
and Douglass North, Eds. 1996. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 283-303. 
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Table 2.1 imagines enforcement as a private good at the micro and macro levels. 
The implications are a far cry from the smooth market place transaction so frequently 
imagined in the literature. 






Vigilante justice, violence 
 







Contractual Model of Property Rights: 
persuasion, reputation, et cetera 
 









 Mode of Enforcement 
 
While Adam Smith spoke of the “invisible hand” that regulates market 
interactions, as we move to the aggregate, enforcement more closely approximates the 
violence and power inequalities discussed by Rousseau.51 At the macro-level, the costs of 
enforcement increase, and private enforcement becomes more violent (and thus requiring 
Hegel’s state.)52 Because individual property holders only engage in contracts if they can 
minimize, if not guarantee, that externality costs are less than the anticipated gain of the 
exchange, excessivly high enforcement costs might very well undermine the incentives to 
                                                
51 Rousseau foresaw state violence, as economic interests began to define politics. Suggesting that causal 
pathway should flow in the opposite direction, he called for Man to organize in small, restrained 
communities, where civil society would control the individualistic temptations of the large economic 
entrepreneur. Hegel, on the other hand, viewed civil society (based on the contractual negotiation) as 
chaotic, and possibly violent. Only the state could civilize civil society by imposing law. For an excellent 
summary of these contrasting positions, see: Yoav Peled. 1980. “Rousseau’s Inhibited Radicalism: An 
Analysis of His Political Thought in Light of His Economic Ideas.” American Political Science Review. 
74(4): 1034-1045; and Paul Thomas. 2003. “Property’s Properties: From Hegel to Locke.” Representations. 
84(Autumn): 30-43. 
52 For a case study of this in Egypt, see Part III in Timothy Mitchell. Rule of Experts. 
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engage in contractual exchange altogether.53 The analytical slide is revealed: individuals 
(and thus private property holders) might be better at internalizing externalities at the 
local-level, but the link between the anticipation of externalities in a contract and 
guaranteed exclusivity of that contract (enforcement) is indeterminant. 
Property rights qua property rights form in the aggregate: the multiplicity of 
micro-level contracts define the broad contours of property rights in a given market or 
state (Demsetz 1967: 354-359; Alchian and Demsetz 1973: 22-27). The mechanisms by 
which the micro-level processes transfer into the aggregate, macro-level, are not clearly 
defined. The contractual logic works if and only if we can hold constant assumptions that 
the costs of guaranteeing exclusity can be internalized as a private good at both the 
micro and macro-level at more or less the same costs. By relaxing those assumptions, the 
model begins to falls apart: What if, at the macro-level, information is more scarce or if 
exclusive benefits are more difficult to guarantee? Put differently, what, if as Libecap 
suggests, as the benefits of exclusivity over an asset increase, so does ownership 
uncertainty (Libecap 1996: 58)?54  
Both Hegel and Rousseau rejected Smith’s “invisible hand.” As property becomes 
scarce, its value increases. In tandem, the incentives for market place defection increase. 
Neither believed that enforcement could be retained as a private good at the macro level, 
because neither viewed the costs of individual enforcement in terms of time or money, 
but rather in aggregate costs to society engendered by the increase of violence. Ever 
pessimistic, Rousseau feared monied interests would lobby for state violence to protect 
                                                
53 Hence, extremely high costs of exclusion are said to lead to communal or collective property.  
54 Reprint of Gary D. Libecap. 1978. “Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: the Case of 
Western Mineral Rights” Journal of Economic History 38(2): 399-458. In Lee J. Alston, Thráinn 
Eggertsson, and Douglass North, Eds. 1996. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 34-58. Interestingly, such a scenario is exactly what Alchian and Demsetz 
argue will trigger the switch from a communal structure of property rights to a private structure (1973: 24). 
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their property, to the detriment of society’s well-being. Thus he called for a return to 
small village life, organized around the moral economy.55 Hegel sensed that alone, civil 
society – that aggregate of economic entrepreneurs – would be unable to organize the 
enforcement of exclusive property rights, leading to violence in the absence of the state.56 
Writing more than a century before Rousseau and Hegel, Thomas Hobbes (1651) had 
already anticipated the following section: demand-side and supply-side models of 
property rights.57  
 
2.4 ENFORCEMENT IN DEMAND AND SUPPLY-SIDE MODELS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The base-line contractual model is attractive, at least in those rare cases marked 
by the absence of state and society. As one scholar puts it, the contractual theory of 
property rights is “useful for making broad generalizations about changes in property 
rights institutions in prehistoric times” (Eggertson 1990: 254). But markets rarely exist on 
their own: they are created by the state at the behest of or to protect society (Hobbes 
1651; Rousseau 1775; Hegel 1821; Polanyi 1944). When we move up the level of 
analysis from individual to group to state, from primitive to modern markets, transaction 
costs on enforcement increase and the self-enforcement mechanism is more difficult to 
maintain, necessitating local or state institutions.  
Variations from the contractual model, demand and supply-side models attempt to 
account for the political role state and society play in the transformative process. They 
argue that enforcement is a private good at the micro-level. As transaction costs increase 
                                                
55 Rousseau probably imagined something similar to the moral economy of Berber villages in the High 
Atlas Mountains, as described by Geertz, Geertz and Rosen. See: Clifford Geertz, Mildred Geertz, and 
Lawrence Rosen. 1979. Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
56 Civil society could police or create a police force as an instrument. The state would keep police in check 
as an ethical third-party enforcer. 
57 In Hegel’s terms, demand was the police, supplied by the state. 
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to a point that private enforcement becomes more costly than the anticipated benefit: 1) 
individuals will lobby the state for public enforcement of property rights (Posner and 
Ehrlich 1974; Libecap 1978; Libecap and Wiggens 1985; Posner 1987; De Soto 2000); or 
2) the state will seek to enforce property rights as a public good to ensure long-term 
business and economic interests (North and Thomas 1970; Davis and North 1971).58  
 
2.4.1 Demand-Side Political Economic Models 
The demand-side school closely follows Alchian and Demsetz’ original claim that 
property rights are the aggregate of individual contracts: either individuals work out 
enforcement issues via informed selection and self-regulated private contracts, or they 
lobby the state to protect their property (Demsetz 1982: 7; Eggertson 1990: 276; Riker 
and Sened 1996: 285). While often interest groups do lobby for property rights, early 
demand-side models (pluralist) were confronted with an empirical anomaly: aggregate 
demand is rarely the supplied outcome. Were this the case, post-colonial property rights 
changes in Algerian and Tunisia would have reflected the contractual patterns of 
smallholding peasantry, which numerically dominated the landholder category at 
independence.59  
More sophisticated demand-side models (interest group / rent seeking) argue that 
in some instances, tight-knit, well-organized interest groups lobby for and win specific 
property rights not on par with the prevailing demand (Olson 1965; Tullock 1967; Stigler 
                                                
58 Noteworthy is how both variations dovetail with Marxian and neo-Marxian thought. See: Robert 
Brenner’s Marxian analysis, namely that property reflects class interests. 1976. “Agrarian Class Structure 
and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe,” Past and Present 70(Feb): 31. Nico Poulantzas 
argues that the state will intervene into economic affairs in ways incongruent with its economic allies if 
only to ensure their long-term political and economic viability. 1973. Political Power and Social Classes. 
London: New Left Books. 
59 Smallholders (1-10 hectares of land) represented 70 percent of landowners in Algeria in 1962; 73.2 
percent in Tunisia. André Tiano. Le Maghreb entre les mythes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France: 281. 
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1971; Krueger 1974; Buchanan et al. 1980; Olson 1982; Tollison 1982; Benson 1984). 
Though publicly enforced goods, property rights often reflect specific, not aggregate 
demand.60 Gaps between micro-level demand and legislative output are a residual 
outcome or transaction costs inherent in the shift from private to public goods.61 Less 
efficient than individual contracts, lobbying and legislation permit property rights in 
cases where private enforcement is too costly for the individual asset holder to assume 
(Benson 1984: 389; Levi 1988: 44).62  
Now, let us relax our assumptions that macro level enforcement is always a public 
good. What if enforcement remains a private good? Neither the naïve nor the 
sophisticated variants of the demand-side model of property rights can explain in its own 
terms how or why property rights enforcement shift from private to public goods and not 
from private to private goods. 
Table 2.2 illustrates this point. It presents four stylized cases that imagine 
property rights as public or private goods at two levels of analysis. Cell One characterizes 
the interest group / rent-seeking models (sophisticated model): the state enforces property 
rights as a public good. Cell Two is a null hypothesis: strictly speaking, individual 
                                                
60 Or for that matter, the rational allocation of resources.  Douglass North outlines this in his discussion on 
the Technical Production Frontier. He explains that a given state has a limited stock of knowledge and 
endowment of resources, which condition the technical, or optimal, production frontier. States rarely reach 
this ideal because rulers are forced to choose from a set of feasible organizations that minimize costs and 
maximize output. These institutions depend on the political structure, and curtail production to what he 
calls the structural, or real, production frontier. When the technical and structural production frontiers 
approximate each other, a vibrant economy manifests. Douglass C. North. 1979. “A Framework for 
Analyzing the State in Economic History.” Explorations in Economic History. 16(July): 249-259; 1981. 
Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton. 
61 In other words, while the lobbying process leads to property rights enforcement as a public good, those 
property rights reflect specific economic interests that disproportionately favor certain groups that are able 
to participate in the lobbying process. 
62 Similarly, were small, concentrated groups with economic power always able to capture the state policy 
making process, we would have expected post-colonial property rights to large landholders to have asserted 
their claims. At independence, four percent of Algerian landowners concentrated 38.5 percent of the land; 
in Tunisia 4.2 percent of landowners had 40 percent of the land. Tiano, op. cit: 281. 
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property holders do not enforce contractual agreements between other individuals.63 The 
core contractual model (naïve model) sets in Cell Three. Enforcement is a private good, 
incumbent on the asset holder operating in a micro-market. According to both naïve and 
sophisticated models of property rights, as value and insecurity increase, enforcement 
mechanisms transfer from the individual in Cell Three to the state in Cell One. Since the 
models offer very little in terms of a road map on how property rights enforcement shifts 
from a private to a public good, an equally valid possibility is that enforcement transfers 
from Cell Three to Cell Four.  
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Indeed, there are many cases in which governments choose to enforce property 
rights as a private good to key groups (Bayard 1989; Knight 1992; Riker 1996; Hibou 
1999; Henry and Springborg 2001; Haber, et al. 2003: 21-22), or situations where the 
state simply cannot enforce its own property rights. These problems are precisely linked 
                                                
63 Hegel and Rousseau agree with this statement, though for Hegel the solution is the state. Rousseau fears 
enforcement would be a private good at the macro level, and that the only check on man is through the 
moral economy, possible only in small communities. 
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with economic liberalization in regimes that Henry and Springborg call “Bunker States” 
(Henry and Springborg 2001: 99-133).64 Cells One and Four reflect the ideal-types of 
possible political economies, if not regime-types unanticipated by the contractual 
model.65  
The implications of private enforcement at the macro level are model-disruptive. 
Naïve and sophisticated demand-side models assume supply based on demand. In 
tandem, they assume enforcement of property rights as a public good at the macro-level. 
Standing alone, the demand-side models extract the state, and in the process make a 
double assumption: 1) enforcement is guaranteed as a functioning contract, a writ, a law; 
2) the lobbying process is the transmission belt between the micro and macro levels. 
Without a discussion of the state, however, pluralist arguments are indeterminate. 
Lacking the tools to explain the mechanisms by which property rights transfer from the 
micro to the macro-level, we cannot assume that property rights come uniquely from the 
consumer market, nor can we account for the “brown areas” that take up so much space 
in developing states. Conceptually speaking, the literature jumps the issue.66  
 
2.4.2 Creating Public Goods: The State in Supply-Side Models 
Placing a central focus on the state,67 supply-side models explain provision and 
enforcement of property rights. States “implement and enforce property rights and other 
                                                
64 Another political economic regime-type they discuss, “Bully Praetorian States” seem to fit close to the 
border of Cells One and Four, though clearly located in Cell One (134-167, especially 161-167). 
65 Cells One and Four also correspond with Michael Mann’s two types of power: despotic and 
infrastructural. Michael Mann. 1986.  The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
66 But in doing so, we miss the point, as summed by Henry and Springborg: “Reform is highly problematic 
in bunker regimes because economic liberalization requires a change in political system” (2001: 121). 
Lacking political reform, they argue, “Most economic reforms of bunker regimes appear to be hollow 
exercises” (ibid. 132). 
67 The literature uses the term “state” in three ways: as an entity in the international system; as an entity 
separate from society; or as a playing field or arena. Focused on the macro-level, property rights literature 
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formal rules, including the rules concerning the extraction of revenue” (Levi 1988: 1). 
Though states sometimes provide property rights in response to lobbying, they can also 
redefine economic institutions in conflict with the polity’s most important economic 
forces (Krasner 1979; Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol 1985; Riker and Sened 1996), 
for ideological reasons (North 1981; Joireman 2000), or when demand is underdeveloped 
or disarticulated.68 In this sense, supply-side models broadly follow the state autonomy 
debate in international relations and comparative politics (Poulantzas 1973; Krasner 
1978, Skocpol 1979).  
Property rights scholars working in the New Institutionalism framework sidestep 
the debate, however, by disaggregating the state into ruler, field, and institutions, with 
corresponding base-line assumptions on the origins and enforcement of property rights.  
First, “rulers rule” (Levi 1988: 1). Rulers seek the continuity and extension of 
power and build states as instruments of coercion and deterrence. States are financed by 
taxes and tribute (Davis and North 1971; North 1979: 252; Levi 1988: 3). Rulers create 
property rights to encourage revenue-generating activities that finance the state, while 
sending credible commitments to producers by defining the limits of expropriations.69 
                                                
employs all three. Property rights scholars approach the problem by alternating between the terms “rulers” 
and “states.” Levi’s proposition that “Rulers rule” (1989: 1) is emblematic of this approach: rulers use 
states (the state apparatus) to rule and to defend their turf from poaching by neighbors or domestic-level 
opposition. 
68 A problem with sophisticated demand-side models is the assumption of organized economic interests 
with political scope. In much of the developing world, colonization precluded the formation of gelled 
indigenous economic interests. Post independence economic elites were formed by and in many cases a 
part of the state elite. See: Catherine Boone. 1992. Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in 
Senegal, 1930-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1994. “State and Ruling Classes in 
Postcolonial Africa: the Enduring Contradictions of Power,” in Migdal, Kohli and Shue, Eds. State Power 
and Social Forces. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 108-140. 
69 In this sense, the state and property rights are part and parcel of the same project: maintaining power. 
Perhaps leaning too much on Thomas Hobbes, one author claims that the US Constitution is simply a 
property rights contract. See: Forrest McDonald. 1986. Novus Ordo Seclorum: the Intellectual Origins of 
the Constitution. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.  
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Second, rulers are constrained in how much they can appropriate: property rights 
and taxation reflect the ruler’s relative bargaining power vis-à-vis other groups within the 
polity (North 1979, 1981, 1990; Levi 1988; Bates 1987). This is because “as both third 
party to every contract and the ultimate source of coersion, the state becomes the field on 
which the battle for control of its decision-making is fought” (North 1979: 252).70  
North refers to the time and political energy spent on negotiations between the 
ruler and constituent as political transaction costs (North 1990: 52).71 Political transaction 
costs often run high: rulers cannot afford to alienate key constituencies. To hedge their 
bets, rulers “act like a discriminating monopolist, separating each group of constituents 
and devising property rights for each so as to maximize state revenue” (North 1979: 252). 
When the ruler is faced with powerful rivals that can provide the same services as the 
state, property rights enforcement might be expected to congruent with the demands of 
the ruler’s constituents (North 1979: 255, 1990; Levi 1988: 11-12). When the ruler has 
few rivals, “[r]ulers  will seek to control the supply of resources or by eliminating rival 
suppliers” (Levi 1988: 12, 19).72 Property rights regimes reflect political transaction 
costs. Indeed, they are the institutional outcome of these distributive battles (Knight 
1992; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). 
Third, specific property rights institutions are devised to minimize enforcement 
costs. Transaction costs associated with contractual exchange also apply to rulers seeking 
                                                
70 North’s argument is congruent with much of the state-society relationship literature on the developing 
world, where different levels of the state are arena where battles for access to state wealth are fought. See: 
Atul Kohli. 1990. Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. And Catherine Boone, op. cit. 
71 In the contractual model, these are “bargaining costs.” 
72 This seems to be congruent with Henry and Springborg’s classification of the political economies in 
contemporary Arab states, characterizing, respectively, “Globalizing Monarchies,” “Bully Praetorian 
States,” and “Bunker States.” In the former two, rudimentary social forces force the regime to compromise. 
The authors use Algeria as an extreme example of the latter, where the state has virtually no political or 
societal competition. 
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to extract revenue, and include the costs of information, measurement, monitoring, as 
well as the costs of applying sanctions and reward for compliance and defection (North 
and Thomas 1970; Anderson and Hill 1975; Demsetz 1976; North 1981). Rulers design 
property rights institutions to hedge on transaction costs (North 1979, 1981; Levi 1988; 
Haber et al. 2003). Property rights institutions minimize contractual transaction costs 
within the range of politically feasible options defined during negotiations between the 
ruler and constituents. This range is not always congruent with maximizing returns: 
choice-sets are limited and institutional outcomes sometimes produce sub-par results.  
Emphasizing the primacy of the state, the area-field and institutional tacks of 
state-centric models of property rights explain in their own terms the macro-side of Table 
2.2. Where a ruler is constrained by groups that compete for power, property rights are 
likely to be enforced as a public good, and taxation moderate, reflected in Cell One.73 
When the ruler stands alone in power, threatened by few, the state is likely to be 
predatory.74 In such instances, property rights enforcement is a private or semi-private 
                                                
73 North argues just this: “The basic set of services that the state would provide are the underlying rules of 
the game. Whether evolving as a body of unwritten customs (as the feudal manor) or as a written 
constitution, they have a twofold objective. (1) They are designed to specify the fundamental rules of 
competition and cooperation which will provide a structure of property rights (i.e., specify the ownership 
structure in both factor and product markets. (2) Within the framework of the first objective, they are 
designed to reduce transaction costs in order to foster maximum output of the society and, therefore, 
increase tax revenue accruing to the state. This second objective will result in the provision of a set of 
public (or semipublic) goods and services designed to lower the cost of specifying, negotiating, and 
enforcing contracts, which underlie economic exchange.” Douglass C. North. 1981, op. cit.: 24. 
74 In some cases, the ruler might enforce property rights as a private good to a small groups of key allies. 
Here, we approximate what Chehabi and Linz dub at “sultanistic regime:” Sultanistic regimes are “based 
on personal rulership, but loyalty to the ruler is motivated not by his embodying or articulating an ideology, 
nor by a unique personal mission, nor by any charismatic qualities, but by a mixture of fear and rewards to 
his collaborators. The ruler exercises his power without restraint or by any commitment to an ideology or 
value system” (7). “”The personalistic use of power for essentially private ends of the ruler and his 
collaboration means that the country is run like a huge domain. The boundaries between public treasury and 
the private wealth of the ruler become blurred” (22). H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz. 1998. Sultanistic 
Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univesity Press. Henry and Springborg paint a similar picture in their 
discussion on Bunker states: “In these patrimonial regimes private property is not secure from the whims of 
arbitrary rulers.” Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg. 2001, op. cit.: 11. 
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good,75 possibly reflecting Cell Four. Though useful in explaining the conditions that 
distinguish Cells One and Four in Table 2.2, most supply-side models still ignore the 
transition from the micro-level to the macro level. The state as arena models lay out the 
grand contours of property rights in a given polity, whereas institutionalist approaches 
that focus on how institutional choice contours the principal-agent problem only discuss 
in-cell variation (again, referring to Table 2.2).  
The problem is a question of approach. Supply-driven theoretical discussions 
focus either on those primitive societies from prehistoric times or polities exhibiting clear 
characteristics of stateness. Put differently, they focus on property rights either before the 
creation of the state, or after. Failing to look at state formation and property rights from a 
truly evolutionary perspective, however, leads analysis to miss important questions.76 
North’s exploration of property rights formation in the Zambian village, and the 
suq and caravan trade in the High and Middle Moroccan Atlas is exemplary of the first 
tendency (North 1991).77 Explaining why property rights have not taken root as publicly 
enforced goods in the cases, North proposes: 1) resistance from tribal institutions; 2) lack 
of a legal structure and court system as well as underpinning political institutions; 3) lack 
                                                
75 Here, we might imagine certain ethnic, racial, or religious groups that are the sole beneficiaries of or 
excluded from property rights enforcement. Alternatively, we might imagine a thoroughly porous 
administration, where enforcement occurs only via personal relations. Henry and Springborg comment that 
both scenarios are characteristic of “Bunker States.” Henry and Springborg 2001: 99. 
76  Trebilcock and Leng’s extensive review of the literature on enforcement and development is a 
noteworthy example of this tendency. Instead of looking to explain why property rights are weak, or why 
they are not enforced, they examine a series of cases in property rights without a state, or within an existing 
system. They comment: “While, for many commentators, contract enforcement problems and, more 
generally, a lack of functioning legal institutions have become important factors in explaining differences 
in the performance of various developing and transition economies, it has been widely recognized that it 
takes time for these economies to develop such legal traditions. During this transition period, informal 
mechanisms may fill some gaps and permit some markets to function.” Michael Trebilcock and Jing Leng. 
2006. “The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development.” Virginia Law 
Review. 92(7): 1543. 
77 Taken from: Elizabeth Colson. 1974. Traditions and Contrast: the Problem of Order. Chicago: Adeline 
Publishing; and Clifford Geertz, Hildred Geertz, and Lawrence Rosen. 1979. Meaning and Order in 
Moroccan Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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of military muscle and political structure (ibid: 103-104). Property rights are privately 
enforced (or at best part of a moral economy) in these micro-societies because the state 
does not exist.78 
Levi’s discussion on variation in English and French taxation and property rights 
in late Medieval Europe (Levi 1988: 95-121) presents a macro-level approach that holds 
institutions as fixed. Levi argues that institutional arrangements explain why English 
monarchs governed more effectively and efficiently than their more powerful Parisian 
rivals. The English taxation system worked better: English institutions had lower 
transaction costs, and English rulers were constrained by a more unruly domestic 
opposition that had real institutional power in a centralized parliament (ibid: 120-121). 
We might imagine the 17th century English system located somewhere between Cells One 
and Four in Table 2.2, whereas the French system lies squarely in Cell Four. Levi argues 
that French rulers did not mimic the English system, in part because they did not want to 
run the risk of creating a centralized opposition, which would affect the ruler’s relative 
bargaining power (ibid: 121).  
Levi’s assertion begs the question of why English rulers allowed a central 
parliament to be created from the outset. Here, and elsewhere in her book, Levi notes that 
relative bargaining power might be rooted in society, hinting: “the economic structure 
inhibited collective action and collective interests” (ibid: 120). For Levi, the type of 
social and economic organization in a polity has a crucial impact on the key variable of 
her “Theory of Predatory Rule” – relative bargaining power (ibid: 10-40, especially 20-
21). These variables are underplayed, however, as she begins her analysis with extant 
institutions. Levi self-consciously notes that “[t]he theory of predatory rule is initially an 
                                                
78 Elsewhere, North attributes the under-development of state enforced property rights to the lack of 
economies of scale. Douglass C. North. 1991. “Institutions.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 5(1): 
97-112. 
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exercise in comparative statics” (ibid: 17). As such, she is more interested in “the 
consequences of incremental changes in the contract over the life of the contract” (ibid.) 
Levi’s tack does not gain purchase on the question of how property rights shift from 
micro-level, privately enforced goods to public goods at the macro-level: with Levi, we 
look only at variation in the macro-level regimes.79  
 
While demand-side models can explain how groups frequently intervene and 
distort decision-making processes,80 they fall short of explaining enforcement because 
they extract the state in exchange for parsimony. Demand is outcome and outcome is 
applied. The state is assumed.  
Supply-side models hold the state as a fixed entity, providing institutional snap-
shots at T1, T2, and T3. The method gives good analytical purchase on how existing state 
and property rights institutions channel decision-making processes through incentives or 
dissuasion, as well as primary discussion on state capacity. However, approaches that use 
comparative statics do not generate insight into the processes by which enforcement 
shifts from the micro to the macro level. Rather, they explore property rights as 
phenomena supplied by society at the micro-level and extracted from the state, or are tied 
to the state once its administrative capacities are set in place. As Catherine Boone puts it, 
“[a]nalysis that started from a given set of institutional parameters [are] hard pressed to 
explain where the parameters [come] from in the first place” (Boone 2003: 17). 
                                                
79 Katheryn Firmin-Sellers concludes her 1995 essay with a foray into this critique. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers. 
1995. “The Politics of Property Rights.” The American Political Science Review. 89(4): 878-879. 
Subsequent writings, however, take institutions as a given by focusing on the import of the colonial state in 
post-colonial property rights development. 2000. “Institutions, Context, and Outcomes: Explaining French 
and British Rule in West Africa.” Comparative Politics. 32(3): 253-272. And 2001. “The Reconstruction of 
Society: Understanding the Indigenous Response to French and British Rule in Cameroun.” Comparative 
Politics 34(1): 43-62. For an excellent critique on this perspective, see Catherine Boone. 2003. Political 
Topographies of the African State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 14-16. 
80 For an excellent overview and original wrinkle on the literature, see Joel S. Hellman. 1998. “Winners 
Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions.” World Politics. 50(2): 203-234. 
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2.5 COLONIALISM, STATE BUILDING AND TIME: LOCAL-NATIONAL TENSIONS AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
More than thirty years ago, Stephen Krasner claimed: “discussion in which the 
state stands against both external and internal opponents has its historical antecedents in 
the writings of the early analysts of state-building” (Krasner 1979: 79). State building 
processes create the political and economic institutional networks that frame 
administrative institutions and develop norms of interaction between state and citizen / 
subject (Nettl 1968; Tilly 1975; Skocpol 1979; Mann 1986; Migdal 1988; Charrad 2001). 
Territorial consolidation, centralization, and the monopolization of enforcement are 
interrelated components of the state building process (Tilly 1975: 27).  
State building it a temporal process. We are taught to understand state building 
processes over the longue durée, and in ordered stages: 1) territorial consolidation; 2) 
centralization and 3) enforcement. States can enforce their laws once there is a 
centralized and efficient administration, which itself is slowly developed in order to 
consolidate territory. Unlike Western nations, where state building processes took 
centuries, prolonged periods of European colonization re-wired local political economies 
to benefit the metropolis and subverted local authority. Societies that gained 
independence during the last wave of decolonization were forced into accelerated and 
often blurred state building processes that have lasted less than half a century.  
Colonial and sovereign interests needed to be untangled at independence. 
National efforts to control territory, centralization, and the monopoly of enforcement 
directly implicate local elites. Negotiations between the national and local elites over how 
new institutions would rewire antecedent local privileges were highly charged battles 
(Boone 2003). As Mounira Charrad notes: “There is a direct conflict between local 
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solidarities based on primordial ties…and a nation-state. Each institution requires the 
loyalty of its members. Each involves mutually exclusive definitions of what the 
maximum political unit ought to be” (Charrad 2001: 19). It is through these state building 
battles that the parameters of new national and local institutions are created; that 
enforcement shifts from the micro- to the macro-level; from local to national control; that 
policy can be enforced downward.  
 
2.5.1 Colonial Experiences and Institutional Choice-Sets 
When state institutions are projected into spaces previously unoccupied or attempt 
to expand of existing institutions, they necessarily encounter resistance. The state’s 
relationship with local strong men, village elders, labor union activists, religious leaders 
or even the simple citizen condition its non-coercive ability to project itself into and 
extract from society. The ability to enforce law at both the national and the local-level is 
dependent on the ability of the state to coerce, co-opt, or socialize local elites and extant 
social institutions into the larger corps politique. Where state-society relationships are 
underdeveloped, the state’s effectiveness and capacity to enforce its own rules is limited 
(Migdal 1988; Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994). 
In Algeria and Tunisia, the state did not exist at independence: the nationalist 
movement negotiated independence and created the post-colonial state (Moore 1965; 
Harbi 1980). Ironically, colonial experiences shaped the national movement (Moore 
1970; Henry 1999; Henry and Springborg 2001).81 In Algeria, settler colonialism 
precluded the development of a mass-mobilizing nationalist political party that the post-
colonial ruling elite could rely upon when building state institutions. Independence was 
fought in the maquis or diplomatic circles abroad. Nationalist elites were extremely 
                                                
81 Clement Henry refers to this as the Colonial Dialectic. 
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divided, and a mass-movement never existed.82 Operating under a more liberal system, 
nationalists in the Tunisian Protectorate founded the Neo-Destour party in 1934 and 
would use it to mobilize the masses for independence and as a crutch during the state 
building era.  
Backed by a mass-mobilizing party with deep inroads into society, the new 
Tunisian regime had a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis local elites. In many areas, the 
local notable and party chief was the same person (Moore 1963: 534). Where they were 
not, the local party branch fought the regime’s proxy battles (Rudebeck 1967). With party 
organization at the local, regional, and national level in place, the post-colonial regime 
was able to organize national and municipal council elections within two years of 
independence. Local and national candidates for these institutions were tried and tested 
party officials. The transfer of power at the national-level and authority at the local was 
smooth.  
Lacking a significant party structure, the post-colonial Algerian regime took 
seven years to organize local representative and party institutions and another 17 years to 
create their national equivalent. Regime origins were chaotic: within a week of Algerian 
independence, the leadership of the nationalist movement entered into a civil war. The 
military seized power and sidelined the political elite, effectively decapitating the already 
disorganized nationalist movement (Quandt 1969; Jackson 1977; Harbi 1980). The new 
regime attempted to by-pass the headache of integrating untested local elite into the new 
system and ruled the provinces by fiat until 1967, when rural instability forced it to hold 
local elections (Leca and Vatin 1975).83 But because the military regime de-activated the 
                                                
82 Except perhaps in France, where the General Union of Muslim Algerian Students (UGEMA, Union 
Générale d’Étudiants Musulmans d’Algérie) and the FLN Fédératon de France were very active. See: Ali 
Haroun. 1986 La 7ème Wilaya: La guerre du FLN en France, 1954-1962. Paris: Éditions le Seuil; and 
Clement M. Henry. 2010. L’UGEMA (1955-1962): Témoignages. Algiers: Casbah Editions. 
83 Regional Assembly elections were organized in 1969. 
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party when it seized power in 1962, in 1967 it was forced to organize local party 
organizations and elections virtually in tandem. National assembly elections and party 
organization would not occur until 1977 and 1979 respectively. In Algeria, the transfer of 
power at the national-level and authority at the local level was anything but rational. 
Table 2.3 Comparative Colonial Outcomes 
 Algeria Tunisia 
Population, 1956 9,962,000 3,783,000 
Nat’l. Party Found; 







15-30,000 = 0.15-0.3% pop. 
(1956) 




80,000 = 0.8% pop. 
(1956) 









Concent.: 10-50 ha 
26% Landowners, 43% SAU 
(1950-1951) 
32.6% Landowners, 32.6% SAU 
(1960-1961) 
Indigenous Land 
Concent: > 50 ha 
4% Landowners, 38.5% SAU 
(1950-1951) 
4.2% Landowners, 40% SAU 
(1960-1961) 
Urban population, 
Towns > 10,000 
20.4% 
(1956) 
26.6% in towns 
(1956) 





Figures taken from Attia 1966: 20; Tiano 1967: 281; Moore 1970: 84; and Zartman 1973: 495-
496, 503; and Lamchichi 1991: 41. 
 
2.5.2 Layering Institutional Development: Incentives and Principal-Agent Problems 
The relationship between local elites and the state in the post-colonial has been 
shaped by the success or relative failure of de-concentrated representative and party 
institutions to function as top-bottom and bottom-up interest articulation corridors. As 
discussed in Part 2.4, institutional outcomes do not automatically reflect the capacity to 
enforce property rights (or any other kind of policy) on the ground. Institutional layers 
sometimes conflict. Critics of the state-centered approaches to politics argue just that 
when they claim: “states must be disaggregated” (Migdal, Kohli, Shue 1994: 3). In the 
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developing world state capacity to implement policy frequently erodes vertically and (or) 
horizontally: as one moves down the administrative hierarchy and away from political 
and administrative power centers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Jensen 1983; Moe 1984; Levi 1988) and (or) the further one moves from the 
capital city and into the periphery (Migdal 1988; Firmin-Sellers 2000, 2001; Whiting 
2000; Boone 2003; Olivier de Sardan and Tidjani Alou 2009). Absenteeism, rent seeking, 
corruption, and obstructionism are behaviors common to decentralized state agents, local 
politicians and notables who wish to re-wire policy to protect embedded interests or seek 
personal gain through “triangles of accommodation” (Migdal 1988). Such is the case in 
Algeria. 
By disaggregating the state beyond the field or arena into different institutional 
layers, New Institutionalism engages these critiques, and provides a method by which we 
can understand human agency (Whiting 2000:15-18). Institutions are “the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North 1990: 3). Institutions channel individual behavior though constraint 
and incentives. Institutions do not guarantee enforcement. Rather they shape the incentive 
set of agents working within them.  
When working with multiple layers of state institutions, enforcement can become 
quite complex: there are as many incentive sets as there are institutional layers (Fan, Lin, 
Treisman 2008). The most poignant example affecting policy enforcement is the 
principal-agent dilemma (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1983; Moe 1984). Local and 
national actors try to maintain, if not expand their authority. Toward this goal, for 
example, rulers promote property rights to maximize fiscal extraction and rely on local 
agents to enforce their decisions. Agents are the set of officials and bureaucrats – in the 
case of Algeria and Tunisia, mayors and local party bigwigs – who measure, monitor, and 
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enforce policy on the ground. They are the ruler’s immediate or distant interlocutors, 
have intimate knowledge of society, and are conferred great power over the inflow of 
revenue. A priori, there is no reason to believe local agents will agree that extracting 
revenue for the ruler is the best strategy to maintain or expand their own power, hence the 
principal-agent dilemma that affects the capacity of states to enforce property rights or 
other types of policy on the ground.  
Party and institutional rules and administrative procedures hedge against cheating 
agents by providing positive feedback incentives for compliance (Thelen 1999; Pierson 
2000a, 2000b; Mahoney 2000; Cai and Treisman 2007) and by implementing the 
mechanisms of dissuasion. When positive incentives outweigh the possible range of 
disincentives, we can expect collaboration with the principal, and strong enforcement of 
property rights on the ground. In many developing states, however, rulers focus on 
dissuasion and punishment, expending great amounts of time and energy trying to 
monitor agents by developing competing layers of bureaucratic oversight. Firmin-Sellers 
(2000, 2001) and Whiting (2000) show that attempts to monitor agents with strictly 
negative mechanisms result in more shirking and cheating. Under such conditions, 
property rights enforcement is weak.  
Vertical political mobility opportunities within representative or party institutions 
are a strong positive incentive for local actors (Prendergrast 1993; Gibbons 2005). In 
addition to increased salaries with increased authority, in developing states, material 
accumulation opportunities often increase as the distance from the nodes of access to 
distribution decreases. Power also generates positive feedback (Pierson 2000a: 77) and 
accrues the higher one travels up the ladder.  
Agents with low vertical mobility opportunities or other positive incentives seek 
out other forms of reward, such as stature, private accumulation strategies, or both. 
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Seeking stature, agents embed themselves in the local political arena and informal 
institutions, seeking patrons and clients. As patrons/clients, they use their political 
position to distribute/receive first- and second-order resources (Lemarchand 1972). The 
gains of having a local patron in public office can at times be politically beneficial for a 
principal, and can off-set headaches caused by the principal-agent problem – if at a 
higher level the agent-cum-principal remains an agent. Agents that become clients, 
however, embrace local political norms (Tuene 1980; Brower and Abolofia 1997), and 
prioritize their patron’s interests before those of the state or party. 
In addition to personal motivation, social motivation too conditions the principal-
agent problem. Regular communication and socialization reduces agency costs (Arrow 
1975; Green and Laffont 1977; Poitevin 2000) by building common bonds, trust, and 
legitimacy (Putnam 1993; 2000; 2003; Nugent 1994; Fukuyama 1995) between principal 
and agent. Running parallel with and implicated in state administration, parties are 
political intermediaries that facilitate trust-building measures between local and national 
elites (Riker 1965; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007). In the Maghreb, the availability 
of colonial-era mass-mobilization nationalist parties affected both the choice-sets of post-
independence elite deciding which institutions to create and when, as well as the ability 
to coordinate with the bottom once institutions were in place (Henry and Springborg 
2001; Henry 2004). 
In Tunisia, local representatives and party officials participated in national policy 
initiatives. In addition to twenty-two years of political sociability during the Protectorate 
(Moore 1965: 8-40), vertical mobility opportunities to move up party and representative 
institutions were positive incentives to induce local elite to collaborate with the regime.84 
                                                
84 For example, 63 (26%) of the 242 candidates for the 1975 National Assembly were mayors, while 137 
(56%) were elected members of regional party Federations. Michel Camau, Fadila Amrani and Rafâa Ben 
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While promoting advancement opportunities to local party cadres, relatively strong party 
and state institutions kept a close eye on politics at the base. Personal material 
accumulation was frowned upon, and the regime took big steps in the years immediately 
following independence to control the distribution points of colonial booty (Moore 1965: 
127, 140-142). Local party and elected officials took their cue from the regime.  
In Algeria, local representatives and party officials had neither positive incentives, 
nor a strong party organization to encourage participation in the decolonization project. 
The lack of a mass-mobilizing party and the sequencing of vertical political integration 
encouraged political localism. Local party organization only began in earnest in 1966 in 
anticipation for municipal elections a year later. The FLN was a dysfunctional party with 
no base from 1962 to 1965; and a segmented base with no center from 1967 until a party 
congress was organized in 1979. While local representatives were also low-level party 
officials, the single-party was not a source of political guidance in 1967, as it was in 
Tunisia during the 1957 municipal elections (Moore 1965; Rudebeck 1967), and offered 
virtually no political oversight (Grimaud 1967; Leca and Vatin 1975).85 Nor did 
municipal representatives have vertical mobility opportunities:86 national legislative 
elections were not organized until 1977.  
Lacking vertical mobility opportunities and hierarchical guidance, focus turned to 
the local political arena: material accumulation strategies oriented local elites. 
Accumulation strategies were abetted by a lack of national coordination from regime and 
                                                
Achour. 1981. Contrôle politique et régulations électorales en Tunisie. Aix-en-Provence: Centre de 
recherches et d’études sur les sociétés méditerranéennes: 304-305. 
85 The post 1965 military regime did name a regional commissioner to each of the 15 prefectures to broadly 
oversee party affairs, with mitigated effects. The 1967 Oran municipal elections were a fiasco – the party 
commissioner fell out with the prefect and the UGTA. While voter turnout was 74.42 percent, half the 
votes where blank ballots. Nicole Grimaud. 1967. “Réforme et élections communales en Algérie.” 
Maghreb. 50(March-April): 9. 
86 In Oran, only three (9%) council members of the forty-two member1967 municipal council were 
promoted to the thirty member regional assembly in 1969; and four (12%) from the 1971 municipal council 
to the 1974 assembly. El Moudjahid; La République, various dates. 
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party. Material accumulation opportunities were also greater than in Tunisia. One million 
settlers fled in 1962, abandoning their land and homes in the coastal cities and colonial 
villages. While the new state nationalized those vacated goods87 in 1963, national and 
local political instability, a virtually inexistent administration (Remili 1967; Taouti 1975), 
and a moribund party organization could not keep local appetites in check.88 The 1977 
National Assembly elections and 1979 FLN National Party Congress did not change the 
incentive structure. The focal point of politics remained local. 
In Algeria, the sequencing of institutional development created incentives for 
council members and party officials to engage in local politics to the detriment of 
national policy between 1967 and 1977/1979. Vertical mobility was too limited and local 
material accumulation opportunities too great for local elites to develop a national vision 
of politics. Why didn’t subsequent National Assembly elections and a re-activated 
national party organization, both of which created vertical mobility opportunities for local 
elites, modify behavior local elite behavior from the local arena to national-scope? 
 
2.5.3 Locked-In Behavior: Political Localism in Algeria 
Tilly once remarked: “when things happen within a sequence affects how things 
happen. (Tilly 1984: 14). The timing and sequencing of representative and party 
institutional development in Algeria and Tunisia influenced subsequent local-national 
relations in the two states.89  
The impact of timing and sequencing on politics is widely acknowledged 
(Aminzade 1992; Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997; Mahoney 1999; Pierson 2000a, 
                                                
87 Biens vacants. 
88 Nor did it necessarily want to.  
89 Since it organized local and national representative and party institutions in tandem, Tunisia is a control 
case. 
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2000b; Thelen 1999, 2000), and can affect the scope of politics. Linz and Stepan, for 
example, have shown that the ordering of national and local elections affects perceptions 
of political community in disaggregated nations with multiple identities (Linz and Stepan 
1992). When regional elections are organized before national elections, citizens become 
more focused on the locale than the aggregate nation. In other words, the location and 
national scope of politics are defined by the level at which citizens first participate in 
political activity. Political participation also shapes the ways in which party members 
perceive the scope of politics. Focusing on timing, Shefter shows that initial party 
organization determines whether a party will engage in patronage mobilization strategies 
(Shefter 1977). Parties with an elite core dedicated to bureaucratic autonomy will eschew 
patronage mobilization strategies. Parties that engage in early patronage mobilization 
strategies are locked into distributive politics by the necessity to maintain its social base, 
and thus necessarily place a premium on the local arena (Teune 1980).90 
For temporal processes to matter within institutions, they must create or alter the 
incentive structure that shape and constrain the behavior of actors (Thelen 1999, 2000; 
Pierson 2000a, 2000b). Put into action, incentive structures create positive (or negative) 
feedback mechanisms, or path dependency, within institutions. “When a path dependent 
process is at work, early developments get deeply embedded in a particular political 
environment, modifying the incentive structure and hence behaviors of social actors and 
thereby changing the social significance of pattern of unfolding events or processes 
occurring later in the game” (Pierson 2000a: 79).  
                                                
90 Patronage focuses on local control over the distribution of first and second order resources. Teune argues 
that as economies develop and politics become more complex, the logic of local patronage mobilization 
erodes. Henry Teune. 1980. “Nationalization of Local Politics and the Governance of Cities in the United 
States.” International Political Science Review. 1(2): 280-295.  
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The timing and sequencing of representative and party development has set into 
motion a localized logic of politics in Algeria. Until 1962, party cells were clandestine 
and communication between militants limited. Between 1962 and 1967, organized 
branches and loosely patched Federations had no incentive structure to hold their 
organizations together: elections had not been held. Lacking exclusive benefits that might 
make a corporate spirit, local party organization was fluid, highly variegated, and based 
around personal alliances and shared histories in the bush. The 1967 municipal council 
elections gave the party a reason to exist – wealth and power.  
The sequencing of local, regional, and national representative elections (1967, 
1969, 1977) limited electoral ambitions to the local level for a decade. Confined to the 
local arena, politics turned inward. Political socialization was restricted to elected 
officials in the municipal councils, regional assemblies, and local party branches and 
Federations, defining a mental map of local politics (Denzau and North 1994). Local 
status and material accumulation, in the absence of vertical mobility opportunities, fueled 
this localized framework. 
While material accumulation opportunities in the new National Assembly were 
initially undefined, a few years into the National Assembly’s first mandate (1977-1982), 
it became clear that local assemblies were a surer way to wealth. The National Assembly 
voted laws presented to it by the presidency or various ministries. National 
Representatives did not make decisions on how public monies would be distributed, as 
they did in the municipal councils and regional assemblies. In the municipal councils and 
regional assemblies, the opportunities to accumulate material at the local level remained 
high even as the number of vacated goods that could be distributed tapered off in the mid-
1970s. Contacts in the municipalities, for example, allowed many large landowners to 
avoid nationalization during the 1971-1973 Agrarian Revolution, which the regime ran 
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through the town halls (Bedrani 1981; Chalabi 1984). When oil and gas came on-line in 
the mid to late 1970s, municipal budgets swelled, increasing the number of public works 
project contracts that could be distributed to the small state-dependent private sector 
(Dillman 2000).  
Lacking national coordination, local party branches and Federations filled local 
political space, and slowly transformed into party-patronage networks that could 
distribute first and second order resources in return for money and favors. To maintain 
local party predominance over the individual, the Federations increased turnover in the 
municipal assemblies so that power would not accrue to personalities. In Oran, for 
example, sixteen representatives of the forty-two member 1967 Municipal Council were 
re-elected in 1971. Returns diminished in subsequent elections: Eight 1971 Councilors 
were re-elected in 1975; only one in 1979; and not a single 1979 Councilor in 1985.91 
The regime turned a blind eye to these developing local party-clienteles, which continued 
to develop during the single-party era. Indeed, it profited from their political control of 
the local arena.92  
The transition to multiparty politics intensified political localism by amplifying 
the struggles over local level resources. In 1988, the party reworked its organization 
structure, increasing the role of local Federations in choosing the national party 
leadership. The FLN lost the 1990 municipal election to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, 
Front Islamique du Salut). Signaling its localized view of party-patronage, in many 
                                                
91 El Moudjahid; La République, various dates. The scheduled 1989 elections were postponed until 1990. 
Those elections results were annulled, and local elections would not resume until 1997, 2002, and 2007. 
92 Increasing oil production also may have so buttressed the regime that it didn’t matter what happened at 
the local level, as long as local problems did not percolate to the top. See: Terry Lynn Karl. 1997. The 
Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: University of Californial Press; Kiren Aziz 
Chaudhry. The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press; Miriam R. Lowi. Oil Wealth and the Poverty of Politics: Algeria Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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municipalities FLN council members sold off as much municipal land and buildings as 
possible before the FIS took power in order to limit its ability to control local level 
material opportunities (Bendjaballah 1997). In 1992, the military took power for the 
second time in twenty-seven years.93 The National Assembly was dissolved, as were FIS-
majority Municipal and Regional Councils, which were replaced by Executive 
Delegates.94  
Local and regional elections would not be held again until 1997, 2002, and 2007 – 
elections dually marked by the return of the FLN and low voter turnout. National and 
local level chaos during the ten-year conflict amplified the regime’s reliance on local 
representatives and FLN militants, who took advantage of the chaos to strengthen local 
level party-patronage networks, increasing their strength vis-à-vis the center.95 This is 
especially the case between 1997 and 2002, when internal conflict peaked. As political 
calm has returned, and along with it the normalcy of multiparty politics, local FLN 
reliance on party-patronage networks to maintain their political base against encroaching 
political upstarts is critical if it wants to remain in power. As a former Mayor of Oran 
once commented: 
In Oran, militants seek social and economic protection. It’s political clientelism, 
and its origins are in the colonial period. Most militants prefer to be a machine, or 
apparatus, rather than in elected positions. This is because elected officials are 
more open to attack. In the FLN, clientelism is linked more to the party than a 
given man. The party wants apparatchiks, not notables. The party distributes 
prebends: protection, impunity, local responsibility and influence, markets, real 
estate. This is to attract militants. If the party stops access to material and social 
goods, the militants stop coming, because Algeria is less and less political. At 
least this is what we understood in the last elections. 
                                                
93 More than 150,000 Algerians died in the ensuing civil conflict. 
94 Executive Municipal Delegates (DEC, Délégué exécutif de commune). 
95 Much of this was illegal. In 2000, 16 of Blida province’s 25 mayors were accused of impropriety. Since 
1997, more than 1000 council members have jailed. L’Expression. 30 August 2009. “Détournement, 
corruption, contrats frauduleux: Pourquoi les maires vont-ils en prison?” For an abundant read, type 
“corruption,” “maire,” “APC,” and “Algérie” in a search engine. 
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In Algeria, what was originally a national strategy to stabilize provincial politics 
by offloading governance problems to the local elite (Leca and Vatin 1975: 193-195) into 
a local level political phenomenon. The sequencing of local, regional, and national 
representative and party development framed the relative incentive set available to actors 
working at each level, localizing political focal points. In 2010, local politicians and local 
elite discount national level politics and disengage from policy initiatives incongruent 
with their own. 
 
2.5.4 Alternative Explanations: The Rentier State 
Rentier State literatures present an alternative hypothesis that might better explain 
weak policy enforcement in Algeria. Taxation in oil producing states is based on 
hydrocarbon receipts, not fiscal revenue. Hydrocarbon producing states are financially 
autonomous from the societies they govern (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Crystal 1990; 
Chaudhry 1997; Karl 1997). Because of this relative autonomy, they do not have to create 
strong institutions to extract revenue and thus lack state capacity (Chaudhy 1997). That 
states with limited interaction with society have underdeveloped capacity is in perfect 
accord with what the State-Society Relationship literature: “States vary in their 
effectiveness based on their ties to society” (Midgal, Kohli, Shue 1994: 2), and with part 
of this dissertation.  
It is not clear, however, that the state’s capacity to tax significantly diminished as 
a result of oil production, as predicted by the literature. Most Rentier State models focus 
on fiscal extraction when measuring the capacity of state institutions. Since 
independence, Algerian non-hydrocarbon tax collection as a percentage of GDP has 
paralleled Tunisia. In 1990, for example, Algerian taxes on domestic goods and services 
were 7.8 percent of GDP, compared to 6.6 percent in Tunisia (Nashashibi 2002: 11-12). 
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Tax collection decreased during over the next decade. In 2000, Algerian taxes on 
domestic goods and services fell to 6.99 percent of GDP. But as Henry remarks, this is 
probably the result of a decade of civil strife rather than a result of oil (Henry 2004: 70).  
 
Table 2.4: Comparative Tax Revenue, Algeria and Tunisia 
Non Hydrocarbon Tax Revenue, % of GDP 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Algeria 26.69 28.60 30.61 31.61 25.03 27.02 38.93 31.79 31.36 27.52 
Tunisia 20.76 20.49 19.84 20.25 21.11 21.10 21.31 21.63 21.48 20.59 
           
Taxes on Goods and Services, % of Tax Revenue 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Algeria 12.31 10.35 10.43 11.26 13.35 10.14 6.99 7.86 9.00 57.78 
Tunisia 19.86 19.93 20.72 32.74 34.15 36.60 37.10 36.96 35.75 35.17 
           
Individual Income Tax, % of Tax Revenue 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Algeria 3.43 2.21 3.02 3.29 3.99 4.24 3.38 - - - 
Tunisia 15.24 16.05 16.65 16.53 17.2 17.15 17.11 17.59 18.01 16.18 
           
Taxes on Income, Profits, and Capital Gains, % Total Taxes 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Algeria 66.56 68.45 71.64 73.58 65.88 72.27 82.43 77.87 74.00 60 
Tunisia 22.35 23.11 23.48 26.23 26.99 26.57 28.12 29.37 31.48 40 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Statistics Database 
 
Taxation is not a good indicator of state capacity (Migdal 1988: 280-286). In both 
Algeria and Tunisia, tax evasion is high. Up to seventy percent of the Algerian workforce 
is in the informal sector. Published tax rates represent the revenue extracted from the 
major national and international firms located in Algiers and Tunis, not state capacity in 
the provinces. Still, the comparison in taxation between the two countries is revealing of 
some of the flaws internal to the Rentier State literature.  
Rentier State models are so focused on the macro-level that they extract politics 
from the framework. Politics determine institutional development, not resources (Linz 
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2000; Henry 2004; Lowi 2009). In Algeria, the 1967 elections were a response to rural 
disturbances, not hydrocarbons: the elections were three years before Algerian oil 
production rose to average production,96 four years before Algeria nationalized foreign 
oil companies,97 and seven years before prices peaked.98 Oil prices were peaking during 
later institutional development. President Houari Boumediene had programmed the 1977 
National Assembly and 1979 Party Congress in the 1976 Constitution. Institution 
building and expansion, though at the national level, occurred during the oil bonanza. 
Rentier State models would have predicted the opposite: during the oil boom in Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen, institutions were de-activated (Chaudhry 1997). Oil has not had the 
predicted effect on the timing of institutional development in Algeria. If it did, then why 
did the regime allow political actors to invest local political space in the late 1960s, just 
years after independence, and when it needed all the resources it could get? Why did the 
regime run the Agrarian Revolution through the municipalities in 1971, months before 
the regime nationalized oil production – and several years before the effects of 
nationalization would be felt?  
Rentier State models might explain the permissive environment that dominated 
the municipalities in the 1970s.99 Once oil was online and the regime flush resources, it 
no longer needed to oversee local level political activity. In fact, it could buy local level 
                                                
96 In 1967, Algeria produced 853,000 barrels per day. Production would plateau at between 120-130,000 
per day in the 1970s and 1980s. British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2009. 
http://www.bp.com. 
97 Algeria nationalized all foreign oil companies that refused a 51-49% ownership agreement in 1971. 
American El Paso was the only company that agreed to the deal, and signed a 20-year agreement with the 
regime. 
98 In 1972, international spot market prices were at around $US 1.90 per barrel. They increased to $US 
10.41 in 1974. British Petroleum 2009.  
99 For example, Fan, Lin, and Treisman have argued that the percentage of GDP generated from local taxes 
is correlated with the degree of local corruption. C. Simon Fan, Chen Lin, and Daniel Treisman. 2008. 
“Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the World.” UCLA Department of 
Political Science Working Paper. Available at: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/Papers/.  
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acquiescence by expanding municipal budgets: oil resources expanded municipal budgets 
in the 1970s. However, oil prices dropped in the 1980s and remained low for close to two 
decades100 without a tandem marked increase in institutional oversight.  
That oil concentrated resources at the national level, increasing competition 
between a fragmented elite and leading to political instability, is not disputed (Henry 
2004; Lowi 2009). Local battles over increased municipal and regional assembly budgets 
increased in tandem, though how this affects the link between local and national politics 
remains unclear in Rentier State literatures. Simply put, in its own terms, Rentier State 
theories cannot explain the argument of this thesis: that colonial legacies shaped regimes’ 
institutional choice-sets upon independence, and that the temporal ordering of 
institutional development have amplified the principal-agent problem between local and 





                                                
100 International spot market prices for crude collapsed in 1985, returning to1985 prices only 2004. British 
Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2009. http://www.bp.com. 
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PART TWO: LAND AND POLITICAL CONTROL: LAND POLICY 
IN PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL ALGERIA AND TUNISIA. 
Part Two of this thesis paints a picture of the state of authority and property in 
pre-colonial and colonial Algeria and Tunisia. It might seem odd to look at the pre-
colonial periods to understand contemporary property rights in Algeria and Tunisia. How 
do property structures and power from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
overlap with the thesis of this dissertation: that the linkages between local and national 
politics in Algeria undermine the application of strong property rights in 2011, while 
strengthening them in Tunisia? Following the “longue durée” approach, beginning the 
study with a focus on the Ottoman era (1574-1881) allows us to highlight how antecedent 
forms of urban-rural interconnectivity have affected both the colonial and post-colonial 
state’s ability to administer property rights (Bayart 1996). History does not determine the 
present, but rather defines the range of institutional reform and strength of rural and 
urban actors engaged in the political struggle over access to the local political 
economy.101 National-level elites wishing to promote substantial property reform are 
bound by extant local-level institutions, which buttress and are reinforced by the 
autonomy of local elite.  
Chapters Three and Four show the center-periphery struggles over authority that 
dominated the pre-colonial and colonial period. Defining property rights was a central 
point of contention between local elites and centralizing authorities in both periods, as the 
Ottoman regencies and French colonial authorities sought to expand their fiscal receipts 
                                                
101 For a brief survey of the historical institutionalist take on path dependency, see Sven Steinmo, Kathleen 
Thelen and Frank Longstreth. (Eds.) 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; For a critical overview of the historical and choice-
theoretic literature, see Paul Pierson. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics,” American Political Science Journal 94: 251-267. 
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by expropriating the rights to define the use of property from local elites. Colonial 
institutions were built from foundations laid by Ottoman state building experiences. In 
Tunisia, “[t]he French grafted onto the existing Tunisian administration features of the 
French bureaucracy” (Charrad 2001: 116). The beylical institutions had already asserted 
control over much of the countryside, whereas limited Ottoman control over the Algerian 
countryside, and the dissolution of those institutions immediately following French 
invasion in 1830 left the French with no local interlocutor by which it could engage a 
rebellious population. Colonial domination over the countryside, and the creation of a 
land market was hyper-violent. The policies settlers imposed on colonial authorities to 
control local land markets, in turn, would affect how a new generation of indigenous elite 
would engage political and economic space, ultimately defining the contours of the 
nationalist movements in both polities. As discussed in Chapter Two, the ability of those 
nationalist movements to link local and national elites into a similar project would play a 
major role in efforts to build post colonial states and nations. As Charrad reminds us: 
“Historical trajectories over the long run must be considered because they provide the 
structural context for the emergence of the sovereign national state” (Charrad 2001: 11). 
Chapter Three looks at local-national relations and property during the Ottoman 
period (1574-1881).102 It begins with a discussion on how differences in geography and 
rural forms of communal organization constrained Ottoman control over the land 
structure in different ways in what would become Algeria and Tunisia, resulting in 
variegated power relations between the central power bases and the rural hinterland. 
                                                
102 Direct Ottoman rule ended as quickly as it was imposed in the two states. Distance and communication 
problems linked to European control over the Mediterranean following the Battle of Lepanto (1571), 
allowed local janissary and Ottoman administrators to impose their own provincial. Direct Ottoman control 
ended in Tunisia in 1613, when Mourad Bey imposed a beylical dynasty, in Algeria with Baba Ali 
Chaouche (1710). Both are said to have remained Ottoman until French occupation forfeited Ottoman 
rights in Algeria and Tunisia in 1830 and 1880 respectively. 
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Traditionally, the center-periphery struggle in the Maghreb has been characterized as a 
fiscal struggle between bled al-makhzan and bled es-siba, literally land of government 
and land of dissent. That approach, however, undermines the great diversity of communal 
organizations and the competition between these organizations and Ottoman rulers to 
control the rules of local market and moral economies.103 Far from a binary system, 
property rights in the pre-colonial Maghreb represented a variety of communal 
organizations, each with variegated power relations with the Ottoman center.  
Different on-the-ground realities conditioned Ottoman capacity to implement a 
uniform strategy of controlled access to fallow and tax productive land, and led to 
different political economic relations between the central authorities and countryside with 
varying degrees of institutionalized development. By French occupation in 1881, the 
Regency of Tunis has increasingly unified and coherent political system that had could 
project itself far into the hinterland, with a more or less stabilized property regime that it 
defined and enforced (Anderson 1986; Charrad 2001). Control over the hinterland in the 
Regency of Algiers was markedly different: permanent authority rarely expanded more 
than a hundred miles from the four administrative capitals, and even there, central power 
was exercised in a highly variegated way, and property rights remained defined and 
enforced at the local level. 
Chapter Four looks at local-national relations in the colonial context. In the 
Protectorate of Tunisia and French Algeria, colonial policy too was largely built around 
or reflected the importance of controlling property rights. This section explores how 
French authorities negotiated extant modes of urban-rural relationships into the colonial 
apparatus and new land structure in a format amenable to colonial control, settler 
appropriation, and agricultural production. It discusses how those modes of political and 
                                                
103 Charrad (2001) deconstructs this image, focusing instead on alternative layers of stateness. 
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economic governance conditioned the linkages between the indigenous elite and local-
level administration, affecting the ability of the anti-colonial movement to penetrate both 
the national- and local-level political economies at independence.  
In Tunisia, where the pre-Protectorate Beylic had largely subdued the countryside, 
the colonial administration was simply grafted onto the beylical institutions (or vice 
versa). Antecedent modes of rural co-optation were incorporated into the colonial model; 
the model of using local intermediaries to implement central authority over politics and 
economy was largely kept in place. Land belonging to religious foundations was 
distributed to French companies and the smaller settler community. Unproductive tribal 
land was largely ignored, whereas large companies were granted concessions over tracts 
of land for cereal production in central and northwestern Tunisia. Much of the productive 
land along the Sahel coast and in the Northeast, the most densely populated areas of the 
country, had already been incorporated into the Muslim private property regime, or melk. 
These properties were brought into a new land market based on the Torrent’s regime, in 
which settlers and Muslim elites actively participated.  
Many of those same Muslim elite enrolled their sons and daughters in the Collège 
Sadiki and the French Lycée Carnot, where they would get a modern education, enter the 
liberal professions or work in the colonial administration, and later form the corps of the 
nationalist movements (Moore 1964; de Montety 1973; Brown 1973). The relatively 
liberal economic and political environment104 permitted the development of a nationalist 
mass movement. Through vertical party and administrative channels and horizontal social 
networks established through business, familial, and tribal ties, the nationalist movement 
was able to implant its cadres in the major cities and villages by independence in 1956.  
                                                
104 By relatively liberal, I mean in comparison to Algeria. 
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In the aftermath of the 1830 invasion, the French annulled extant political 
institutions and expropriated Ottoman properties, which included fallow land. Ottoman 
control over most of the land in the periphery, as discussed in Part 2.1.3, however, was 
largely theoretical, and authority had to be asserted. When penetrating the countryside, 
the French administration faced stiff resistance from the same groups that had kept the 
Ottoman rulers at arm’s length. While the first official Centre de colonization, Saint-
Cloud was established near Oran in October 1848 (Sari 1982; Pringuey 2001), it took 
France more than forty years to subdue the Northern coastland (Grandmaison 2005), and 
another twenty years to bring the Saharan region fully under control (Brower 2009). In 
order to control Algeria, France had to dominate the hinterland. It broke the indigenous 
population through military force and by attacking the basis of their local political 
economies – by subverting the land regime. Large tracts of tribal land were declared 
fallow, and distributed to settlers, whereas collective land expropriation punished 
rebellion. Close to a million Algerians died between 1830 and 1871 (Kateb 2001). 
Notwithstanding the colonial cities of the West,105 the indigenous population 
largely outnumbered the settler population. In direct control over the affairs of northern 
Algeria after 1870, the European minority created a highly segregated political and 
economic system to protect its minority status and privileges. Precluded from the colonial 
administration, the market, and politics, Algerian nationalists were unable to establish 
vertical or horizontal relationships similar the to Tunisian experience, much less a 
nationalist mass movement. Wholesale colonial expropriation of the land structure 
reduced indigenous ties with the local-level political economy to a limited landowning 
elite that collaborated with the colonial regime. Absent developed links in the countryside 
                                                
105 E.g., Oran, Sidi Bel Abbès, Aït Temouchent. 
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and faced with a collapsed colonial local administration, the post-colonial regime was 
unable to effectively control land policy. 
 
 66 
Chapter Three: Land Tenure and Local-National Relations in the Pre-
Colonial Era 
More than a simple Hanafi requirement, appropriation of mawat, under these 
conditions, was the keystone of the political system developed by the Ottomans. 
(Hénia 1996a: 73). 
 
Little is known about the rapport between Man and land in North Africa during 
the long period between the Roman and Ottoman empires.106 Political control in the areas 
comprising modern-day Algeria and Tunisia oscillated between empire, emirate, and city-
state, and was divided between urban centers of commerce and religious learning and the 
semi-nomadic rural periphery.107 Writing in the context of a highly segmented society 
based on ethno-religious polities and bazaari-states, famed sociologist Ibn Khaldun 
claimed that political authority, continuity, and will rest on a dialectical pendulum shift 
between rural and urban control.108 The foundation and erosion of power, he argued, were 
attributable to asabiyya, or tribal solidarity. This solidarity was the glue that prevented 
the tribe from splitting into rival sub-groups or families (douars) and sealed the bond that 
permitted lasting alliances (sfuf) with subordinate or cooperative tribes (Hart 1973; 
Gellner 1973; Seddon 1973). The foundation of urban order lay in rural organization and 
stability. Rural institutions in turn, were tightly knit into the land-ownership structure. 
                                                
106 A research unit founded in November 2001 at the Tunis-based Centre des Études et Recherches 
Économiques et Sociales, headed by Abdesslem Ben Hamida had begun to more empirically focus on the 
theme. 
107 See Ibn Khaldun. 1967. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press; Leo Africanus. 1963. The History and Description of Africa. New York: B. Franklin. 
108 The notion was also picked up and developed by Ernest Gellner. 1969. Saints of the Atlas. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 67 
3.1 PRE-COLONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES 
Property rights in pre-colonial Algerian and Tunisia fell under a four broad land 
regimes, based on Islamic jurisprudence, local custom (qanûn), and centralizing 
authorities, which determined the rights of exclusivity and methods of enforcement in 
specific ways (Bendjaballah 1997): private (melk), religious endowments (hubus), tribal 
(arch), and khassat as-sultan, or land belonging to the “Prince” (Merad-Boudia: 1977).  
Distribution of the various property regimes closely followed population density 
patterns and the local power structure. Khassat as-sultan could be found in areas under 
direct domination of a local centralized power, whereas melk and hubus properties were 
also common in the sedentary zones marked by a high concentration of villages (Tlemcen 
and Kabylia in Algeria, and the Sahel in Tunisia). Arch and hubus property predominated 
in the transhumant regions (Valensi 1977: 25-27). In this fractured political and economic 
system, localized property rights were enforced through a variety of mechanisms. 
Private land or melk, dominated in the cities and villages. Property was either 
officially titled by a local judge (qadi) who based his rulings on the Maliki rite of Islamic 
jurisprudence109 or recognized by the village assembly, such as the tadjmat in Kabylia, 
which also adjudicated disputes (Christelow 1982).110  
Religious endowments were also common in high population density areas. Also 
referred to as waqf, hubus are properties (e.g. buildings, agricultural land) belonging to 
members of specified family lineages or religious foundations such as Islamic orders 
(tariqa) or Quranic schools (madrasa, pl. madaris). Profits generated from the productive 
use of these properties go directly to the descendents or religious institution in question. 
According to Islamic law, religious endowments are non-transferable and inviolable, and 
                                                
109 In Sunni Islam, there are four madhab, or schools of Islamic legal-jurisprudence: Maliki, Hanafi, 
Shafi‘a, and Hanbali. The rites interpret civil code differently.  
110 Allan Christelow notes that in parts of Algeria, this had not changed by the time of French occupation.  
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thus the incorporation of a hubus for a specific family lineage has been used as a social 
strategy among Muslim elite in the Maghreb to pass property from generation to 
generation during periods of political and economic instability (Hénia 1999; Shuval 1996, 
1998). 
Tribal land, or arch, composed the largest block of land during the pre-Ottoman 
period. Governed through a mixture of Islamic law (sharia), and local defined norms 
(amal) determining custom (orf) and usage (‘addate), tribal land was subdivided 
according to function. Unused land (mawat) was considered “the commons” until 
rendered productive (ihyaa). Distribution, exclusivity, and enforcement rights of 
productive land were determined by a council of tribal elders (jema‘a), which was made 
up of the heads of each tribal branch. The tribal council awarded the largest, most 
powerful branches the best allotments. The same principal applied to the branches, and to 
the smaller units of social organization continuing to the douar, literally tent. Exclusivity 
operated along similar lined based on interior rules of hierarchy. Collectively, 
landownership was excluded to outsiders, strong branches excluded weaker branches 
from non-authorized use of their land, et cetera. Enforcement of land disputed between 
tribes occurred through armed conflict or mediation at the weekly or monthly market or 
via specialized maraboutic tribes claiming descent from an important local saint or the 
prophet (shurfa, sing. sharif) (Gellner 1969; Christelow 1980). 
Communal land-ownership and regular migration patterns gave property a social 
dimension in addition to the Islamic legal texts and customary practice. Often, property 
lines were demarcated by tribal location along seasonal migration patterns, and regularly 
scheduled property transfers were not uncommon. For example, each spring Tribe A 
would migrate from Zone 1 on the Saharan periphery to Zone 2 in the steppes in order to 
graze its herds. Tribe B, which had occupied Zone 2, migrated to Zone 3 in the plains to 
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exchange its woolen textiles for wheat with the settled population. In autumn, Tribe B 
would return to Zone 2 to barter its wheat for sheep with Tribe A, who would in turn 
migrate back to Zone 1. Property lines were thus both set and mutable, according to 
arranged inter and intra-tribal agreement. More than just transferable space, arch property 
defined tribal identity. Valensi notes: “It was as if migration legitimated the possession of 
lands, and as if the arrival and settlement as a group established the right to occupy a 
specific territory…This shared experience laid the foundation for the unity of the tribe. 
Just as genealogy describes fission in time, so migration traced secession in space” (1985: 
35).  
 Finally, land controlled by the central authorities was alternatively called khassat 
as-sultan, miri, or ‘amiri. This land was always located near a local power center. The 
Prince frequently granted tracts of land to local notables in return for personal favors or 
political support. Such land, or iqta, was a one-time grant that could be revoked and 
which generally was non-transferrable. Grantees themselves employed sharecropping, or 
khammeset. In return for labor and inputs such as equipment and seed, the peasants who 
worked the land were allowed to keep a fifth of the production.  
Notwithstanding the importance of trans-Saharan trade, the North African 
regional economy was focused on Mediterranean trade routes. The absence of a 
significant settled peasant core that could be easily exploited by urban elite abetted the 
development of a tax regime that relied on bust and boom rent from commerce, trade, and 
piracy. Irregular fiscal receipts limited state building and the development of 
institutionalized mechanisms to control the rural periphery. Self-sufficiency was the 
dominant household strategy, and the multitude of smallholdings precluded the state’s 
capacity in this instance of fiscal retrieval (Hénia 1996a: 69). 
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 Additionally, a low population density on arable land made the costs of a state 
land monopoly greater than the potential benefits (ibid: 67-73). Large tracts of unused 
land called henchir were readily available for appropriation. This land was considered 
“dead,” or mawat, and the rules governing its acquisition were quite flexible. Based on 
the Quranic injunction that “land belongs to he who works it,” the Maliki tradition held 
that possession could be legitimately transferred to individuals and tribes who 
productively worked it.  
Ownership had two dimensions: custom or legitimacy (al-yad) and possession (al-
hawz). Legitimacy was defined parochially according to local power relations: The 
unused land in the countryside surrounding the cities could be transferred into private 
ownership once a symbolic, if not irregular tax on land vivification was paid to the town 
treasury or central mosque. In the rural villages, legitimacy was the acquiescence of the 
village council or a payment to the local mosque, whereas in tribal lands legitimacy was 
determined by the worth of family lineage and name (Hénia 1996a). 
 
3.2 OTTOMAN INCURSIONS AND EFFORTS TO RE-ORDER LOCAL POWER 
For the Central and Eastern Maghreb, the late sixteenth century was marked by a 
series of endogenous and exogenous events that would precipitate the debut of 
widespread property rights change: Ottoman incursion and the changing nature of 
Mediterranean naval power. 
The Ottomans arrived in North Africa in the early sixteenth century, founding the 
Regency of Tunis in 1574 and establishing the Regency of Algiers a decade later in 
1587.111 Along with a new language and urban culture, the Ottoman Turks imported the 
                                                
111 Kheirredine and Aruj, the dreaded Turkish privateers of the Southern Mediterranean, first took Algiers 
in 1518, and Tunis in 1534 from the Spanish. Possession of the cities would oscillate between the 
Barbarossa brothers, remaining elements of the Ibn Hafs family (the Hafsid dynasty) and the Spanish until 
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Hanafi rite of Islamic jurisprudence. The Ottomans did not displace the Maliki rite – 
indeed the prestigious Zeitouna mosque in Tunis and its less prominent counterparts, the 
Casbah Mosque in Bejaia, the Grand Mosque of Constantine, and Sidi Boumediene in 
Tlemcen, continued to teach the Maliki alongside the Hanafi rite, as did the smaller 
Quranic schools. Similarly, legal disputes over land and family were judged within the 
rites in which these contractual obligations were made.  
The introduction of the new rite had two significant effects. First, it accelerated 
the incorporation of hubus by urban elite. Under the Maliki rite, the initial owner of a 
property had no legal claim to the property or usufruct of that property once he made the 
donation. Under the Hanafi tradition, however, the initial owner could continue to benefit 
from rent or production of the property until his death. Abdelhamid Hénia notes that the 
new flexibility led to a short-term hubus bubble by landowners wary of political 
instability (1999). Second, and more important to the question of state building, the 
Hanafi rite modified the process by which unclaimed or dead land (mawat) was 
transferred into private or communal ownership following vivification. According to the 
Hanafi rite, mawat land was the private domain (ardh al-bey or beylic) of the Ottoman 
Sultan in Istanbul, and was guardedly managed by his local representative. 
This legal distinction would become increasingly important as the Ottoman rulers 
consolidated their rule, and as maritime power shifted from the Ottoman Empire to 
European nations. In the decades following Turkish penetration of North Africa, 
especially after the failed siege of Malta (1565) and the Turkish naval route at Lepanto 
(1571), European privateers and navies came to be the dominant force in the 
Mediterranean. Over the next hundred years, Barbary corsairs and Ottoman merchant 
                                                
1574 and 1587, when the Ottoman Empire formally annexed Tunis and Algiers (respectively.) See John B. 
Wolf. 1979. The Barbary Coast: Algeria under the Turks. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.; Carl Leon 
Brown. 1974. The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey: 1837-1855. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 19-40. 
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fleets were slowly reduced to littoral cruisers and bay-water schooners. This, combined 
with the European maritime economic expansion, put extra pressure on the new regimes 
to develop resources from the interior, placing a premium on land control for the 
extraction of revenue previously earned through Mediterranean commerce, and in part 
sparked the development of the Ottoman Algerian and Tunisian state (Hénia 1996a).112  
Indeed, the period between the late 17th and early 18th centuries is marked by a 
significant shift in rules governing the appropriation of mawat from the North African 
Maliki to the Ottoman Hanafi rite. More firmly usurped under the ardh al-bey regime, 
mawat was no longer available for free-appropriation. Authorization to transform it into 
melk land was more effectively enforced, and more heavily taxed by a centralizing 
authority. An expanded state land portfolio also gave the Sublime Port’s representative a 
lucrative source of revenue and clientelism through iqta, or selective land grants to key 
allies and azel, or permanent grants used to settle tribes. Iqta were land-use rights 
strategically conferred to local notables and courtiers in return for political support. 
Under the contract, the recipient maintained usufruct of the land until his death or until 
expropriated by the state. Iqta lands created enormous rent for recipients, and were thus a 
major source of state patronage. New fiscal revenues and expanded land to distribute 
under iqta contracts represented an important source of revenue that helped to offset 
declining military stipends from Istanbul.  
Incorporation of mawat into the ardh al-bey and the distribution of iqta became 
the founding-model for the effective process of land appropriation and agricultural 
production by the Turkish rulers and co-opted urban and rural elite. Hénia argues that the 
appropriation of mawat became the keystone of Ottoman control and political order 
                                                
112 Perhaps this is to North African agricultural development as were the Enclosure Laws to the English 
Industrial Revolution. 
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(1996a: 73). While the same land strategy was initially applied in Algeria and Tunisia, 
Ottoman ability to penetrate the countryside and control mawat was conditioned by a 
number of variables, including geographical space and terrain, and the political realities 
of dealing with a restive rural population. Successful transformation of the landscape was 
dependent on the political inroads and relations with the rural population: the more 
sedentary the population, the more regular the political contact and the less fluid the 
game of shifting tribal alliances in establishing these associations; antecedent forms of on 
the ground rural organization were key. 
 
3.3 THE BEYLIC OF TUNIS 
Tunisia of the late sixteenth century was more or less ethnically homogenous and 
the majority of the population (based in the Tunis-Medjerda / Cap-Bon / Sahel elongated 
triangle113) was organized either into small farming and fishing villages with high degrees 
of corporate solidarity114 (Medjerda and Sahel) or into the typical Maghrebi hierarchical 
socio-political model of urban domination over the suburban and immediately adjoining 
rural periphery (Tunis-Medjerda / Cap-Bon). Though still organized along tribal lines, 
much of the North had been increasingly subdued through commercial links with and 
military proximity to Tunis, Béja, and Le Kef. Central authority was weakest in the 
central steppes and Saharan periphery in the South. Ottoman military superiority, flat 
terrain, and an increasingly settled though still tribally organized population abetted a 
                                                
113 The Cap-Bon is the jagged peninsula protruding from Tunisia on the Northeastern coast, just south of 
Tunis. South of the Cap-Bon, the Sahel is that region of the Eastern Mediterranean shore ranging from 
Sousse to Sfax, and not penetrating more than 40 km inland. The Medjerda river valley is located 
approximately 30 miles to the North West of Tunis. 
114 For an anecdotal picture of the Sahel village, see Jacques Berque. 1962. Le Maghreb entre deux 
guerres. Vol 1. Paris: Éditions du Seuil: 236-260. For a story on Medjerdji organization, see Nicholas 
Hopkins. 1983. Testour ou la transformation des campagnes maghrébines. Tunis: Ceres Productions. 
Interestingly, it was precisely in the settled areas with corporate solidarity that the Beys had the most 
trouble in making real-estate inroads.  
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relatively smooth transfer of power from the Hafsids to the Ottomans.115 Inheriting a 
relatively efficient political system (developed by the displaced Hafsid dynasty) with 
links to the countryside, the occupying force simply replaced the central nodes of 
political rule.  
Figure 3.1: Tribal Geography in Tunisia 
 
Source: Ganiage 1958: 169 
 
The process of incorporation of mawat into the ardh al-bey was uneven, reflecting 
extant population density, land value, and proximity to power. The ardh al-bey was 
expanded mainly in the northwestern cereal region around Béja and Jendouba, where 
                                                
115 With the exception of the Khroumir, in the mountainous Northwest, and the Drid, Frechiche, 
Hamamma, and Majeur in the upper steppes of Central Tunisia, rural rebellion was much less common than 
in Algeria or Morocco. See Habib Attia 1966. “L’évolution des structures socials et économiques dans les 
hautes steppes.” Revue tunisienne de science sociale. 3(5): 5-51 and Jamel Ben Tahar. 1995. “L’emprise 
des Ghraba et des notables sur la terre dans le Caïdat du Kef au cours de la deuxième moitié du XIXème 
siècle.” Transformations actuelles des sociétés rurales du Maghreb: Actes du colloque. 7(5). Tunis: 
Université de Tunis I: 455-468. 
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land density and proximity to the capital checked tribal resistance. It also made inroads 
into the Medjerda valley and in the Cap-Bon. Most of the Northeast, where the 
population was increasingly settled into agricultural villages, was tied-up in hubus, or 
melk holdings that pre-dated Ottoman incursions. Inroads into the more populous Sahel 
were achieved only by the beginning of the nineteenth century, similarly reflecting the 
density of private, or melk holdings. (Valensi 1985: 102-103). Land south of the Tunisian 
Tell remained under the arch regime, indicating its lesser value, the prevalence of semi-
nomadic segmented social organization, and tribal resistance. By the turn of the 
eighteenth century, Valensi estimates that nearly 6 million hectares116 (ha), or roughly 50 
percent of the beylical Tunisia fell under the arch regime, though only one-third of this 
was arable, revealing a southern geographical concentration (1985: 71). 
 
Figure 3.2: Ardh al-Bey, Beylic of Tunis 
 
Source: Signoles 1985: 324 
                                                
116 One hectare (ha) is equal to 1,000 m2, or 2.471 acres. 
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By the mid to late sixteenth century, the Beys117 had set into place a shrewd 
strategy of accumulation and stability based on military power, threat of property 
expropriation, and the distribution of iqta and azel land grants to acquiescent urban 
notables (beldiyya), tribal, branch and douar / village leaders (sheikh, pl. shuyukh), and 
tribal confederation and regional leaders (qaid) who supported Ottoman power. To co-opt 
local legitimacy, the men were generally chosen by the tribal confederation (or branch) or 
village assemblies (jema‘a), based on perceptions of honesty, integrity, and social 
prominence, measured by the landholding, men in his retinue, and capacity to negotiate 
for the social organization (Fitoussi and Benazet 1931: 89-90; Ganiage 1959: 130-138). 
Approbation of the Bey was followed by a title payment called the tarîq al-masheikh. 
Increasingly, these local and regional leaders, whose own social stature was buttressed by 
the land and patronage afforded by the Beys, had an interest in maintaining local peace 
(Ben Tahar 1997) and in collecting taxes for the bi-annual mahalla, or tax collection 
military parade (Larguèche 2001). The Beys keenly understood the proximate power of 
their local clients. Hénia (1996b) notes that inadequate tax collection, the non-enforced 
moratorium on unauthorized vivification of land, and even occasional rebellion were not 
a priori bases to replace local interlocutors and agents.  
An increasingly stable countryside, and smooth land-regime transition helped the 
Beys institutionalize the state, which by 1705 had developed into a lasting dynasty (the 
Husseinids, 1705-1957) that respected the gerontocratic rule of ministerial succession. 
Increased military spending and decreased commercial tax receipts due to European 
military encroachment pressured the state to further develop and rationalize its fiscal 
institutions and extractive power. This translated into a greater hold on the rural 
                                                
117 Ottoman provincial governor. 
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periphery. In 1705, the Husseinid beylical dynasty initiated the appointment of regional 
governors, or qaids, to areas with important concentrations of ardh al-bey land and settler 
areas: prior, qaids had been co-opted by local groups. At the Sub-qaid level, assemblies 
of tribal sub-groups or villages continued to elected shuyukh to represent their interests in 
matters of state. Though tribally elected qaids continued to rule in areas where the Bey’s 
authority was weak and the confederations were strong (Ganiage 1959: 161-176), over 
the next hundred years, they too would become functionaries. The increased scope of 
central power increasingly eroded tribal autonomy, while the centralizing effects of 
market forces encouraged sedentarism on fertile land (Anderson 1986). By the early 
nineteenth century, an increasingly important settled rural elite had been transformed into 
provincial latifundia at least partially dependent on the Bey to protect its propertied 
interests (Brown 1974). As the beylical state expanded, so increased the number of local-
level state representatives and in bureaucratization of the function. By 1874, there were 
close to 3,600 public notaries in the Beylic, along with 45 qadis to arbitrate local 
problems (Bargaoui 2011). By the mid-nineteenth century, the qaidal corps numbered 
close to sixty (Charrad 2001: 94-95), and a 1875 reform placed the qaids on the beylical 
payroll mandating a standardized form of bookkeeping and called for regular audits of 
provincial affairs.  
Under the beylic, the rural population was slowly incorporated into the state. The 
measured bureaucratization of the rural political elite was made possible by a 
strengthening of state institutions through the increased monopolization of land, and the 
incentives access to this land gave to a sedentary and semi-nomadic political elite. As this 
elite began to see the working benefits of the regional or national administrations, the 
process accelerated, though not without periodic anti-administrative and fiscal rebellion. 
Initial attempts to cut out the intermediary by reducing the relative autonomy of the 
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shuyukh by levying heavy fines on local leaders that had grown too powerful or too 
complacent collapsed under the weight of rural insurrection (1726-1727). Similarly, 
Kheireddine Pasha’s mid-nineteenth century reforms that attempted to set into place for 
census of all puberty-aged males, the implementation of various market-transaction and 
capitation taxes and culminating with the short-lived Constitution Period (1861-1864), 
folded under rural pressure (Slama 1970; Chater 1978; Anderson 1986; Charrad 2001). 
While neither attempt at state reform was successful, each allowed the Regency further 
penetration into and control of the countryside.  
 
3.4 OTTOMAN RULE IN ALGERIA 
Unlike Tunisia, where a significant percentage of the land was cultivated by urban 
notables, yeoman-type peasant farmers, or semi-nomadic tribes that were undergoing the 
process of settling, in the sixteenth century, the majority of Algeria’s population was 
nomadic and based on highly segmented tribal lines.118 Culturally unified under the 
Maliki rite, the population was linguistically divided and organized into a hodge-podge of 
local traditions that would make centralizing relations with the rural population a 
complicated affair. While the bulk of the population lived along the 800 mile 
Mediterranean coast, it was politically disarticulated.  
The Tunis-based Hafsid dynasty, which had ruled the stretch of northern Algeria 
since the early fifteenth century, had begun to collapse under the dual pressure of 
economic decline and Spanish incursion. Weakened, Bejaia, Constantine, and Tlemcen 
had slipped from its control by beginning of the sixteenth century, either incorporated 
                                                
118 The urban population at this time was only 5-6 percent of the population, compared to Tunisia’s 10-11 
percent. Source: Clement H. Moore. 1970. Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.: 27. 
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into neighboring dynasties or forming independent kingdoms. Kaddache paints a broad 
picture of the political geography of pre-Ottoman Algeria:  
Fragmentation affected all of the Central Maghreb…Bejaia and Constantine had 
declared independence from Tunis, Oran independence from Tlemcen, and the 
southern Oases fell under the tutelage of Arab nomads. Town councils ran the 
northern cities, guided by Islamic brotherhoods. Commerce was in decline; the 
major trade routes at the mercy of the Hilalian tribes, and commercial exchanges 
with Sub-Saharan Africa dependent on the petty kingdoms established in the 
Sudan (Kaddache: 320-321). 
The political instability that affected communication, trade, and travel between 
cities, villages, and markets, was augmented, moreover by geography. With the exception 
of Kabyle villages perched in the Djurdjura, the major city-states and sedentary zones 
were located in the fertile plains and valleys, and separated by the Tell Atlas – a range of 
mountains that runs from Morocco to northern Tunisia, and which in Algeria frequently 
dips to the Mediterranean – and by the Saharan Atlas which also runs West to East, 
several hundred miles further South.  
Notwithstanding Berber Kabylia, a densely populated village region perched in 
the Djurdjura Mountains, Algerian geographical and cultural discontinuity did not permit 
a majority population core like the Tunisian Sahel. In this context, major Algerian cities 
such as Bejaia, Constantine, and Tlemcen existed more or less autonomously from the 
interior population. Fiscal control over the land was limited and access to this revenue 
had to be carefully negotiated with the resistant population in a series of bluffs and 
cautious use of force. Semi-developed political institutions that linked local power with a 
centralized core were much weaker in Algeria than in Tunisia of the late sixteenth 
century, complicating Ottoman consolidation.  
While Algiers fell under the protection of the Sublime Porte in 1515, it was not 
until 1534 that the beylical institution began to take shape, when the Sultan named a 
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direct representative, or Pasha, to oversee military campaigns. From 1534 to 1587, the 
Pashas sought to extend their territory to the West and East, temporarily capturing 
Tlemcen from the Zianides in 1535, Bejaia from the Kingdom of Koukou in 1559, and 
Constantine in 1567. To consolidate authority in the West, in 1563, the Pasha founded a 
provincial headquarter, led by a Bey at Mazouna. The Bey handpicked his corps of qaids 
who ruled the surrounding cities with support of a local barrack of Turkish troops. The 
qaids, in turn, coordinated with local tribes to collect taxes and maintain control over the 
West. The model was later extended to Titteri, south of Algiers, and to Constantine 
(Kaddache 2000: 377-378). 
Political and institutional instability marked the period between 1587 and 1659. 
Ottoman troops, or janissaries, who number 24,000 by 1634, increasingly usurped the 
Pasha’s control over administrative and military affairs (Kaddache 2000: 369-410). 
During this period, only twelve of forty-four Pashas served the duration of their three-
year term (ibid: 408). Seizing on a weakened center, Kabyle and Arab tribes in the 
Mitidja and Kabylia, zones immediately abutting Algiers broke from control nine times 
during this seventy-two year period (Kaddache 2000: 404-405). The period culminated in 
a janissary coup. The Pasha was replaced by a military council presided by the agha, who 
himself was co-opted by the council and whose mandate was theoretically limited to two 
lunar moons.119 None of the agha co-opted by the council willfully relinquished power at 
the end of two months: each of the four men who led the junta during this period were 
assassinated while in office.  
In 1671, the janissaries agreed to elect a supreme military leader, or Dey, for a 
lifetime mandate. Under the deylic, state-building reforms began in earnest. 
                                                
119 The Sultan continued to send a Pasha to Algiers on a tri-annual basis until 1710, when Ali Chaouche 
Dey threatened to murder the Pasha sent from Istanbul. In 1711, the Sublime Porte agreed to end the 
Pachalic of Algiers. 
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Administratively, the deylic was divided into four regions: the Dar as-Sultan, and the 
Beylics of Constantine, Mazouna (transferred to Mascara in 1708), and Titteri. 
Nominated by the Dey for three-year mandates, the Beys paid a hefty sum for the title 
and chance to retain part of the fiscal revenue they raised. The beylics were 
administratively broken into qaidats, and watans, or tribal administrative units. The 
nominated qaids controlled cities and regions immediately under the control of the Bey. 
Makhzan watans were organized around the sheikh, who was given sometimes given the 
honorific title qaid (Kaddache 2000: 435-436).  
 
Figure 3.3: Political Boundaries, Deylic of Algiers 
 
Source: Belhamissi 1976: 86 
 
Ruedy notes: “The fact that formal administrative arrangement existed for the 
governance of the whole of Algeria should not obscure the fact…that the actually power 
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of the Dey over the Regency’s diverse lands and peoples varied enormously” (2005: 33). 
The Dey’s personal power was perpetually tested. Unpopular Deys risked insurrection 
from his own troops: One half of all the Deys from 1671 to 1817 were killed while in 
power (Moore 1970: 26). From 1817 to 1830, political instability was so great that the 
Dey and contingent simply holed up in the Algiers Casbah, rarely venturing into the local 
population. Given the unstable political climate, it should not come as a surprise that by 
1830 political institutions in Algeria were still organized along a military model, unlike 
stable Tunisia where transition from military to beylical control occurred nearly 200 
years earlier, in 1632.   
Control between the Dey and the Beys also varied greatly. Running from 
Cherchell in the West to the capital and encompassing the fertile Mitidja Plain, in tranquil 
times, Dar as-Sultan was under direct supervision of the Dey. The Beylic of Titteri 
protected the Dar as-Sultan’s southern and eastern boarder. Commanding access to the 
Chlef Valley, Mitidja Plain, and the gateway to restless Kabylia, the beylic was the most 
tightly controlled by the Dey. Further from Algiers, the Beylics of Oran and Constantine 
had more administrative and military autonomy from the Dey, especially in times of 
unrest in the capital. Not surprisingly, though nominated by the Dey, the Beys of 
Mascara/Oran120 and Constantine sometimes had surprisingly long tenures. Noteworthy 
are Kelian Hussein Bou Komia, Ahmed Bey and Salah Bey, who ruled Constantine from 
1713-1746, 1756-1771, and 1771-1792 respectively (Kaddache 2000: 479), and 
Mohammed Kebir, who ran the western beylic from 1779 to 1799 (ibid: 460-465).121  
Ruedy notes that longevity might be linked to local leadership style as much as 
from instability in Algiers (2005: 32-33). Local leadership was based on the realities of 
                                                
120 The Beylic was transferred from Mascara to Oran in 1792, following the departure of the Spanish. 
121 Bou Koumia outlived six Deys; Ahmed Bey, two; Salah Bey, two; Mohammed Kebir, three. Source: 
Kaddache 2000: 438; 460-465; 479. 
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the terrain, which are tied to varying geographies, local economies, and social 
organization (Boone 2003; Woods 2003). With fewer janissaries, the Beys of Constantine 
and Mascara/Oran had to make denser local alliances that the Dey in order to maintain 
stability and collect taxes, and did so in ways reflecting the reality of the ground. 
Ranging from Oujda in present-day Morocco to the frontier of Titteri, the Beylic 
of Mascara/Oran was home to the largest number of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes 
(Ruedy 2005: 32-33),122 which posed both fiscal and security problems. Ongoing conflict 
on the Beylic’s borders with the Alawite Kingdom of Morocco and the Spanish Presidio 
of Oran inhibited permanent sedentarization on the vast plains between Oran and 
Tlemcen, and running long the Chlef Valley. And tribal upheaval weakened the Beylic’s 
western defenses.  
Figure 3.4: Tribal Geography, Beylic of Mascara 
 
Source: Belhamissi 1976: 112 
                                                
122 By 1934, the case was the same. The majority of the inhabitants of the western plains continued to live 
in the khayma or ghourbi – the former typical of the nomad, the latter of a sedentarizing nomad. 1934. 
Atlas d’Algérie et de Tunisie, Habitation rurale des indigènes. Gouvernement Générale Algiers: 
Gouvernement Générale de l'Algérie / Direction de l'Agriculture, du Commerce et de la Colonisation / 
Service Cartographique. Alger: Imprimerie Bacconer. 
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With few janissary troops at his disposal to defend and to tax the Bey of 
Mascara/Oran had to enter local tribal alliances. The most powerful tribes such as the 
Douaïr and Zmala from Oran, Hachem from Mascara, the Mekhalia from Mostaghanem, 
and the Hawwara from Mazouna, were incorporated into the makhzan. The makhzan 
were used to tax the ra’yat, or vassal tribes such as the Flitti and Beni Amer, and to 
prevent incursions from the large independent tribes that resisted Turkish tutelage, such 
as the Madjaher (Belhamissi 1976: 99, 112; Boyer 1977: 55-58; Kaddache 2000: 460, 
464). Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 3.1, the Beylic of Mascara/Oran had the highest 
percentage of makhzan tribes and lowest percentage of independent tribes in the pre-
colonial Algeria. Far from institutionalized, these alliances were constantly tested, broken 
and re-forged. The fluidity of segmentary politics inhibited the imposition of a lasting 
qaidal corps in the Beylic of Mascara/Oran as the Husseinids achieved by 1705 in Tunis 
(de Aramburu 1978; Djerbal 1980). 
Encompassing part of Kabylia in the central Algeria to the Tunisian border, and 
descending past the Aurès Mountains to Biskra, the Beylic of Constantine was the most 
important of the three beylics. Housing two-thirds of the total population (Kaddache 
2000: 470), the beylic had the greatest population density, the most sedentarized 
population, and subsequently the most intensive agriculture. Commercial exchanges with 
the South, the Beylic of Tunis, and Europe were dense. The Beys of Constantine forged 
close ties with the urban and commercial elite. Salah Bey’s reign (1771-1791), for 
example, was marked by moderate property taxes and significant urban infrastructural 
development. The urban elite provided auxiliary troops to supplement the local garrison 
in times of emergency, and linked the beylical capital with outlying cities such as 
Annaba, Bejaia, and Djidjel with commercial and familial ties (Grangaud 2002).  
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Table 3.1 shows a striking different in the ratio of makhzan to independent tribes 
in the Beylic of Constantine, compared to the situation in Mascara/Oran. The bulk of the 
independent tribes in the large Beylic of Constantine were situated at the far ends of the 
provincial border, and made up the Kabyle Berber confederations to the West, Chaouiyya 
Berbers in the southern Aurès and Arab tribes further south. The smaller percentage of 
makhzan tribes represents assertive authority over the sedentarized, agriculturally 
productive core of the population located on the Constantine Plain, stretching from 
Constantine to Setif. To encourage settlement, the Beys granted urban notables iqta and 
makhzan tribes azel tracts of the ardh al-bey, which by 1830 included 75,599 ha (Ruedy 
1967: 34; Guignard 2010: 85). The Mila Plain, for example, was granted to the powerful 
Zmala confederation, which settled and worked the fertile land (Gherras 1995: 168; 
Kaddache 2000: 474-476). With a growing settled population forming a dense 
agricultural core, the makhzan system increasingly lost its raison d’être (Babès 1984; 
Ruedy 2005: 36; Vayssettes 2005).  













 Algiers Titteri Mascara/Oran Constantine   
Makhzan 19 / 26% 14 / 19% 46 / 29% 47 / 21% 128 / 25% 16% 
Subject  11 / 15% 23 / 32% 56 / 36% 14 / 6% 104 / 20% - 
Semi-Indep. 20 / 27% 12 / 19% 29 / 18% 25 / 11% 86 / 17% 15% 
Independent  23 / 32% 13 / 20% 26 / 17% 138 / 62% 200 / 38% 69% 
Total 73  62 157 224 518 100% 
Source: Adapted from Charrad 2001: 99; and Hermassi 1972: 47. 
 
Table 3.2 shows the total breakdown of territorial control in the northern Tell 
during the late Ottoman period. Close to 100 percent of the land was controlled by tribal 
units, reflecting the limited development of institutionalized power by French occupation. 
 86 









Ardh al-Bey 158,721 1,578 1% 
Makhzan  3,400,000 34,000 24% 
Subject  5,000,000 50,000 35% 
Independent  5,500,000 55,000 40% 
Total 14,000,000 140,000 99% 
Source: Ruedy 1967: 34; Ruedy 2005: 36. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the total area held in the ardh al-bey by the Dar as-Sultan, and 
the Beylics of Mascara/Oran and Constantine in the late Ottoman period. Of the eighty 
five thousand square kilometers (km2) indirectly controlled via the makhzan tribes, only 
1,587 were actually directly in Ottoman hands, about 1.8 percent. This despite the 
presence of enormous tracts of mawat land.   
Table 3.3: Ardh al-Bey Holdings 
Political Region Land, Hectares Land, Kilometers2 
Beylic of Constantine 75,599 755.99 
Beylic of Mascara/Oran 46,759 467.59 
Dar as-Sultan 36,363 363.36 
Total 158,721 1,587.21 
Source: Ruedy 1967: 34. 
 
Taken together, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 reveal the broad contours of the bled al-
makhzan-bled es-siba opposition in pre-colonial Algeria. Unlike Tunisia, where the Beys 
directly controlled and politically distributed large tracts of land, Ottoman control over 
the Algerian countryside was indirect, and relied entirely on the makhzan tribes to 
maintain stability and to levy taxes. Those taxes, moreover, came almost exclusively 
from the 35 percent of the land occupied by the subject tribes. The remaining forty 
percent of the Tell was completely outside of Ottoman control. In these regions, either the 
confederation or branch jema‘a or local religious brotherhoods collected their own land 
 87 
tax. Particularly telling is the fact that by the time of French occupation in 1830, more 
than one half of land revenue in the Dar as-Sultan was collected by the tariqa (e.g. 
Rahmaniyya, Qadiriyya, Tidjaniyya), never reaching provincial or central coffers 
(Depont and Coppolani 1897: 243, cited by Moore 1970: 28).  
More than simply showing the intensity of bled al-makhzan-bled es-siba 
opposition, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 also reveal the varying and localized nature of power and 
authority and the highly segmented and disarticulated nature of Algerian society at 
closure of the Ottoman period in Algeria. With a denser and more settled population 
organized in villages and douars, the communal structure of the heartland of the Beylic of 
Constantine afforded the Bey greater leeway over his subjects. As more makhzan tribes 
were induced to settle on azel land, and as the settled ra‘yat tribes became increasingly 
subject to the conditions of khammeset, or sharecropping, offered to them by the Bey’s 
urban allies who received iqta grants, the Beys of Constantine were able to reduce their 
relative reliance on the makhzan tribes to project regional authority. A relatively small 
military force can control villagers engaged in self-sufficient agricultural production and 
sharecropping peasants dependent on the local lord. Lacking a core sedentary population, 
the Beys of Mascara/Oran were entirely dependent on the makhzan to raise taxes from 
the still largely transhumant ra‘yat tribes. The beylic found it more difficult to claim ardh 
al-bey lands among the subject tribes located at the periphery of the makhzan. 
When the French arrived in Algeria in 1830, they would occupy a land that had 
was neither unified, nor standardized, and where the antecedent state’s capacity to project 
into the hinterland profoundly weak.  
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 3.5 OTTOMAN LEGACIES 
Robert Brenner (1976, 1982) has suggested that property rights are the 
enforcement mechanisms of rural property relations, which define the institutionalized 
relationship between the owners and direct producers of agrarian production. The state is 
a reflection of the outcome of competing interests, who seize the state and shape its 
institutions in ways coterminous with their economic interest. His model implies that 
state institutions are developed to enforce rules that guarantee the economic interests of 
those in power; property relations and thus extant property rights determine the 
development of property rights enforcement mechanisms, implicitly transposed into the 
concept of the state.  
In pre-colonial Algeria and Tunisia, property relations did set the contours of the 
Ottoman state, but not in ways anticipated by Brenner. Brenner’s argument cannot stand 
alone because while the form of the beylical institutions were shaped by the broad lines 
of rural property relations, property rights themselves were not always implemented by 
state, nor were they a reflection of society’s interests. Looking at medieval Europe, where 
local-national relations had been developing for hundreds of years, Brenner did not 
anticipate the type of economic and social organization (Moore 1966; Boone 2003) 
variation and disjuncture between center and periphery found in the Central Maghreb.  
A relatively flat countryside and homogenous society already exposed to the 
Hafsid centralizing power and the expansion of sedentary agricultural production that 
responded to international markets demands (Charrad 2001: 91) abetted the expansion of 
the Beylic of Tunis. Over time, more and more tribes settled, important shuyukh became 
qaids, and in turn benefitted from beylical largess. Administrative reforms made the qaids 
increasingly dependent on state authority to maintain their privileged position. For the 
majority of the population in the Tunisia of 1881, the broad contours of property rights 
 89 
were defined, and enforced by the beylic. In Tunisia, the state used a dense network of 
administrators and the incentive of iqta and wealth to shift dependency on property rights 
enforcement mechanisms from the local community (whether the tribal or village jema‘a) 
to the beylical administration. Local dependence on national enforcement of property 
rights shaped the political needs and interests of local elites (Boone 2003: 23). Once the 
settling of tribes and economic dependence on the Bey reached a critical mass, the 
feedback cycle began and indeed amplified. 
In Algeria, property rights hardly reflected the interests of the Ottoman elite. In 
order to order to maintain a veneer of authority, the Beys bartered military support in 
exchange for control over property rights enforcement with the local population. 
Following Boone’s suggestion that communal structure goes a long way in explaining 
intra-national local-national relations (2003: 20-33), Table 3.3 showed us cross-regional 
variation within the Regency of Algiers. Where the local elite was increasingly dependent 
on the beylic to enforce property grants, where the population was increasingly settled 
and organized in villages, as in the Beylic of Constantine, the state was able to subsume a 
greater proportion of land under its specific property regime. When communal structure 
was more clearly organized around tight-knit, mobile, kin-based groups that the state 
needed for to co-opt for its own survival, as in the Beylic of Mascara/Oran, property 
rights enforcement remained incumbent on the local group. As Boone comments: “In a 
hierarchical peasant society, rural leaders are political actors whom the center must 
engage, either as allies or rivals” (ibid: 23) 
Pre-colonial state-building attempts were directly linked to local-national 
struggles over the right to define and enforce property rights. Where the state managed to 
co-opt or integrate local elites into its preferred regime, property rights enforcement 
shifted to the national level. Where the regime remained dependent on local groups for its 
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own survival, as in Algeria, property rights enforcement remained a local affair. In the 
Beylics of Constantine, Mascara/Oran, and Tunis, topography and antecedent communal 
structure conditioned the local-national relations to define and enforce property rights. 
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Chapter Four: Colonial Efforts to Build / Reform the Regencies 
The Domaine de l’État was the keystone to colonial political control. It allowed 
the Protectorate to directly administer the country (Yazidi 1999: 7). 
Questions of property are intrinsically linked to successive occupations and to the 
perpetual struggle between dominator and dominated; the logic of land is the 
penalization of the real or potential opposition to the power in place (Bendjaballah 
1997: 13-14). 
 
 Intellectuals and policy makers in France of nineteenth century were as fascinated 
with the power of markets as they were tantalized by ideas of empire (Marseille 1984; 
Brower 2009). To achieve empire, Paris needed to re-wire the political economies of the 
periphery and subdue indigenous modes of authority and power. At the nexus of local 
power and economy lie property rights. Property rights defined the rules of the market, 
and the contest to determine who could control markets were at the heart of the local-
national political struggles that marked the Ottoman era and which would shape the 
colonial regime. 
 The French governed Algeria and Tunisian differently. As a settler colony 
occupied in 1830, Algeria was incorporated into France in 1848. Occupied half a century 
later, Tunisia was a Protectorate: the colonial administration grafted itself to the Beylic of 
Tunis. While we might look at variation in colonial systems in the classical terms of 
direct versus indirect colonialism (Miles 1994) to understand the development of 
property rights under French occupation, another way of approaching the matter is by 
looking at the property rights regime at occupation. Who defined, distributed, and 
enforced property rights? From what sources did their power to do so derive? What 
strategies did France need to employ in order to gain control over these markets? This 
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approach give us better purchase in understanding the rationale behind the political 
origins of institutional variation (Boone 2003: 20-33) than the classic approach of 
explaining varying colonial institutions as the outcome of geopolitical context or cabinet 
political debates in Paris (compare Ganiage 1959 and Le Cours Grandguillaume 2005 
with Brower 2009, who nicely makes this distinction). 
The economic, political, and social realities the French military and civilian 
administrator encountered in Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881 could not have been 
more different. The exigencies of on-the-ground quick decision-making in response to 
rapidly changing local conditions often determined policy more than debate in the 
métropole (Brower 2006). French colonial policy in Algeria and Tunisia, at least in the 
initial stages, was a reaction to events on the ground. As described in Chapter Three, Part 
Four, 1830 Algeria was still predominantly organized along a tribal-based communal 
structure, where the glue that bound members was the moral economy structured around 
exclusive access to and distribution of arch agricultural and grazing lands (Ben Salem 
1996: 302). Just as the tribes had resisted Ottoman control over the fruits of their land and 
labor, they formed the greatest opposition to French control over Algeria. Amir 
Abdelkader’s smala state, which formed a fluid alliance of tribal confederations spanning 
the Algerian High Plains, resisted the French for sixteen years (1831-1847). Part of 
Abdelkader’s own undoing was from tribal and tariqa resistance to jihad taxes (Khodja 
1985). The revolts that ravaged the countryside over the following quarter century could 
too be characterized as tribal, and were centered on protecting tribal property rights – the 
economic and moral foundation of kin-based asabiyya.  
Closely following Polanyi’s description of the English Enclosures in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century (1944), colonial strategy to control local markets 
aimed at capturing and sequestering arch land from the local moral economies (Scott 
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1976) that had effectively resisted Ottoman control. To this effect, between 1844 and 
1873, the French passed a series of laws, backed by military power, to disenfranchise the 
tribes via organizational division, cantonment, and land expropriation. The 1871 Mokrani 
uprising, led by the Ath Abbès tribe in Kabylia and the Rahmaniyya tariqa with which it 
was closely associated marked the final moment of a forty-year violent struggle between 
colonial authorities and the tribes that had resulted in the death of up to a million 
Algerians (Kateb 2001). The uprising culminated in the Warnier Law of 1873, which 
allowed the sale of tribal land to European settlers, and which was the last of a series of 
laws that sought to break the backbone of the tribe, and with it overt anti-colonial 
resistance to French control over local politics and markets. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Part Three, by 1881 the Northeast and Tunisian 
Sahel, had already been incorporated into the beylical system (Brown 1974), as had the 
majority of the Northwest where tribes were increasingly settled, on iqta or azel 
concessions and residing in villages (Venema 1990; Ben Tahar 1993). While tribes 
controlled up to fifty percent of the land, much of this was located in the arid and semi-
arid South and in the Central Steppe (Attia 1966; Valensi 1985). By the time the Bey 
signed the 1881 Treaty of Bardo, an established corps of qaids that decentralized beylical 
authority and interconnectivity with international markets (Valensi 1969; Sebag 1989; 
Zouari 1990) had tipped the balance of power away from local groups, and the Beys 
increasingly defined a centralized property rights regime.  
The French Protectorate grafted elements of the Beylical administration to the 
new regime. While the Bey of Tunis continued to lead Tunisia – which increasingly 
formed a nation (Brown 1964; Anderson 1986; Charrad 2001) – a French resident 
governor controlled the sovereign posts of foreign policy, taxation, and policing. 
Depending on the population breakdown, local politics were controlled by mixed 
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municipal councils, or the corps of qaids and shuyukh that had been developed over the 
previous century. To repay the debts it had incurred over the nineteenth century, the 
Beylic ceded large tracts of ardh al-bey and public hubus land to settlers and French 
companies. To raise taxes, the Protectorate also encouraged the titling of melk land. 
Gallicized Tunisian land was protected from arbitrary expropriation, which encouraged 
Tunisian landowners – as had hubus in previous centuries – to participate in the new 
property rights system.  
Political space afforded to the native population might also be viewed in relation 
to the colonial-era property rights regime. The Tunisian Protectorate did not require the 
wholesale usurpation of the land structure to wrestle control of property rights and power 
from local actors – centralizing reforms in the Ottoman period had already done much of 
this. Using the beylical corps of qaids and shuyukh whose status as local-national 
intermediaries had been increased by the 1875 reforms, the French could control the 
countryside and rationally develop local land markets that incorporated real incentives for 
the Tunisian landholding elite. This elite, though opposed to colonial rule, participated in 
the system, sending their sons and daughters to the Collège Sadiki and Lycée Carnot, 
where they would get a modern education, enter the liberal professions or work in the 
colonial administration, and later form the corps of the nationalist movement in what 
Clement H. Moore calls the “colonial dialectic” (1970: 34-90). The relatively liberal 
economic and political environment permitted the development of a nationalist mass 
movement. Financed by the first generation of nationalists, the Neo-Destour was founded 
in 1934 by the second generation. Through vertical party and administrative channels and 
horizontal social networks established through business, familial, and tribal ties, the 
nationalist movement was able to implant its cadres in the major cities and villages by 
independence in 1956.  
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In Algeria, settler colonization began more or less in tandem with the first series 
of tribal land expropriation laws in the late 1840s. The laws, as noted above, broke the 
backbone of tribal resistance, but also removed the tribes from the most fertile tracts of 
land, including those running along the Chlef and Soummam Valleys and on the great 
plains that stretched from Oran to Tlemcen, from Constantine to Mila and the Mitidja. As 
a minority, the European settlers who occupied these lands were fully dependent on the 
colonial regime to protect their property. Though settlers disagreed on the best form of 
local policy (Prochaska 1990; Marynower 2008, 2010), they nevertheless formed a 
concentrated group with a singular interest in perpetuating the colonial property rights 
regime.  
When power passed from military to civilian hands in 1870-1871, the settler 
lobby became a key veto player in French national politics. Though a minority 
throughout the colonial era, the settler population had full control over the local 
administration and security apparatus, and used the administration to selectively limit 
Muslim entry into the local economic, political, and social markets (Ageron 1968). This 
small minority was selectively recruited from the largest tribes and most important 
groups that had been defeated militarily and economically years before (von Sivers 1979, 
1982, Establet 1991). Reliant on colonial power to buttress its own position, the 
collaborating Muslim elite had no legitimacy. In such a context, the disparate elements of 
the Muslim masses, disarticulated by colonialism’s de-activation of communal 
organization, had few indigenous focal points from which they could articulate demands 
(Bourdieu and Sayad 1964; Fanon 1968). 
Attempts to coordinate Muslim political and social action within the colonial 
framework were undermined by the settler population, which feared losing control over 
the colony’s political economy. Parties such as Ferhat Abbas’ Democratic Union for the 
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Algerian Manifesto (UDMA, Union démocratique du manifeste algérien), which 
attracted Muslims from the liberal professions, and Messali Hadj’s worker’s party, the 
Algerian People’s Party (PPA, Parti du peuple algérien), which attempted to participate 
in colonial politics were blocked by police repression or fraudulent ballot counting (Stora 
1982; Rahal 2010). Lacking political and economic space from which it could develop, 
the increasingly radicalized Algerian nationalist movement went underground in 1948. It 
re-emerged as the National Liberation Front (FLN, Front de libération nationale) on 
November 1, 1954 when it launched armed insurrection (Harbi 1980; Stora 1986). 
 
4.1 COLONIAL ALGERIA 
While the city of Algiers fell relatively quickly in 1830, it would take another 
forty years for the occupation to attain full control over all of Northern Algeria, and 
another twenty to control the South. French Algeria can be broken into three periods, 
each characterized by different strategies to wrestle authority to control property rights 
from local elites and institutions. 
In the first period, the French military battled the same tribes that had resisted the 
Ottomans with such zeal. The French subdued the northern Tell only after mobilizing an 
estimated third of their army (Ruedy 2005: 64).  
The second period of colonial occupation spans from the 1847 to 1870-71, and is 
marked by a multiplication of military and civilian administrative divisions and a series 
of land laws that sought to finally break tribal control over land in order to create a 
property market that would encourage settler colonies. During this period, the last tribal 
uprisings were crushed, and the French would achieve what the Ottomans never had: 
control over mawat land and hence the broad contours of the property rights regime. 
 97 
The third period of colonization, lasting from 1870-71 until the War of 
Independence in 1954, is characterized by civilian control and increased settler 
domination over land and politics. The settler population, which would peak at nearly one 
million, or close to one tenth of the population, increasingly controlled the land portfolio, 
owning 37 percent of Algeria’s estimated seven million ha of arable land by 1954. The 
1865 law that established a two-tiered system of citizens and natives discriminated 
against Muslim participation in the colonial administration, political system, and market. 
Settler lobbying also limited Muslim access to social services such as medicine and 
education. Efforts in the early twentieth century to liberalize settler policies and to 
encourage Muslim participation were systematically opposed and defeated by the settler 
population. The municipal elections of 1948, which encouraged Muslim participation, 
were neither fair nor free. Muslim participation, it was feared, would undermine settler 
privileges, if not the basis of the colonial system: access to cheap land and a guaranteed 
market in France. The colonial situation in Algeria precluded the development of a mass-
movement nationalist party.  
 
4.1.1 1830-1847: Military Occupation and the Tribal Wars 
Ottoman political institutions collapsed rapidly. The French seized Algiers and 
surrounding plain on 5 July 1830 and Medea, the capital of the Beylic of Titteri, in June 
1831. The same year, General Clauzel took Oran. Annaba and Bejaia, key ports in the 
Beylic of Constantine were both taken by 1833. Foretelling of policy to come, the same 
year, the military expropriated the ardh al-bey, property belonging to the Turkish regime 
and its officials, and the public hubus within the areas it controlled (Adel 1978: 106). 
Though theoretical – the French had only made small territorial gains – the decree 
portended catastrophe for the tribes that had settled on the Bey’s azel land in the 
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Constantine Plain (Guignard 2010: 89). While it was able to establish and hold 
beachheads in the West, the Center, and the East fairly quickly, the French would spend 
the next fifteen years battling for control over the northern Tell, or fertile littoral of land 
situated between the Mediterranean Sea and Tell Atlas Mountains. Opposition came from 
the tribes in the High Plains, organized from the territory of the former Beylic of 
Mascara/Oran.  
Based in Tlemcen, where a sizeable contingent of Turks had taken refuge, initial 
resistance in the West was led by Hadj Mahieddine, leader of the Qadiriyya tariqa,123 and 
under the patronage of the Sultan of Morocco, Moulay Abderrahman. Moroccan 
participation divided the Tlemcani elite, which split into two camps: the pro-Moroccan 
Maures against the Turks and Koulouglis – descendants from mixed janissary-Algerian 
marriages. Parallel tensions divided the makhzan and ra‘yat tribes. After initially 
supporting the uprising, the Douaïr and Zmala makhzan tribes from the Orani Plain 
refused to participate in the 1832 attack on Oran, and rallied to the French in 1835 in the 
hopes to retain the privileges they enjoyed under the Spanish Presidio and Beylic of 
Oran.124 In November 1832, Mahieddine retired. At meeting assembling various regional 
tribal shuyukh, the Hachem125 from the regional around Mascara and Flitti, a ra‘yat tribe 
formerly subordinate to the Hachem, promoted and elected (baya‘a) Abdelkader, 
Mahieddine’s son, Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful) the same month. Emir 
Abdelkader quickly unified the rebellion, rallying the Tlemcani Maures by accepting 
tutelage of the Sultan of Morocco, and winning the Hamiyane and Madjaher 
confederations, which had always resisted Ottoman control (Belhamissi 1976: 112; Boyer 
1977: 58-61; Kaddache 2005: 587-592).  
                                                
123 The tariqa would be later associated with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999-present). 
124 Ironically, their lands would be the first to be colonized following pacification. 
125 Incidentally, this was Mahieddine and Abdelkader’s confederation. 
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During the next four years, the Amir Abdelkader would expand his state from the 
confines of the Beylic of Mascara/Oran to Medea.126 Based in Mascara, the Amir 
Abdelkader organized his state into eight territorial-based khalifalik, broken into aghaliks 
and qaidat that roughly followed tribal frontiers. Each layer was tasked with collecting 
tribute to finance the resistance (Dinesen 2001). As his state expanded, the fluid tribal 
alliances changed frequently. Tribes joined and defected, following the logic of inter-
tribal politics of the ancien régime. The logic of who could legitimately claim to control 
and tax land played as important a role in uniting the alliance, as did religious fervor. The 
ra‘yat Beni Amer joined in 1833 shortly after the Douaïr and Zmala defected, breaking 
their sub-ordinate, tribute-paying status with the latter (Boyer 1977: 58-60). As the 
Douaïr and Zmala defection underscore, however, desire to protect tribal land and 
privileges from outside encroachment ran in two directions. For some, the Amir’s 
authority to raise tribute was no more legitimate than that of the Ottomans or the French 
and the jihad taxes created horizontal rivalries. The Tijani tariqa, which had also 
historically raised tribute for its city-state in Laghouat, resented the Amir’s encroachment 
in their political-economic market, and rebelled (Bessaïh 1997; Brower 2009). Conflict 
over the right to collect tribute also created tensions with Ahmed Bey as the Amir’s zone 
of influence began to intersect with that claimed by the Beylic of Constantine. 
The last Ottoman leader of Constantine, Ahmed Bey too was interested in 
claiming the mantle of resistance. Unlike the Amir, who organized his state along a tribal 
logic, Ahmed Bey set about creating a bureaucratic state (Ruedy 2005: 62) Shortly after 
the fall of Algiers, the Constantine city notables pledged support to Ahmed Bey, under 
terms of a charter “specifying obligations and taxation procedures…signed by the ulama, 
shaykhs, and amins of the corporations” (Clancy-Smith 1994: 72). Hoping to create a 
                                                
126 The French abandoned the former capital of the Beylic of Titteri, shortly after they took it in 1831. 
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kingdom akin to the Beylic of Tunis, Ahmed Bey wrote to Istanbul asking for a 
proclamation granting him control over all of former Ottoman Algeria (Ruedy 2005: 61). 
Tribal conflict stymied his ambitions to control the Ziban trade routes, near Biskra in the 
South. Meanwhile to the West, the Amir Abdelkader had eliminated the remaining 
pockets of Ottoman and Kouloughli power, and joined the Rahmaniyya tariqa to develop 
inroads into Kabylia and the Southeast – both preserves of the Beylic of Constantine 
(Clancy-Smith 1994: 76). In May 1837, as the French were preparing to siege 
Constantine, the Amir signed a peace treaty with the French. When Constantine fell on 13 
October, Ahmed Bey fled to the South where he hoped to rally the tribes and regain his 
capital. 
The May 1837 Treaty of Tafna further extended the territory of Amir 
Abdelkader’s state. In exchange for recognizing French control over Oran, 
Mostaghanem, and Algiers, the French granted the Amir control over most of the West, 
parts of the Mitidja, and extending to Kabylia in the East. The treaty, which only lasted 
two years, gave both parties a reprieve to prepare for another series of wars. As the Amir 
expanded his alliances and raised more tribute, the French consolidated their holdings in 
the area immediately surrounding Oran, and Mostaghanem, expanding their grip over 
much of the Mitidja Plain, and prepared the invasion of Constantine from their bulkhead 
in Annaba. Indicative of spatial control during this period, the French only controlled 
28.44 km2 around Oran and Mostaghanem and 143 in the Mitidja (Ruedy 1967: 85).127 
In 1839, hostilities were renewed. The French attacked territory claimed by the 
Amir near the border of the former Beylic of Constantine. The Amir counter-attacked, 
                                                
127 Reflecting on the Amir’s presence in the West, Alexis de Tocqueville suggested limiting colonization to 
Algiers. To protect French settler property rights, he suggested: “We should thus state as the first point that 
a continuous barrier would have to be erected around the territory destined to receive the colonists.” (de 
Tocqueville 2001: 85) 
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sacking French farming villages in the Mitidja Plain, and laying siege to Mazagran in the 
West. In 1840, the French launched a campaign against the major cities of the West, 
sacking and burning the Amir’s capital, Mascara. In 1841, the powerful Madjaher 
confederation from Mostaghanem rallied to the French and was rewarded with its own 
qaidat (Belhamissi 1976). In 1843, the French launched a surprise attack on the Amir’s 
new mobile capital, or smala. According to Ruedy, this marked the end of the Amir’s 
state as tribal confederations began to defect from the alliance (2005: 64), hopeful to 
negotiate their own treaties with the French that would preserve their land.  
 The Amir fled to Morocco the same year, re-entering Algeria in 1845.128 After a 
series of successful battles and reversals, the Amir eventually surrendered to the French 
near Nedroma, just north of Tlemcen (Kaddache 2000; Dinesen 2001; Ruedy 2005). 
Ahmed Bey was captured a year later. 
The collapse of the Amir Abdelkader’s state in December 1847 marked the end of 
wide-scale, organized resistance to the French. The collapse of inter-tribal collective 
action facilitated the re-wiring of political and economic power at the local level. Over 
the next thirty years, the French systematically attacked the tribal land structure, 
weakening intra-tribal solidarity. In tandem, it usurped local control through new 
institutions either imported from France, created in the field by military commanders, or 
by co-opting the disenfranchised tribal elite.  
 
                                                
128 The Amir was actually expelled after Moroccan Sultan Moulay Abderrahman was forced to sign the 
September 1844 Treaty of Tangier following defeat at the Battle of Isly. The Treaty defined the Algerian-
Moroccan border and recognized the Amir an outlaw in both Algeria and Morocco. 
. 
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4.1.2 1847-1871: Re-wiring Local Power 
The devastating wars of the 1830s and early 1840s broke inter-tribal coordination 
and resistance. During the next thirty years, the colonial regime would project French 
authority from the capital and provincial cities into the hinterland to achieve what the 
Ottomans and Amir Abdelkader had never done: assert central authority over the tribes. 
The keystone to this local-national struggle lay in control over arch land.  
Arch land was an impediment to colonial agricultural development and authority. 
At the time, French administrators estimated arch holdings at around forty-three thousand 
km2 (Kaddache 2000: 649). Outside the Mitidja, which had already been fully brought 
under French control, the most fertile tracts of land lay in the Constantine and Orani 
Plains and Chlef Valley – land belonging to the tribes that had rallied to the Amir 
Abdelkader and Ahmed Bey. As the bedrock of the moral economy that maintained intra-
tribal solidarity, arch land could be neither purchased nor sold. In the words of Lila Ben 
Salem: “Belonging to a [tribal] group necessarily implies possession of land. It is a sine 
qua non condition of group identity” (1996: 303). Land was the glue that bound the 
group, and enabled it to maintain its sovereignty. In order to fully profit from a 
potentially rich agricultural market, the French had to move this land from the moral to 
market economy. Arch land also undermined colonial authority. In the eyes of the 
Muslim population, tribal shuyukh legitimacy derived from their authority to enforce 
tribal property rights over arch land. 
Between the mid-1840s and 1871, the French would pass a series of laws that 
would progressively bring arch land under its control. Shifting this land from the tribal 
moral to the colonial market economy, the colonial administration dually managed 
whole-scale property rights reform and social re-ordering. As the tribes were displaced 
and arch land expropriated for colonial settlement, the regime replaced the shuyukh and 
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jema‘a with colonial institutions. The modes of colonial government were far from 
uniform. Following the local-national logic, those reflected the balance of power between 
settler, Muslim, and administration.  
Taking advantage of the Amir Abdelkader’s brief exile in Morocco and setting the 
stage for full colonization, the colonial army expanded the scope and authority of its 
occupation. In 1844, the military declared the right to tax and expropriate fallow land 
under its control. Though not specifically targeting arch land, the 1 October 1844 
Ordinance, the wording of the decree allowed the military to selectively punish tribes in 
by sequestering pastures and fallows scheduled for bi- and tri-annual rotation (Guignard 
2010: 89). The ruling was followed by an ordinance in the 21 July 1846 Ordinance that 
created an arbitration commission for contested land. Proof of ownership required a title. 
For the village and town elite, this was often not a problem. Muslim qadis had been 
issuing titles for centuries (Christelow 1982; Hénia 1999). Arch land rights were based on 
the moral economy of custom and legitimacy (al-yad) and possession (al-hawz) and were 
rarely formally titled (Gherras 1995: 177).  
In April 1845, a Royal Ordinance divided the Algeria into three provinces, 
Algiers, Constantine, and Oran, with borders that roughly followed the Beylics of Oran 
and Constantine.129 The ordinance also defined territorial administration throughout the 
colony in a three-tiered system: civil territories (Communes de plein exercise); mixed 
communes; and the Arab Bureaux. Civil territories, where settlers were close to a 
majority, had an elected mayor and municipal council. The military managed the mixed 
communes and Arab Bureaux. A military administrator or a delegated member of the 
settler community would run the mixed-communes, until 1848, when they shifted to 
civilian control with an elected town council. While numerically the majority, Muslims 
                                                
129 Dar as-Sultan and the Beylic of Titteri were merged. 
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could not participate in local politics until the 27 December 1866 Decree, which limited 
Muslim representation to those who had applied to French citizenship and who could 
occupy to no more than a fifth of the municipal council (Brett 1988; Weil 2003). The law 
mandated a French mayor, and proscribed the Muslim population from participation in 
mayoral elections.  
In 1848, a year after Amir Abdelkader’s defeat and exile, and the same year 
Ahmed Bey was captured in the South, Louis Phillippe I was deposed and the Second 
French Republic declared. With the arrival of Napoleon III first as President then as 
Emperor of the Second Empire, France began colonization in earnest, and established 
fifty-four agricultural colonies (Centre de colonisation) in the three provinces: eleven in 
Constantine, seventeen in Algiers, and twenty-six in Oran (Kaddache 2000: 647). 
Located close to the regional capitals, the centers were frequently positioned on makhzan 
arch, such as Aboukir (Mesra), Cassaigne (Sidi Ali), Noissy-les-Bains (Aïn Noussy), and 
Rivoli (Hassi Memeche), founded on land belonging to the Madjaher, who ironically had 
rallied to the French to protect their makhzan privileges seven years earlier. 
The 16 June 1851 Communes Law extended the settler project, defining 
municipal prerogatives and rights, and modifying property laws to create a land market. 
The law imposed Civil Code on Algerian individually owned melk property, subsuming it 
into the French private land regime, and laying the legal basis for a private land market. 
The provision was symbolic, as most melk continued to be collectively owned and bound 
to shefa‘a, or the right of pre-emption (Adel 1978: 260). The law also contained a 
number of provisions to protect Muslim interests. Article 14 of the 1851 law banned the 
sale of arch land to individuals outside the tribe, and Article 16 placed jurisdiction of 
non-melk Muslim land in the Muslim courts, presided by the qadi, or Muslim judge.  
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What the law would give the tribes it would also take. The crown of the 1851 
Communes Law was the sequestration of fifty percent of arch land held within the 
administrative boundaries of civil territories and mixed communes. The municipal 
councils determined which land would be expropriated, taking the very best tracts. The 
land was registered in the local cadastre and redistributed as land grants or sold in public 
auction, further increasing the size of the colonial land market. Communal land provided 
the new colonial municipalities an important source of revenue and the provisions were 
meant to encourage settler migration. Over the next ten years, 85 new colonies were 
created. In the East alone, 61,000 ha of arch land were confiscated from 16 
confederations (Gherras 1995: 190). Bendjaballah notes that in the Constantinois, a small 
number of tribes that had already entered proto-capitalist agriculture were able to re-
purchase land at the communal auction-house (1997: 86). The vast majority, such as the 
Douaïr and Zmala of Oran, however, simply lost their land. The 1851 Communes Law 
dealt a serious blow to the moral economy of asabiyya for the tribes in these lands.  
French colonial economists and jurists lauded the power of the market in property 
and social change. Advisor to Napoleon III, Ismaël Urban noted at the time: “it’s not 
individual property we are making, it’s the individual” (Ageron 1961: 10). However, by 
1851, only 204 Muslims had voluntarily titled their land in the French registers in the 
Mitidja Plain (Adel 1978: 126). And of the 364,341 ha of land that passed into French 
hands between 1830 and 1861, only 3,676 ha actually came from individual-to-individual 
sale. The remaining 360,665 ha were seized by force: 158,721 ha from the ardh al-bey 
and 16,258 ha from the public hubus following the sacking of Algiers, Constantine, and 
Oran; land considered “vacant” or outright expropriated from dissident tribes accounted 
for another 69,688 ha; and 112,450 ha were seized by the Communes Law or general 
public-use sequestration (Ruedy 1967: 100).  
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Outside of the provincial capitals and the new colonial municipalities, the military 
continued to govern, and did so through the Arab Bureaux (Establet 1991; Frémeaux 
1993; Abi-Merched 2002). Created in 1833 as the Special Bureau for Arab Affairs to 
provide a corps of Arab-language translators, an accumulation of responsibilities led to a 
formal reorganization and attachment to the War Department in 1844. Forty-six districts, 
or cercles, staffed with three to four French officers and no more than fifty soldiers, 
governed very large territories populated by the tribes (Perkins 1980: 15). Modeled on the 
Amir Abdelkader’s tribal state (Lacoste, Nouschi and Prenant 1960: 267), the district was 
subdivided into qaidats and sheikhats. Prestigious tribes were given control over the 
qaidat, which oversaw the sheikhat, organized around douar boundaries. 
Table 4.1: French Property Acquisitions, 1830-1861 
Type of Property Area, Hectare 
Purchased Land     3,676 
Expropriated Land 360,665 
Ardh al-bey 158,721 
Public hubus   16,258 
Mawat (not in ardh al-bey)   69,688 
Arch 112,450 
Other      3548 
Total 364,341 
Source: Ruedy 1967: 100 
 
The new system did not necessarily reflect continuity, however. Perkins notes: 
“The retention of the traditional tribal organization did not require the retention of the 
individuals within it” (1980: 91). The local French officer chose his qaidal corps and 
shuyukh according to personal leadership style. While some chose to co-opt the 
traditional leaders vested with the legitimacy of the confederation or branch jema‘a, 
following the policy of les grandes familles, others preferred to create their own clients. 
Ruedy notes that in the West, the majority of qaids were chosen from the tribes that 
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opposed Amir Abdelkader (Ruedy 2005: 72). This is the case of the Madjaher from 
Mostaghanem, who lost much of their land in the immediate environs of Mostaghanem, 
but were given a qaidat (Belhamissi 1976).  
The new corps was responsible for administering military policy and extracting 
taxes. Allowed to pocket ten percent of their tax collection, they would often overcharge 
their subjects and under declare revenue (Gherras 1995: 191). De-coupled from the moral 
economy contract to defend the interests of the tribe, corruption and abuse of power was 
non uncommon. This perception was only strengthened when in 1863 Napoleon III 
distributed 34,000 ha of former arch land as a personal gift to 315 shuyukh (Adel 1978: 
161). While ostensibly the Arab Bureaux defended the tribal institution, in reality, they 
undermined the legitimacy of tribal authority and intra-tribal solidarity. An Arab Bureau 
field report from 1858 reported the imminent collapse of tribal authority (Perkins 1980: 
97). 
The 1863 Sénatus-Consulte of 22 April 1863 modified the rules surrounding arch 
and legislated intra-tribal political authority. Ostensibly, the law was meant to protect the 
tribes by annulling the 1844 and 1846 expropriation decrees, and by assigning legal rights 
to arch land. The law issued titles to collective and individual tribal. Tribal melk property 
was Gallicized and lost its legal distinction. Once titles were issued, the restriction on the 
sale of arch land, Article 14 of the 1851 Communes Law, could be lifted, further 
buttressing the colonial land market.  
Ironically, the major obstacle to protecting tribal land was the tribe itself. In 1863, 
it was still not clear what land belonged to the tribe, and how the division of land within 
the tribe would occur. The tribes themselves had to be identified and territory delimited. 
The law decreed tribes would be broken into their smallest social unit, the douar, which 
would henceforth be an administrative unit akin to a hamlet, or douar-commune, 
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dependent on the local Arab Bureau, local mixed-commune, or civilian territory. A 
sheikh for each douar-commune was elected by the jema‘a, which was nominated by 
colonial administrators.  
Once the douars had been identified, the jema‘a and a colonial commission would 
determine what land belonged to whom in an operation baptized “amiable accords.” The 
legislation specifically ruled out an egalitarian distribution of land, and the colonial 
commissions often connived with jema‘a to grant titles to individuals amenable to the 
colonial regime (Adel 1978: 196). Between 1863 and 1871, 667 douar-communes were 
established; covering forty-three thousand km2– of which 2,840,591 ha could enter the 
colonial land market registered under individual titles (ibid: 197). Between 1863 and 
1869, settlers purchased more than ten percent of that land (ibid: 201). Sénatus-Consulte 
succeeded in transferring arch from the moral to the market economy, and with it, 
undermined the social cohesion of the tribe. 
Clearly, “[t]he legislation sought to break the tribe – the catalyst of revolts, 
assimilated with the archaism of the ancien régime” (Guignard 2010: 85-86). The process 
was unevenly applied throughout the Tell – the operation had to be postponed on the 
southern Orani Plain after the Ouled Sidi Cheikh rebelled in 1864 (ibid: 88). And it 
almost always led to violent intra-tribal conflict (Establet 1991: 265-277, 287-296). The 
new administrative division re-wired traditional hierarchy and socio-political space, often 
in arbitrary ways: politically only one sheikh could represent a douar-commune, and a 
same sheikh could not represent multiple communes. A social unit, the douar was 
sometimes split into multiple douar-communes, dividing traditional hierarchical 
leadership and increasingly atomizing the social unit (Lacoste, Nouschi and Prenant 
1960: 371; Adel 1978: 195). 
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The 1863 law was a blessing for colonial interests. The expansion of colonial 
public and private land opened the door to mass colonization. The European population 
nearly doubled during the 1860s, climbing to 279,000 in 1870, as did its hold on the land 
structure. The survey of the same year tallied 765,000 ha in colonial hands (Ruedy 2005: 
69). With the increase in settlements came administrative expansion. By 1870, civilian 
territory encompassed 12,780 km2, governed by 96 municipalities – managing 13,300 ha 
each on average (Ageron 1968: 162). To assist the new colonies, Paris leased land to 
large companies in exchange for large public works projects. Just west of Mostaghanem, 
in 1865, the Société anonyme de l’Habra et de la Macta received a 25,000 ha concession 
to build a dam on the Fergoug river, that would irrigate nearby Perregaux, a colony 
founded ten years earlier on land that had belonged to the Flitti. Similar projects were 
developed in the East, on the fertile azel land formerly owned by the Bey of Constantine 
(Adel 1978: 161-162). 
 
Figure 4.1: Colonial Progression, French Algeria 
 
Source: Ruedy 2005: 56 
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The Sénatus-Consulte was a disaster for the Muslim population. A series of bad 
harvests, the privatization of tribal land, and the destruction of the moral economy 
resulted in widespread famine. Between 1866 and 1868, in the Constantine region alone, 
an estimated 250,000 Algerians perished (Adel 1978: 2000; Sari 1982). Formerly 
powerful tribes such as the Ouled Naïl fell into complete destitution (Brower 2009). As a 
sheikh from the Ouled Rechaïch lucidly commented: “The French defeated us on the 
Plain of Sbikha. They killed our young men and they imposed war amends. That was 
nothing – our wounds heal. But the constitution of individual property and the 
authorization of sale was the death of the tribe and twenty years later, the Ouled Rechaïch 
no longer existed” (Salem 1996: 307).  
Between 1847 and 1871, colonial authorities managed to disrupt and re-assemble 
the tribal institutions, push arch from the moral to the market economy, and impose 
centralizing authority via the Arab Bureaux, colonial municipalities, and mixed-
communes. During the next eighty years, Algeria would become French. Fearful of 
losing the privileges guaranteed by the colonial system, like the makhzan tribes of past, 
the settler community excluded Muslims from political and economic space. Access to 
basic services, such as education and healthcare was restricted despite growing Muslim 
demands for equal treatment. Lacking the room required to build a pro-independence 
mass-movement party, Algerian nationalists went underground, and would eventually in 
1954 launch a bloody eight-year struggle for independence. 
 111 
 
4.1.3 1871-1954: Protecting Settler Prebends and Muslim Exclusion 
Prussia’s crushing defeat of French forces and annexation of Alsace and Lorraine 
in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, the overthrow of Napoleon III, and the ascension of the 
Third Republic marked a shift of power in the colony from military to settler hands. In 
1871, the newly elected settler administration began closing the Arab Bureaux in the 
Algerian Tell. Settlers had always resented the Arab Bureaux’ policy of les grandes 
familles, and the restrictions military control placed on land under their administration. 
Re-baptized the Indigenous Affairs Services, sixteen Bureaux were closed in the Tell; 
most of the remaining twenty-eight were located in the pre-Saharan and Saharan region 
on lands that did not interest the settler population (Perkins 1980: 20-21). The closure of 
the northern Bureaux increased civilian administered territory from twelve thousand to 
fifty-three thousand km2 between 1870 and 1879 (Gherras 1995: 260). 
Kabylia, which had largely escaped Ottoman control, and had never been entirely 
pacified by the French, revolted in 1871. Large landowner and rural elite Mohamed 
Mokrani led the uprising, backed by the Rahmaniyya tariqa, in reaction to the shift in 
authority. The rebellion was brutally suppressed. 6,500 km2 of fertile land in the 
Soummam Valley were sequestered as punishment, creating a new zone for colonization 
and inciting a massive wave of Kabyle migration to Oran, Algiers, and Paris (Lacoste, 
Nouschi and Prenant 1960: 345). 
Over the next twenty years, the land regime was progressively brought into the 
French system. The 26 July 1873 Warnier law rescinded the remaining barrier to full 
colonization of Muslim land, decreeing the individualization of collective land and entry 
of all land into the French property market. And the 1897 real-estate law ruled that prior 
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liens or litigation linked the Muslim land titles would not affect re-titling and sale in the 
French system.  
Not surprisingly, the settler population boomed. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 reveal the 
striking expansion of the colonial population and administration that occurred in tandem 
with the transfer to civilian rule in the colony.  










Acquired for Col. 
1871-1880 246 401,000   60,000    461,000 
1881-1890 107 176,000 227,000    403,000 
1891-1900  46 126,000 159,000    258,000 
1901-1910 112 175,000 352,000    527,000 
Total 529 878,000 798,000 1,676,000 
Source: Benachenou 1976: 217; Ageron 1979: 76-97; Ruedy 2005: 84. 
Table 4.3: Administrative Control 
Year Civilian. Land, ha Municipalities Mixed-Communes 
1879   5,349,646 181 44 
1880   7,383,583 184 63 
1881 10,482,964 196 77 
1884 10,659,344 209 75 
1886 12,075,692 232 78 
1891 12,855,053 249 73 
Source: Ageron 1968: 162. 
 
The dismantling of the Arab Bureaux in the Tell brought thousands of hectares of 
land under civilian control. As noted above, before 1870, the municipalities and mixed-
communes directly governed a little over a million hectares of land. A decade later, the 
surface area governed by the communes had increased to more than seven million, while 
the number of civilian-administered localities only doubled. The four hundred thousand 
ha distributed to new settlements between 1870 and 1880 created the basis of the new 
land market, while the series of real-estate reforms passed during the same period 
streamlined the acquisition process, making it easier for settlers to purchase land by 
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chiseling parochial Muslim and customary land rights that had been half-heartedly 
worked into legislation. Beginning in the 1880s, the state distributed less colonial land 
simply because the land market was functioning with greater efficiency. In 1883, the year 
rural colonization peaked, an estimated forty-one percent of the European population 
resided in the countryside (Ruedy 2005: 85). 
 The rural European population plateaued at around two hundred thousand in the 
1890s (ibid). Subsequent European migrants headed to the large colonial cities, as did the 
sons and daughter of settler-farmers (e.g. Algiers, Annaba, Constantine, and Oran). While 
rural settlers represented close to forty percent of the European population, they 
represented only six percent of the total rural population in 1906 (Ruedy 2005: 121), 
though the percentage varied between the three provinces, indicating settlement trends.  




By Community, %  
Province European Muslim European Muslim 
Algiers   30,766,   4.96%   588,688, 95.04% 13,244,  27.33% 35,220, 72.67% 
Constantine   20,599,   2.45% 821,411, 97.55%     6,640,    8.41% 72,331, 91,59% 
Oran   37,312, 11.68%  283,049, 88, 32% 21,036, 36.94% 35,913, 63.06% 
Source: Adel 1978: 391 
 
Increasingly landless, the Muslim rural population joined the European 
workforce, In 1901, 13.31 percent Muslim farm workers were working on colonial farms; 
by 1914, eighteen percent worked on the farms (Ageron 1968: 827). Mechanization over 
the next forty years would push the number of rural workers downward. Ruedy estimates 
that by 1954, half of the adult Muslim population of working age was unemployed (2005: 
123). Mechanization also affected middle-sized Muslim farms, which could not get 
access to credit and hence sold their farms under the weight of competition 
(Benachenhou 1976: 225; Adel 1978: 379). Between 1930 and 1950, the number of 50 to 
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99 ha farms tilled by Muslim farmers decreased from thirty-five to sixteen thousand 
(Ruedy 2005: 122). By 1950, four percent the Muslim landowners controlled 38.5 
percent of all arable land, while French settlers, though representing less than ten percent 
of the population, controlled twenty-seven percent of the total arable land portfolio, or 2.7 
million ha (Tiano 1967: 281; Lamchichi 1991: 41).  
Outnumbered, and entirely dependent on the colonial system that had been set 
into place, settler politicians rejected any sort of economic or political liberalization that 
could call into question the legitimacy of the colonial property rights system. A 14 July 
1865 ruling established a two-tiered citizenship rule that required Muslims to apply for 
French citizenship (Brett 1988). Rejecting the application procedure, which included the 
switch from the Muslim to civil family code, no more than sixty thousand Muslims ever 
became French citizens (Weil 2003: 14; Amara 2008), less than a percent of the total 
Muslim population, which had reached close to ten million in 1962. Muslims were 
discouraged from secondary and university education. In 1954, fewer than six hundred 
Muslim students were enrolled at the University of Algiers (Henry 2010: 28). 
Efforts to extend Muslim rights were defeated by the settlers in 1936 and 1944. 
The 1936 Blum-Violette plan proposed allowing extending the right to vote to 24,000 
Muslims, while allowing them to maintain their personal status – i.e. Muslim, not French. 
The settler population rejected the law, rejecting “transgression from the principal on 
which Algerian colonization was founded: a distinction between French citizens and 
Muslim subjects” (Weil 2003: 13). Parties such as Ferhat Abbas’ Democratic Union for 
the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA, Union démocratique du manifeste algérien), which 
attracted Muslims from the liberal professions, and Messali Hadj’s worker’s party, the 
Algerian People’s Party (PPA, Parti du peuple algérien), were blocked by police 
repression or fraudulent ballot counting, as in the 1948 vote (Stora 1982; Rahal 2010). In 
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the years preceding independence, the PPA from which would shoot the clandestine 
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), would never claim more than 15,000-30,000 
adherents (Moore 1970: 84; Zartman 1973: 495-496). Lacking political and economic 
space from which it could develop, the increasingly radicalized Algerian nationalist 
movement went underground in 1948. Its paramilitary elements re-emerged as the 
National Liberation Front (FLN, Front de libération nationale) on November 1, 1954 
when it launched armed insurrection (Harbi 1980; Stora 1986). 
Using control over the levers of administration control and colonial violence,130 
settlers excluded Algerian Muslims from political and economic space, precluding the 
development of a gelled pro-independence party. Lacking administrative and political 
space to develop a party structure, the anti-colonial movement would largely develop 
underground and in a decentralized manner, outside the major cities. Anti-colonial elite 
hold of the land structure was limited due to the extremely lopsided distribution of land in 
the hands of the colonial elite and a small and dense group of co-opted Algerian Muslims. 
As such, the anti-colonial struggle would be focused in the rugged hinterlands (the 
revolution began in the Aurès maquis), organized by rag-tag armed resistance bands 
(mujahidin) comprised primarily of dispossessed fellah or disgruntled farm workers, only 
nominally organized around core policy issues, with very limited institutional control 
spanning from the center to the periphery (Harbi 1980; 1992a). The FLN’s clandestine 
and decentralized organization and limited numbers precluded a dense network of 
administratively proficient party cadres, and would limit the party’s subsequent efforts to 
harness the countryside in both state building and property reform experiments.  
 
                                                
130 In May 1945, a nationalist demonstration in Setif triggered regional anti-Muslim rioting. Anywhere 
from 7,000 to 40,000 Algerians were killed in the massacres, along with 100 Europeans. Ruedy 2005: 149; 
Planche 2006. 
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4.1.4 Colonial Portrait: Maître Said Benabdallah (I-2) 
Maître Said Benabdallah was born in 1932, in St. Cloud (Gdeyl), French 
Algeria’s first official colonization center, located 30 km East of Oran. His family lived 
in Oran, but because his father was dodging the draft instituted during the First World 
War, he brought his wife to St. Cloud, which had a more mixed population than Oran, 
and regular police and gendarme controls of Algerian Muslims were less frequent than in 
Oran.  
Maître Benabdallah’s great-grandfather was a qadi of the Hachem confederation, 
and had witnessed Emir Abdelkader’s baya‘a in 1832. His grandfather too was qadi, as 
well as a wealthy landowner in the Ghiss region near Mascara. Shortly after his 
grandfather died, his uncle took over the patriarchy. In 1888, his uncle confronted the 
Aurelier brothers who had tried to illegally occupy his land. Arms were drawn, and his 
uncle shot one and killed the other. Fleeing with his six-year old brother, Maître 
Benabdallah’s father, the uncle installed the family in Oran.  
Four years after his birth, and still on the run, Maitre Benabdallah’s father moved 
the family to El Bordj, his mother’s douar in Mascara. No longer eligible for the draft, his 
father and family returned to Oran in 1939. His parents enrolled him and his older brother 
in a French primary school. Both he and his brother excelled in coursework – his brother 
was one of the few Algerians with a university degree in 1954. When classes would 
finish, Maitre Benabdallah went to the Moorish cafés where, lacking public space, 
Messali Hadj’s Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés (MTLD) organized meetings, 
and soon became involved in the movement’s clandestine armed movement, the 
Organisation Secrète (OS).  
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When Maitre Benabdallah finished his ‘bac’131 in 1952, he worked as a clerk 
during the day. On his weekends and at nights, he would go on reconnaissance missions 
for the OS with revolutionary martyrs Ahmed Zabana and Hamou Boutlelis, and with 
Houari Souiah, Oran’s first prefect. In 1953, he was arrested in possession of a 
topographical map and a compass in St. Cloud. His mission was to pinpoint the 
coordinates of French police stations and military caserns. Beaten and tortured, he 
explained he was a Muslim Scout and on a hike. Having divulged no information, 
subversion charges eventually dropped. Unfortunately, like his father twenty years 
before, Maître Benabdallah was dodging his military service, sent to a military prison for 
a month, and then forced into the service. 
Humiliated by colonial inequity, he joined the FLN in April 1955, and was sent to 
Wilaya V, Zone 6.  
 
4.2 TUNISIA: BUILDING ON OTTOMAN FOUNDATIONS 
French President Jules Ferry used Khroumir tribal razzias from northwestern 
Tunisia into French Algeria as a pretext for the April 1881 invasion. Occupation of 
Tunisia was less violent than in neighboring Algeria (Ganiage 1959; Martin 2003). 
Outgunned by a French army that had fifty years of North African combat experience and 
modern weapons, the Beylic surrendered a little more than three weeks after the French 
debarked. On 12 May 1881, Sadok Bey signed the Treaty of Bardo. Treaty of Bardo 
confiscated beylical power over matters of state. Control over foreign affairs, defense, 
agricultural, and fiscal policy were placed into the hands of the French High 
Commissioner in Tunisia, or Resident General. The French administration was grafted to 
                                                
131 He earned both the first and second baccalaureate (high school) degree. The second degree was required 
for university training. 
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the Beylical state. Article III iterated France’s obligation to “lend constant assistance to 
His Majesty the Bey of Tunis against any danger that should menace His Majesty’s 
person or dynasty or compromise the tranquility of his State” (Traité de Bardo, 1881). 
The Bey’s central government was left intact. His prime minister continued to manage 
major dossiers, which were presented to his government once cleared by the Resident 
General and his administration. 
Areas of armed resistance were located in tribal areas in the Northwest, Central 
Steppe, and South, where the Bey’s authority, while recognized, remained at least 
partially theoretical (de Montety 1973: 171). Tribal resistance was the greatest in the 
zones most implicated in the 1864 revolt: the Khroumir in the Northwest; the Drid, 
Frechiche, Hamamma and Majeur confederations in the Central Steppe; and tribes further 
to the South near Sfax and Gabès (Attia 1966; Venema 1990; Ben Tahar 1995). The 
resistance was suppressed by July, and the tribes subject to harsh penalties. Article VII of 
the Treaty of Bardo placed the war reparations on the shoulders of the tribes, leaving it to 
the beylic to recover those costs (Traité de Bardo 1881). 
 
4.2.1 Co-opting Indigenous Elites in the Protectorate System: Local-National 
Colonial Articulation 
The qaidal corps, mostly beylical functionaries after the 1875 reform, obeyed the 
Bey’s cease-fire. The beylical model of political organization had integrated this elite into 
a circuit of mutual dependence, based on iqta grants and tax prebends. The French 
protectorate maintained the qaidal corps after the takeover, though they eliminated about 
half of the posts, consolidating the remaining thirty-seven districts (Fitoussi and Benazet 
1931: 407). Expanding the layers of native administration, in 1889 the qaidat were 
divided into sub-divisions, or khalifat. The Bey continued to name the qaids, who as 
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salaried bureaucrats were allowed to keep between two and five percent of the taxes they 
raised (Fitoussi and Benazet: 413-414). The head of each sub-administrative level (i.e. 
the qaid, khalifa, and shuyukh) was invested in raising taxes, identifying land titles, and 
police functions. After 1905, the Bey also nominated the shuyukh auxiliaries, who had 
been co-opted by the tribes during the pre-colonial era. Unlike the reforms of 1726-1727 
and 1861-1864, the 1905 reorganization did not trigger rural rebellion. Ashford relates 
the passivity to changing modes of social organization: “centralized authority was 
introduced at a time when the tribal patterns were beginning to break down enough to 
permit more effective local participation in affairs outside the tribal framework” (Ashford 
1967: 68). 
To oversee the qaidal corps, the Protectorate created the Native Administration 
Control Service (SCAI, Service du Contrôle de l’Administration Indigène) in 1884. The 
SCAI was grouped into five regions and nineteen districts,132 each headed by a French 
civilian comptroller (contrôleur civil) who reported to the Resident General. The civilian 
comptroller had the power of regional governors. In addition to supervising the qaidal 
corps and overseeing the shuyukh, the civilian comptroller also oversaw the municipal 
councils (Fitoussi and Benazet 1931: 202-217).  
In 1885, colonial authorities incorporated the Tunis City Council, which had 
chartered under Mohammed Bey in 1858, into the new administration, with eight French, 
one Jewish and eight Muslim members appointed by the government. The same year, the 
municipal experiment was expanded to Bizerte, Kef, La Goulette, Sousse, and Sfax. The 
municipal councils were mandated to oversee local-level, day-to-day affairs that affected 
                                                
132 Roughly corresponding to the Northwest (1); Northeast and Tunis suburbs (2), eastern Central Steppes, 
(3); western Central Steppes (4), and South (5). Perkins notes that the SCAI was created in part to control 
the Military, which had organized the regions into cercles, replicating the Arab Bureaux model, which was 
largely abolished thirteen years earlier in Algeria. The cercles lost authority to the SCAI in the North, and 
remained active only in the Saharan regions after the 1890s. Perkins 1980: 21-26. 
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the provincial towns and their suburban peripheries, under the guidance of the local 
civilian comptroller. 
Writing from a colonial framework, Fitoussi and Benazet note that the expansion 
of city charters broke from the heritage of excessive beylical centralization (1931: 417). 
Indeed, provincial elites now had more representation than under the more recent beylical 
system where local-level administrative decisions were the purview of the qaids. Viewed 
by the rural elite as a mean of guaranteeing economic and social advancement if not for 
themselves, then for their sons and nephews, notables across the countryside lobbied for 
increased municipal representation. By 1914, twenty-five percent of the population fell 
under the jurisdiction of thirty-eight councils. In an effort to prevent destabilizing 
centrifugal effects, the 1914 Municipal Reform placed increased administrative, fiscal, 
and political restrictions on the councils, while expanding charters. Fifty-three in 1922, 
by 1952 there were sixty-four incorporated municipalities, located mainly in the 
Northeast and the densely populated Sahel (Ashford 1967: 68). 
In 1922, the Protectorate expanded delegated representation at the national and 
the regional level when it created the Grand Council, five Regional Councils, and the 
Qaidat Councils. Each level integrated colonial industrial and agricultural interests, 
“traditional functionaries” (e.g. qaid, shuyukh), or settler notables – sometimes all three – 
into the protectorate framework, and was configured to maintain total French oversight 
(Dabbab 2000). 
Outside municipal territories, the administration organized Qaidat Councils, 
composed of shuyukh delegates, presided by the qaid. While the composition and size 
varied, each council represented at least one delegate from each masheikhat, with the 
remaining seats proportionally distributed according to population size. Shuyukh 
delegates had to be local notables and landowners, defined as such by the sheikh and 
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verified by the qaid and civilian comptroller (Fitoussi and Benazet 1931: 271-272). An 
evaluation list of candidate delegates, drawn by the sheikh and verified by the qaid and 
civilian comptroller, was sent to the Prime Minister, who nominated the delegates to the 
purely consultative Qaidat Councils for a six-year mandate. The bureaucratization of the 
process was striking, and this “administrative territorialization undermined the position of 
tribal leaders, as they became office-bound functionaries and lost contact with the daily 
preoccupations of their less-favored kin” (Anderson 1986: 150, cited in Charrad 2001: 
118). It tied the shuyukh-defined notables increasingly into the system, opening doors to 
administrative access and bank credits. Partly an earnest attempt to make-good on 
wartime promises of de-centralization, party an effort to off-load the cumbersome 
nomination Beylical process, the government organized elections in the 1,400 
masheikhat, giving males residents the right to vote for an administration composed list 
of shuyukh candidates. The same year inaugurated a series of national-level qualification 
exams that sought to standardize competencies for newly appointed qaids. 
Regional councils were created in the five Native Administration Control Service 
zones. The regional councils were an experiment in decentralizing financial 
responsibility, and explicitly linked colonial and Muslim elites interests. Presided by the 
civil comptroller, regional councils were composed by members of the qaidal and 
municipal councils within each region, along with members of the regional chambers of 
agriculture and industry. Municipal delegates, in addition to the vice-president of the 
capital provincial city, included settler and Muslim delegates, each elected by the 
ensemble of their peer-community within a region. Regional councils outlined major 
development projects for the municipalities and qaidat within administrative boundaries, 
established annual regional budgets, and determined specific fiscal policy. Though 
overlapping interest structures of delegated Muslim and elected colonial elites, the 
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regional councils were biased toward colonial corporate and agricultural interests  (see 
Table 4.5, below). 
Aggregating national level colonial and indigenous interests, the administration 
replaced the Advisory Council, established in 1891,133 with the Grand Council, organized 
along the same principals as the regional councils. The seventy-eight member chamber 
was composed of fifty-two French and twenty-six native delegates and presided by the 
French Resident General. While the French section was elected, indigenous assembly 
members were co-opted from the regional chambers of commerce and industry and five 
regional assemblies – themselves a reflection of colonial and indigenous economic 
interests. The Grand Council’s role was to articulate economic interests. It examined the 
Bey’s annual budget (itself defined by the Resident General, as stipulated in the Treaty of 
Bardo), and proposed amendments to the Prime Minister, but could neither propose 
legislation nor debate political or constitutional matters (Fitoussi and Benazet 1931: 232-
252; Kraïem 1990; Ben Hamida 1992).  
Overseen by the civilian comptroller and Resident General and hardly egalitarian, 
the four-tiered regime nevertheless created a system of local-national articulation, 
integrating the local indigenous elites into the political economy of the protectorate in 
ways inconceivable in neighboring French Algeria. It gave the colonial administration 
crucial insight into the political system at the most local-level, while defraying the costs 
to the French-administered beylical institution. Incorporating the rural Tunisian elite into 
the process had a dual effect. First, it created a significant corps of local and national 
level elite that became habituated to the workings of modern administration. Second, it 
created incentives for the rural elite to enter the colonial process – partly in order to 
                                                
133 The Advisory Council (Conférence consultative) was itself a Protectorate artifact of the Council of 
Sixty, founded by the Bey in 1860. 
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protect their traditional rights, partly to participate in the new land regime. The latter 
effect would greatly abet colonial land policy, which was focused on capitalist agriculture 
in the northern plains and in the fertile Cap-Bon peninsula. 
Table 4.5: Mixing Interests, Regional Councils (1928) 
 Bizerte Tunis Kef Sousse Sfax 
 Fr. Nat. Fr. Nat Fr. Nat Fr. Nat Fr. Nat 
Qaidal  
Council 
2 6 2 4 2 6 3 8 3 8 
Chamber of 
Agriculture 
4 2 4 2 4 2 - - - - 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
3 2 4 3 3 2 - - - - 
Mixed  
Chamber 
- - - - - - 6 3 6 3 
Chamber of 
Mining  
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 
Municipal 
Council 
6 3 7 6 5 3 6 3 6 3 
Vice Mayor 
Prov. Capital 
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 
Total 17 13 19 15 16 13 17 14 17 14 
Source: Fitoussi and Benazet 1931: 276 
 
4.2.2 Land Policy: Integrating Local Elites into the Political Economy 
French penetration into the countryside was more measured than in neighboring 
Algeria. Before it initiated wide-scale land transfer through a colonial land-market or 
sequestration, the French administration would tally beylical and private indigenous 
holdings, and register them in a controlled and well-managed process.  
The first step was to identify government-owned land and create the mechanisms 
for a rational land market. Unlike Algeria, where beylical land was confiscated, Tunisian 
ardh al-bey was consolidated and management transferred to the Direction of Finances. 
There, the Bey’s private holdings were parsed from state land, which placed under to 
French management by the 8 June 1883 Convention of La Marsa. An initial tally counted 
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800,000 ha in the ardh al-bey - 350,000 of which personally belonged to the Bey, the 
remainder considered state land (Buthaud 1953: 71). French reforms apparently had a 
positive effect on beylical coffers. Between 1892 and 1906, authorities identified and 
confiscated an additional 78,000 ha of cereal lands in the Northwest and Central Steppe 
and 80,000 ha of olive orchards in the South (Yazidi 1999: 120). Another 40,000 ha 
Public Land were acquired between 1930 and 1935 (Attia 1966: 20). Fiscal revenue 
generated from the ardh al-bey jumped from 200,000 francs-or in 1882 to 460,000 in 
1891 (ibid: 48).  
The Convention of La Marsa also affected hubus. The public hubus portfolio, 
which had been centralized under the Zeitouna Mosque in 1874, was transferred to the 
Ministry of Agriculture in 1883. A series of reforms between 1885 and 1888 reinforced 
the Hanafi practice of hubus exchange, or mu‘awada, and Maliki practice of inzel or rent 
into market compatible, legal operations (Hénia 1999: 335-336). Employing those 
mechanisms, the 13 November 1889 Decree annually transferred 2,000 ha of hubus from 
the Ministry of Agriculture to the Direction of Finances and public domain portfolio 
(Rinderhagen 1911: 20). A year later, the Resident General created the Agricultural and 
Colonization Fund (Caisse d’agricole et colonisation) to sell this land to French settlers.  
The French subsumed arch land into the ardh al-bey and reorganized the sector in 
1901 and 1935. The 1935 law formalized tribal holdings on the ardh al-bey, allowing 
collective ownership under the ward of the state. The law was more form than function, 
however, because 140,000 ha had already been confiscated as punishment for rebellion 
and integrated into the public domain. And on the remaining land, Tunisia’s nomadic 
tribes had begun to settle long before the French gunboats docked in 1881. Though 
collective, much of the land had been already parceled and transformed into individual 
plots of hawaz in anticipation of a future grant or discounted sale (Attia 1966: 20). 
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In July 1884, a Beylical decree established a commission to study the feasibility 
of parceling, titling and sale of ardh al-bey land. Applied in 1885, the reform followed 
the Australian Torrens System,134 where the state maintains a centralized registry that 
tracks land ownership over time. Pre-colonial efforts to create a centralized land registry 
abetted the process: the population in the urban centers and much of the Sahel already 
had documented land rights (Hénia 1999: 46-80). With the registry underway, the 
government created the legs of a land market: the Real-Estate Law of 1 July 1885. The 
law built from an 1883 legislation that allowed the cross-national sales. Unlike the 5 May 
1883 law, which stipulated that land purchased from a native would remain under Sharia 
land legislation, the 1885 reform, while maintaining the notion of a dual legal system, 
ruled that land purchased by European companies and setters passed to the French 
property regime (Soulmagnon 1934: 16).  
Initial entry of Muslim land into the market was slow. In three years, only 15,000 
ha of Muslim land entered the registry (Yazidi 1999: 58). Initial tax rates were too high to 
mobilize native landholders who already had melk titles. In 1890, those fees were 
decreased and Muslim interest in the system increased. Jurists lauded the reforms. The 
Maurice Petit Report of 1891 Advisory Council noted: “Thanks to matriculation, the 
rights of indigenous property sold to a European went from very uncertain to absolutely 
certain. The almost always obscure and contested native titles are transformed into 
indisputable title…” (Conférence Consultative 1891: 102, cited in Yazidi 1999: 54). And 
the 1896 Advisory Council Report noted an interest rate reduction on land loans from 
twelve to six percent (Conférence Consultative 1896, cited in Yazidi 1999: 70).  
                                                
134 Former Minister of Justice, Commerce and Industry, and Defense and head of Tunisia’s first democratic 
party, the MDS, Ahmed Mestiri humorously commented to the author that next to the eucalyptus tree, the 
Torrens act was Australia’s greatest contribution to Tunisia (I-1). 
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French acquisition accelerated following the reforms. Most purchases or land 
grants were in the North – permitting the expansion and modernization of cereal culture 
in the Kef plain and near Jendouba, and vineyards in Cap-Bon. The former were either 
appropriated from rebellious tribes or distributed from the ardh al-bey lands controlled in 
the Direction of Finance; in the Cap Bon, much of this land was purchased from the 
Tunisois beldiyya elite. Land in the Sahel and further to the South remained largely in 
Tunisian hands. Sahelis refused to sell their land, whereas further south, land was pasture 
scrub with high salinity levels that did not interest settlers or colonial companies. By 
independence, French control over the land structure amounted to 853,000 ha, or roughly 




Figure 4.2: European Land Distribution, Protectorate of Tunis 
 
Source: Signoles 1985: 328 
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The French-inspired land registry gave Tunisian landowners a broader range of 
legal protection and choice of market operations when they decided to buy, sell, or rent 
their land than was afforded by the qadi-issued title with its Hanafi and Maliki 
restrictions. Throughout the country, Tunisian elites used this system to protect their 
interests and readily entered the expanding land market. Much of the Tunisois elite 
participated in the property bubble of the late 1890s, selling their land to French 
speculators who in turn resold the land to large corporations for wild profits (Bistolfi 
1960: 23). Poncet notes that sequestration of ardh al-bey and Muslim land sales in the 
North weakened the economic foundations of the Tunisois bourgeoisie. As shown in 
Figure 4.2, during the early colonial period, Saheli landowners matriculated their 
holdings and purchased heavily in the North. With their new holdings, they economically 
and eventually politically displaced both French settlers and Tunisois elite  (Poncet 1961: 
145), especially in the region surrounding Hammamet and Nabeul (Signoles 1985: 333). 
The shift gives us an interesting slant de Montety’s argument that Saheli schooling led to 
the slow displacement of the tunisois elite by underscoring the propertied basis of the 
newcomers (Montety 1973). 
In the rural interior, private and ardh al-bey land that was not already titled was 
identified and delimited by a commission composed of the local civilian comptroller, an 
inspector from the Direction of Finances, the qaid, the local sheikh and theoretical owner 
(Yazidi 1999: 130). Since proof of landownership was one condition for Muslim 
participation in the Qaidal Council – the local level entry point to the Protectoral political 
economy – one might have expected to see the same types of shady deals made between 
the shuyukh, jema‘a, and municipal councils following the 1863 Sénatus-Consulte in 
Algeria. While abuse of power probably did occur, the rooted Tunisian peasantry that had 
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real claims based on al-hawz and al-yad tempered the process, and a yeomanry appears to 
have been promoted. In 1962, 4.7 percent of the population in the historically tribal 
regions of Gafsa (Hamamma) and Kasserine (Majeur) owned about twenty-five percent 
of arable land, while close to fifty percent of landowners held sixty percent of the land in 
estates ranging between ten and fifty hectares (Attia 1966: 21). Participating in the land 
registry and new market, Tunisian notables and Saheli elites increasingly had stakes in 
the land regime under the Protectorate. 
 
4.2.3 Protectorate Market, Changing Patterns of Power, Formation of the Neo-
Destour 
Intra-Tunisian land transfer shook the foundations of the local political economy. 
As the Tunisois elite sold, the Sahelis bought and economic power shifted from the 
traditional land-owning beldiyya, to the Saheli textile wholesalers heralding from villages 
like Ksar Hellal and Sousse. At the southern periphery of the greater Sahel, in Sfax, local 
notables took advantage of a failed settler scheme on the Domaine de Siala. The domain 
had been expropriated from the Siala family by Sadok Bey in 1871, and was integrated 
into Direction of Finance in 1892, placing parcels on the market in 1896. Inspired by the 
euphoria of the 1890s land bubble, settlers began planting thousands of olive trees. By the 
time the bubble burst, settlers had planted between 133,000 and 300,000 ha of olive trees 
(Sethom 1992: 22; Yazidi 1999: 112). But since those trees had not reached an age to 
produce a full harvest required to pay back loans, the settlers began to sell the land en 
masse. Prices crashed and the Sfaxi bourgeoisie was able to re-purchase the land at 
deflated prices and with a French title (Fakhfakh 1976). As the trees came into maturity – 
it takes an olive tree between ten to twenty years, depending on rainfall to produce a full 
yield – entrepreneurial Sfaxis would re-invest their profit in land in Sfax and to the North, 
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or in commerce and light industry (Denieuil 1992).135 It is not surprising that Sfax and the 
Kerkennah Islands situated just 25 km east, became a hub of nationalist union activity. 
By independence, five million olive trees were owned by the Sfaxi elite. While we do not 
have a breakdown of landownership for the Sfax region, by 1962 four percent of the 
Tunisian population owned 40 percent of arable surface area (Attia 1966: 20; Tiano 1967 
281).  
As these groups brought their trade and families to the capital, they enrolled their 
sons in French secondary schools and universities (Khaddar Zangar 2001). Three-
quarters of the party elite at independence had attended the Collège Sadiki, the Lycée 
Carnot, or Zeitouna University; and close to sixty percent came from Tunis, the Sahel, or 
Sfax (Stone 1982: 147). Having received a secondary degree or formal training in 
economics and law, they were qualified to enter into the colonial administration in Tunis, 
the Sahel, and the rural provinces. Doing so, they took a great hand in the political 
economy, transforming economic into political power during the Great Depression, when 
their vital interests were most at stake. Using their network of Saheli tradesmen and 
Jewish moneychangers, they infiltrated national, regional, and municipal level institutions 
and fought a successful struggle for independence. Their trade networks were an ideal 
channel through which they could organize their political party, the Neo-Destour, headed 
by Salah Ben Youssef and Habib Bourguiba.  
Exemplary is the case of M’hamed Chenik. A Saheli from Ksar Hellal, Chenik 
began his career in 1912 as an accountant in the textile industry. By 1917, he was co-
director of the factory. In the 1920s, he expanded into agriculture and finance, founding 
the Coopérative Tunisienne de Crédit (Mestiri-Chebbi 2001). Co-opted into the Chamber 
                                                
135 Sfaxi industrial money would eventually enter the financial sector. In 1975, Mohammed Fakhfakh and 
former Minister of Finance Mansour Moallah – both Sfaxis – along with Habib Bourguiba Jr., founded the 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie (BIAT). 
 131 
of Commerce and president of the indigenous section of the Grand Council, his virulent 
defense Tunisian economic interests during the credit crunch of the Great Depression 
temporarily cost him his position. In 1934, he teamed up with Bourguiba to finance the 
Neo-Destour party, and used his position within the Grand Council, and later as Prime 
Minister to Moncef Bey and Liamine Bey to support nationalist positions (Mestiri 1990; 
Ben Hamida 1992; Julien 2001). 
The party’s leadership and main network of support came from the Sahel, with 
important implantations in Tunis and the Cap-Bon. Using its economic networks and 
newly found prominence, gradually, this (ethno-) elite was able to establish a presence in 
a countryside that was itself increasingly governed by provincial municipal councils and 
courts. The party’s strategy of infiltrating the administration was effective. By the late 
1940s, forty-two percent of the party leadership (at all levels) held government positions 
– up from six percent during inter-war period  (Hassine-Raouf 1989: 212, cited in Perkins 
2004: 116). It is quite possible that the Neo-Destour leadership spent at least party of its 
time coordinating the militant base during hours spent in the offices of the local 
administrations, and via its contacts in the qaidal and regional councils, regional and 
national chambers of commerce, and Grand Council. Ironically, these institutions had 
been initially conceived to bring the indigenous population under control. 
A mere three years following its 1934 founding, the Neo-Destour had 28,000 
members in the more than four hundred branches that constituted a strongly 
institutionalized national structure (Moore 1965: 105). All municipalities and nearly 
every village of consequence contained a local party branch. In the years approaching 
independence, moreover, the party had enrolled nearly 200,000 members (Moore 1970: 
235) – nearly five percent of the population at that time. Not by chance, areas least 
penetrated by the party – the Central Steppe, and the Saharan South – were those where 
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colonial penetration was most limited. Lightly populated regions characterized by harsh 
terrain that nobody but the tribes really cared for, these areas lay outside of the colonial 
political arena. As Moore comments: “In relatively homogenized Tunisia, both colonial 
administration and urban nationalist penetrated the countryside…Central control was 
never a problem after independence except, briefly in parts of the Center and South, some 
of which had been under military rather than civilian administration during the 
Protectorate (1970: 136-137). 
 
4.3 SETTING THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAME-WORK FOR POST-INDEPENDENCE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
Recent studies on property rights institutions and development have linked 
colonial property rights institutions to post-colonial economic growth (La Porta et al. 
1999; Landes 1998). Those discussions follow the argument that direct and indirect forms 
of colonial rule had a great impact on the organization of post-colonial state institutions 
(Miles 1994l Firmen-Sellers 2000). Fewer scholars have sought to understand 
institutional origins themselves (Boone 2003). Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 
2005) argue that European powers developed colonial property rights in function of 
varying levels of mortality rates. In places like sub-Saharan Africa, plagued by easily 
transmittable tropical disease, European settlement was low and colonial powers 
developed extractive institutions. Temperate zones attracted European settlers, who 
developed a strong set of institutions to protect their property rights. And “[t]he colonial 
state and institutions persisted even after independence” (2001: 1370). 
At face value, their argument stands: neither Algeria nor Tunisia had high settler 
mortality rates, and both colonial systems protected the landed interests of the settler elite 
during the colonial era. What these studies miss is the variation in degrees of violence 
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that had to occur in order for colonial property rights to be asserted at the outset. In 
Algeria, the Beys had not wrestled authority to define the ownership and use of property 
rights in tribal lands by the time the French arrived. In the local-national balance of 
power, the periphery dominated. In order to shift power to the center, the French had to 
exert high levels of violence, killing close a million Algerians from 1830 to 1871.136 To 
maintain control while it consolidated its rule, it attacked the moral economy of the 
tribes. In Tunisia, the Beys had succeeded in wrestling authority from local elites during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Keeping the Beylical institutions, French 
administrators required less violence to appropriate land for settlers and commercial 
enterprises.  
The degree of settler colonization and violence required to wrestle control from 
the periphery also played a great role in determining the degrees to which native elites 
could be integrated into the colonial political economy. The sheet inequity of the 
Algerian colonial political economy precluded the incorporation of indigenous elites into 
the political system as, albeit with marked inequality, in the four-tiered Tunisian 
protectorate. Incorporating a large number of Algerian elites ran the risk of creating a 
breach in the foundation of the settler colony: protection of settler property rights. Settler 
control over local politics did abet the development of a strong set of institutions that 
protected settler property rights as predicted by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, but 
did so to the exclusion of the vast majority of Muslim population from the economic, 
political, and social spheres. Muslim attempts to create a mass-mobilizing nationalist 
movement were murderously oppressed. As a result, the nationalist movement that 
ultimately wrestled independence from France did so in a guerilla war that itself inhibited 
                                                
136 A picture of the violence of the colonial system is clearly painted in Brower’s 2009 work on the 
colonial occupation of the Sahara. Timothy Mitchell paints a similar picture in Egypt (2002). 
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the development of an organized, hierarchical party that united local and national elite in 
an organic way. Property rights reform and state building in independent Algeria would 
be radical, and radically inefficient due in part to the colonial heritage of its national 
movement. Property rights enforcement, far from the predictions made in the economic 
literature, would be weak. 
Using the four-tiered system, the administration in the Tunisian protectorate 
expanded state reach into the countryside. Limited integration of the Muslim elite into the 
political and economic spheres spurred the development of a mass-mobilizing nationalist 
political party that had a twenty-two year period in which it could create local branches 
with experienced coordination with the national party structure. These local and national 
elites also shared vested interests in elements of the colonial property regime. While 
colonial land too would be nationalized at independence, property rights reform was 





PART THREE: STATE BUILDING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ENFORCEMENT IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ALGERIA AND 
TUNISIA 
Recent scholarly work has begun to explore the effects of colonial institutional 
legacies on economic growth in the developing world. Colonial political and property 
rights institutions, they argue, have been re-produced in the post-colonial era, where the  
pivotal distinctions affecting economic growth are between the legacies of common law 
and civil code (La Porta et al. 1998; Firmin-Sellers 2000) or between settler societies and 
indirect rule (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2005). It is unclear how these arguments work for 
states like Algeria and Tunisia. At face value, state and economic institutions – and the 
administrative rules that govern them – mirror the former colony. When we look beyond 
the formal institutions, however, we see tremendous variation in the ways in which 
politics occur and property rights are actually enforced. In the Central Maghreb, colonial 
heritage had exactly the opposite effect. Though a former protectorate, Tunisia has 
stronger property rights in the post-colonial period than French Algeria, where settlers 
controlled the levels of the colonial political economy to protect the landed privileges. 
Decolonization is the re-ordering of political and economic control from the 
colonial to the provincial capital. Political independence had to be coupled with 
economic independence: settler business interests, land, and markets had to be wrestled 
from the former colonial power (Naylor 2000). The ways in which these processes 
occurred were shaped by political accords signed between Paris, Algiers, and Tunis and 
post-colonial regime ideologies (Mamdani 1996), which were themselves shaped during 
the anti-colonial struggle. Breaking the Évian Accords, which protected the rights of 
settler land, Algeria unilaterally expropriated French property in 1963. Tunisia and 
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France negotiated a regulated land transfer until 1964, when Tunisia nationalized the 
remaining colonial portfolio – with compensation.  
Decolonization is also about re-ordering political and economic control between 
the provinces and the capital of the new polity (Boone 2003). From the periphery, where 
local rules and custom are engrained, a new centralizing power threatens to re-wire past 
privileges. As Charrad notes, there is sometimes “direct conflict between local 
solidarities based on primordial ties…and a nation-state. Each institution requires the 
loyalty of its members. Each involves mutually exclusive definitions of what the 
maximum political unit ought to be (2001: 19). As in the Ottoman and colonial period, 
center-periphery debates in the post-colonial era centered on defining the relationship 
between the capital and provinces. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, colonial heritage is important, though the causal 
link with post-colonial institutions does not lay in the ratio of settlers to Muslims per se 
but in the degree to which colonial oppression that was required to maintain strong 
property rights for the European population. Access to or exclusion from colonial 
political and economic space conditioned the way in which the nationalist movement 
would organize and create links between the indigenous elites in the colonial capital and 
periphery. The importance of these socializing processes would be revealed as the 
nationalism movements took power: Where state-society relationships are 
underdeveloped, the state’s effectiveness and capacity to enforce its own rules is limited 
(Migdal 1988; Migdal, Kohli and Shue 1994). 
Notwithstanding a small and illegitimate Algerian minority, settlers refused 
Muslim entry into the political market. Nationalist attempts to work on the margins of the 
colonial political sphere, as the Neo-Destour party had done in Tunisia, were 
systematically undermined by the settler minority. The radical position of settler politics 
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radicalized the pro-independence movement: Nationalists resorted to an armed uprising 
in 1954. Algeria gained independence without a mass-mobilizing nationalist party with 
strong bonds linking national and local level elites. The Tunisian protectorate partially 
integrated Muslim elites into the political economy, and created a space within which 
nationalists could maneuver, abetting the development of a mass-mobilizing nationalist 
party. By independence, Tunisian nationalists had established a party organization with 
scope and reach and often the local notable and party chief was the same person (Moore 
1963: 534).  
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven explore how colonial antecedents affected state 
building processes in the post-independence era, and ultimately defined the limits of state 
capacity. The chapters specifically focus on the development of state and party 
institutions at the local, regional, and national levels and how the timing and sequencing 
of these reforms institutionalized state-society, local-national political and economic 
relations. 
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Chapter Five: Independent Tunisia, State Expansion into the 
Countryside 
We once believed that the countryside was under-administered; we believed that 
the tribes were more or less left to themselves. In fact, Tunisia during the 18th and 
19th centuries was ponderously administered (Attia 1966: 11). 
The principal preoccupation of the Tunisian state in agriculture has been political 
order (Jenayah 1995: 132). 
 
Colonial administrative and economic institutions trained a corps of indigenous 
Tunisian cadres skilled in modern economic and administrative techniques. A twenty-two 
year struggle over administrative, economic, and political rights allowed ample time for 
the Neo-Destour party to implant its organs throughout the administration, enabling it to 
establish a shadow government well before independence. Though strong in the 
northeastern corridor running from Bizerte through the Medjerda valley to the Tunisois 
and Cap-Bon, the rural, olive production economy of the Eastern Sahel remained the 
center of Neo-Destour strength. Urban support was buttressed by the allied national labor 
union concentrated in Tunis, Sfax, and the Kerkennah islands. Using family and tribal 
links in an administration that infiltrated the municipal administrations from the 
countryside, the transfer of power from the French colonial administration to the Neo-
Destour occurred with only a few political hiccoughs.  
With a 325,000 member-strong militant base diffused into 1,800 local branches at 
independence (Moore 1965: 112-113), the party was a machine with broad support and 
developing interest articulation mechanisms. Institutionally, the party controlled the state 
apparatus, blurring the distinction between party and state and party-state. From the top, 
independence leader Habib Bourguiba had a firm grip on national level political 
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institutions. The Political Bureau and Central Committee, represented by handpicked 
men, controlled policy directives from the National Assembly to the regional Federations, 
the district-level party Delegates (délégués), and local level party branches.  
Centralized at the national level, the post-colonial regime’s strength and Achilles 
heel laid in the decentralized and independent-minded party base, and in the local-level 
institutions that had allowed the Neo-Destour to grab power from the bottom during the 
colonial era. Before it would move to reorganize the party to assert Political Bureau 
ascendance over the provincial Federations and local branches, the regime re-organized 
the administration, placing the most experienced party leaders in key posts. Between 
1956 and 1969, policy aimed to rein in and centralize regional and local level institutions 
where the party was implanted, and to expand state presence into the areas left 
underdeveloped by the Protectorate. In 1956, the regime organized elections for the 
National Assembly, which integrated local and national party veterans and elites. Local 
and regional policy aimed at expanding the party and consolidating the administration. In 
1957, the regime organized municipal elections. It was not uncommon to see nationally 
party leaders or ministers at the top of municipal lists.  
The 1956 and 1957 National Assembly and municipal elections served two 
purposes. First, they integrated party elites into state institutions, giving them a vested 
interest in the system. While neither conferred real power to all of its members, the 
institutions were prestigious and membership opened access to the administration and 
economy. Second, the elections created positive incentives through vertical mobility 
opportunities: National Assembly members yearned for ministerial portfolios, municipal 
representatives eyed the National Assembly, while the branch militant coveted town hall. 
Having created a symbiotic relationship between party and state at the local level in core 
regions, consolidating its political control, the regime re-wired control away from the 
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party to state institutions in areas where party support was the strongest. Once in control 
of the state and party in the administratively developed urban and rural areas it could 
move into the shadow zones left unoccupied by the Protectorate. The regime trained party 
and state cadres for extension into the periphery, slowly tying local interests in those 
regions to the new state, as the Beys and resident general had done before.  
Unlike Algeria, the private property system inherited from the Protectoral was left 
in place and widespread nationalizations did not occur. Public and private hubus were 
liquidated in the late 1950s – the former incorporated into the public domain, while the 
latter were itemized and distributed to their heirs. Colonial land was transferred at a 
managed pace, and nationalized with compensation in 1964. The most radical project of 
the post-independence regime was the cooperatives experiment of the 1960s. The 
experiment sought to take advantage of the nationalized colonial land portfolio, create 
jobs for the rural unemployed, and rationalize small farmer production techniques. With 
an inter-dependent system that linked rural and urban / center and peripheral interests via 
the party and the administration, property rights decisions from the top were applied at 
the bottom. 
The expansion of the cooperative experiment to the private sector in the late 
1960s put the system to the test. Regions with low party membership – the South, Central 
Steppe, and Northwest – were specifically targeted. To be sure, these regions had the 
largest colonial-era holdings, and thus were the first targeted. However, within these 
regions we see varying density of cooperatives that overlap with zones hostile to 
Bourguiba’s regime. In these zones, cooperatives asserted state authority. While 
unpopular with small and large farmer alike, the planned integration of private land into 
state-managed farms encountered only scattered resistance that was quickly brought 
under order. The Tunisian system’s party-administration administrative channels were 
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successful in containing localized dissent until the projects were expanded to the 
Tunisois, Sahel and Sfax regions – bastions of Neo-Destour support. For local and 
national cadres from those regions, local and literally landed interests trumped the 
promotional benefits of implementing national level decisions. Faced with a choice 
between the use of force and loss of his party’s core support base or disowning the 
cooperative experiment and mastermind Minister of Agriculture and Planning Ahmed 
Ben Salah, Bourguiba chose the latter. Initially successful, ambitions to expand the 
cooperative system to land within party strongholds collapsed under the weight of local 
and national level party opposition, revealing aspects of a delegative model of politics, 
with articulation channels that linked local and national party elite. Private land was 
restituted and selective tracts of public domain were distributed to key allies to make up 
for the costly experiment. 
During the rest of Bourguiba’s reign, national decisions were abided by local 
elites that recognized the regime’s carrot and stick: multiple avenues of vertical mobility 
existed with the party organization or elected office and were open to elite who engaged 
the system; exclusion or jail was the price for those who did not.137 Bourguiba’s 
successor Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali expanded the party-state model in the multiparty 
period, increasing the number of party branches, local administrative offices, and 
municipalities during the twenty-three years he was in office. Access to land continued to 
be a major source of patronage. The party-state system collapsed once he fled the country 
in January 2011. While it is too early to say whether this reveals the inherent weakness of 
the Bourguiba system, the collapse of the system underscore the importance of 
                                                
137 Unlike Algeria, however, Bourguiba frequently reintegrated the politically disgraced back into the 
system. 
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coordinating and integrating local elites into a national system. Once the party base broke 
with the national party elite the system collapsed. 
 
5.1 ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF TUNIS 
Tunisia became independent on 20 March 1956, and six days later the Constituent 
Assembly filled with Neo-Destour party members was elected to draft a constitution and 
form a government. In June 1956, the Ministry of Interior reorganized the regional 
administration, replacing the thirty-seven qaids and seventy-seven khalifat with thirteen 
Governorates.138 Of the thirteen handpicked Governors, only two had served as qaid 
under the Protectorate (Moore 1965: 127), marking a partial break from traditional 
politics. On par with a national minister, the Governor was personally responsible for 
political and economic order at the regional-level. The office operated its own budget and 
administration, controlled regional detachments of the National Guard and Army, 
managed the regional land portfolio until 1961, had veto power over municipal council 
decisions, nominated the District Delegate (sub-prefect), and presided the Governorate 
Councils, which had previously been an economic advisory board. Reformed in 1963, the 
Governorate Councils resembled the Regional Councils of the colonial period: strictly 
consultative, they assembled representatives from the regional party coordination 
committee, peak associations, and municipal council presidents. 
Nominally independent of the party,139 locally elected municipal councils worked 
in conjunction with the Governorate party federation, party delegates (chosen to represent 
the branches in the Federations), and party branches to solve local problems and to 
implement national development strategies. The party closely monitored the 
                                                
138 The Governorate of Tozeur was eliminated shortly after it was formed.  
139 The 1957 Municipal elections were opened to independent lists. This policy was rescinded in 1960. 
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municipalities for indications of political insubordination. A twenty-two year political 
and administrative internship at the municipal-level during the colonial period made party 
elite keenly aware of the potential strength of local-level institutions, and their ability to 
subvert national-level governmental dictates. According to the draconian 1957 Municipal 
Law, which closely followed the rules established during the colonial period, discussion 
of subject matter not immediately falling under municipal jurisdiction was strictly 
forbidden during the weekly reunions, as was unauthorized communication with 
neighboring councils. The purse and police remained in the hands of the Governor: 
projects involving financial transactions required Governorate-level approval and the 
local council’s police powers were limited to the regulation of city markets. In the larger 
cities, municipal councils helped to coordinate economic and political programs between 
the various party delegate and federation work, though in the smaller towns party branch 
and municipal council membership often overlapped, reducing monitoring costs in the 
single party-state. The advantage of sitting in the municipal council was the respect the 
prestige of representing the party concurred, and access to higher levels of administration 
and power. 
Municipal council expansion accelerated in the years immediately following 
independence. Numbering sixty-four in 1952, by 1960 there were more than 116 
councils, mainly in the North and the East, along the coastal Sahel region. An estimation 
assuming even-regional distribution based on total 1960 councils and population 
predicted fourteen for the Sousse region (Sahel), whereas twenty were chartered. Similar 
over-representation is seen in the northeastern regions of Bizerte, Nabeul and Tunis for 
the same time.140 Presumably, regional disparities reflected higher levels of economic 
development in those regions. Article Two of the 1957 Municipal Law set qualifications 
                                                
140 Estimations based on information provided by Ashford, 1967: 86. 
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for municipal representation on the basis of financial viability as determined by the 
Ministry of Interior. Topographically, there appears to be an overlap between regions of 
dense representation and Neo-Destour party strongholds. Ashford nicely sums: “There is 
no way of estimating how many communities lacking strong party branches or hostile to 
the Socialist Destour have not been given the status of municipal council” (Ashford 1967: 
77). Though represented in all major urban areas and in increasingly in the smaller towns 
and villages, only two-fifths of the country had locally elected municipal councils. 
Excluding Tunis, the figure was closer to one-third, and by eliminating Bizerte, Nabeul, 
and Sousse, nearly four-fifths of the remaining population fell outside of the minimum 
representation afforded by the municipal council system (ibid: 1967: 87). 
Table 5.1: Municipal Growth 









Source: Thiébault 1998: 87. 
 
Areas outside of the municipal councils were organized districts led by a 
Governor-nominated District Delegate. Districts were broken into masheikh, or sectors, 
led by the local sheikh. During the colonial era, the sheikh was the official local-level 
intermediary with the administration, and was appointed by the qaid upon 
recommendation from the local tribes or village leaders. In 1945, the colonial 
administration allowed shuyukh selection via popular vote in the 1,400 masheikhat. 
Beginning in 1956, the sheikh was selected at the local-level from a pool of three 
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candidates. While party membership was not a requirement, the party branches 
nevertheless filtered-out those men not prepared to bend to the political exigencies 
required for local-level development and party-state building. A year later, the number of 
masheikhat was pared-down to 754, in hopes that by extending their territorial scope, 
problems of kith and kin have less of an effect local level rural politics. The number also 
corresponded with the number of party branches, and it was not infrequent that the sheikh 
and local branch head were the same man. As more and more municipalities were 
chartered, the number of masheikhat necessary for provincial governance declined, 
administrative territories were trimmed in number, leveling off at 642 in 1964 (Amrani 
1979: 251). Party officials would supplant the shuyukh altogether in 1975 following local 
reforms that created branch-appointed sector chiefs, or ‘umda. 
 
5.2 PARTY ORGANIZATION: TAKING THE BOTTOM FROM THE TOP? 
Before 1958, party branches nominated the party delegates, or délégués, to 
represent their local-level interests in the forty-one party federations at nationally 
organized Party Congresses. This gave the base a significant degree of political weight 
during the Congresses, and at times, federation interests differed with the Political 
Bureau. Regional and local party reform was announced in fall 1958, when Bourguiba 
dissolved the party federations, replacing them with regional offices, led by a centrally 
nominated Party Commissioner. The decision changed party-administration relations at 
multiple levels. Federations, whose officers were elected by the branches, had 
strengthened inter-branch bargaining power in negotiations with the Political Bureau at 
the national level, and governor at the regional level. Splitting them into autonomous 
units hindered collective action. This created a more docile base, and forced the branches 
to entertain better relations with the regional Governor (Moore 1965: 117, 126). It also 
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created tensions at the local level between Commissioner, on the one hand, and Governor 
and branch on the other. 
Clashes between the Commissioner and Governor were not uncommon. Three 
Governors between 1958 and 1963 were fired or transferred following disputes with the 
Commissioner (Moore 1965: 129). Local branches also saw the Political Commissioner 
as an outsider. Like the Governor, he was rarely appointed to his home region. While the 
Commissioner had and used the power to dissolve unruly local branches, his power was 
dependent on the Political Bureau, whose members were sometimes closely linked to the 
local branch. In the Sahel, for example, local branches had close ties with ministers in 
Bourguiba’s cabinet, who were often also concurrently served as branch and Political 
Bureau members and local mayors. Commissioners to Sousse had to be careful not to 
alienate local interests (Moore 1965: 138-139). In 1963, Bourguiba eliminated the 
Political Commissioner, whose ill-defined role as national overseer of regional 
administration and local party activities created too many localized problems. A 
regionally elected Coordination Committee replaced the political commissioner and 
regional office. The committees were responsible for regional party activity, coordinating 
the branches, and forming new party cadres. By the mid 1960s, the party had trained 
close to 10,000 cadres (Moore 1965: 152-155). The new system compromised elements 
of the Federation and commissioner systems. The branches elected a regional 
Coordination Committee, which proposed a Secretary General from its members for 
ratification by the Political Bureau (Rudebeck 1967: 103-106). While branch 
participation in regional politics expanded, the Political Bureau nevertheless screened the 
branch candidates before that could participate in Coordination Committee elections. 
Close to a quarter of the candidates proposed in 1965 were invalidated (Rudebeck 1967: 
117). 
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In 1958, the number of party branches was reduced from 1,800 to 754, or one per 
masheikhat. The merging of rival party branches led to some local disturbances. Such 
disputes were most prevalent in the federations with the longest history of party activity, 
and were quickly smoothed over through intervention by respected regional and national 
leaders (Moore 1965: 143). The reduction aided the flow of information from Political 
Bureau to the branch. The reform also overlapped party branch and sheikh duties. By 
setting party branches numerically and geographically on par with the masheikhat, the 
reform underscored the diminished role of the sheikh as rural-urban intermediary. This 
was an especially important role in controlling the regions where the colonial 
administration and the party had only weak penetration, or where the sheikh was still 
revered by the local population. 
Administrative and party representation was limited in the Center and the South – 
areas governed by the French military during the colonial era. In these predominantly 
rural areas, the shuyukh were still viewed as respected intermediaries between the central 
government and the tribes. In many ways their social stature and political autonomy was 
reinforced during the turbulent anti-colonial years (the late 1940s and early 1950s), when 
they led rag-tag groups of fellagha (literally, bandit) to fight the French. National control 
of these areas proved difficult, and party under-administration would be painfully felt 
during the Bourguiba-Ben Youssef showdown for party control between 1954-1955 when 
many of the fellagha-shuyukh took up arms in violent pro-Ben Youssef riots and turf 
warfare. Instead of rushing into organizing municipal councils for this population, the 
regime sought to develop party branches as rural nodes of representation, and did so by 
training local cadres and establishing a standard party branch infrastructure under the 
direct supervision of the Political Bureau (Moore 1965: 155). The plan was successful – 
at least if party membership figures mean anything. By 1970, the party rural expansion 
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plan had helped recruit another 200,000 members, increasing total membership to 
400,000, roughly nine percent of the total population (Moore 1970: 235). As the party 
extended its rural reach, political competency slowly usurped the intermediary role 
previously ceded to the tribal or village sheikh.  
 
5.3 RECLAIMING THE LAND, 1956-1964 
Using state institutions and party cadres, the regime delegated reform from the top 
to the bottom in ways that strengthened its hold on the rural periphery, while keeping 
basic articulation-mechanisms open to the local party branches via the regional 
Coordination Committees. In tandem with the administrative and political reforms during 
the decade following independence, the regime concentrated its grip over the political 
economy in the agrarian periphery. Between 1956 and 1969, the regime took charge of 
land foreign and collective land. This included the vast lands that comprised hubus, arch, 
and collective melk regimes and European-owned properties. The grid of administrative 
and political agencies that would crisscross the countryside in the years following 
independence abetted this task. Late in the late 1960s, the regime attempted forced 
collectivization of private and public land into state-managed cooperatives, but was 
abruptly halted and land redistributed when the Sahel – the Neo Destour’s core region – 
rebelled, bringing the other regions with it. From 1970 to present, the regime has slowly 
ceded parts of the state land to various peasants, agro-engineers, and private-sector 
farmers. Party membership and ministerial approval is the key that unlocks the bounty of 
the land. For small plots of land, consent of the ‘umda or local municipal council, party 
branch, and District Delegate gain access to the Governor’s ear. Larger plots of land, 
according to various sources, are allotted directly from the Ministries of Agriculture and 
Interior and the Presidency. 
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Strengthening the implantation of party cadres in the regional and local 
institutions that had been developed during the colonial era, by the early 1960s the 
Tunisian state had firmly gained a hold over the administrative and political institutions 
of the agrarian periphery. Land reform was an economic imperative and control over the 
rural agrarian structure would buttress the capacity to project itself into the periphery. In 
a series of 1956 and 1957 decrees, the regime imposed a land-based tax on agriculture 
and abolished the hubus land regime. A decree on 31 May 1956 nationalized the state’s 
remaining 150,000 ha of public hubus into the Tunisian public land portfolio. Because 
the size of public hubus holdings had been steadily diminished since the 1889 Franco-
Tunisian law, the mainly legal task was relatively easy, though politically it generated 
resistance from the religious establishment, angry with the incorporation of the Zeitouna 
Mosque into the public education system, two months earlier. 
A year later, the state dissolved private hubus, which then represented 1,450,000 
ha, or roughly sixteen percent of arable land (van Dooren 1968: 65; Gouazé 1973: 129). 
Much of this was owned by the large Tunisois families, who rented the land to peasants 
(inzel), and the zawiyya and tariqa. Here, the politically easy decision was motivated by 
economic considerations. Regional commissions, headed by the Governor, were charged 
with identifying and distributing the land between heirs and tenants. Moore notes that the 
process was with mixed results (1965: 127), and the decisions were often taken to court 
(Signoles 1985: 325). Former Tunisian Minister of Justice who oversaw the legal aspects 
of the transaction, Ahmed Mestiri, concurred, noting: “We had to get rid of the private 
hubus, parcels of hubus were everywhere and were a brake on development. The 
problems was identifying the heirs, and the number of cases created a considerable 
backlog” (I-1). A year after the liquidation was to have occurred, in the region of Kef 
alone, in 1958, 27,185 ha still had not been re-distributed (Cherif 1991: 65). 
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Also, in 1957, the regime pushed the individualization of collectively held melk 
land under a scheme that traded titles for land improvement. Grouped by masheikhat into 
management councils representing jema‘a-elected heads of family, the land was parceled 
into five to ten ha plots and ceded to individual families. To aid production, the councils 
were given a budget and license to freely contract with external entities. Upon council 
and sheikh recommendation, the titling process shifted to the District Delegate to the 
Governor’s office, and if lucky to the Ministry of Agriculture. A success, the transfer led 
to the greatest explosion of olive tree plantation since the Sialine scheme in the 1890s, as 
entrepreneurs with tribal and capital connections spirited their money into a windfall 
profit opportunity. Attribution in lease-form was limited to land individually worked for 
more than ten years, when the program was scheduled to terminate. 
Seven years later, the state implicated arch land in a similar scheme. Though 
ceding possession from the state to the tribe, ownership remained under the state’s 
purview. Tight control and heavy local party surveillance minimized illegal seizures and 
sales. Attribution in lease-form was limited to land individually worked for more than ten 
years. Alternately, the tribes were encouraged to incorporate their land into the 
cooperatives (discussed below), where usufruct and benefits would be worker-managed 
and state-distributed. In the southern Central Steppes and South, where land had less 
productive value, segments and entire tribes organized into the state-run cooperatives. 
Firmly settled on under-productive land, the tribes became tributary to the state’s 
economic largess, which was channeled through the party branch and cooperative 
management teams (Duvignaud 1970). Tight control and heavy local surveillance 
minimized illegal seizures and sales of both collective and religious endowment land.  
In 1959, the Tunisian government came to an agreement with the French to 
schedule a series of state managed land purchases from remaining European settlers, 
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purchasing 100,000 ha (Hicheri 1996: 132). Before 1961, the Governor was in charge of 
managing former colonial land in his region. While access to it was under control the 
President’s Secretary Bahi Laghdam (1957-1969), who distributed 150,000 ha and 
500,000 olive trees – 150,000 of which were in the Sahel – to allies between 1956 and 
1961 (Moore 1965: 142). As the portfolio grew, the government needed something other 
than ad hoc regional committees to oversee the process. The 28 November 1961 Land 
Law created the State Domains Office, (OTD, Office des terres domaniales) to manage 
state lands, and introduced measures to lease tracts for a four-year period (Moore 1965: 
127; 199). With the OTD in place, the regime eyed remaining tracts of foreign land.  
 
Figure 5.1: Tunisian Governorates, 1956 
 
Source: Rudebeck 1967: 272 
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Though tied to the 1959 agreement with France, the government coveted the large 
farms situated around Jendouba, Bizerte, and Cap-Bon – the most fertile tracts of land in 
the country. Vestiges of agro-colonialism, they were still operated by French agro-
corporations. Law 61-14, passed in August 1961 required the Director General of all 
modern-sector agro-capitalist farms to have Tunisian nationality. Seeing the writing on 
the wall, many companies sold their land. A bolder law was passed on 12 May 1964 
expropriating (with compensation) the 600,000 ha of land that had not already been sold 
by European settlers (Tekari 1995: 22). The law prohibited foreign nationals as well as 
private Tunisian companies from agriculture sector activity, allowing them but a few 
months to dissolve their boards and liquidate their assets. By knocking corporate farms 
and foreign nationals out of the game, the regime vastly expanded its authority in the 
agriculture sector and rural society, eliminating alternative and potentially autonomous 
sources of economic and structural power.  
The sudden boom of public land created a management problem. Though Tunisia 
had trained cadres and competent party officials, the addition of 600,000 ha to the OTD 
strained the Tunisian administration. The mostly fertile land recuperated in 1964 required 
modern agro-engineers to staff and manage day-to-day operations. This was especially 
true on the larger cereal farms around Béja, Bizerte, and Jendouba, which were capital-
intensive cultures, unlike the orchard farms and vineyards of Cap-Bon. The lackluster 
period of private sector led agricultural development (1956-1962) had made it clear that 
Tunisia lacked a pool of national farmers with the capital and technology needed to 
maintain modern agricultural production in a portfolio of this size, and the regime 
considered the peasantry a brake to its political and economic aspirations (Gaché 1987: 
181). The regime would experiment in cooperative farming. 
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In 1956, the nationalist party wrestled political authority from the colonial to the 
provincial capital, claiming authority over the economy with the last land nationalization 
in 1964. Administrative and party reforms during the first decade of independence 
subverted remnants of pre-colonial and colonial authority in the countryside, while the 
Party Commissioner and Coordination Committee reforms of 1958 and 1963 contracted 
power away from the party branches, which were increasingly dependent on the regional 
and national party structures. Liquidation of the public and private hubus, moreover 
showed the regimes power to defined and enforce the exclusive use and transfer of 
property at the local level. While the majority of hubus were located close to the urban 
centers of power, extension of national state power over property rights over the rural 
periphery during the cooperative experiment (1961-1969), reveal the degree to which the 
post-colonial regime had succeeded in state building via its party-administration, which 
linked Tunis with the rural periphery. 
 
5.4 THE COOPERATIVE EXPERIMENT, 1961-1969: IMPOSING STATE AND POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 
The regime had been contemplating a Yugoslav-inspired land cooperative project 
for several years and a pilot cooperative farm project in the Medjerda Valley begun in 
1958 yielded encouraging results. In 1962, Minister of Planning Ahmed Ben Salah 
(1961-1969) announced a more ambitious project, which would incorporate 200,000 ha 
of OTD into agricultural cooperatives called Cooperative Production Unites  (UCPs, 
Unités cooperatives de production). Former colonial domains constituted the core of the 
UCP land, which was supplemented by small to medium-sized private land in abutting 
plots, and limited to cereal lands in the North and Northwest.  
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Workers and small landowners that joined took part in UPC management and 
production decisions. The membership base elected an administrative council, which co-
opted a president and a vice-president. To induce peasant participation in the program, 
the Ministry of Planning guaranteed purchases at stable prices through new marketing 
boards that also assured collection and distribution: the National Cereals Agency (Office 
des céreals) and National Oil Agency (Office national de l’huile).  
While small farmers initially voluntarily integrated their farms into the program, 
lured by access to credits, they soon found themselves salaried employees on their own 
land. In 1963, Ben Salah created the Regional Agricultural Development Commission 
(CDRA, Conseil régional de dévelopement agricole) to oversee the UCPs at the regional 
level, and a local CDRA representative, usually a technocrat with agricultural training, 
was appointed to the UCP administrative councils. The CDRA representative could veto 
any administrative council decision, and regularly reported deviance to the regional 
Coordination Committee and Governor. Cooperative members that opposed national 
directives or who wished to quit the program risked exclusion from regionally controlled 
transportation circuits, selling to the nationally organized marketing boards, and access to 
key inputs such as capital, fertilizers, seeds and tractors. 
In the years following independence, large private sector farmers had taken 
advantage of deflated prices on the colonial agriculture machine park to purchase tractors 
and combines. Mechanized production techniques allowed them to expanded their arable 
surface area and production by renting unused land from small and medium sized farmers 
and the state (Sethom 1992: 54-55). The 1962 cooperatives program stymied large 
farmers by prioritizing the integration of land abutting the UPCs. In the region of Kef, for 
example, in 50.23 percent of large-farmers’ productive land was rented; by 1966, their 
portfolio of leased land dwindled to 34.87 percent (Makhlouf 1967: 40).  
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Nevertheless, the program expanded. Between July 1963 and December 1964, the 
cooperative land portfolio grew by 214 percent, from seventy-nine thousand ha to 297 
thousand (Simmons 1970: 463). In 1965, Ben Salah extended the cooperatives to all 
state-owned land, and the portfolio grew by another 36.1 percent by the following year 
(Amrani 1976: 356). During this same period, Service Cooperatives (Coopératives de 
service) were created in the Cap Bon, Sahel, and Tunisois regions to finance 
mechanization and agricultural inputs to small farmers. In the South, Ben Salah created 
General Assistance Cooperatives (CMVP, Coopératives de mis en valeur et de 
polyculture).  
In 1966, Ben Salah studied a proposal to expand the movement to the private 
sector. Part of the rationale was that the private sector was undermining the cooperative 
movement by dumping produce on wholesalers outside of the commercial circuits 
established by the Cereals Agency and National Oil Agency (Nerfin 1974: 63-64). After a 
year of debate within his department, which surely weighed the political risks, he moved 
forward. The cooperative movement initially encountered little local-level resistance. 
Apart from riots in the Saheli village of M’Saken in 1964, which was quickly contained, 
producers largely conformed to decisions delegated from the top.141 A Coordination 
Committee report on cooperative activity in the village of Kerais (delegation of M’Saken) 
in December 1965 – almost a year to the date of the 1964 anti-cooperative riots in 
M’Saken – highlights the importance the party continued to place in the cooperative 
system. Two of the eight points highlighted pertain to local branch support of the 
cooperative movement (Rudebeck: 173-174). 
                                                
141 In reaction to the riots, Bourguiba dissolved the local party branch and nationalized the land belonging 
to rioters in December 1964, restituting it a few months later. 
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Local branches and Coordination Committees conformed to decisions from the 
top for a number of reasons. 
First, the program did not penalize all large farmers, just those renting land near 
existing cooperatives. In fact, many of them profited: rumors of nationalization induced 
some small and medium-sized farmers to sell their land, often at cheaper-than-market 
rates (Simmons 1971: 46). Former Minister of Justice Ahmed Mestiri who opposed the 
movement claimed large and medium-sized landholders with capital expanded their 
holdings as smaller farmers, with fewer political connections, preferred to sell their land 
and move to the cities than to be forced to incorporate their land in the cooperative 
movement (I-1). Empirically, Makhlouf shows that in Kef, while farmers who rented land 
lost out during the cooperative program, seventeen of the thirty-six large landowners 
acquired 1,208 ha between 1962 and 1966 (Makhlouf 1967: 41-42).  
Second, the UCPs were not concentrated in zones with developed party branches, 
but rather in the South, the Central Steppes, and in the northwest cereal regions like Kef: 
regions that had always been difficult to govern.  
Table 5.2 Neo-Destour Membership by Region, 1965 
 Branches Members 
Governorate Terr. Prof. Number Pop. % 
Bizerte 68 24 32,000 10.7 
Béja 71 7 19,700 6.3 
Gafsa 87 24 32,000 9.0 
Kasserine 42 8 19,000 6.3 
Kef 81 7 21,620 6.7 
Sfax 102 20 35,000 8.2 
Sousse 148 27 47,000 8.2 
Souk-el-Arba 47 56 22,000 8.7 
National Total 1020 249 381,320 8.3 
Source: Rudebeck 1967: 142. 
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In the Central Steppes, Northwest, and South, historically tribal areas located on 
the periphery, party implantation was weak. While cooperatives were mainly a 
technocratic means of provide employment to peasants in the regions dominated by 
colonial-era settler farms, the regime also used cooperatives to undermine regionalized 
oppositions, as they were “obviously a convenient device to control and supervise the 
activity of thousands of Tunisians” (Ashford 1967: 213). Table 5.2 reveals a descriptive 
view at the link between party membership levels and cooperatives farms. In 1966, party 
regional strongholds still largely escaped the cooperative experiment; areas of dissidence 
did not. A look at the selection of UCP implantation between the regions of Béja,142 a 
bastion of the Communist Party, and Jendouba (Souk-el-Arba), a region that had 
historically supported the Neo-Destour, is revealing. Both are in the heartland of the 
cereal economy and were more or less equally structured in size and types of extant land 
regime. And yet by 1969, 164,751 ha of land were in UPC holdings in Béja, nearly three 
times the 60,908 ha of land incorporated in Jendouba. Similar observations might be 
made of the South, where party-allied Sfax’ portfolio of 115,103 ha looked pithy in 
comparison to Gafsa143, a region that had supported Salah Ben Youcef in the 1950s, and 
where the UPCs claimed 472,361 ha of land (Simmons 1970: 465).  
Third, as long as the cooperatives were outside of the core party regions, party 
leaders, many of whom had been parachuted into the local administration and party 
structures outside of their home region (Moore 1965: 132-158; Duvignaud 1977: 209-
230; Zussman 1992: 73, 77-78; King 1997), were still willing to implement national 
                                                
142 Incidentally, fourteen of the thirty-four candidates for the 1965 Coordinate Committee were deleted 
from the list. Only seven were deleted from the Souk-el-Arba lists that same year. Rudebeck 1967: 117. 
143 Similarly, 31 of Gafsa’s 70 candidates for the 1965 Coordination Committee were deleted from its list; 
only ten of Sfax’ 33 candidates received similar treatment. And that number might be linked to the fact that 
head of the Tunisian Workers Union (UGTT, Union général des travailleurs de Tunisie), Habib Achour, 
had fallen from favor. Ibid. 
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reforms. Successfully promoting a program developed by Ben Salah – who was said to 
have the president’s ear – would surely lead to promotion. When asked which party 
member had proved himself to be the best Destourian in a 1965 interview, a Gafsa branch 
member replied it was the member “who has succeeded in persuading people to work in 
the cooperative” (Rudebeck 1967: 172).  
While it is now clear that only twenty percent of the cooperatives were actually 
recovering their administrative costs by 1968 (Simmons 1971: 53), reports coming from 
the Central Bank, based on the Ministry of Agriculture’s reports, showed positive results. 
Caught in the same upward promotion dynamic, CDRA cadres supervising the 
cooperative committees were doctoring the results. Reading those same reports, in 
January 1969, Bourguiba told a group of landowners in the Cap Bon “in four or five 
years you will not regret having had confidence in Bourguiba” (Simmons 1971: 54). The 
same month anti-cooperative riots in the Saheli village Ouerdanine resulted in several 
deaths.  
As the project expanded, exuberance waned. And still the process continued. 
Shopkeepers and industrialists working the in the foodstuffs industry came under fire in 
1967, when the Ministry of Planning expanded the cooperative movement into 
commerce, textiles, foodstuffs, and leatherworks, alienating the Neo-Destour’s Jerbian 
base. By August 1968, roughly 1,795,490 ha, or approximately twenty percent of 
cropland had been incorporated into the UCPs (Simmons 1970: 465). In March of 1969, 
the Ministry of Planning announced the incorporation of all Tunisian land into the 
cooperative movement. Between January and August 1969, the number if cooperatives 
doubled bringing the total amount of UCP land to close to 2.8 million ha, or roughly one-
third of all arable land (Simmons 1970: 463). The remaining 4.2 million ha was placed 
under ward of the Ministry of Planning, scheduled for future collectivization. 
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Only when the program to the core of the Neo-Destour party, the Sahel and Sfax, 
did opposition vocalize. Coordinating their opposition at the branches in, Ksar Nabeul, 
Hellal, Monastir, Sousse and Sfax, via the Coordination Committees in Sousse and Sfax 
and at the national level, the Saheli and Sfaxi political elite shut down the municipal 
councils and used their kinship, social, and party relations with the Governors, ministers, 
and deputies to gain the President’s ear. Perhaps indicating a change in statistical 
procurement, in April 1969 the Banque Nationale d’Agriculture released a scathing 
report on program efficiency: the cooperatives were under-performing and on verge of 
bankruptcy. While profit levels rivaling private sector performance marked the pilot 
stages of the cooperative movement, a three-year drought had seriously undermined 
productive capacity, which was structurally limited due to rapid expansion and poor-
management. 
Table 5.3: Evolution of Landholding, 1962-1980 
Size, ha 1962 % 1980 % 
<20  1,707,000 34 1,832,000 36 
20-50 1,304,000 26 1,270,000 25 
50+ 2,008,000 40 1,984,000 39 
Total 5,022,000 100 5,085,000 100 
Source: Enquêtes agricoles de base, 1990, INS, Tunis. Cited in Cherif 1999 
 
Under sudden and intense political pressure, the regime abruptly halted the 
experiment in September 1969, announcing the end of forced collectivization. The 
cooperatives hemorrhaged overnight, as the bulk of the private sector withdrew in 
jubilation. In May 1970 four and a half million ha of private land was returned (Jenayah 
1995: 141). The bulk of the public domain was kept, especially in the North, where cereal 
production required high capital inputs and the land was too politically and economically 
valuable to give away. Here, the state maintained 300,000 ha, of which 246,000 ha were 
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divided into cooperatives, public agro-capitalist, and pilot-farms (Cherif 1995: 253). 
Another 154,000 ha were distributed to the private sector, mainly along the fertile plains 
of the Upper Tell and along the Medjerda Valley. Smaller parcels went to farmers with 
party membership, whereas larger tracts of land were granted to large farmers with strong 
political connections and high-ranking party dignitaries (ibid: 45) in a limited but high 
profile pay-off to the political class for their support of Bourguiba in the aftermath of the 
cooperative fiasco. Summing the reaction of Tunisian farmers to the cooperative period, 
Simmons comments: “The best indication of the net results of 15 years experience of 
cooperative farms was given by the Tunisian government on September 2, 1969, when it 
virtually abandoned them” (Simmons 1971: 45). 
The cooperative experiment was both financially and politically costly. Though 
perhaps reckless, the regime’s willingness to expand the movement despite early warning 
signs such as the M’Saken riots, and the near total dismantling of the program in 1969 
reveal much about local-national party and state relations in post-independence Tunisia. 
The cooperatives program was a political experiment that was as much a technocratic 
response to decolonization and rural unemployment as it was a devise to expand and 
buttress state control and authority over the countryside. The project reflected the summit 
of both state and party.  
In 1964, the year Tunisia nationalized remaining foreign-owned land, the Neo-
Destour changed its name to the Socialist Destourian Party (PSD, Parti Socialiste 
Destourien) to reflect a new economic policy. Following the lead of the Political Bureau, 
Coordination Committees increased visits to the party branches to explain the contours of 
the new policy. Branches were responsible for educating the population and overseeing 
the cooperative movement at the local level. The cooperative project also emanated from 
the highest levels of the state. By the mid 1960s, Ahmed Ben Salah was arguably the 
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second most powerful man in Tunisia. Named Super-Minister of the National Economy, 
Ben Salah held the combined portfolios of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, and 
Finance and Plan. His offices tailored the plan, which was implemented by the CDRA 
and its local level agent delegated to the local cooperative council.  
While they might have personally opposed the project, until mid 1969, local state 
and party cadres nevertheless implemented the cooperative program in the most remote 
regions of the Tunisian state. The battles between the center and periphery over the 
authority to define and enforce the exclusive use and transfer of property that 
characterized past struggles between the Ottoman Beys or French administrator and tribal 
sheikh and jema‘a were now a part of the past. In 1956, the nationalist party wrestled 
political authority from the colonial to the provincial capital, claiming control over the 
economic with the last land nationalization in 1964. That it could extend its model of 
property rights over land outside the colonial portfolio reveal the degree to which the 
state had re-wired local institutions, bringing them under national control. 
The collapse of the cooperative program also reveals the regime’s dependence on 
the party cadres, branches and Coordination Committees to control local affairs on its 
behalf. As discussed above, local prestige and vertical mobilization opportunities 
associated with party membership were positive incentives that encouraged local 
implementation of national reform. The forced integration of private land in 1969, 
however, immediately affected the pocketbook of party cadres, branch members, and 
Coordination Committee representative. In the mid 1960s, farmers were the second 
largest socio-economic category of local and regional party elite: fifty-seven percent of 
party cadres in the Governorate of Sousse (Moore 1965: 153); nineteen percent of 
national branch presidents and fourteen percent of the branch members; and twenty-one 
percent of the thirteen Coordination Committees (Rudebeck 1967: 150, 153) were self-
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identified farmers. Following the Saheli branches, party branches across the nation 
revolted. 
Finally, the regime’s response underscore self-awareness of the importance local 
party administrators and militants played in the consolidation and functioning the regime, 
and extension of state power into the periphery. As much as party militants were 
dependent on the regime for local prestige and vertical mobility, the regime was 
dependent on the local elite to implement national authority and enforce its decisions. 
Instead of further alienating the foundation of its own authority, which would have 
resulted in local subversion (as in Algeria, discussed in Chapter Six), if not regime 
collapse, Bourguiba backtracked.  
 
5.5 LAND AND POWER, 1970-1987: OUTSOURCING CONTROL OVER THE 
COUNTRYSIDE 
Between 1970 and 1982, the regime embraced a dual system of state and private 
owned land and agriculture production. In 1976, the Ministry of Agriculture limited the 
OTD to production. Its credit and input functions were pared off to the private sector or 
smaller public sector upstarts. In the absence of a coordinated strategy focusing on major 
capital-intensive agrarian projects, production stagnated. The evolution of tomato and 
wheat yield – Tunisian household staples – shows a contrasting evolution during the 
period between 1969 and 1981. Private sector wheat production stagnated in the absence 
of a policy focusing on major-capital intensive restructuring. Tomato yield, by contrast, 
augmented from 153,000 metric tons in 1970 to 380,000 in 1981 as small and medium-
sized farmers switched to the more labor-intensive crop.144 Ironically, the most 
productive sectors were the remaining core of Northern cooperative farms and the few 
                                                
144 Data taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization. http://www.faostat.fao.org. 
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individual farmers that were able to sink capital into large projects. Since the cooperative 
farms represented only fifteen percent of state land by this time and individual farmers 
were prohibited from pooling resources in an incorporated body, production was 
structurally limited. In the early 1980s, the regime experimented with a new plan to 
develop cereal-producing OTD lands.  
Experiments in land devolution were matched by a strengthening of the local 
administration. Re-wiring power from the party to the administration was necessary as 
the party and representative institutions increasingly became gerontocratic, offering fewer 
vertical mobility opportunities for the base.145 Blocked by men who had been in power 
for close to twenty years, a new generation of party cadres called for political and 
economic liberalization. In 1971, they rallied behind former Minister of Justice Ahmed 
Mestiri at the PSD National Congress in Monastir. Mestiri almost succeeded in setting 
limits to Bourguiba’s power, which included a state-centric political economy. The state 
land portfolio, a non-renewable and lucrative patronage resource, had to be rationally 
managed and strategically distributed. By appointing more local state administrators, the 
regime could keep an eye on the party branches. In 1975, the sheikh was replaced by the 
‘umda, a local official screened by the Delegate, nominated by the Governor, and 
approved by the Minister of Interior (King 2003: 51-52), while at the national level, the 
land portfolio continued to be closely guarded by Bourguiba.  
With the administrative and political organization in place, the regime partially 
relaxed OTD policy by selectively distributing large tracts of cereal land in the North. A 
                                                
145 This is the fundamental weakness of these republican regimes: their inability to recruit youth after the 
1960s created Gerontocratic Republics that have little legitimacy in the eyes of their very young 
populations. These tensions, among others, ultimately exploded in Tunisia in January 2011. Ironically, 
however, the inability to create new, legitimate Tunisian elites also resulted in the nomination of 83 year-
old Beji Caid el Sebsi as caretaker Prime Minister in late February 2011. Ironically, Caid el Sebsi supported 
Ahmedi Mestiri’s 1971 opposition to Bourguiba, which was itself an effort to dislodge the old guard. 
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1982 decree loosened the prohibition on corporate agriculture, permitting joint-venture 
public-private companies, Agriculture Development Companies (SMVDA, Sociétés de 
mis-en-valeur et de développement agricole), to work large stretches of government land 
in forty-year leases. Between 1982 and 1991, thirty-one SMVDAs were created, twenty-
one of which operated in the cereal plains of the North.146 Unlike the cooperatives, the 
SMVDA did not seek to control the local population. Rather the new strategy was to 
outsource local employment to agro-capitalists who were politically dependent on the 
regime’s land distribution policy – and as a concentrated, small group, more easily to 
control. Not surprisingly, the program was highly selective. With extremely high start-up 
costs, small- and medium sized Tunisian farmers who would have closer ties to the 
branch presidents and municipal council members were precluded from the arrangement. 
Tight regulation on performance schedules and operating procedures allowed the state to 
cancel the contract within a year’s notice.147 While opening public land to new 
production techniques, the scheme only slowly increased production. Of the twenty-one 
SMVDAs in the North, by 1991, only eight broke even (Cherif 1999: 257-258).148 
On 7 November 1987, Habib Bourguiba was deposed in what would later be 
dubbed a “Constitutional Coup,” organized by Prime Minister Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali 
                                                
146 The average SMVDA was 1,843 ha. 38,700 ha were ceded in total, with six SMVDAs receiving a total 
of 29,000 ha: La Société el Amra at the former Office de l’Elevage à Borj el Amri (7,300 ha); SODEA-
Ghanima in Testour (6,400 ha); Société des Fermes Latières in Mejez-el-Bab (4,000 ha); SMADEA in Bou 
Salem (4,000 ha); Société Mateur-Jalta (4,000 ha). The bulk of these were supported with the newly created 
Tunisian development banks or with national, mixed, or foreign investment company funds (BNA, BTKD, 
BTQI, STUSID, POULINA, Group B. Ayed, Fonds Abu Dhabi, etc.) Cherif 1999: 257-258. 
147 In the typical Tunisian regulative fashion, the laws governing SMVDA operation placed too rigorous 
expectations on the new companies. Companies not meeting Ministry of Agriculture and SMVDA pre-
arranged profit margins were subject to expropriation. 
148 Pigeon-holed by minimum employee numbers, high social costs, over-valued land fees, and over-
estimated production schedules, of the 21 SMVDAs created in the North in 1982, only five were profitable. 
Another three broke even. The remaining thirteen were under-productive. While the regime allowed these 
13 to remain in service, their inability to produce pegged rates placed their continued existence entirely in 
the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture and its political whims. Agence de promotion des Investissements 
Agricoles (APIA). 1994. Rapport de suivi des SMVDA créées entre 1983 et 1991: 266, Cited in Cherif 
1999. 
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(1987-2011). During his twenty-three year reign, Ben Ali re-organized the party, 
expanding its rural network, and further liberalized the land portfolio to close allies. 
While Ben Ali’s consolidation over the national political sphere and use of land-
patronage initially reinforced the already strong hold over the periphery, the 
appropriation of the national economy by his family would soon erode his popularity, and 
eventually undermine his local level party support.  
 
5.6 ZINE EL-ABIDINE BEN ALI, 1987-2011: THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE REGIME 
Political reforms announced by the new president called for the devolution of 
power in a multiparty framework. In July 1988, constitutional reform officially 
disassociated the party with the state. In preparation for the 1990 municipal elections, 
Tunisia’s first truly multiparty ballot since independence, a series of reforms increased 
administrative authority over rural areas, transferring authority from the Coordination 
Committee to the local administration. The most important of these early reforms was the 
February 1989 law that established Rural Councils for the population still outside of the 
municipal council regime. Rural Councils were composed of five to ten members 
nominated by the local Governor for three-year terms. Under the purview of the ‘umda, 
the Rural Councils re-wired remaining rural authority from the Constitutional Democratic 
Rally (RCD, Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique) to state institutions. The 
transfer was pointless; under Ben Ali’s multipartism, local and national elections were 
rigged. Opposition parties won only one municipal council in the 1990 elections 
(Thiébault 1998: 87).  
The new regime’s policy built on Bourguiba’s timid political opening to the land-
owning elite. King argues Ben Ali broke with Bourguiba’s strategy by encouraging a re-
traditionalization of the countryside, using the party as a local intermediary between the 
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rural elite and the disenfranchised peasant (King 2003). The difference seems semantic. 
By the late 1980s, the party branch as a corporate institution had fallen into disuse, their 
authority displaced by local notables who were nominal militants. As Bourguiba 
distributed land to notables during the regime consolidation of the late 1950s, and for 
regime survival in 1969, Ben Ali distributed tracts of land to allies with the most intimate 
contacts with the local, regional, and national administration (ibid: 42-75). And as shown 
in Table 5.4, neither strategy, moreover, seems to have had a major impact on land 
holdings. 
Table 5.4: Evolution of Landholding, 1962-1990 
Size, ha 1962 % 1980 % 1990 % 
<20  1,707,000 34 1,832,000 36 2,207,000 41 
20-50 1,304,000 26 1,270,000 25 1,220,000 23 
50+ 2,008,000 40 1,984,000 39 1,939,000 36 
Total 5,022,000 100 5,085,000 100 5,365,000 100 
Source: Enquêtes agricoles de base, 1990, INS, Tunis, Cited in Cherif 1999 
 
A series of laws in 1988 and 1989 further relaxed the rules governing company 
access to state-owned land. A 1991 law restructured and reduced the maximum surface 
area allotted under the SMVDA lease-contract, making land accessible to Tunisian agro-
entrepreneurs with less start-up capital. And in 1993, foreigners were allowed in without 
Tunisian participatory capital in an attempt to re-invigorate the sector, which had fallen 
into severe debt.149 Bank and finance company participation was prohibited from future 
SMVDA contracts in 1996. While honoring past SMVDA contracts, the current regime 
has favored a distinctly political distribution of long-term land leases, sometimes ceded at 
the price of a symbolic dinar per hectare.  
                                                
149 A 1994 report noted that of the key twenty-one northern SMVDAs, six had a debt-ratio of less than ten 
percent, while an addition five had a debt-ratio of greater than fifty percent. APIA, 1994: 273, cited in 
Cherif 1999. 
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In this context, the administration and to a lesser degree the RCD continued to 
control the levers of economic power in the countryside. Political control over the private 
sector was indirect and channeled through the nexus of party branch and local 
development subsidies consisting of inputs distributed by the party and the President’s 
personal National Solidarity Fund, 26-26. Under Ben Ali, RCD membership, which had 
seriously slipped in the mid 1970s and 1980s, rose to 120,000 (Hibou 1999: 4), mainly 
through recruits from the countryside (Galan and Hen 1991). RCD rural branches 
increasingly served as patronage centers where inputs such as fertilizers and seed were 
distributed in advance of election, though their overall responsiveness to local demands 
dissipated (King 2003: 140). 
Unsurprisingly, the opposition failed to attract rural candidates (Camau and 
Geisser 2003: 245). Former Minister of Justice and leader of the Social Democratic 
Movement (MDS, Mouvement Démocratique et Sociale) Ahmed Mestiri claimed his 
party simply did not have the rural infrastructure to compete in the countryside, so it 
contested the cities (I-1). Lacking rural patronage, opposition parties did not have first-
order or second order material resources to distribute to create a rural clientele 
(Lemarchand 1972; Galan and Hen 1992). Unsurprisingly the opposition party that won a 
municipal council in 1990 lost it in the 1995 polls, when opposition parties won six of the 
4,090 contested municipal seats (Thiébault 1998: 87). 
Reflecting on the changes multipartism has had on Tunisian decentralization in 
the late 1990s, French scholar Gérard Marcou, glumly wrote: “De-concentration 
continues to dominate decentralization” (Marcou 1998: 7). The 1989 administrative 
reforms, promoted as rural enfranchisement, buttressed the regime by protecting its rural 
flank. Perhaps with a better grasp on the political development of the Tunisian state, 
Mohamed Jenayah, remarks: “the principal preoccupation of the Tunisian state in 
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agriculture has been political order” (Jenayah 1995: 132). He might be better reworded to 
reflect Samuel Huntington’s ‘rural stability groups’: the Tunisia state’s premier 
preoccupation is political order via rural structures and agriculture to better keep control 
of restive urban elites (Huntington 1968). 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
Since the Ottoman period, authorities in Tunis have been projecting power into 
the periphery, delinking parochial authority from its dependent local population and re-
wiring it with the center. Half the country had already been sedentarized and formally 
brought under the authority of the Bey upon French invasion in 1881. The process 
continued the process during the Protectorate, which finalized the bureaucratization of 
local titles by integrating them into the colonial administration.  
Bourguiba continued the long process, first displacing remaining traditional 
hierarchies with the party, and then slowly blurring the line between party and state 
administrators. Land reform played a big role in the process, revealing to the peasant and 
local party militant the awesome reach of state power. While the cooperative project 
ultimately ended in failure, it showed that Tunis was not deaf to intense local pressure. 
The agents that gave the state power and authority at the local level were still part and 
parcel of the political system.  
While the 1970s and 1980s were marked by a retrenchment of political control at 
the local level – largely paralleled by a decline in party membership – the Ben Ali regime 
found limited outsourcing to the private sector paralleled with increased local 
surveillance, afforded the regime better control over the rural periphery. In essence, the 
regime has changed land policy – from a socialist to a capitalist orientation – while 
maintaining the overarching strategy of measured rural control. In 2010, property rights 
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institutions were strong in Tunisia, and the central state defined and enforced the 
exclusive use and transfer of property.  
 
Epilogue  
Writing on the Ben Ali regime in 2003, Stephen King remarked:  
The stability of the new, less populist authoritarian regime in Tunisia is still in 
question. The RCD is increasingly recognized as having abandoned its historical 
commitments to equity and become a party representing the interests of rural 
notables, the urban bourgeoisie, and transnational finance. Labor (the base of the 
national labor union, if not the leadership and the small peasantry are muttering 
complaints about their lack of strong representation in the hegemonic party 
political system…The closed political space and lack of civil liberties are stifling 
to everyone. On the other hand, Ben Ali’s regime has proven that it can handle 
many of those challenges, and may be able to for a long period of time, absent 
major events provoking a break (King 2003: 140) 
 
In December 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, an informal street vendor immolated 
himself in protest of al-hogra, literally the “disdain” to people shown by public officials. 
His produce had been confiscated by a local police officer. As news of his death spread 
through his and nearby neighborhoods, a riot broke out. After several days of continued 
riots, the police responded with violence. Unlike M’Saken of 1964 or Ouerdanine of 
1969, Ben Ali’s RCD party branches could not quickly intervened to calm the population. 
The party had been outsourced to local big wigs, who were part of the “al-hogra 
problem.” As news circulated, Tunisians in other villages held demonstrations against 
police brutality, al-hogra, and the Presidential family corruption.  
Like the protests in the Sahel in August 1969, calls for change came from the 
countryside. Unlike 1969, Ben Ali did not have a large support network with close links 
population to convince him to switch strategies. Transformed into a material patronage 
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network, the RCD had lost all real contact with the population, and was entirely 
illegitimate. Protests by now had moved to Tunis. In early January, police fired on 
protestors, killing hundreds. Perhaps seeking to emulate Bourguiba with Ben Salah, Ben 
Ali sacked his Minister of Interior on 12 January. On 13 January, he gave a televised 
speak re-inventing the democratization promises he made in 1987. He fled a day later. 
While it is too early to make a proper diagnosis of post-Ben Ali Tunisia, it seems 
unlikely that the new regime will have problems enforcing property rights – despite 
ongoing looting in downtown Tunis. While the Ben Ali regime has fled, the state 
administration, though shell-shocked, will probably re-assert itself, though undoubtedly 
reformed and corresponding with citizen needs. The long process of state building and 




Chapter Six: Post-Colonial Algeria, Local-National Impasse. Contested 
Property Rights 
The failure of property law is generated by the confrontation of contradictory 
logics: local and central logics in a struggle over the right to use property 
(Bendjaballah 1997: 46). 
 
When I finished French military service in 1955, I headed to the maquis and 
integrated the ALN. A lieutenant, I was posted with Wilaya V, Zone 6.150 We had 
one permanent mission: to break the colonial hold on the countryside. We were to 
terrorize the colonial system by killing settlers and qaids. And we were to create 
space for the FLN. We attacked and burned isolated colonial farms on the plains 
and forest guards in the hills. We contacted Algerian villagers.  
We were supposed to prepare the population for independence. During the 
revolution, we taught the people to avoid the French state and to create their own 
law. We created the “Committees of Five.” The douar jema‘a elected a sheikh, a 
party organizer, a tax collector, a propagandist-school teacher, and a qadi. The 
sheikh was the only person subsequently in contact with us, and he only met one 
of our delegates – we couldn’t have closer contact with the population out of fear 
that the French had spies, or that under torture one of the committee members 
would reveal our identities. The tax collector raised money for the schools and 
ALN provisions, while the qadi, usually the villager who best understood the 
Qu’ran, adjudicated local disputes. Until the internment camps in 1959, the 
Committees of Five worked.  
We convinced villagers to ignore the law between 1954 and 1962. At 
independence, our problem was to get them to respect the law! (Maître Said 
Benabdallah, I-2). 
 
Maître Benabdallah’s experiences in the maquis give us a prescient point of 
departure for understanding post-independence Algerian state building and property 
reform. Two salient points can be drawn. First, excluded from the political sphere and 
                                                
150 Zone 6 covered Mascara and Saida in Western Algeria – incidentally, the Amir Abdelkader’s base of 
operations. 
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militarily inferior, the FLN took the revolution to the countryside,151 seeking to 
undermine local representatives of the colonial system, assassinating colonial officials, 
settlers, and the indigenous qaidal corps. The FLN also encouraged the douar to boycott 
colonial institutions: authority, education, justice, and taxation. Village-elected, FLN-
sanctioned representatives filled the authority gap. Symbolically, the FLN resuscitated 
terms associated with pre-colonial modes of organization and authority (e.g. sheikh, qadi, 
jema‘a). Drawing authority away from local representatives of colonial power, the larger 
strategy was to create free zones in the countryside from which military commandos 
could expand their operations (Bensadoun 2005). 
The second point is that while the FLN siphoned authority from the colonial 
administration and vested it in the douar jema‘a, it could hardly take advantage of the 
“Committees of Five” at independence. Four of the five members had no contact with the 
FLN, and the sheikh only knew one person in the party. Security dictates imposed “the 
rule of three:” agents at the lower and middle range of the political hierarchy only knew 
their immediate superior and subordinate. In part because of this vertical blackout, in July 
1962, there was no organic structure that formally linked the party leadership with the 
base (Harbi 1980). Thus, post-colonial regime immediately entered a struggle with local 
populations and elites over the definition and rights to colonial-era property. 
 
                                                
151 Of course, the FLN also had a diplomatic strategy – the two were to hand in hand. In the interior, 
mujahidin harassed settlers and undermined colonial authority. Outside Algeria, FLN political leaders 
toured Western capitals, organized news conferences, met diplomats, and sought to gain as much 
international accreditation as possible in order to bring light to the inequity of the Algerian colonial 
situation, and above all, show the outside the brutal tactics a minority group was willing to use to keep 
power. See: Haroun 1986; Aït Challal 2000; Henry 2010. 
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6.1 BEN BELLA’S REGIME: INSTITUTIONAL CHAOS BETWEEN MILITARY COUPS 
The 19 March 1962 Évian Accords, signed between France and the Provisional 
Government of the Algeria Republic (GPRA, Gouvernement Provisoire de la République 
Algérienne), called for a cease-fire and immediate referendum on the status of Algeria. 
By the time independence was announced, on 5 July 1962, the FLN was in disarray. The 
political leadership was divided between the Political Bureau, led by Ahmed Ben Bella, 
and Benyoucef Benkhedda’s GPRA, which had negotiated the Évian Accord with France 
three months earlier. Each side claimed the exclusive legitimacy to govern. Between July 
and September, Algeria came close to entering a civil war, pitting the GPRA, which 
seized Algiers with support of military leaders from Wilaya III and IV152, and the 
Political Bureau supported by military leaders from the National Liberation Army (ALN, 
Armée de Libération Nationale) and Wilaya I, II, and V153 (Harbi 1980; Haroun 2000). 
After a few minor skirmishes, Ben Bella took power in September 1962. He immediately 
disbanded the GPRA, replacing its ministers and naming prefects to the fifteen 
administrative regions, or Departments, from a list negotiated with the ALN a month 
earlier at a secret meeting held in a farmhouse outside Bou Saada, two hundred 
kilometers south-east of Algiers. The distribution of ministerial and high administrative 
posts was split between Ben Bella’s nominees and representatives of ALN leader Colonel 
Houari Boumediene’s entourage (I-3; I-4). 
The Évian Accords did not specify who would control public security during the 
transfer of power. In April, the French military withdrew to its caserns. In some towns, 
French police jointly patrolled with FLN platoons, but the decision was entirely a 
courtesy and incumbent on the French mayor (I-2). Public security was by no means 
                                                
152 The FLN organized its armed resistance into five Wilaya, or military regions. Wilaya III and IV are 
Kabylia and Algiers, respectively. 
153 Aurès-Nememcha, Constantine, and Oran. 
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evenly distributed. In the provinces, law and order broke down. In Oran, the emblematic 
colonial city, European and Muslim civilians were massacred; properties destroyed and 
looted (Benaboura 2005; Monneret 2006).  
In the chaos, close to ten billion francs of real estate were destroyed, and M2 
decreased by two billion as settler frantically withdrew money from banks and departed 
(Zarka: 538-539). Between July and August 1962, one hundred thousand European 
functionaries left Algeria with the close to nine hundred thousand departing settlers. In 
two months, three-quarters of qualified staff and ninety percent of administrative cadres 
fled (Galissot 1969: 128). In their wake, land, buildings, and apartments were 
appropriated, including this author’s.   
 
“Houari X” Observes the Chaotic Period (I-9) 
In April 1962, “Houari X,” officer in the ALN, was sent to Mascara to observe the 
cease-fire. In July, he returned to Oran, where he had been named to the Special 
Delegation that ran the municipality after independence. As word of promotion 
circulated, friends and family visited him with specific requests. One acquaintance, 
“Ayachi,” solicited him to secure a transfer of money from the Morales Domaine near 
Perregaud (Mohammedia) to Oran. The countryside was dangerous at the time, and their 
were rumors of bandits targeting French settlers who had decided to stay. Though 
“Houari X” was a Special Delegate, he apparently moonlighted on the side. On his way 
back, he was stopped at a hastily drawn roadblock by armed adolescents near St. Denis 
du Sig (Sig), thirty kilometers east of Oran. “Wearing my uniform, I got out of the truck, 
slapped the kids, and headed back to Sig, where I turned them over to the gendarmes. 
This could have never happened during the colonial era, nor after.” 
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Pro tempore Municipal Councilor (see below), officer in the Army, and private 
bodyguard, the fluid professional roles of “Houari X” reflect the turbulent conditions of 
Algeria in the summer of 1962. 
 
6.1.1 State Institutional Development in the Ben Bella Years 
The new Algerian government had two priorities in the summer of 1962: create a 
state and prepare the harvest. The problems collided. Building a state begins with staffing 
institutions. During the colonial era, racist settler policy kept Algerians out of the 
administration. In 1954, Algerians occupied only 205 of the 7,090 senior posts in the 
colonial administration (Taouti 1975: 91). Racially charged settler policies placed 
stringent entry requirements, included renouncing Muslim civil status and a mandatory 
university diploma. Ironically, the same racial policies limited higher education 
opportunities: in 1954, there were fewer than six hundred students enrolled at the 
University of Algiers (Henry 2010: 28), mentioned earlier. 
Table 6.1: Muslims in the Administration, 1954 
 Non-Muslim Muslim % Muslim 
Category A 7090 205 2.8 
Category B 19543 3278 14.4 
Category C and D 19745 6648 25.2 
Total 46,378 10,103 21.8 
Source: Taouti 1975: 91 
 
Unlike Bourguiba, the new Algerian government154 did not have a mass-
mobilizing party with administrative experience that could take over from the French. It 
had to make a party and create an administration from scratch. In July 1962, the GRPA 
derogated the administration’s entry requirements, allowing the government to nominate 
                                                
154 The GPRA (July-September 1962) and Ben Bella (September 1962-June 1965). 
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high functionaries (Category A, e.g. directors), while loosening the requirements 
governing the recruitment of middle-level (Category B, e.g. accountants) and low-level 
(Category C, e.g. clerks) administrative functionaries (Decrees 62-502/503). In 
September, the government prioritized high, middle, and low functionary posts and 
reserved Category D posts (e.g. security guards, receptionists, workers) to former 
combatants. The same law automatically re-integrated former combatants into their prior 
administrative posts, while inviting Algerian nationals serving in France, Morocco, or 
Tunisia to join the new administration – the sons of the Algerian notables propped up by 
the colonial regime (Taouti 1975: 113).155 At the end of 1963, the Ministries of Finance 
and National Education complained they had only staffed 55 and 45% of their posts, 
respectively (ibid: 118). 
The new regime relied on its military, transferring many officers from the eight 
hundred strong Ministry of General Liaisons and Armament156 (MALG, Ministère 
d’Armement et des Liaisons Générales), to the provincial administration (I-24; I-27; 
Lemkani 2004).157 Keeping the colonial Departments, which had been expanded from 
three in 1954 to fifteen by independence, the regime staffed the Wilaya158 with Walis 
negotiated at the August meeting in Bou Saada. At the provincial level, the Wali was the 
State and directly in charge of overseeing the Wilaya budget, allocating housing and 
subsidies, creating jobs, and maintaining security. While most had been officers close to 
                                                
155 The few Algerians who had become high cadres and functionaries found it difficult to work in French 
Algeria, and were forced to take jobs in the Moroccan colonial administration. 
156 About half would constitute the new Algerian internal espionage Military Security (SM, Sécurité 
Militaire) corps. 
157 Though hardly scientific, of the twenty or so sons and daughters of MALG officers I have encountered, 
the majority have stated that either their fathers or grandfathers were bachaga, qaid, or qadi at one point in 
the colonial administration. The MALG recruited young men who were sure of themselves, and who had an 
understanding of modern administrative techniques, if not a formal education.  
158 In 1968, the name département changed to Wilaya; the Prefect to Wali. Similarly, the Sub-Prefecture 
became the Daïra, and the Sub-Prefect became the Chef de Daïra. For simplicity’s sake, I refer to all 
divisions with their post-1968 name. 
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Boumediene or high-ranking FLN officials during the Revolution, like Oran’s first Wali, 
Houari Souiah (I-7), not all had participated in the War of Independence. Noteworthy is 
Abdelhamid El Hassar (1962-1963) from Mostaghanem, who was an exceptional leftover 
from the colonial high administration (I-2). Lacking close relations with the new 
government, and a potential political liability, most professional cadres like El Hassar 
were rotated out of power shortly after independence. In 1963, nine Walis were former 
military commanders; six were high-ranking FLN officials (Jackson 1977: 84). Under the 
Wali were 101 District Chiefs (chef de daïra), also frequently former officers like Maître 
Benabdallah (Sidi Ali, Mostaghanem 1962-1964), who implemented the Wali’s program, 
maintained security, and managed the municipalities in his District (Benakezouh 1984: 
170).  
Though emptied over the summer, remaining sitting Municipal Councils were 
annulled and replaced by co-opted delegations headed by a Special Delegate (Délégué 
Spécial) nominated by Algiers. The Special Delegates appointed to Algeria’s major cities 
had usually been a ranking officer in the FLN/ALN159 or ALM/MALG, such “Houari X” 
(1962) (I-9) and fourth delegate to Oran, Sghier Ben Ali (1965-1967) who was also from 
the same village as Algeria’s first Minister of Interior (I-8).160 Because the new state 
desperately lacked of trained cadres, in the smaller cities the Special Delegate was 
usually a civilian co-opted from the local population. One Special Delegate attributed his 
appointment to the fact that he was the youngest, most educated FLN sympathizer in his 
village (near Mostaghanem) (I-5). With accounting skills, he could tally colonial 
properties and keep track of public monies. Former combatants assisted him following 
                                                
159 See the discussion of the FLN at independence, below. 
160 Ahmed Medeghri, 1934-1974; Wali of Tlemcen, 1962; Minister of Interior, 1962-1964; 1965-1974. 
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the 31 August 1963 Presidential Decree, which mandated a reserved number of seats for 
mujahidin in each delegation (I-5; Leca and Vatin 1975: 190-192) 
Despite their individually competent trajectories, the capacity of the new local and 
regional administrators to bring order to the provinces was undermined by Ben Bella’s 
political maneuvering and mercurial style. The vagaries of power politicking between his 
trusted cohort and increasingly autonomous and powerful military patrons pushed Ben 
Bella to frequently shift his regional appointees. For example, the Special Delegate to 
Oran, who had powers rivaling a Wali of a smaller Wilaya, was changed four times in 
five years (I-6; Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 225; Grimaud 1973: 343). Comparatively, of 
the thirteen Governors in Tunisia named in 1956, eight were still governors in 1964 
(Rudebeck 1967: 104). Frequent rotation hindered the institutionalization of a rational 
link between Algiers and the provinces, which themselves were living through the chaos 
associated with de-colonization. Moore, who was in Algeria during part of this period, 
comments: “it was often unclear who ruled a particular province or District. In practice, 
personalities loosely associated with the FLN, the Army, or even the trade union wielded 
considerable power in different localities quite independently of the administration or 
indeed of any central authority” (Moore 1970: 137).  
In addition to a lack of qualified cadres and frequent rotation, administrative 
borders were stretched to their limits. Lacking enough cadres to staff the Special 
Delegation corps, in 1963, the government reduced the number of chartered 
municipalities by close to sixty percent – from 1,590 to 676. The municipalities that lost 
their charters were incorporated into the municipal boundaries of the remaining cities. 
Comparing this with the twenty-three Tunisian municipalities that were chartered 
between independence (1956) and the first Municipal Elections (1957), one gets a sense 





Figure 6.1: Algeria’s Fifteen Wilaya at Independence 
 
Source: Blair 1970: 22 
6.1.2 Creating the Foundations of a Party: Ben Bella and the FLN 
During this period, Ben Bella began to look at the FLN as a politico-
administrative tool. The composition of the Political Bureau, which represented the 
mixed civilian-military government negotiated in August 1962, could not be touched 
without starting a major political battle – and the outcome was quite indeterminate. 
Instead, Ben Bella tasked Party Secretary General Mohammed Khider with organizing 
the party. Khider’s efforts to create a mass-mobilizing party were blocked by Ben Bella 
who, threatened by the idea of another counter-weight in the system, proposed a 
vanguard party with selective membership. The debate was purely theoretical (Moore 
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1973: 33). Jackson ironically summed the party in late 1962: “Viewed in substantive 
terms, the ‘party’ at that time referred to Khider’s headquarters” (Jackson 1977: 98). 
Indeed, the party was never a party in the proper sense of the word, but rather a fractured 
avant-garde nationalist movement that quickly transformed into an army, forced rival 
movements to dissolve and merge into it, and then itself dissolved into the state (Roberts 
2002; Rahal 2009).  
Khider’s task was to make a party out of a fluid membership base that lacked 
organization and organic links with the center. To structure a party, he delegated 
Commissioners (Mouhafedh) to draw together seventeen party Federations 
(Mouhafedha), 109 Districts (Daïra), 1,112 branch offices (Kasmat), and thousands of 
cells (neighborhoods), which broadly fell under Algeria’s regional and local 
administrative units.161 By 1963, the new party was collecting dues from 153,000 
members, and 619,000 militants – between five to ten times the numbers before the Évian 
Accords (Leca and Vatin 1976: 101). When Ben Bella refused another request to 
organize a National Congress in April 1963, Khider quit the party. He fled into exile the 
same year, taking with him the party treasury. He was assassinated in Madrid in 1967. 
With Khider’s departure, Ben Bella promoted himself FLN Party Secretary 
General. Fully in control, he now favored a mass-mobilizing party. In November 1963, 
he announced the formation of a Preparatory Commission, headed by close ally Hadj 
Mohamed Ben Alla. Over the next few months, the two handpicked Federation delegates, 
beginning a tradition that spans into the contemporary period (Chapter Seven). On 16 
                                                
161 The number of FLN political units differs between studies. Ottaway and Ottaway count seventeen 
Federations, 109 dairas, and 1,112 Kasmas for the same period; Côte counts fifteen Federations, 101 
dairas, and 1,578 Kasma for the same period. Ottaway and Ottaway count 109 daira, whereas Côte 
counts101 daira for the same period. Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 115; Côte 1988: 317. 
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April 1964, the FLN organized its first National Congress.162 The meeting resulted in a 
reorganization of the structure set into place the year before, eliminating the daïra. Under 
the new bi-laws, the National Congress would be held every five years. Delegates to the 
Congress were selected by the seventeen Mouhafedh upon proposition from the Kasmat, 
which themselves were reflections of the aggregate party Kasma. The National Congress 
elected a Central Committee to define its program, implemented by the Political Bureau, 
which was elected by the Central Committee and led by the Secretary General of the FLN 
(Jackson 1977: 181-185).  
While the Neo-Destour had organized five National Congresses between its 
founding in 1934 and independence in 1956, it took the FLN until 1964 – ten years after 
the party was created – to organize a National Congress. The results of that meeting were 
annulled less than a year later, when Colonel Houari Boumediene seized power, 
dissolved the Political Bureau and Central Committee, and froze party activities – with 
virtually no protest from the party, and no bloodshed. 
 
Maître Benabdallah on Land and His Experiences as Chef de Daïra, 1962-1964 (Sidi 
Ali, ex-Cassaigne, Wilaya of Mostaghanem) ((I-2) 
Sidi Ali is between the Madjaher and Maghraoua, at the periphery of the Dahra. It 
was one of the first colonial villages163, and not many Muslims lived there until 
1962. Part of my job was inventorying the property in Cassaigne [Sidi Ali] and 
the surrounding villages, as well as all the farmland. Cassaigne has lots of 
vineyards. I also had to get the records on all the new families who had moved in. 
The problem, like I said earlier, is that I taught the population to avoid the 
administration for seven years, now I had to teach them to abide by the law.  
                                                
162 The FLN counts this as its Third National Congress, after the clandestine Soummam Valley Congress in 
1956 and the Tripoli Congress in the summer of 1962.  
163 It was actually officially founded as a colony in 1873 by farmers expanding from the Madjaher lands 
that had been colonized to the West twenty-years prior Rivoli (Hassi Memeche), Aboukir (Mesra), et 
cetera. 
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I encountered a lot of resistance. People wanted to keep what they took when the 
French left. They said that it was theirs. They fought for it. Most of them didn’t. 
Though they respected the FLN, they hadn’t been members during the struggle, 
though many of them were by now. A few claimed to be mujahidin, but that was 
easier to check, because I was in the Zone 6 just south and had friends who had 
been in Zone 4 – a bloody zone. They people told me the Revolution was fought 
for their land. Their tribal fraction had been there before the French, and now it 
was theirs again. I had to tell them “no, it’s ours.” It’s beylic!164 
 
6.1.3 Property: Land Chaos and the Formation of Beylic 
Like the population transfer between June and August 1962, the post-
independence land transfer was one of the largest in recent history. Muslims wanted their 
land back, and the Europeans were fleeing. The 1950-1951 Land Registry records a high 
concentration of land in large domains. Thirty one percent of European farms occupied 
nearly eighty-eight percent of the colonial land portfolio, whereas four percent of Muslim 
farms composed close to thirty-nine percent of indigenous landholdings (Sethom 1966: 
107; Attia 1967: 281). Most of the European farms were on the fertile plains of the West. 
Settlement was concentrated in the Department of Oran and Mostaghanem, where settlers 
held 498,000 and 258,377 ha, respectively, in 8,017 farms (Blaire 1970: 72). 
Independent, Algerians wanted their land back. Land belonging to the Muslim 
elite was an easy target: many of the bachaga and qaids who took sides with the French 
fled Algeria with the departing settlers and was occupied by its workers or peasants from 
the surrounding douars seeking to reclaim land that had been confiscated through the 
Sénatus-Consulte deals ninety-nine years before. The colonial farms were more 
complicated: for the first few months of independence, nobody knew if the settlers would 
return, and the land was still legally protected by the Évian Accords. 
                                                
164 The expression beylic derives from ardh al-bey, and refers to state property. 
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Unsurprisingly, during the colonial period the Ministry of Agriculture had a small 
Muslim staff. At the end of 1962, the Ministry only had seven agro-technicians,165 three 
agro-engineers, and high-ranking cadres on staff, and needed an estimated eight hundred 
accountants for the Algiers and Oran offices alone – a deficit of sixty-eight percent 
(Motsch 1963: 185; Sbih 1968: 14; Taouti 1975: 108). The government had to prepare for 
the 1962 harvest, but had no cadres to diagnose the problem, much less find a solution.  
Sensing the coming disaster – their managers had left with the owners – 
permanent workers from the large colonial domains seized nearly one million ha of the 
European land portfolio, continued production, and geared for harvest the best they 
could. The size of the domains reflected the degree of settler population and type of crop. 
In the East (Mila Plain), where settlers were fewer in number and cereal production 
prevailed, there were fewer Self-Management Farms, but they were greater in size, 
reflecting the size of colonial domains. Colonial domains in the Mitidja Plain and in the 
West were smaller, due to a high density of settlers the predominance of vineyards and 
citrus production, which require less land to reach optimal production levels and profit 
(Blaire 1970: 72).166 Consolidating the land to ease management problems associated 
with fewer qualified supervisors, the workers grouped twenty thousand farms, including 
the Domaine Lenoir in Remchi (Cavaignac) (I-10) and Domaine Morales in 
Mohammedia (Perregaud) (I-9), into 2,071 super-estates: each averaging 1,250 ha 
(Taouti 1975: 101; Bennoune 1988: 177). A far cry from the measured expropriations in 
Tunisia, lacking a state staffed with trained cadres and with without party institutions on 
                                                
165 Swearingen counts five. Swearingen 1992: 119.  
166 Clegg argues that the West was less touched by the Workers Self-Management movement because the 
Army took over the best stretches of land, while Blaire claims the West was the most intensively occupied.  
Perhaps they were debating size of average farm and not numbers. Having driven extensively spoken with 
former politicians and quite a number of farmers, have never heard Clegg’s argument repeated (Blaire 
1970: 72; Clegg 1971: 53) 
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the ground, authority to exclusively define the use and transfer of property had switched 
from the center to the periphery during the first few months of Algerian decolonization. 
Lacking a better plan, and in no way as well organized at the Algerian General 
Workers Union (UGTA, Union Générale de Travailleurs Algériens), which counted 
eighty thousand dues paying members in 1956167, Ben Bella had little choice but to 
acknowledge the self-managed workers (autogestionnaires) and their rights by 
Presidential Decree on 22 October 1962 (Zartman 1973: 503). The Decrees set the legal 
framework for a process that had already begun: organization into Self-Management 
Workers Committees (CGEAV, Comités de Gestion dans les Entreprises Agricoles 
Vacants). Farms with ten or more employees were now required to set up legally liable 
Workers Committees. Composed of at least three members and a co-opted president, the 
Workers Committees had the responsibility of commercializing products, getting loans, 
and paying workers the official minimum wage. The new legal framework helped the 
regime and new Ministry of Agriculture identify colonial land that had been seized via 
self-reporting: eager to secure their rights, the workers quickly formed and registered the 
committees at the National Office of Vacated Goods (BNBV, Bureau National pour la 
Protection et Gestion des Biens Vacants), located in the regional Wilaya. The 
registrations began a tug of war between the state, which claimed legal ownership of the 
land (beylic), and the workers who fully possessed it (al-hawz) (I-11; I-12). 
The seizures would be vindicated in March 1963 when the regime unilaterally 
expropriated 2.7 million ha of vacant European land, along with close to three hundred 
thousand ha of land belonging to bachaga and qaids who had fled to France (Sethom 
1966: 119). By this time, close to two million ha of colonial land were under the still 
                                                
167 More than double the FLN. By mid-1963, the number had UGTA membership had expanded to three 
hundred thousand. Ruedy 2005: 198. 
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expanding self-management scheme, the remaining 800,000 ha – mainly consolidated in 
holdings smaller than fifty ha – were transferred from the BNVA to the National Office 
of the Agrarian Revolution (ONRA, Office National de la Révolution Agraire) (Ruedy 
2005: 199). ONRA was a hurried institution created by the Ministry of Agriculture to 
prevent the wholesale appropriation of colonial land by the self-management movement, 
and to try to bring some administrative control over the countryside through its own farm 
cooperatives.  
First ONRA Director Ahmed Mahsas, a self proclaimed supporter of “state-
managed self-management” and early Ben Bella brother in arms, was promoted Minister 
of Agriculture in late 1963 (Cheurfi 2007: 760-761). Between 1963 and 1966, the regime 
made limited inroads into the countryside, slowly repairing wrecked infrastructure and 
administration, and attempting to tally and centralize the newly gained land holdings in 
both the ONRA and self-managed farms portfolios (I-2; I-5; I-6). Cooled relations with 
the UGTA, which represented the self-managed farm workers, made the task more 
difficult (Christopher 2002: 319-320). The regime also lacked a strong local party 
organization that could structure, if not control the self-management movement from 
within, as the Neo-Destour implemented and managed the cooperative movement in 
Tunisia.  
Responsibility of re-wiring the regime’s relationship with the countryside, fell on 
the shoulders of the military and new administration. In return for decentralized 
management rights for the workers and access to credits, the October 1963 Decrees 
integrated the Self-Management Committees into the administrative framework via the 
BNBV and later the ONRA. The quid pro quo gave the Ministry of Agriculture authority 
to delegate technical directors to each of the farms to promote rational management and 
modernization of farming techniques, as well as to relay policy preferences between the 
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workers and state. Lacking trained technical experts at the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
government used the July 1962 National Administration Decrees along with the 31 
August 1963 Presidential Decree (guaranteeing former combatants a minimum number of 
seats in local administrations) to parachute mujahidin into the Self-Management 
Committees (Clegg 1971: 144-145). This created a great degree of tension on the farms, 
as former combatants viewed the workers – the majority of whom worked on the colonial 
domains from the beginning to the end of the war – as collaborators, while the mujahidin 
were seen as state interlopers charged with subverting the movement. During this 
confusing period, 400,000 ha of land from the colonial portfolio simply disappeared from 
the records (Pfeifer 1985: 50). 
 
6.1.4 Making Sense of the Ben Bella State Building Experience 
The Ben Bella era was chaotic. During the summer of 1962, the colonial state 
disappeared, and with it centralized, exclusive authority to define the use and transfer of 
property. The colonial state and its property rights institutions168 were replaced by a party 
that was never a party in the proper sense of the word, but rather a fractured avant-garde 
nationalist movement that quickly transformed into an army, forced rival movements to 
dissolve and merge into it, and then itself dissolved into a state-in-formation (Roberts 
2002: 40). The contrast with Tunisia could not be more striking: The Neo-Destour had 
made deep in-roads into the periphery and rooted itself in rural society ahead of 
independence, building from the centralizing foundations of the Ottoman Beylic and 
French Protectorate.  
                                                
168 This is a far cry from Acemoglu and Johnson’s description of post-colonial property rights institutions. 
2001. 
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A core of men who had never created an organic link with the hinterland formed 
the new Algerian state. To be sure, as Maître Benabdallah explained, the FLN made 
efforts to organize the countryside with the “Committees of Five.” The FLN succeeded in 
convincing many peasants to re-wire local authority from the settler state to the jema‘a, 
but the dictates of security – “the rule of three” – undermined the party’s ability to 
harness this authority following independence. Having convinced the country folk to 
administer themselves, the FLN was hard pressed to re-wire that authority back to the 
central government-in-formation in 1962. The very basic dignity (nif) they gained 
through self-governance, and more broadly victory over France, convinced the peasant 
that land would “be ours,” ta‘na.169 State efforts to assert authority over land revealed its 
position: colonial land was “beylic.” Almost perfectly echoing Charrad, the jema‘a, 
tadjmat, and Self-Management Committee and new state had “mutually exclusive 
definitions of what the maximum political unit ought to be” (Charrad 2001: 19). The 
battle over the exclusive authority to define the use and transfer of property in the first 
three years of independence situates itself into a larger struggle to assert state authority in 
post-independence Algeria. 
In her 2003 work, Catherine Boone hypothesizes a number of rural state building 
strategies, which usefully frame the political situation in Algeria between 1962 and 1965. 
National rulers strategically select state building strategies in function of the strength of 
countryside elites (Boone 2003: 20-33). Where the rural elite is weak, rulers choose 
institution building strategies that approximate “administrative occupation:” “The regime 
will attempt to govern from the center rather than building the dense networks of state 
outposts in rural areas, and will not devolve power to rural actors” (ibid: 36). Where rural 
                                                
169 This contrasts with ta‘hum, which literally means theirs. Most Algerians use beylic to describe state 
property, whereas property belonging to the rich, the elite, or the state – “the regime” – is ta‘hum: simply 
“theirs.” 
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elite are strong, rulers either share power or attempt to usurp the position of local notables 
– the choice is incumbent on whether the rural population is dependent on the state for its 
local property rights regime (and surplus extraction) or not. States develop powersharing 
where rural elites are dependent on the centralized authority to protect its control over the 
market; where rural elites independently extract resources, the ruler attempts to usurp and 
re-wire their power (ibid.) 
From 1962 to 1965, Ben Bella hesitated between choosing “usurpation” or 
“administrative occupation” as rural state building strategies (Boone 2003: 36-37). On the 
one hand, the state did not face a hierarchic rural society at independence.170 Colonialism 
had itself usurped tribal authority by attacking the land structure with the 1863 Sénatus-
Consulte. On the other, the state could not govern from the center. Unlike the cases 
presented in Boone’s 2003 study, when Algeria decolonized, the state collapsed. And 
with it, the extant property rights regime. Both state and property institutions, moreover, 
had been designed exclusively to protect settler interests, and placed a high premium on 
excluding Muslims form of political and economic power. In 1962, the rural Muslim 
social hierarchy – les grandes familles and the qaidal corps – which had been (re-)created 
by the colonial property rights regime, also collapsed, throwing the countryside into a 
political vacuum where property rights were enforced by might (similar to Cell Four, in 
Table 2.2, Chapter Two). The state had to expand from Algiers (and Oran and 
Constantine) into the countryside if it were to exclusively control the definition and 
concomitant rights to use and transfer beylic. It lacked a developed human infrastructure 
with which it could fully achieve this, however, and thus de-concentrated power over the 
fifteen wilaya and municipalities before it attempted to penetrate deeper. 
                                                
170 The jema‘a that formed the “Committees of Five” were far weaker than the jema‘a before 1963. 
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In the case of Self-Managed Workers Committees, however, rural state building 
strategy approximated Boone’s category of “powersharing,” if only by default and for 
what was meant to be a temporary measure. Under “powersharing,” “[i]nstitution 
building aims at cementing and organizing a powersharing relationship between the 
center and rural elites” (Boone 2003: 36). The regime coveted the European land 
portfolio even as it signed the Évian Accords, but had been beaten to it by the workers on 
site and who were better organized at independence. The October 1962 Workers Self-
Management Committee Decrees institutionalized a stopgap “powersharing” relationship 
between Algiers and the UGTA workers on the farms. Nationalization of European 
property in March 1963 timidly set the stage for a strategy of slow “usurpation.” Legally, 
the land shifted from hawz to beylic. The October 1963 Decrees inserted state agents into 
the Committees. The added bonus was that decentralizing discretionary placement of the 
mujahidin-functionaries to the de-concentrated Wilaya administration outsourced 
mujahidin management problems from the center, while reinforcing regional state 
institutions by shifting patronage to the Departments. 
Stopgap measures, the post-independence reorganization of state institutions in 
the countryside did not resolve local-national tensions over the spatial location of 
authority. In many ways, it made them messier. Indeed, more than 400,000 ha 
disappeared during these struggles. While it was ultimately a national level struggle 
between the President and his military patron that led to the 19 June 1965 coup d’état171, 
Ben Bella’s position had been weakened by his government’s inability to control large 
and small uprisings percolating from the provinces, much less beylic. During his short 
three-year tenure, Ben Bella faced a rebellion led by FLN historic Hocine Aït Ahmed in 
                                                
171 Then Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs (1963-1979) and current President (1999-), Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika called Tunisian Ambassador to Algiers Ahmed Mestiri to explain the coup. Mestiri recounts 
Bouteflika’s explanation: “Ben Bella voulait nous prendre nos terres, notre révolution” (I-1). 
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Kabylia (1963), and a mutiny in the Aurès mountains, led by Colonel Mohamed Chabani 
(1964) – both, ironically, in zones the Bey of Constantine never entirely controlled, and 
from which the Algerian Revolution had sprung. Ben Bella’s strategy failed. 
When the states mismanaged their provincial state building strategies, Boone 
writes, “the expected effect is regional instability or breakdown of regime hegemony in 
the countryside” (Boone 2003: 40) 
  
6.2 PRESIDENT HOUARI BOUMEDIENE (1965-1978), THE ALGERIAN STATE: TOP-UP, 
BOTTOM-DOWN STATE BUILDING STRATEGIES 
In June 1965, Colonel Houari Boumediene dissolved the National Assembly, 
which had been elected in September 1964 from a single list proposed by Ben Bella’s 
April 1964 Political Bureau, replacing it with a twenty-six member Revolutionary 
Council (Conseil de la Révolution) to rule during a transition period. Similarly, he 
annulled the first FLN National Party Congress, Central Committee, and Political Bureau, 
naming in their stead, a five-man FLN Executive Secretariat staffed entirely by former 
officers and presided by Cherif Belkacem.172 Unlike his predecessor, Boumediene did not 
carry lofty ideas about the National Assembly or the FLN National Congress. Stability, 
he had seen in both the colonial period, the maquis, and during Ben Bella’s topsy-turvy 
reign, came from the base not the top (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 257; Roberts 2002: 
41). Unable to transform both party and state apparatus – in large part due to the 
structural paucity of Algerian cadres at independence – Ben Bella could not evenly assert 
control over the countryside, much less claim authority to exclusively define the use and 
transfer of property. Friction from his attempts to do both led to his downfall. “Instead of 
rushing into action, it [Revolutionary Council] decided to set up commissions to study 
                                                
172 Belkacem and Boumediene had both served in the Wilaya V together during the War of Independence. 
Cheurfi 2007: 362-363. 
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thoroughly the agrarian reform, the communal reform, the reorganization of the party, 
and the enrichment of the March Decrees” (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 203). 
 
6.2.1 Strengthening Local and Regional Institutions 
Boumediene’s strategy for occupying space would be two-tiered: top-down and 
bottom-up. The de-concentrated state building experiment begun under Ben Bella 
intensified under Boumediene, who prioritized strengthening the provincial 
administration and national party cadres. He named close colleagues and members of the 
Revolutionary Council to the five Military Regions, which had been reformed under a 
professionalizing army following independence. Boumediene also reintegrated Ahmed 
Medeghri to the Ministry of Interior where the two re-shuffled the Wali, District Chief, 
and Special Delegate corps, eliminating Ben Bella’s political choices, replacing them 
with men who “understood the importance of the terrain,” (I-24) “who knew how people 
(ech-chaab) behave,” (I-27) and who above all, were “Napoleonic” (Knauss 1977: 73). 
Mohammed Khider’s party organization, which overlapped the various party 
structures with Algeria’s administrative units, had set into place a formidable template for 
controlling the regions – in addition to the five military regions and civilian corps 
attached to the Ministry of Interior. Those structures had been modified by Ben Bella and 
Ben Alla in preparation for the April 1964 FLN National Congress and before 
Boumediene could engage the second step of his model of state building, the local 
Federations needed to be re-structured. Coordinator of the FLN Executive Secretariat 
FLN Cherif Belkacem was delegated the role of reforming the party. “The self-styles 
intellectuals that Ben Bella had appointed as commissaries and heads of the Federations 
were soon replaced, in large part by retired officers of the wartime FLN” (Ottaway and 
Ottaway 1970: 223). 
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The Wali and Party Commissioner were to confer in bimonthly meetings, which 
outlined national and regional development strategies. The move symbolically connected 
the party with the state – not unlike the Party Commissioner experience in neighboring 
Tunisia, and later the Coordination Committees. While the Wali’s authority usually 
trumped the Commissioner’s in the event of a showdown, the relationship between the 
two varied from region to region (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 222; Grimaud 1973: 34; 
Leca and Vatin 1975), reflecting the disarticulated character of Algeria at independence. 
The format cascaded down the political and administrative hierarchy, organizing 
bimonthly meetings between the District Chief and head of the District FLN Kasma. At 
this level, however, the balance of power shifted entirely to the Direct Chief. Though he 
had to be politically accredited, head of the local Kasma represented the party base, not 
Algiers. The regime de-concentrated its state and “party” institutions from Algiers to the 
Wilaya and District. Perched from these administrative centers, it developed the second-
tier of its state building strategy (Remili 1967; Benakezouh 1984).  
Between 1963 and 1965, Khider and Ben Bella had developed a party 
organization that, while fledgling, hypothetically could be dangerous if ignored and even 
more useful if manipulated. After Boumediene annulled the first National Congress, 
dissolved the Political Bureau and Central Committee, replacing them with the Executive 
Secretariat, the national organs of the party were in sure hands. The branches and 
federations remained under-utilized. Boumediene needed to link the base to the new 
system but in a way that the party was a tool of the regime, not the inverse. The 
compromise was to decouple state and party at the national and municipal level, linking 
them at the intermediate level.  
At the municipal-level, the state building strategy reversed order. Instead of de-
concentrating state institutions to the municipal level as it had with the Special Delegates, 
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it would develop local party structures, integrating them into anticipated Municipal and 
Regional Council Assemblies. The strategy was “powersharing” to usurp local authority 
and undermine local resistance to state building imperatives (Boone 2003: 36). Using a 
carefully controlled bottom-up strategy to link local interests with the regime, 
Boumediene timed the formation of party branches with People’s Municipal Assembly 
elections (APC, Assemblée Populaire de Commune). If successful, the strategy would 
give local powerbrokers enough incentives to buy into the system. The new party 
notables could then be used as an auxiliary corps to enforce state policy on the ground, as 
the Neo-Destour had done in Tunisia. An elected municipal administration, moreover, 
would outsource problems away from the state (the Special Delegate) and onto the FLN, 
represented by the Municipal Council. (Leca and Vatin: 193-194).  
 
6.2.2 Organizing the Municipal and Regional Assembly Elections  
Efforts to reform the party stalled shortly after Cherif Belkacem appointed new 
Party Commissioners and reorganized the Mouhafedha in 1965. Over the next year, the 
Revolutionary Council debated Boumediene’s strategy (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 
223).173 Earnest branch reorganization and recruitment began in November 1966 – less 
than three months before the 5 February 1967 Municipal Elections. Lacking both the time 
and resources to redraw local responsibilities, the reorganization simply defined a set of 
procedures to select candidates for the APC elections.  
 Setting a framework continued through to today, the branch delegates in the 
Kasma voted on a list equaling twice the number of seats for the local town hall. The list 
was then submitted to the Wilaya Commission,174 via the Mouhafedh When possible, the 
                                                
173 Unlike tempestuous Ben Bella, Boumediene had a consensual style of governance, and in his first years 
in power, rarely advanced a policy that might disrupt his alliances (Roberts 2002). 
174 The Wilaya Commission was convened in anticipation of each election. 
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Wilaya Commissions represented the Wali or District Chief, and representatives of the 
National People’s Army175 (ANP, Armée Populaire Nationale), a former combatant, the 
FLN, the UGTA, the FLN Youth and Women’s movements, and the Muslim Scouts. 
Each Wilaya Commission was led by a nationally prominent figure – eleven of the 
sixteen delegation presidents were high-ranking officers (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 
223-224). Once validated by the Wilaya Commission, the list was submitted to the 
Revolutionary Council for final approval. 
Logistically the Wilaya Commission was no more capable of reviewing the 
average 1,270 candidates per Wilaya than the Revolutionary Council the 20,316 
candidates for the elections. Their involvement simply allowed them to insert kith, kin, 
and political allies on the lists, such as Ahmed Medeghri’s friend and ally Sghier Ben Ali, 
Oran’s fourth Special Delegate. Further, since the elections aimed to incorporate as many 
local powerbrokers as possible, intervention from above had to be moderate or at least 
reflect local realities.  
Disputes over the lists did occur, and the outcome was based on the relative 
strength of disputing factions. The ANP had the strongest input on the lists in Algiers and 
Constantine: the head of the First (Algiers) and Fifth (Constantine) Military Regions 
presided the Wilaya Commissions (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 224). In Oran, the FLN 
lost a three-way struggle with the UGTA and Wali Benyoucef Boumahdi (Grimaud 1973: 
342), this despite the fact that Cherif Belkacem was personally in charge of drawing up 
the lists.176 The sons and daughters of the traditional elite-cum-party members won in 
Kabylia (Roberts 1983; 2009).  
                                                
175 After independence, the ALN was re-baptized the ANP. 
176 Maître Benabdallah said Cherif Belkacem contacted him for the 1967 list, but he refused, preferring to 
pursue a diploma in law (I-2). 
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The absence of trained party cadres deferent to national party directives, matched 
with local, regional or national-level patronage, also allowed some local personalities to 
buy a seat on the list (Leca 1973; Benakezouh 1984: 229). In large cities like Oran, the 
majority of candidates were employees of state owned companies, teachers, or local 
merchants.177 In the countryside, medium property owners (owning 10-50 ha) were well 
represented (Weexsteen 1973: 17). In some cases, large landowners (100+ ha) also made 
it on the lists, though they had ostensibly been banned.178 In Maghnia (Lalla Marnia) a 
village equidistant from Remchi (Cavaignac) and Tlemcen, two-thirds of the APC list 
were farmers, a quarter of them large landowners (El Aidi 1983: 49-62), while in 
Remchi, farmers composed half of the APC list, one with several hundred hectares of 
land (I-13; I-14).  
National turnout was high: seventy-one percent.179 Regionally, turnout was 
diverse, probably reflecting localized disputes over the lists. In Kabylia and Annaba, 
turnout was below fifty percent.180 In Oran, 74.42 percent voted in Oran, though half the 
ballots were left blank.181  
To the regime, the elections were a success (Leca and Vatin 1975: 123). The 
hook, it seemed, had been set. Because the 1967 municipal budgets had already been 
allocated (Ottaway and Ottaway 1973: 226), the new councilors had to look to Algiers for 
patronage monies: After the elections, “the first demands reaching Algiers concerned 
increasing allocations for unskilled clerks and chauffeurs – patronage, in short for newly 
                                                
177 El Moudjahid, February 9, 1967. In the large cities, the candidate’s name and profession were 
indicated. 
178 Ottaway and Ottaway remark that the rules prohibiting their participation were not put into writing until 
after the lists were made. Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 224. 
179 El Moudjahid, February 9, 1967. 
180 Hugh Roberts attributes low turnout in Kabylia to a dispute over which tribal confederation would head 
the lists. 2009. 
181 El Moudjahid, February 9, 1967. 
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elected councilors (Moore 1970: 246-247).” Lacking funds and a regional and national 
party structure, Algerian FLN councilors seemed to focus on the capital. This contrasts 
sharply with Tunisia, where Neo-Destour Party Commissioners blocked branch and 
Municipal Council requests for monies from Tunis (Moore 1965: 142-143). In Tunisia, 
positive incentives were prestige and vertical mobility opportunities. 
 
6.2.3 De-concentrating Control over the Agrarian Political Economy, 1967-1971 
Though Boumediene expressed support for an agrarian revolution (Mameri 1975; 
Francos and Sérérni 1976), between 1965 and 1970, national land reform was semantic. 
Instead of attacking the land structure directly and facing resistance from an unlikely 
alliance of Self-Management Farm workers (I-11; I-12),182 large property owners (I-
13),183 and peasants that had squatted colonial land (I-2), the regime consolidated control 
over the periphery.184 It set the parameters of the agriculture sector and land markets by 
monopolizing upstream access to credit and downstream pricing and distribution 
mechanisms,185 re-defining the local tax authority, and consolidating the land registries. 
The reforms would fix some of the errors made under Ben Bella and reflected expanding 
state presence in the countryside: the state de-concentrated the nodes of rural authority to 
the regions and later to the APCs. 
 
                                                
182 Who were themselves in favor or widespread land reform, but in the context of Self-Managed Workers 
Committees. 
183 Who were opposed to land reform in any form. 
184 Who were in favor of land reform that redistributed and privatized land to peasants in a system with 
state-provision of inputs and credits. 
185 Nationalization of the oil sector followed the same pattern. Before the regime nationalized international 
oil companies in 1971, it formed SONATRACH (now the national oil and gas company) to run the down-
stream pipeline. Rebah 2006; Ghozali 2009. 
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Upstream and Downstream Sectors: Reinforcing State Control through the Wilaya 
To gain greater control over the Algerian consumer market, in 1967 the state 
nationalized foreign-owned supermarkets, grouping thirty into the Nouvelles Galéries 
(Société Nationale des Nouvelles Galéries Algériens). The same year, the Office of 
Algerian Fruits and Vegetables (OFLA, Office des Fruits et Légumes Algériennes), a 
public sector purchasing agent set up during the Ben Bella years, was given monopsony 
purchasing rights over the Self-Managed Farms (Dillman 2000: 98-99). The Algerian 
Office for Cereals (OAIC, Office Algérien Inter-professionnel des Cereales) had been 
given a monopsony over cereals and dry stuffs in 1963.186 ONRA was also dissolved. 
Credit policy and technical assistance was devolved to Regional Credit Union (CRA, 
Caisses Régionales de Crédit), run through the Direction of Agriculture at the local 
Wilaya.187 The administrative shift from the Ministry of Agriculture in Algiers to the 
Wilaya marked the increased confidence the regime had in the regional administration, 
which had been cleaned in 1965, and staffed with recent graduates of the National 
Administration School (ENA, École Nationale d’Administration) and National 
Agronomy Institute (Institut National Agronomique), founded shortly after independence 
(Taouti 1975). 
 
Authority of Fiscal Receipts: Partially Integrating the APCs 
From 1963 to 1969, Self-Managed Farm tax receipts were automatically deducted 
at the point of sale by the OAIC and OFLA. Despite ONRA (1963-1967) and later the 
CRA (1967-1983) agents in the Workers Committees, the committees continued to get 
                                                
186 For more on these reforms during the Ben Bella period, see Blaire 1970 and Clegg 1971. 
187 Credit had been run through the Sociétés Agricoles de Prévoyance until they were wrapped into the 
Centres Coopératives de la Réforme Agraires, a subsidiary of ONRA and directly managed through Algiers 
in March 1963. Blaire 1970; Clegg 1971. 
 198 
loans and sell produce to private wholesalers Clegg 1971: 72; Dillman 2000: 98). The 
black market offered better, market rates in a timeframe that corresponded to the harvest, 
and the local technical advisor or former combatant sometimes turned a blind-eye to the 
practice (I-10; I-11; I-12). Concentrated tax evasion surveillance from Algiers (and later 
the Wilaya) had shown its limits. To countermand practices that reduced fiscal receipts 
and undermined state efforts to control the sector, in 1969 the government re-defined tax 
authority over the Self-Management Farms. The new tax administration incorporated the 
municipalities (APCs). 
In 1963, the municipal administrative borders were extended to encompass 
neighboring cities or villages that lost their charter. At the same time, the Ministry of 
Finance ruled that agricultural taxes levied by the municipalities during the colonial 
period should be re-wired directly to the Ministry via the Wilaya Direction of Finances. 
The move undercut the financial autonomy of colonial agrarian cities (e.g. Aïn 
Temouchent, Constantine, Mascara, Oran, Sidi Bel Abbes, Tiaret), whose main source of 
revenue came from taxing the abutting vineyards and wheat plantations (Marouf 2010). 
The issue had been raised at the 1968 National Mayor’s Conferences (Conférence 
Nationale des Présidents d’Assemblées Populaires de Commune), when delegations from 
the Algiers, Oran, and Tiaret APCs criticized government Self-Management Farms 
exemption of communal taxes as fiscal favoritism (Leca and Vatin 1975: 80-81; 201; 
257).188 The regime responded by shifting some of the tax collection burden to the APCs 
increased surveillance, while augmenting municipal coffers and expanding local 
patronage opportunities – both at the expense of self-management farm autonomy. 
 
                                                
188 See: El Moudjahid, 6 February 1968. 
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Consolidating the Land Registries and Identifying Land via the APCs 
During the colonial era, land titles were registered at the Municipal Land 
Registry, which also notarized land transactions. The ALN/FLN outlawed land 
transactions during the Revolution to prevent speculation and profiteering. While the ban 
was lifted in 1962, the notaries and clerks who managed the system had left. In some 
cases, like Sidi Ali (Cassaigne), the Municipal Land Registry had been partially 
destroyed by the departing French (I-2).189 The problem was compounded by the rapid re-
distribution of French vacated goods by the new population. After the 1963 March 
Decrees, vacated goods (e.g. land, villas, apartments, factories, shops) theoretically 
became state property (beylic), though possession (al-hawz) was in the hands of 
Algerians, many of whom used their position and status to accumulate as much as 
possible (Knauss 1977: 65-78; Pfeiffer 1985: 83).190 Parsing through what had been 
colonial (and after 1963 theoretically beylic) and what was private posed a serious 
problem, made all the more difficult by a peasantry that had increasingly “been 
conditioned to be cautious, even cynical and suspicious” (Knauss 1977: 70).191 
 Between 1962 and the mid-1960s, whether land transfers were recorded or not 
depended on local dynamics, especially the relationship the local state agent (e.g. the 
                                                
189 In addition to land records, a radical settler group, the Secret Armed Organization (OAS, Organisation 
de l’armée secrète) burned the University of Algiers library. 
190 People often point to Kaid Ahmed, a member of the Revolutionary Council, as an example. Kaid owned 
3,000 ha of land after independence. No in-depth analysis has ever been conducted on the scope of land 
purchases or swindles in the decade following independence, though the phenomenon is often remarked. 
For more on the subject, see: I. William Zartman. 1975: “Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite” Political 
Elites and Political Development in the Middle East. Frank Tachau, Ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc: 255-292; Peter Knauss. 1977. “Algeria’s ‘Agrarian Revolution:’ Peasant Control or Control of 
Peasants?” The African Studies Review. 20(3[December]): 65-78; Karen Pfeiffer. 1985. Agrarian Reform 
Under State Capitalism in Algeria. Boulder: Westview Press: 83. 
191 While Knauss was specifically referring to the Agrarian Revolution, a year later, general attitude 
prevailed in 1970. 
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Special Delegate or District Chief) had with the population: was he legitimate with a high 
level of probity in the eye of the population?  
If he could convince Algerians to record their titles, were he and his staff 
administratively competent enough to property record the transaction? Though he lacked 
a full record of colonial titles, Maître Benabdallah wanted to keep a basic ledger of 
property claims and transactions in Sidi Ali (Cassaigne). The problem was that the local 
population assimilated the new administration with the old: the Municipal Land Registry 
remained in the same building – a structure that represented a repository of land theft in 
peasant eyes. Almost Proudhonian, to the peasant, property recorded in those walls was 
theft. To get around this problem, Maître Benabdallah used his experiences with the 
“Committees of Five.”192 He encouraged his Special Delegates and District agents to use 
the pre-colonial contractual and titling procedures used in the countryside.193 Calling 
shuhud, or witnesses, to swear the exchange had transpired, and that the seller was in fact 
the owner, his agents created a preliminary register (I-2).194 In other municipalities the 
problem was less acute either because the records were left in tact (I-6), or because the 
Special Delegate had been trained in the titling process (I-5).195 
By 1970, the regime had set into place and increasingly streamlined local 
administration. Under the watch of the Wali or District Chief, staffed with a corps of 
administers formed during the previous eight years (Taouti 1975: 323-359), and with 
                                                
192 Ironically, as Maître Benabdallah noted at the introduction of this chapter, part of the resistance was 
that for eight years the FLN had taught the population not to listen to institutionalized authority, replacing it 
with the “Committees of Five” – experience from which he was now drawing.  
193 Perhaps it was this experience that convinced Maître Benabdallah to study law. He was a key player in 
reforming the Algerian justice system, and wrote a book on his experience in the maquis: Said 
Benabdallah. 1982. La justice du F.L.N. pendant la lutte de libération. Algiers: SNED. 
194 In Tunisia, this had often been a problem in land transactions between a tribe and a city dweller during 
the Ottoman period. There, the witness was called ‘adlun radi, or witnesses of good faith. Hénia 1999: 66. 
195 Again, in each case, the local-national relationship is determined by parochial variables, reflecting a 
disarticulated nation at independence. 
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three years experience in local governance, the new corps of FLN-councilors were 
entrusted to manage the new titling system. Though really just a return to the pre-1962 
procedure, it was hoped that the 1970 law would formally identify the contours of the 
land structure, extend the state’s tax base, and bring order to the land market, which 
continued to elude the state, in the lead up to an expected wide-scale land reform.  
 
6.2.4 Property Reforms and the Agrarian Revolution: Power to the APCs 
By the late 1960s, the regime had consolidated and de-concentrated the 
administration to the regional level, and integrated the FLN into the APCs. It had also 
gained a better foothold over the land and produce markets, and strengthened the self-
managed farms tax regime.  
On 30 November 1971, the Official Journal published the texts to the long 
awaited Agrarian Revolution (Révolution Agraire).196 The texts197 (the Charter of the 
Agrarian Revolution, Ordinance 71-73) decreed a radical change to the Algerian land 
portfolio and a remarkable extension of APC authority. The reform was divided into two 
stages, 1972-1973 and 1973-1975.198 During the first phase (1971-1973), government 
land would be divided and worked in cooperatives created on state agricultural land.199 
The government also placed a moratorium on private land transfers, and required that 
titles be established for all land and stored at the Municipal Land Registry, charging the 
APCs with the task. Working with data generated by the APCs, the second stage (1973-) 
nationalized absentee land (e.g. private hubus, urban landlords) and limited private 
                                                
196 Boumediene made the announcement on 8 November 1971. 
197 The Charter is accessible at http://www.joradp.dz. 
198 There were in fact three stages. The final stage extended the cooperatives to tribal lands south of the 
Saharan Atlas, which still maintained a pastoral-nomad lifestyle. I do not explore the third stage, which was 
never fully applied. 
199 This excluded the self-managed workers farms. 
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landholdings to 110 ha. The remainder, as well as the land expropriated from absentee 
owners, was transferred to the cooperative sector. 
 
Creating Cooperatives and Socialist Villages 
Between 1972 and 1973, seven hundred thousand ha of land and sixty thousand 
landless families were organized into close to three thousand Agricultural Production 
Cooperatives (CAPRA, Coopérative Agricole de Production de la Révolution Agraire) 
(Burgat and Nancy 1984: 81). To structure life in the CAPRA, the government 
announced the construction of the “Thousand Socialist Villages” (Lesbet 1983). 
Extensions of the nearest APC, the Socialist Villages planned small housing units for 
each cooperative family, a mosque, a post-office, and a CAPSC commissary, which sold 
OFLA and OAIC products (ibid.) Former socialist villages like M’Said (between Aïn 
Temouchent and Oran) are immediately recognizable today. Villagers did not control 
their own administrative affairs. Ironically built on the edifice of French military 
interment camps200 – centers that grouped close to two million Algerians at independence 
(Cornaton 1963; Sutton and Lawless 1975; Sutton 1999) – village affairs were managed 
by the nearest APC. Reflecting on the total lack of power over his life within the CAPRA 
Socialist Village, one peasant commented to Knauss: “Before we were khamès of the 
great landowner. Now we are the khamès of the State. And all the workers know it” 
(Knauss 1977: 74). 
Management and financing of the cooperatives was devolved to one hundred 
Multi-Functional Agricultural Service Cooperatives (CAPCS, Coopérative Agricole 
                                                
200 Beginning in 1956, the French military began forcing Algerian peasants into internment camps. The 
strategy aimed to break the FLN’s “Committee of Five” support. Large swaths of land were declared zones 
interdits. Here, douars and villages were razed and anyone spotted by the French military could be shot on 
sight. 
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Communale Polyvalent de Service) (Knauss 1977: 70). The CAPSC determined the 
number of employees, paid salaries, and made production choices. Breaking with 
previous policy that placed the Self-Management Farms under the Regional Credit Union 
at the Wilaya, the regime continued its new policy of de-concentration by giving the 
APCs management decisions within the CAPSC. By 1977, 1,412,920 ha of land were 
under the cooperative system (Ruedy 2005: 223). 
 
Registering Titles and Expropriating Land 
Building from the 1970 Land Registry reforms, the APCs were required to title all 
land in their municipal boundaries. It also charged the APCs with the discretionary power 
to indentify the quality of landownership (e.g. land held in abstentia or rented private 
hubus land). To do so, the Mayor designated an “extended APC (APCE),” or commission 
composed of council members and which reserved a minimum number of seats for the 
National Union of Algerian Peasants (UNPA, Union National des Paysans Algériens).201 
In practice the minimum number of seats were not reserved to these groups (Chalabi 
1983: 120-122; El Aidi 1997). Farms owned by absentees or frozen in private hubus were 
uniformly expropriated once holdings had been fully identified. A ceiling of 110 ha on 
private land was also announced, though not uniformly applied. Though working from 
Ministry of Agriculture guidelines, maximum limits on ownership were determined by 
the APC. The rulings reflected many variables including the number of salaried 
employees and family members affected, crop-type, and extant degrees of mechanization 
and irrigation (Adel 1978; Gherras 1995). They also reflected the strength of the local 
APC vis-à-vis the Direction of Agriculture at the Wilaya and Ministry in Algiers (El Aidi 
1997). Land exceeding APCE-established limits was confiscated and integrated in the 
                                                
201 A satellite of the FLN, the UNPA was created in  
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cooperatives. To prevent a sudden wholesale parceling, the ordinance dissolved the land 
market, forbidding unauthorized land transactions. The moratorium on land transfer 
helped the regime to retroactively reclaim land illegally acquired between July 1962 and 
November 1971. Land legally purchased during the same period was subject to 
expropriation in the event that owners failed to cooperate with APC cadastre teams.  
Several members in Boumediene’s cabinet opposed the Agrarian Revolution. 
Kaid Ahmed202, who owned close to three thousand hectares, quit the Revolutionary 
Council and the leadership of the FLN in protest. Minister of Interior Ahmed Medeghri203 
openly opposed the reforms in general and the APCEs specifically, whereas Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Abdelaziz Bouteflika204 reportedly confided to Minister of Industry 
Belaïd Abdesselam: “Boumediene…has finally followed a path opposed to ours.” 
Cabinet-level opposition did not affect Boumediene’s decision, and shortly after 
opposition ministers made their positions clear, he replaced them (Roberts 1994: 22). 
Ironically, the keystone of Boumediene’s new top-down, bottom-up state building 
strategy would be the institution that undermined the Algerian Agrarian Revolution: the 
APC.205 As noted above, the middle classes had made their way into the 1967 APCs in 
city and countryside alike. Some, sensing the coming Agrarian Revolution had sold their 
land (I-13) or divided it to family members (I-11; I-12). In some cases, discussed below, 
they did both and came out winners after 1971. Others, had already under-registered their 
titles at the Municipal Land Registry during the chaotic Ben Bella era (I-2; I-10; I-11; I-
                                                
202 He fled to Morocco that year. 
203 He was found dead in his office in 1974. Police reports ruled the death a suicide. 
204 “Boumédiène a fait ça par démogogie pour gagner la faveur de la population; il a suivi, finalement, une 
voie contraire à celle sur laquelle nous croyons être d’accord avec lui.” In Mahfoud Bennoune and Ali El-
Kenz. 1990. Le hazard et l’histoire: Entretiens avec Belaïd Abdesselam. Volume II. Algiers: Collections 
Sud: 219. Compare with his comments to Mestiri, footnote 20. 
205 The APCs were increased from 632 to 691 in 1971. Côte 1988: 317. 
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12). Between 1962 and 1968, as a category, large landowners decreased by fifty percent  
(Knauss 1977: 76). See Table 6.2, below. 
Once the 1971 moratorium on land transactions was set into place, the APC 
became the central focal point for landowners who wanted to protect land. Landowners 
who did not already have a council seat – or an associate or relative in place – actively 
solicited councilors searching for a local benefactor (I-10). Councilors manipulated the 
system in three ways: by pushing the maximum legal land limit to its outward 
boundaries, by using extant legal loopholes to win appeals, and by “disappearing” the 
land from the Municipal Land Registries. 
The former was the easiest, but the least effective. Having endorsed doubling the 
maximum holding for irrigated land recommended by the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Oran APC negotiated an average extension of five hectares per holding (El Aidi 1997: 
50-51). 
 In Maghnia (Lalla Marnia), a former bachaga, B.A. sold sixty-seven hectares of 
his land to nine buyers between 1963 and 1968. In order to avoid the land register, all but 
one of the transactions were informal.206 In 1967, his brother was elected into the APC. 
Because his land sales had not been recorded, in 1974 he was notified that his land was 
subject to nationalization. Whether his brother transpired to get the land declared fit for 
nationalization is unclear. What is clear is that the land of eight of the nine buyers no 
longer belonged to them: the APCE committee had attributed it back to B.A. Each 
appealed the decision with the APCE and lost. He and his brothers then claimed the 
property was family land. Since there were eight brothers, individually each would own a 
plot below the maximum set by the APCE. The brothers won their appeal by allying with 
                                                
206 The same phenomenon occurred in Sidi Ali under Maître Benabdallah’s tenure, which is why he 
encouraged the shuhud. While not legally binding, there was some sort of record that a transaction had 
occurred to avoid potentially conflict situations like this. I-2. 
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the quarter of the 33-member APCE, including the head of the FLN Kasma, who 
themselves were large landowners and subject to nationalization. The won their appeal in 
1975 (El Aidi 1997: 87-93).207 
 
Table 6.2: Evolution of Muslim Land 1964-1965 and 1973 Land Registries 
Category 1964-1965 1973 % Change 
1-10 ha 1,318,125 1,640,870 +24.49% 
10-50 ha 2,967,545 2,619,503 -11.73% 
50-100 ha 765,585 654,795 -14.47% 
100+ ha 786,905 628,978 -20.07% 
Total 5,839,660 5,544,145 -6.77% 
Source: Leca and Vatin 1975: 442; Raffinot and Jacquemot. 
1977: 312. 
 
Combined, the strategies appeared effective. Of the close to 5.5 million ha of 
private land tallied in the 1973 Land Census, only four hundred thousand ha of private 
land were expropriated. Of the 24,167 farmers that were targeted, 13,907 appealed 
through state-authorized channels and 4,485 won their property back – close to twenty 
percent (Aït Amara 1993: 189). Those who were targeted and who lost appeals were 
allowed to choose which plots of land would be nationalized. For this, and because the 
bulk of government land (excluding the self-managed farms) nationalized in 1963 were 
smaller, less fertile holdings, nearly two-thirds of land ear-marked for the Agrarian 
Revolution was poor or un-productive land (Burgat and Nancy 1985: 81). 
Working to get land erased from the land registry appears to have been the best 
strategy. Between 1965 and 1973, close to another three hundred thousand hectares of 
land went missing. Added this sum with the four hundred thousand that were “lost” 
                                                
207 The Maghnia strategy was also apparently used in Remchi. While I-10, I-11, and I-12 all mentioned the 
case, none would give further details.  
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during the Ben Bella era, within a decade, close to a million hectares of land simply 
vanished – an area far to great to be explained by desertification. 
 
Municipal Land Reserves and Building Permits 
The last in a series of noteworthy APC empowering property reforms was the 
1974 Land Reserves Law. The law mandated the creation of Municipal Land Reserves 
(Réserves Fonciers). In coordination with the Wilaya, the APCs would define zoning 
laws and maintain a fund of land for municipal extension. The Land Reserves were 
initially composed of state land ceded to the APCs and maintained in size through 
judicious application of eminent domain. Land incorporated into the reserves was zoned 
for municipal extension projects, increasingly contracted out to private construction 
companies (Dillman 2000: 115-128). While the private land marked was still frozen, the 
constitution of Municipal Land Reserves would create a new source of patronage when 
land sales were unfrozen in the liberalizing 1980s (Bendjaballah 1997: 37). The same 
zoning laws also mandated municipal and Wilaya building permits. In the urban milieu of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, local notables, market operators who knew the arcane 
informal rules of doing business with Town Hall, and the Municipal Councilor – who 
were often the same man – dominated access to these permits and thus the construction 
sector (I-25; I-27; 1-28). The many of these groups, led by men like Cherif Athmane 
(Eden Group) in Oran or Brahim Hasnaoui (Entreprises Hasnaoui) in Sidi Bel-Abbès, 
would later become national players.  
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6.2.5 Horizontal Powersharing 
The 1967 APC elections were critical to Houari Boumediene’s two-tiered rural 
state building strategy, which de-concentrated power to the Wilaya and Districts from the 
top and sought to integrate local elites from the bottom via the APCs. The keystone to the 
strategy was the FLN Mayor. By co-opting local elites into the FLN party and structuring 
them in the APC under the control of the Mayor, the regime would have a bottom-up 
corps of quasi-administration elites. Functionally reflecting the nexus of this top-down, 
bottom-up strategy, the 1967 Municipal Code208 invests the Mayor as both state cadre and 
elected official (Benakezouh 1984: 193).209 Ensuring a truly bottom-up strategy, 
moreover, the Municipal Code also banned agents from the Ministry of Interior (Wali, 
District Chief) from participating in the elections (Leca 1973).210 The gambit, of course, 
was that a seat in the FLN-staffed APCs would re-wire the interests (and power) of local 
notables away from their local arenas and toward the state. In other words, for a 
powersharing strategy to work, local elites would need to be dependent on the state’s 
economic largess (Boone 2003: 36). Dependent local elite-cum-agents could then usurp 
local space and further project state power into the periphery, as the Neo-Destour had 
done in Tunisia. 
The 1967 and 1971 APC elections were an experiment in powersharing (Roberts 
1983; 2009), but not in the direction Boumediene had desired. The powersharing 
experiment was not between the center and the periphery, overlapping interests and 
forming a unified regime, if not nation, as we saw in the Tunisian case. Rather, 
powersharing operated horizontally, between local elites, and did very little to break (and 
                                                
208 Available at www.joradp.dz. 
209 Not dissimilar from the Neo-Destour Coordination Committee in Tunisia. 
210 Leca notes that this might also have been to prevent regional level alliances with local elites, or to 
prevent the watering down of the administration. Leca 1973. 
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in certain cases reinforced) those “mutually exclusive definitions of what the maximum 
political unit ought to be” (Charrad 2001: 19). Put differently, local elites still contested 
the authority of the state to control their political-economic arenas. 
The key to a vertical powersharing agreement was linking the FLN corps to the 
state administration through the APCs. The problem was that the administration had to 
re-order the FLN while ordering the APC lists. As discussed above, the FLN base was 
never entirely structured according to the 1964 National Party Congress framework. At 
the national level, the party could not articulate its own interests in 1967 – the Central 
Committee and Political Bureau had been abolished only two years before. And at the 
local level, branches and Mouhafedha (federations), which were unformed masses in 
1962, had only been loosely drawn and organized by Ben Bella and Ben Alla in 1964. 
The local federation leader, Mouhafedh, (appointed by Ben Bella and Ben Alla) was 
replaced by Belkacem in 1965. Because the Party Commissioner was delegated by 
Algiers and usually had no real relation with the militants or actors in the local political 
economy, articulation of a national local-party strategy was inefficient. 
It was neither the party base nor Executive Secretariat that created the local 
hierarchy, but the 1967 APC elections. Rather, the post-1967 local hierarchy was 
established/reinforced by the sixteen Wilaya Commissions that drew up APC electoral 
lists in the fall of 1966. Those lists represented a coterie of interests, including the 
Revolutionary Council, the five Military Regions, the Wali, local District Chiefs, the 
UGTA, the Party, former combatants, and local property owners and merchants. The 
Wilaya Commissions undermined Boumediene’s goal of creating an army of local 
political cadres from the FLN base by undermining central authority over the local party, 
which still had not been formed. The re-constructed party represented and served 
parochial interests, not Algiers’. Perhaps realizing the mistakes of 1967, Boumediene 
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replaced Cherif Belkacem with Kaid Ahmed in 1968, who tried to organize branch, 
Kasma, and Mouhafedha elections over the next year. Regional power centers, such as 
the heads of the Military Regions in the East and Southeast and APC Councilmen 
undermined those efforts (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 222; Benakezouh 1984: 124-125). 
Similar top-down and bottom-up problems persist today (Chapter Seven), limiting 
society’s ability to articulate to Algiers, and hindering Algiers’ efforts to apply policy on 
the ground. 
While a significant number of the 10,158 Councilmen elected 1967 were 
circulated out in 1971, the Mayors stayed in place. Thirty-seven percent of the 1967 
councilors were candidates on the 1971 lists; twenty-one percent were reelected. 
Nationally, more than two-thirds (67%) of the Mayors ran for a second term, and fifty-
four percent were reelected to office. In farming regions, the percentage was often higher. 
Eighty-three percent of the Mayors in the Wilaya of Tlemcen retained office (e.g. 
Maghnia, Remchi); ninety-one percent in Oran (Sig, M’Said)211; and ninety-five in 
Mostaghanem (Sidi Ali, Mohammedia).212 It seems hard to believe that their reelection 
had nothing to do with local interests and the anticipated land reforms. The Agrarian 
Revolution was announced eight months after the polls, after months of intra-
Revolutionary Council discussion and negotiation, and years of media coverage and 
hype. 
In addition to lacking positive incentive to induce FLN-Councilmen to enforce 
national state or party directives, such as an autonomous budget, between 1962 and 
1977/79, there were no vertical mobility opportunities. By late 1971, the party still had 
not held a National Congress to link the provincial elites with the center, and downwardly 
                                                
211 The city of Oran bucks this trend. Only 24 percent of the APC were re-elected in 1971, though three 
Regional Assembly candidates joined the municipal corps. 
212 All figures computed from numbers printed in La République, 18 February 1971. “Entre 1967 et 1971.” 
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articulate ideas developed in Algiers. In fact, at the outset of major land reform, FLN 
Executive Secretariat President Kaid Ahmed quit the party and the government. The 
Central Committee and Political Bureau had not been reconvened since 1965, and the 
National Assembly (APN, Assemblée Populaire Nationale) would not be re-called until 
1977.213 In 1969, the regime had created Regional Assemblies (APW, Assemblées 
Populaires de Wilaya) for each of the Wilaya, but they were not attractive to the 
Councilmen of cities like Oran or villages like Remchi. More closely controlled by the 
Wali – the APWs and Walis offices are always in the same building. And with less 
discretionary power over local property than the APC, in the post-1971 period, elites of 
the big cities and medium-sized-agrarian municipalities found their interests better served 
in town hall (I-8; I-10; I-13). Three APW representatives from the 1969 session ran for 
and won office in the 1971 APC; only two Municipal Councilors made the step up, 
possibly indicating spatial nodes of accumulation and material interests.214  
The APC-APW dynamic would change over the next two decades, broadly 
reflecting the ways liberalization affected accumulation strategies in the different local 
political economies (e.g. Oran and its regional market; Mostaghanem and agriculture; 
Algiers and real-estate), and largely following Boone’s discussion on economic 
dependence, communal structure, and local-national relations (Boone 2003: 33-37; 
Roberts 2009; Parks 2011), as briefly discussed in Chapter Seven and the Conclusion. 
Comparing the Algerian experience with Tunisian political developments just 
before Ben Salah’s cooperative movement is perhaps instructive. By the time Ben Salah 
decided to expand the cooperative system, the Neo-Destour had organized seven National 
                                                
213 Only eight of Oran’s 550 Municipal Councilors elected in the nine APC elections organized 1967 were 
promoted into the seven National Assemblies organized since 1977, a little more than one percent; only two 
members of Oran’s 279 APW representative corps, or 0.7 percent, made it to the same assembly. Source: 
Author’s representative database. 
214 Source: Author’s candidate database. 
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Congresses, three Municipal and two National Assembly elections. Links with the 
national and local elite had been fully established, and local Neo-Destour officials had 
real positive incentives to apply Tunis’ decisions: vertical mobility opportunities within 
the party and state representative institutions. 
Lacking a link with Algiers, connected to local and regional interests, no 
promotion opportunities, and with pre-set budgets, it is not surprise that the co-opted 
local elite chose to engage in horizontal powersharing and accumulation strategies during 
the Agrarian Revolution. Doing so, they undermining state building attempts by 
manipulating quasi-state institutions that were to re-wire their alliance in the first place. 
Zartman puts it succinctly: “Indeed the wealthier Algerians, landowners and merchants 
rather than industrialists for the most part have been joined by the governing elite rather 
than joining them” (Zartman 1975: 268). Though guarded, a 1974 article published in 
Révolution Africaine, a state paper, reflects more or less the analysis: 
The 1968 Party reorganization has not occurred. The special commissions created 
to reinforce party ranks and add youthful militantism failed. The feudal spirit has 
reappeared and the Party has not been able to overcome its lack of competent and 
engaged political cadres. Lacking these cadres, demagogy, opportunism, 
incapacity, and irresponsibility has taken control of its spirit.215 
Depending on how one looks at it, Houari Boumediene’s state building strategy 
was a success or failure. He succeeded in de-concentrating the state from the national to 
the regional level. And he succeeded in gaining control over the land portfolio. The 
process, however, resulted in the weakening of the state’s ability to exclusively define the 
use and transfer of property at the local level. While reforms placed millions of hectares 
of land under state authority, the strategy resulted in the illegal appropriation of close to a 
half a million hectares of beylic and private land. It also primed the municipal arena for 
more illegal appropriations and administrative subversion for decades to come. Setting 
                                                
215 Révolution Africaine. 14-20 May 1974. Cited in Benakezouh 1984: 125. 
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responsibility of applying the 1971 Agrarian Land reforms focused local actors on the 
local arena, setting a template in place that as still not been entirely broken. 
The timing in which property rights and local institution building occurred did not 
create the vertical (top-down, bottom-up) powersharing agreements Boumediene had 
initially sought. Instead, of re-wiring local authority and making it dependent on Algiers, 
it created horizontal alliances that would erode state authority over local-level affairs, 
beginning a process of localized accumulation and power that would have important 
ramifications on future local-national relations in the contemporary era (c.f. Hachemaoui 
2011). 
 
6.3 PRESIDENT CHADLI BENDJEDID AND THE STATE OF DEROGATION, 1979-1992 
Boumediene died of a rare blood disease in 1978. To ease the transfer of power, 
the army resuscitated the FLN’s national structures, organizing the second National 
Congress since independence in early 1979. The Congress elected a Central Committee 
and Political Bureau, and co-opted the military’s presidential candidate, Chadli 
Bendjedid. A consensus figure, Bendjedid promised liberalizing economic reforms to 
jumpstart a national economy that was transitioning from agriculture to industry, and 
beginning to feel the effects of a failed Agrarian Revolution (Entelis 1986). The local 
political-economic arenas created by the sequencing of representative elections and 
timing reforms (discussed above) were reinforced during Bendjedid’s era. Regional and 
local prerogatives over the land and real estate market were expanded and the national 
economy liberalized.  
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6.3.1 Reforming Property Laws 
 Production of staple food crops dropped precipitously between 1971 and 1981. 
While the total surface area of potato crops increased from 41,900 to 76,010 hectares 
between 1970 and 1981 (close to forty-five percent), total yield dropped from an average 
76,424 hectograms per ha to 66,114 between the 1961-1970 and 1971-1980 periods 
respectively. Tomato production fell from 128,349 to 95,682 hectograms per ha during 
the same periods. By the late 1970s, Algeria had an acute food shortage.216 Responding to 
the serious food crisis provoked by the Agrarian Revolution was the regime’s first 
priority. In 1981, the state loosened its grip on the fruit and vegetable distribution circuits 
and pricing monopsony in a de jure wink to parallel economy wholesalers who had 
already usurped the sector away from the state marketing boards (Dillman 2000: 97-
101).217 The law let the market determine the price of most fruits and vegetables, though 
potatoes, onions, citrus, and dates remained under a fixed price regime, and cereals and 
dry stuffs remained in the OAIC. The state turned to a massive foodstuffs importation 
scheme in 1982 to offset the anticipated reform time lag. The imports crowded parts of 
the private sector out of the market. During this period, many medium farmers sold their 
land and shifted to construction (ibid: 97-101; 115-128). 
 On 7 February 1981, a Presidential Decree unfroze the land and real estate 
market, allowing private and cooperative property to be bought and sold between 
individuals. French era apartments, such as the authors, which had been wrapped into the 
BNBV in 1963 and later transferred to the Office of Real-Estate Management and 
Promotion (OPGI, Office de Promotion et de Gestion d’Immobilier), were sold at 
subsidized prices to create a start-up fund for the new market. 
                                                
216 Information taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization. http://www.faostat.fao.org. 
217 In 1976, the regime tried to monopolize sales to the consumer through the Souk el Fellah. 
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  May 1983 marked a radical shift from Boumediene’s land policy. On 18 May, the 
regime formalized squatter’s rights. Squatters on public (beylic) or private land who had 
continuously possessed (al-hawz) it for more than fifteen years could now apply for a 
title. A Presidential Decree on the 28th folded CAPSC, CAPRA, and self-managed 
farmed into a common land regime called the Socialist Farms (DAS, Domaines Agricoles 
Socialistes). Between 1983 and 1984, 3,415 DAS covering 2.8 million hectares of land 
were created, employing 155,368 workers.218 An additional 705,164 ha of CAPRA land 
was distributed to a hundred thousand individual farmers (Aït Amara 1993: 189). In 
August, Bendjedid announced a total thaw of the land market moratorium. A series of 
decrees announced a limited sale of state land. Though land earmarked for the market 
was usually in small (0-10 ha) non-irrigated plots located in the High Plains, 338,000 ha 
were sold to sixty thousand farmers (ibid: 190).  
Keeping with the Algerian de-concentration institution building strategy, the 
regime expanded the number of Wilaya from thirty-one to forty-eight in January 1984, 
while the number of APCs was expanded from 704 to 1,541.219 In tandem with the move, 
Bendjedid broke up the state-owned enterprises into smaller regional and municipal 
companies, confiding their management to the APCs and APWs. While it has been 
speculated that the move was to build political support among state cadres and elected 
officials in the provinces (Hadjadj 1999), the result is uncontestable: the APWs and APCs 
now had a large body of companies, assets, and workers under their purview. 
A 1986 law set the legal parameters for private land and real-estate agencies, 
giving the new agencies access to the Municipal Land Reserves at discounted prices. For 
example, in 1991 rates, the APC would charge four million dinars per hectare of land in 
                                                
218 These farms absorbed an additional 500,000 ha of state land not previously held in the CAPRA or 
worker farms. 
219 The Wilaya were expanded from fifteen to thirty-one in 1974. 
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the Oran Municipal Land Reserves, while the going market rate at the time was fifteen 
million dinars per hectare (I-18). A new class of wealthy land and real-estate merchants 
would emerge from the law (I-16; I-17). Authorization to deliver the lucrative permit was 
tied to the Mayor’s office and was distributed selectively. 
Less than four years after the DAS were consolidated, they were broken apart. 
Law 87-19 of 12 August 1987 divided the DAS sector into Collective Farm Corporations 
(EAC, Entreprise Agricole Collective). Organization and budgetary control was ceded to 
the farmhands. In return for a symbolic rent paid to the APC, workers were confided 
management decisions for the first time since independence – on land than many of them 
had occupied at independence. The law marked the end of the beylic and al-hawz dispute 
that had pitted Algiers against the countryside for twenty-five years.  
However, it also opened the door to a new era of land conflict pitting the former 
workers against themselves, reminiscent of the 1863 Sénatus-Consulte that attacked arch, 
the foundation of the jema‘a moral economy, and tore the tribes apart. The workers, who 
had labored together their entire life and sometimes been neighbors in a Socialist Village, 
also had the right to dissolve their properties into individually managed farms called 
Individual Agricultural Enterprises (EAI, Entreprise Agricole Individuelle). In this case, 
an APC commission was called and individual properties were tallied and distributed. By 
the end of 1987, twenty-two thousand EACs managed 2.3 million ha of land, and close to 
six thousand of EAI managed the remaining sixty thousand ha (Gherras 1995; 67-69).220 
While the law planned that owners of EAIs were to be given peripheral plots, Aït Amara 
notes that the best strips of land in prime EACs were privatized to local notables (Aït 
Amara 1993: 192). Once the decision to break the EAC into EAIs was made, it was 
                                                
220 Presumably, the state kept close to 500,000 ha of land: the discrepancy between the DAS area and 
combined EAC and EAI area. 
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difficult for a single individual to subsequently quit the regime. In some cases, 
disgruntled farmers would subdivide and rent his plot or even sell it illegally (Gherras 
1995: 67-69). The incentives to illegally rent or sell EAI or parcels of EAC were 
incredible. 
Table 6.3: Evolution of EAC / EAI 1987-1991 
 1987 1991 
 Area, ha Area, ha 
EAC 2,300.000 1,910,109 
EAI 55,969 166,277 
Total 2,355,969 2,076,386 
Gherras 1997: 67, 69.  
 
By the end of 1987, twenty-two thousand EACs managed 2.3 million ha of land, 
and close to six thousand of EAI managed the remaining sixty thousand ha. By 1991, the 
number of EACs dropped by sixteen percent, or 1,910,109 ha. The number of EAI farms 
jumped by close to three hundred percent, or 166,227 ha (Gherras 1995; 67, 69). The 
total surface shrank by close to three hundred thousand ha in four years. Again, the 
processes of land loss out paced those of desertification. 
 
Three Quick Anecdotes on the former DAS Farms 
The following three anecdotes of my own experiences at three former DAS farms 
are not rigorous: I never saw a title and I never found accurate data on the size of the 
various land regimes within which the properties had historically shifted. Nevertheless, 
the three provide real, albeit subjective, accounts of what has happened to some of these 
lands.  
Privatized EAI Plot: The first anecdote is based on a visit with friends to an 
acquaintance’s villa, in the Wilaya of Mascara, just near the administrative border with 
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Oran. The villa, a colonial-era farmhouse that has been renovated, is perched on slope of 
a large tract of land, probably fifteen hectares, with a dried oued dividing the southern 
third of the property. The owner, a retired high administrative cadre in one of Algeria’s 
most important industrial companies, explained that villa and surrounding land had 
belonged to a French family221 and occupied by workers at independence. The owner 
claimed it had been an EAI before he bought it (March 2008). 
Privatized ECA Plots: In Oran, I once bought plants from a nursery located on 
several hectares of land in the now booming Bir el-Djir district. Impressed by the variety 
of plants and flowers, I began a discussion with the owner, a woman in her forties. When 
she handed me the receipt, I saw that the nursery was officially an EAC. I asked her 
about the surrounding land in general. She said that in 1962, the area was non-irrigated 
land mainly belonging to the municipality222 and was incorporated into beylic, later added 
to an olive-producing CAPRA. In 1983, it became a DAS and was broken into an EAC in 
1988. Villas occupy the surrounding plots, where the EAC should extend. When I asked 
the woman where she got her agricultural training or whether her father was a fellah on 
this land, she said no: the nursery was a hobby, she was a medical doctor (December 
2010). 
The Domaine Lenoir, Remchi: The Domaine Lenoir is a prominent stretch of land 
in Remchi (Cavaignac). During the colonial period, the Lenoir family lived in Tlemcen223 
and had a Spanish worker to run the domain, which produced a variety of crops, 
including olives, cereals, and vineyards (I-10; I-11; I-12; I-13; I-14). At independence, 
workers occupied the farm and organized a Self-Management Committee. Self-
                                                
221 He did not provide the name. 
222 Mawat? This is partially confirmed by Chalabi’s figures, that indicate most of the land in the region was 
non-irrigated and under-colonized. Chalabi 1984: 181, 212. 
223 They resided at Villa Sénès, El Kalâa Road. This information is taken from a colonial-era phone book 
reproduced in Louis Abadie. 2005. Tlemcen de ma jeunesse. Nice: Éditions Jacques Gandini. 
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management initially worked well – the workers knew the local mujahidin incorporated 
into the farm who had been farmhands from the region), and had good relations with the 
local state agent (I-14). In 1983, the Domaine Lenoir was broken into a DAS. In 1987, 
the workers were divided over whether or not to keep the farm together (I-11; I-12). One 
group broke into EAIs, while a core decided to remain together in an EAC. The EAC 
kept the colonial manor and equipment, and now mainly produces cereals,224 though part 
of the land is used for self-sufficient farming, where the surplus is sold at the local 
weekly market (I-11; I-12). The EAIs, which were made up of the lucrative olive 
producing plots, were ultimately illegally sold to an immigrant, who consolidated them 
(I-13; I-14). While the remaining EAC workers are saddened the farm did not stay 
together, they nevertheless respect the new owner who has modernized production 
techniques and irrigated the plot. One worker wryly commented, however, that had he 
had access to the same amount of bank credits as the immigrant, he would have created a 
veritable Shangri-La (I-12). 
Photo 6.1: Domaine Lenoir, Remchi (Cavaignac) 
 
Source: Author’s Photo, 01/05/2010 
                                                
224 The vineyards were ripped out during the 1970s, following France’s decision to stop buying Algerian 
wine in retribution for Algerian nationalization of French oil companies in the Sahara. 
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6.3.2 Resuscitating the FLN and National Political Institutions 
Bendjedid’s twelve-year tenure was marked by a resurgence of national level 
political institutions. Between 1979 and 1992, when a military junta forced him out of 
power, Bendjedid organized three FLN National Congresses and National Assembly 
elections.  
During the 1980s, Bendjedid tried to re-integrate the party into both state and 
society. Many scholars characterize the political system during the Bendjedid era as a 
hardening of the FLN and a resurgence of party prominence. Here, they point to reforms 
that made the party an integral part of the “iron triangle” of Algerian politics: joint-rule 
by the military, the administration, and the FLN (Entelis 1986: 16; Quandt 1998: 7; 
Ruedy 2005: 250). In January 1981, the FLN Central Committee ruled that the cadres of 
all mass organizations were required to join the party. The same year the Central 
Committee gave the president power to nominate the thirty-one Mouhafedh, or regional 
federation presidents, while eliminating the role of Political Commissioner. And Article 
128 of the Fifth FLN National Congress,225 organized in 1985, ruled all promotion to 
high cadre status in the state administration was incumbent on party membership. 
FLN reforms and an expansion of national level institutions might have 
strengthened the incentives of local-level actors to implement state policy in return for 
vertical promotion. Three APC and APW elections had been organized during the 
Bendjedid era, potentially serving as a vast “political nursery” for the three National 
Congresses and APNs (Leca and Vatin 1975: 108). However, local elites were solicited 
to higher office in neither party nor the National Assembly. To date, only four of Oran’s 
550 Municipal Councilors elected since the 1967 APC elections have been promoted into 
                                                
225 In fact, this was the third since independence, see infra. 
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the Algeria’s National Assemblies; only two members of Oran’s 279 APW representative 
corps made it to the same assembly. The 1977 National Assembly collected party and 
military elite that had often retired from high politics or the administration. The APN was 
their golden parachute. Furthermore, at the top levels of the hierarchy, the party did not 
have a budget to distribute downward. Commenting on the national FLN of the 1980s, 
Entelis remarks: “Most debilitating has been the virtual powerlessness of the party as a 
dispenser of even the most minor favors and services” (Entelis 1986: 173). 
 The strength of local branches, Kasma, and the APCs during this period has been 
debated. Scholars that focus on the national-level FLN reforms argue the APCs were 
weak. Commenting on the reforms, Entelis noted: “The result is politically lethargic and 
administratively marginal local-level associations that depend on the central authorities 
for guidance and animation” (Entelis 1986: 161). Ruedy states: “Local government’s role 
was essentially one of implementation” (Ruedy 2005: 209). To be sure, presidentially 
nominated Mouhafedh undermined the authority of local FLN Kasma to elect regional 
federation presidents from the base. Nor did local players have much say on the national 
arena. However, this group of scholars is looking at the political power of the local party 
branches and municipalities in the larger political system, not at the local arenas. 
Doing so, they miss the growing scope of municipal control over the local 
political economy. They also miss the power dynamics that increasingly spawned local 
political arenas that often escaped formal national control. A process begun in the 
Boumediene era, the APCs (and the local, regional, or national interest that backed them) 
increasingly controlled the local political economy. The Agrarian Revolution and the 
bulk of Bendjedid reforms were run through the APCs, not the Wilaya or Ministry of 
Agriculture. The authority to exclusively define the use and transfer of property, while 
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still officially incumbent on the Algerian state, had slipped into the hands of the local 
elite that infiltrated the FLN and was elected into the APCs. 
 
6.3.3 October 1988, the End of FLN Hegemony, Chaos on State Land 
The single party regime collapsed in October 1988. State and party were 
separated and a new 1989 Constitution guaranteed multiparty elections. The land 
liberalization (privatization / appropriation) process accelerated during in 1990s, as did 
political decentralization. During the period, land nationalized during the Agrarian 
Revolution was restituted. Between 1988 and January 1991, when the military forced 
Bendjedid to step down, centralized authority shifted to the regions. Law and order broke 
down during the 1990s. Many APCs were dissolved and replaced by Executive 
Municipal Delegates (DEC, Délégué Exécutif de Commune) nominated by Algiers. 
During this period, many of the EACs and EAIs were illegally sold; zoning laws were 
disregarded, and legal disputes over land taken turned bloody. 
 
Privatization and Competing Claims 
Using new civil liberties, the large landowners pushed for the restitution of land 
expropriated during the Agrarian Revolution. In 1990, the Union of Free Farmers (UFIA, 
Union des Fellas Indépendents d’Algérie), a powerful lobby of medium landowners 
successfully lobbied for the restitution of nationalized land. Law 90-25 restituted close to 
four hundred thousand ha to the twenty thousand large farmers whose land was 
nationalized in the mid-1970s (Aït Amara 1993: 192).  
The law did not create a framework by which the land would shift hands, 
however, and opened the floodgates of past land grievances. Between 1830 and 1990, 
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beylic land had belonged to the tribes, settlers, qaids, private owners, and workers. Once 
90-25 had passed, the layers of former owners protested different contours of the law. 
Competing levels of legitimacy were invoked, each with a mutually exclusive claim to 
the same plot of land. In some cases, the tribes re-united and reclaimed arch land owned 
anterior to the Sénatus-Consulte and Warnier Laws (Bendjaballah 1997). More recently, 
land was occupied and worked by CAPRA, DAS, EAC, and EAI farmers, who now were 
threatened with displacement. They based their own land claims on al-hawz and the 
revolutionary (and Qu‘ranic) adage: “Land belongs to he who works it.” Ihiyaa 
(vivification) and al-hawz (possession), they claimed, were the real legal foundations of 
land rights, not obscurantist past modes of social organization or vestiges of colonial 
privilege. Finally, the restituted owners were anxious to begin working the land, or to sell 
it (I-19) – land prices had sky rocketed since the market was opened in the 1980s. As law 
and order broke down in the mid-1990s, legitimacy (al-yad) was enforced through 
individual power and violence (similar to the situation in 1962 and Cell Four, in Table 
2.2, Chapter Two). In Tiaret, for example, large property owners and the local 
administration collaborated to eject workers from the former state farms, creating a 
“reign of terror” (Aït Amara 1993: 191). Topographically, moreover, it appears that the 
regions most affected were also the centers of village massacres during the 1990s, as the 
army battled an Islamist insurgency in the countryside.226  
Ultimately, the winners were the sons of the qaid, sheikh, and bachaga families 
that had controlled the countryside before independence. These families had slowly 
established their grip on local-level politics with Boumedienne’s municipal 
decentralization in 1967, consolidated their hold on the rural land structure during the 
                                                
226 The violence centers in the Wilaya of Algiers, Blida, Chlef, Relizane, and Tiaret – areas most affected 
by colonization, nationalization, and de-nationalization. Unfortunately, no intensive study on this 
correlations have been done to date. 
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anarchy of the Bendjedid reforms, and today constitute the second generation of Algerian 
“New Middle Classes.”227 
 
Multiparty Politics 
The 1989 Constitution guaranteed freedom of association and multiparty 
elections. The 1989 FLN National Congress, organized by Secretary General Abdelhamid 
Mehiri228 called for massive party reorganization. In an effort to finally build a party base 
that had real impact in national politics, he rescinded presidential nomination of the 
Mouhafedh and re-applied the rules surrounding organization of and participation in the 
National Congress. Under new rules, applied the same year, the branches elect the 
Kasmat, which in turn elect the Mouhafedha. The Mouhafedha co-opts a Mouhafedh. 
Together, and in consultation with the Kasma, they elect delegates to the National 
Congress. Delegates at the National Congress elect a Central Committee, which in turn 
elects the Political Bureau and co-opts the Secretary General. The June 1990 APC and 
APW elections disabused Mehri of the hope that the reforms would rejuvenate the FLN. 
The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Front Islamique du Salut) won 865 of the 1,541 
APCs. In the Wilaya of Oran, the FIS won every APC, including Oran City; it won seven 
of forty-six APCs in Tlemcen. In Tiaret, a region marked by a high concentration of new 
large landowners who needed to administration to help clear workers from their restituted 
land, the FLN won twenty-two of the thirty-nine APCs up for grabs; the FIS won the 
remaining town halls (Arun 1991: 41-63). In order to block the FIS from controlling the 
municipal political economy, many incumbent FLN APCs distributed large tracts of the 
                                                
227 The “New Middle Classes,” à la Manfred Halpern, opposed liberalization processes in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Their dependent position was undermined by the violence of the 1990s. For more on the 
old “New Middle Classes” See Halpern 1963. 
228 Bendjedid’s brother-in-law – he married one of Chadli’s sisters. 
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Municipal Land Reserves and surrounding agricultural land to local allies during the 
lame-duck period (Bendjaballah 1997: 336). The act in itself shows the importance local 
notables placed on the municipal councils for controlling the local political-economy 
arenas. The transfers were not always legal, adding to the competing claims over local 
land. In 1992, the Minister of Agriculture reported: “A total ignorance of the terrain 
blocks any advancement in the domain of reforms” (Bendjaballah 1997: 53). 
Following a massive FLN route and FIS victory in the first round of ANP 
elections in 1991, the military forced Bendjedid to resign, annulled the election results, 
dissolved the National Assembly and imposed a High State Committee to run Algerian 
affairs. APCs controlled by the FIS were similarly dissolved. Local and regional 
management shifted to the Executive Municipal Delegate (DEC) named by Algiers, but 
co-opted from the former local elite of FLN notables and retired officers and state cadres. 
In 1993, radical groups of political Islamists launched a brutal insurrection in the cities, 
and later the countryside, that would kill close to 150,000 Algerians (Touati 1995; Willis 
1997; Quandt 1998; Martinez 2000), weakening central authority over the countryside. 
Parachuted into power, the DECs entered alliances with the Wali and local powerbrokers. 
In exchange for stability, many illegally accelerated the transfer of beylic and state 
property to private hands. Many of the current criminal cases against Walis and DECs 
from the era focus on land swindles. 
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6.4 THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY ALGERIA 
  
The failure of property law is generated by the confrontation of contradictory 
logics: local and central logics in a struggle over the right to use property 
(Bendjaballah 1997: 46). 
 
Since the Ottoman period, Algeria has been the terrain of a power struggle 
between centralizing national rulers and the disarticulated, decentralized political arenas 
of localized interests. Unable to control the tribes, the Beys used the proxy makhzan to 
collect taxes from the ra‘yat in exchange for fiscal autonomy and landed privileges. 
Power in the countryside was outsourced and the Bey’s authority exclusive authority to 
define the use and transfer of property were limited.  
With a modernizing administration and army, the French militarily defeated the 
tribes, undermining the authority of the shuyukh and jema‘a by attacking the moral 
economy of asabiyya. Unwilling or unable to defend tribal interests, many joined the 
ranks of les grandes familles and qaidal corps. Land was sequestered and settler property 
rights strictly enforced. To protect the economic foundations of French Algeria, settlers 
lobbied to keep Muslims out of the political and economic spheres. Threats to settler 
domination were undermined or violently oppressed. The political climate prohibited the 
development of a nationalist mass-mobilizing political party during the colonial period, 
and so the nationalist movement radicalized and went underground, launching an eight-
year armed-struggle for independence. 
As the ALN/FLN dissolved into the state at independence, the new regime 
immediately discovered it was at odds over the fruits of the revolution. The debates 
focused on who would define the rights and use of land. Whereas the population sought 
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to re-occupy land sequestered during the previous 132 years, the state tried to stake its 
claims over the entire colonial land portfolio. Lacking organized, penetrating in-roads 
into society, and occupying an administration-in-formation, the Ben Bella regime was not 
in a position to assert its claims. Instead, it acknowledged legal occupation rights to the 
Self-Management Farms, and slowly moved to assert itself on the remaining land. In 
tandem, he laid the framework of the post-independence FLN party, while de-
concentrating power from Algiers to the Wilaya, Districts, and Municipalities. For a 
number of reasons, the strategy failed. Unable to control the countryside for reasons 
discussed above, Ben Bella was overthrown in a bloodless coup in 1965. 
Boumediene developed a two-tiered strategy that continued to de-concentrate 
authority to the Wilaya, but tried to develop in-roads into the local political arenas. His 
strategy, as discussed above, relied on the nexus of FLN and APC. By inducing local 
elites to join the FLN and promoting them to the APC, it was hoped the regime could re-
wire their interests away from the local arena and make them dependent on Algiers. 
Because local FLN-Councilors had neither an autonomous budget nor vertical mobility 
opportunities, the powersharing agreement that Boumediene had hoped would be top-
bottom, rotated to its side. Local elites and municipal councilors undermined the Agrarian 
Revolution, in a process that intensified the localization of political-economic arenas. 
Bendjedid’s rapid dismemberment of the Agrarian Revolution increased local power over 
the political economy. His national level reforms did not integrate local elites, and by the 
time multiparty elections were called for the APCs and APWs in 1990, the break between 
local and national elites was increasingly obvious. The dark decade of the 1990s and the 
chaos associated with the violent period nearly completed the rupture with state collapse. 
Under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999-present) regime has tried to put the pieces 
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back together via the FLN. As the introductory anecdotes of Chapter One reveal, and as 
Chapter Seven, shows, it has not entirely succeeded.  
Bendjaballah claims the failure of law stems from competing interests over the 
right to define the use and ownership of property. In post-colonial Algeria, there has been 
a perpetual struggle over the authority to define the exclusive use and transfer of 
property. In as much as these are debates about property, they are debates of authority. 
While in 2011, Algerians all agree that they have a sovereign state, “mutually exclusive 
definitions of what the maximum political unit ought to be” (Charrad 2001: 19) remain, 
pitting local notables against national elite for control over the local political economy. In 
such a context, property rights enforcement on the ground is weak; the state is weak. 
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Chapter Seven: Local-National Relations in Oran, the APC-FLN 
Connection 
In this city, on the eve of every important political event, the Mouhafedha of Oran 
is put under the spotlight and becomes a fixation, bringing back the old demons 
within the clans of that make up the family of the oldest political party.229 
 
Chapter Six focused on state building in the Algerian periphery, underscoring 
how the lack of trained administrative and party cadres framed President Houari 
Boumediene’s state building repertoire. Instead of rushing headstrong into policy he 
could not assume and political battles he could not win, he developed a top-down, 
bottom-up two-tiered system. The central administration dispatched a small corps of 
military officers and political leaders-cum-administrators to the fifteen Wilaya and 101 
Districts. To fill the gap between the District and the ground, Boumediene attempted to 
re-wire local authority with a new local party elite. Controlling the Municipalities, this 
army of agent-representatives would execute policy on the ground. For the reasons noted 
above, the plan backfired. Instead of vertical powersharing between the Wali and District 
Chief, the agent-representative and local elite – often one and the same – entered a 
horizontal powersharing agreement. Beylic, which had been contested by central 
authorities and local elites during the Ottoman era and French colonization, was 
transferred into private hands, re-routed from its defined use, or disappeared from the 
Municipal Land Registries during the Agrarian Revolution, and subsequent partial 
liberalization of agricultural policy. 
This chapter focuses on state building, property reform, and the Orani political 
arena. It is divided into two parts. Part One explores the origins of horizontal 
                                                
229 El Watan, 5 September 2009. “FLN: La pagaille d’Oran.” 
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powersharing between notables, entrepreneurs and the Oran FLN Federation and the 
ensuing battles for control over and access to property. Part Two focuses on the 
interaction between the local Federation and national party organization since 2002, when 
the party regained control over the local political-economic arena. 
Part One outlines the evolution of horizontal powersharing in the local political-
economic arena. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, personalities named by national and 
regional elite along with local notables, constituted the local FLN hierarchy. This period 
is characterized by the relationship between Mayor Seghier Ben Ali (1965-1967; 1967-
1971; 1971-1975) and Minister of Interior Ahmed Medeghri (1962-1964; 1965-1974).  
A changing political economy and growing local prominence of the head the 
Second Military Region Colonel Chadli Bendjedid in local business and party affairs 
altered the relationship between local business elites and notables, the APC, and FLN. 
Local notables and business elite shifted out of politics (and the APC), seizing 
opportunities in the new construction and public works sectors. During this period, the 
FLN, which had been slowly organizing under Bendjedid’s superintendence, filled the 
void. Controlling access to the APC, the party was the gatekeeper to the local political 
economy, which centered on real estate and access to municipal land for construction. 
Wardship over the local construction, public works, and real estate markets was the 
party’s asabiyya: it attracted militants, and created meaningful discipline in the local 
party hierarchy, with the Mouhafedh at the summit. During this period, the FLN shifted 
from a collection of prominent local individuals into an apparatus with a corporate spirit. 
Controlling access to those markets, the Oran Federation was independent from Algiers. 
In Oran of the late 1980s, beylic belonged to the local party apparatus, not the state.  
The party lost control over the markets in 1990, when the Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS, Front Islamique du Salut) trounced it in the APC elections. Shortly following the 
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1992 military coup, the FIS Municipal Council was annulled and replaced by an 
Executive Municipal Delegate (DEC, Délégué Exécutif de Commune) named by Algiers. 
Lacking the party’s authoritarian stewardship, and in a period characterized by an 
imploding state, the local political-economic arena collapsed. Distribution of beylic, 
which had been politically measured during the era of FLN control, accelerated. Large 
entrepreneurs, state agents, and citizens illegally appropriated state owned land and real 
estate. Much of it was parceled and re-sold with illegal titles, contributing to the ongoing 
debates and struggles over property and its rightful owner. Today, many private land 
titles circulating in the market are actually for plots of land the state still claims. 
Ironically, the state property illegally sold and purchased during this period is itself 
contested by previous generations of workers, renters, and owners. For the current 
possessor, past claims are illegitimate, while for the state and often the owners of the 
recent and distant past those sales are theft. Hence, in today’s Algeria, in the eyes of 
possessors and dispossessed, all property is theft. Property rights are weak.  
As discussed in earlier in this thesis, state authority over the periphery is 
tantamount to a strong property rights regime. Part Two of this chapter assesses central 
political control over the provinces. Specifically, it looks at the dynamics between the 
APC, the Mouhafedh, and the national party organization since the FLN’s return to power 
in 2002.  
In many ways, re-asserting party control in the multiparty period has been as 
messy as it was in the 1960s and early 1970s. To win the 2002 elections, the national 
organization and local Federation needed to coordinate strategies. The situation in 2002 
was different than in the 1970s and 1980s. The Oran Federation was out of power and out 
of money. FLN headquarters in Algiers had the money to finance the elections, but 
required Mouhafedh coordination to help select the right candidates. In exchange for 
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financing, the Oran Federation gave the Political Bureau partial control over the APC 
lists. For the first time since independence, the national and local party effectively 
coordinated strategy. The coordination lasted less than a year, however. In March 2003, 
FLN Secretary General Ali Benflis announced he would run against sitting President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, dividing the party at the top. The division also affected Oran: the 
Mayor was Benflis’ campaign coordinator in Western Algeria, and overshadowed the 
local Mouhafedh. Both sides attempted to take over the forty-eight regional Federations 
during “the Mouhafedha Wars,” and Oran became a central battlefield during the 
campaign. Seeking to preserve the local party from civil war, if not protect himself, the 
Mouhafedh of Oran took a neutral stance. 
 In control of the state apparatus, Bouteflika prevailed: the Mayor was arrested for 
property fraud, and the Mouhafedh resigned. The President was re-elected a month later. 
Between 2004 and 2005, the national party tried to reconcile former enemies in 
preparation for the 2005 National Congress. At the same time, national figures supported 
the ongoing nation-wide battles between rival factions of the pro-Bouteflika campaign. 
United during the campaign, different factions tried to take control over the regional 
Mouhafedha during “the Kasmat wars.” The logic was that whoever could control the 
most Federation delegates at the 2005 National Congress was guaranteed a seat in the 
Central Committee and Political Bureau. The local logic of the battles was control over 
the party Federations and the local political-economic arenas. In Oran, three groups 
fought for the Mouhafedh. By the time the 2005 National Congress was organized, 
however, none had sealed victory. 
 Having won their seats in the Political Bureau during the 2005 National Congress, 
the national figures that had fueled the Oran Kasmat wars withdrew their support. To 
resolve these ongoing local battles, the national party sent a series of Wilaya 
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Commissions to organize new branch, Kasmat, and Mouhafedha elections – as Cherif 
Belkacem and Kaid Ahmed had tried to do thirty years before. Efforts to reconcile the 
Kasmat chiefs failed. The limits of national party control over the local political arena 
were once again revealed: having taken the APC in 2002, though divided, the local 
chieftains had access to and control of the local market. They were no longer financially 
dependent on Algiers. 
 In the run up to the 2007 APC elections, the divided Oran Federation sent three 
lists to Algiers. As a solution, the party proposed a unique list that would incorporate the 
three factions onto a fourth list. Fearing the Kasmat battles would play out in the 
Municipal Council and effectively block city development, the Ministry of Interior 
parachuted five of its candidates onto a fifth and final list. Lacking a Mouhafedh to 
coordinate local interests and to protect the party from external pressure, the Oran 
Federation watched as “the five” seized the APC. Though from Oran, none of “the five” 
were militants belonging to a local Kasma, and only one had previously been a party 
member. Ultimately “the five” united the warring factions, who tried once, and succeeded 
on the second attempt, to overthrow the Mayor and his team.  
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7.1 THE LOCAL POLITICAL ECONOMIC ARENA: ORAN’S POLITICAL HISTORY 
Oran was the most European230 of settler cities during the colonial era: close to 
two-thirds in 1954 and just under fifty percent in 1961 (Soufi 2002). Colonial Oran was 
wealthy. It controlled the regional port and was the central commercial hub in the region. 
Its brokers sold its wines to European dealers and exported its grains and citrus to the 
métropole. The city had a thriving light industry. Moneyed families from the interior 
bought property in Oran, and the housing market flourished. Proud of their city, the 
population dubbed Oran “la joyeuse.” Oran was a microcosm. Perhaps for this reason, 
Oran (now dubbed “el bahia”) has always had a peculiar relationship with Algiers. The 
insularity of Oran’s political and social arenas to the rest of the French Algeria was 
criticized in Albert Camus’ La Peste (1947), and by FLN, which found it difficult to 
organize local support during the War of Independence (Meynier 2002: 204).  
Control over real estate and public works projects was the foundation of the 
colonial political market, and the power to distribute these goods and services is located 
at Town Hall (Benkada 2002; Lespès 2003; Lakjâa 2008). Power struggles focused on 
control over the real estate market in the European downtown, and access to municipal 
land for construction in the Muslim periphery.231 Swinging demographic changes that 
began in 1954 and accelerated toward the end of 1961 affected power and wealth in the 
city and eroded bourgeois authority. In the months leading to independence, violent inter-
communitarian conflict resulted in European and Muslim massacres that today might be 
considered ethnic cleansing (Fleury 2003; Monneret 2006). As power shifted from 
European to Muslim control in July 1962, all but a thousand European families 
                                                
230 Before independence, Oran had the largest synagogue and only bull-fighting arena in North Africa, 
reflecting the very large Jewish and Spanish population of the city. 
231 Yasmina Khadra paints a nice picture of neighborhood segregation in colonial Oran. Khadra 2008. 
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concentrated in Miramar232 and St. Eugène fled to France and Spain, fearing for their 
lives.  
 
7.1.1 Ben Bella and Local Resistance, 1962-1965 
Families from Oran’s Muslim neighborhoods (e.g. Lamur, Medioni, Ville 
Nouvelle), as well as les grandes familles from Mascara, Mostaghanem, Nedroma, 
Tlemcen, occupied vacated apartments, villas, and businesses abandoned by the fleeing 
European population – properties ostensibly protected from expropriation by the 1962 
Évian Accords. In the first months of independence, the Muslim community found itself 
on “the frontier of the commons.” Property had no true ownership; it simply belonged to 
its occupant.233  
From the first days of Orani independence the population and new regime entered 
conflict: they had had divergent, if not mutually exclusive, views on the ownership of 
vacated settler land and real estate. Until March 1963, when it expropriated European 
vacated goods, the regime retained the position that the property belonged to its former 
owners. After March 1963, European property was subsumed into beylic. However, to the 
Self-Management Councils that occupied and continued production at abandoned 
factories, the plants and workshops were al-hawz: since they worked it, the property and 
profits belonged to them. To the individuals who occupied smaller European apartments, 
shops, and villas, the rights of possession were also evoked. After all, the Revolution was 
about taking the country back from the French. It was about reversing colonial property 
theft.  
                                                
232 My neighbor worked for a doctor during the colonial period. She was given the keys of doctor’s 
apartment to watch over the belongings during the 1962 summer holidays. The doctor never returned. 
According to my neighbor, “Monsieur Martinez” owned my apartment (which is in Miramar) until he died 
in 1994. The building still bears its colonial-era sign: “Co-propriété Miramar.” 
233 Approximating Cell Two, in Table 2.2, Chapter Two (page 35). 
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State efforts to indentify and protect settler property Oran through hastily drawn 
Property Protection Committees (Comités de Sauvegarde) broke down rapidly. Assuring 
law and order was the local administration’s primary goal (I-2; I-5; I-7; I-9). Oran’s first 
Wali Houari Souiah denounced the departure of French functionaries from the 
Municipality and Wilaya as a concerted effort to sabotage and disorganize the 
administration and property market (Soufi 2002). During the first few months of 
independence, struggles over control of European property took intra-Algerian 
dimensions, pitting the administration against the population; and powerful notable 
families against poorer workers and migrants.234 Weak families were expelled from the 
bourgeois apartments they occupied; many notable families claimed entire buildings. The 
demographic topography of Oran today still reflects the 1962 takeovers: Choupot, Protin, 
Miramar, Montplaisant and Miramar remain wealthy; Cavaignac, Medioni, St. Pierre, and 
Ville Nouvelle remain working class. 
 When Ben Bella created the National Office of Vacated Goods (BNBV, Bureau 
National pour la Protection et Gestion des Biens Vacants) as a holding for now state-
owned vacated goods,235 he came into conflict with Algerians who had possessed the 
properties for more than a year. Suddenly, Oranis were expected to rent “their property” 
from the state.236 In December, protests turned into riots that culminated in cries of “Vive 
la France,” and the waving of French flags. Ben Bella attributed the riots to the “those 
opposed to the Revolution because they do not have ministerial positions and who have 
                                                
234 Approximating Cell Four in Table 2.2, Chapter Two (page 35).  
235 November 1963, eight months after vacated goods were nationalized, and sixteen months after 
independence. 
236 Part of these properties stayed in the Pubic Offices for Subsidized Rents (OPHLM, Offices Publics 
d’Habitations à Loyer Modérés), which themselves were a remnant of the colonial period holdover, 
legalized by law 62-152.  
 237 
beautiful villas,” alluding to a local conflict with Si Moussa,237 a local military 
commander who had gone into dissidence (R.A.D.P./M.O.N: 218). Two informants note 
that they were also a result of property conflicts (I-8; I-9). 
 
Figure 7.1: Muslim Neighborhoods, Oran 1950 
 
Source: Rahal 2010: 2. 
                                                
237 Colonel Si Moussa (Mohamed Benahmed). GPRA President Benkhedda promoted Si Moussa to the 
head of the ALN in October 1961. In a conflict with Benkhedda, Boumediene never accepted the 
promotion, and Si Moussa went underground shortly after independence. In 1999, he joined the leadership 
of Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s presidential campaign. Cheurfi 2001: 64. 
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Figure 7.2: Neighborhoods in Oran 
 
Source: Bendraoua and Souiah 2008:184. 
 
 Ben Bella’s attempts to project state authority to the periphery were a failure. As 
discussed in Chapter Six, between 1962 and 1965, the central and provincial 
administration was extremely weak. Unlike Bourguiba, Ben Bella lacked a party, which 
could serve as a proxy agent in the interim state building period. While there were 
thousands of party members by 1963, thanks in part to Mohammed Khider, they had not 
been organized in a cohesive manner. Branches and Kasmat were only hastily structured 
in anticipation for the 1964 FLN National Congress, and Ben Bella handpicked the 
delegates to stack the meeting in his favor. A part from carrying a card, there was no real 
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exclusive benefit to induce membership or to prevent free-riding and meaningful 
organization suffered. Lacking both administrative and party cadres, the Ben Bella 
regime was too weak to extend the authority to exclusively define the use and transfer of 
property. Clumsy efforts to do so ended in violence. Beylic remained theoretical.  
 
7.1.2 Horizontal Powersharing in Oran, 1965-1975 
Boumediene attempted to alter the balance of power between Algiers and the 
provinces by re-wiring elite authority from the ground-up. His plan required an organized 
local FLN that would control the APCs. The prestige and power that accrued from a seat 
in the Municipality (or the party’s connections to the APCs) would induce both local 
elites and the masses to join. And the Iron Law of Oligarchy would automatically 
organize the Kasmat and branches into meaningful structures.  
The agent-representatives created by the FLN / APC elections would be a proxy 
administration, filling the space between the Wilaya and District offices and the ground: 
native Municipal Councilors knew the lay of the land better than the parachuted Walis 
and District Chiefs (like Maître Benabdallah), and would help the regional administration 
apply the law. The gamble was that local elites, either created by the center or vested with 
the authority of party and mandate, could be made beholden to and dependent on the 
symbolic status of a seat in the APC and hypothetical material largess from the capital.  
However, the vertical powersharing agreement between Algiers, the party, and the 
APCs, flipped on its side.  
The local party had to be organized in tandem with the elections, creating too 
many opportunities for local and regional interests that were independent from Algiers to 
infiltrate the lists. This is the case in Oran. Local party organization had not occurred 
before the Wilaya Commissions defined the 1967 Municipal lists. By default, the 
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Municipal lists and subsequent APC selections established the local party hierarchy. 
While FLN Executive Secretary Cherif Belkacem led the Wilaya Commission, his efforts 
to select clients that would be beholden to Algiers (if not him) were undermined. In Oran, 
“the most prominent figure was…not a representative of the central government, but a 
local personality (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 22) and the Wilaya Commission was 
drawn from a coterie of local, regional, and national interests. The final lists lacked a 
cohesive corps of trained party cadres. These regional and local interests trumped 
Belkacem’s selection of local agents that would be loyal to party interests. As a result, in 
Oran, the Executive Secretariat lost its three-way struggle with the local UGTA and Wali 
Benyoucef Boumahdi (Grimaud 1973: 342), who sponsored local merchants and 
members of the liberal professions and was himself supported by the Second Military 
Region Chief Chadli Bendjedid (I-8; I-9). 
Denouncing regionalism and nepotism that were undermining the party, in 1968, 
Boumediene announced “the Year of the Party.” He entrusted Kaid Ahmed with 
reorganizing the local leadership. Over the course of the year, Kaid charged Wilaya 
Commissions to organize branch, Kasmat, and Mouhafedha elections, this time in the 
hope that regional and local interests would be sidelined.  
The established party hierarchy, sitting in the APC, blocked his efforts.238 The 
same regional and local interests that blocked Belkacem in 1967 supported them. 
Ottaway and Ottaway underscore tensions at the base pitting the local elite against party 
militants: “Even in the communes, party officials and members of the people’s 
assemblies found themselves opposed, though the latter had mostly come fro the ranks of 
the FLN.” They developed “a sort of reserve, in certain cases hostility toward the FLN” 
                                                
238 A hierarchy created in 1967. 
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(Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 258).239 The Iron Law of Oligarchy that was supposed to 
mechanically create a local hierarchy within the local Federation did just that, but the 
APC wore the crown, not the party organization. Speaking to militants in January 1969, 
on the eve of anticipated Regional Council elections, and two years ahead of the 
scheduled 1971 APC elections, Kaid admitted that substantial party reforms had not been 
implemented. 1969 would be “the Year of the Party.” “He spoke of concentrating all 
efforts that year on the establishment of branches and kasmas, indicating that the 
organization of the party at the level of the federation (arrondissement) and the 
department was still only a ‘theoretical projection’” (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 257). 
Those commissions were also blocked, and another attempt at reorganization would not 
occur for another two years, in anticipation for the 1971 APC elections. 
The tension of the top-down, bottom-up strategy, whose lynchpin rest in the local 
level FLN agent-representative, also percolated to Boumediene’s cabinet, pitting Kaid 
Ahmed against Minister of Interior Ahmed Medeghri.240 The heart of the disagreement 
revolved around where primary loyalty of the agent-representative should be located. As 
an elected member of the FLN, the Municipal Councilor belonged to the party; as an 
agent, he241 belonged to the Ministry of Interior.  
Two weeks before the 1971 APC elections, Kaid Ahmed announced the formation 
of a new Wilaya Commission that would “avoid a margin of error linked to local 
pressures,” referring to notable and proxy-agent infiltration on the 1967 lists. He called 
                                                
239 This and the next paragraph draw extensively from Ottaway and Ottaway, who give an broad narrative 
of the struggle to reform the party in anticipation of the 1969 and 1971 elections (Ottaway and 
Ottaway1970: 255-259). 
240 Tragically, while they were bitterly opposed over which department would control the FLN, their fate 
was linked in their opposition to the Agrarian Revolution. Kaid Ahmed went into exile in 1971, Medeghri 
committed suicide in 1974. 
241 Only eight women were represented in the Oran APC from 1967 to 1990. – five percent of all elected 
Councilors. In the countryside, the percentage was much lower. The five to ten percent of Algiers, Annaba, 
Constantine, and Oran was exceptional in male-dominated Algerian politics. 
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on the militant base to “be vigilant and reject nominees from pressure groups”242 during 
the branch and Kasmat elections, from which the Mouhafedha would draw lists for 
Commission approval. Wali Daho Ould Kablia (1970-1974),243 Minister of Higher 
Education Mohamed Benyahia,244 and head of the Second Military Region Chadli 
Bendjedid co-chaired the Wilaya Commission, which ostensibly represented the 
triumvirate of administration, party, and army interests.245 As the party’s delegate, 
Benyahia warned an assembly of the Oran Kasmat that the central problem facing the 
party in 1967 and in 1971 was finding “honest men, with integrity and a spirit of public 
service.”246 
The final 1971 Oran APC list reveals the tensions generated by the internal 
contradictions of the agent-representative. First, it reflects the power struggles at the top 
for control of the bottom. Kaid Ahmed was no more successful than Cherif Belkacem in 
getting the party on the lists. Only one of the four nationally accredited permanent party 
cadres that participated in the eighty-six-candidate list was elected into the APC.247 The 
administration and the army blocked the party’s candidates. The list also highlights the 
effects a weak corps of party cadres, inexistent vertical party organization, and struggles 
within the Revolutionary Council had on insulating the bottom from the top. Ten of the 
                                                
242 La République, 30 January 1971. “Communes 71: M. Kaïd Ahmed à l’hébdomadaire du Parti: ‘Tout 
election est une occasion pour le Parti de tester et de trouver des hommes.’” 
243 Kablia was one of the four hundred Malgache who were transferred to the administration and had a 
brilliant career in the Wali corps. In 2001, he was promoted to the Ministry of Local Affairs, working 
closely with his boss, Minister of Interior Yazid Zerhouni. Zerhouni too was in the MALG, though was 
recruited by the Sécurité Militaire at independence. 
244 A founding member of UGEMA, Benyahia eventually followed the diplomatic career path of many of 
his student-day peers, and was promoted Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1979 (Henry 2010). He died in 
1982, when his plane was shot down by a missile on the Iraqi-Turkish border (Cheurfi 2007: 251-252). 
245 The regime finally domesticated the UGTA in October 1968, and it now only played a minor role in the 
commissions (Moore 1970: 194-200). 
246 La République, 10 February 1971. “Dans les kasmate d’Oran…la certitude d’un travail bien fait.” 
247 El Moudjahid, February 9, 1967; La République, 12 February 1971. “Élection: les candidats d’Oran;” 
La République, 18 February 1971. “Les élus d’Oran.” 
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forty-two Councilors, including Medeghri’s friend and ally Mayor Sghier Ben Ali, were 
re-elected – twenty-four percent, and higher than the national average.248 The local 
political hierarchy, drawn in 1967, resisted Kaid Ahmed’s efforts to renovate the base. 
In a 1971 interview given to the national news agency, Minister of Interior 
Medeghri outlined some of the weaknesses of the 1967 APCs, noting that close to ninety-
seven percent of the 667 APCs ran a budgetary deficit. He criticized the lack of 
administrative skills and probity of many local officials and warned against further 
decentralization of power to the APCs. Medeghri ended his interview declaring: “I 
believe that when we say the Algerian Municipality has become a school it’s not a just 
empty words, but a self-evident reality.”249 With weak oversight and few positive 
incentives to comply with national directives, the material opportunities that would 
become available to local representatives during land and property reform later that year 
would teach the agent-representative that the local political-economic arena paid off. In a 
short interview, Medeghri effectively underscored the weak link in the two-tiered system: 
the agent-representative, party-Councilor. Yet Boumediene announced he would run the 
Agrarian Revolution through the APCs eight months later. 
 
7.1.3 Changing Role of the Party in the Local Arena, 1970s-1980s 
Whoever controls the Mouhafedha can control the FLN: the APC, the APW, and 
by extension the Senate (I-21). 
 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the dynamics of Orani politics changed. 
The period witnessed the rise of the local party machine, the Mouhafedh, and local 
                                                
248 La République, 18 February 1971. “Entre 1967 et 1971.” 
249 La République, 12 February 1967. “Medeghri: ‘L’APC s’est impose en tant qu’administration du pays.” 
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business elites. Breaking from patterns of developed during the early years of APC and 
FLN organization, notable families divested control over APC under a tacit agreement 
with the local party organization that neither would unduly interfere in the affairs of the 
other. A former Mayor of Oran, who had a high-ranking post in the Ministry of Interior at 
the time, explained the changes as a local political-economic equilibrium shift that 
followed the evolutions of the local economy. None of this, he noted, could have been 
done without the patronage of Chadli Bendjedid (I-8). 
During the fifteen years before he ascended to the presidency, Chadli Bendjedid 
headed the Second Military Region (1964-1979). Based in Oran,250 Bendjedid married 
into the influential Bourokba family from Mostaghanem.251 The family has close ties to 
the local business elite and notable families, especially Mostaghanemi, Nedromi, and 
Tlemcani families linked to the still influential local zawiyyas. Perhaps due to his close 
connections to this elite, he took a relatively hands-off approach to local politics and 
business, and was well regarded by the local party and economic elite.252 Though the 
most important member of the 1971, and 1975 Wilaya Commissions, Bendjedid’s 
interventions reflected local interests, served as an informal coordination mechanism 
between party and business elite, and shielded the local arena from candidates parachuted 
by Algiers (I-8; I-16; I-24; I-28).253  
                                                
250 His villa was situated in wealthy Protin – a neighborhood that concentrates Oran’s most influential 
Mostaghanemi, Nedromi, and Tlemcani families.  
251 Originally from Mazouna, the family is involved in hostelry, commerce, and construction. It owns the 
Hôtel Timgad, Plaza Superette chains, and Plaza Immobilier. 
252 Achour Cheurfi makes the opposite claim: “Promoted colonel in 1962, he concentrated his power and 
interests on the Province of Oran where nothing was decided without his accord” (Cheurfi 2007: 204-205). 
253 Ottaway and Ottaway seem to be in at least partial agreement with this: “There were some regions, the 
Department of Oran, for example, where the military commander did not play an important political role; 
yet even in these areas, the most prominent figure was usually not a representative of the central 
government but a local personality” (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 222). 
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Not surprisingly, unlike other federations at the time, the leadership of Oran FLN 
shared Bendjedid’s marked preference towards economic liberalism (Leca and Vatin 
1978: 75).254 The Mouhafedh and Kasmat Secretaries were sure to disseminate this 
approach to the local economy to their militants as Ben Alla, Belkacem, and Kaid’s 
efforts to broadly assemble the party into a hierarchical organization began to jell into a 
real structure. The trend did not change when Colonel Bendjedid ascended to the 
presidency in 1979. While in 1981 the Central Committee gave President Bendjedid the 
authority to nominate the party’s thirty-one Mouhafedh,255 his nominees to Oran largely 
followed his relatively hands-off approach to the party and local market (I-8). 
Oil and natural gas production came on line in early 1970s, following 
nationalization of foreign companies in 1971 and the creation of the world’s first 
liquefied natural gas plant (“la Camel”) in Arzew (Ghozali 2009). With new resources, 
the government shifted investment from agriculture to heavy industry and public works 
projects – which required downstream services and private sector contractors (Bennoune 
and el-Kenz 1990). Oran, which cusped Arzew, was one of the first to cities to feel the 
impact.256 Local entrepreneurs and the party seized new opportunities in the construction, 
public works, and real estate sectors.  
Table 7.1 shows the effects the new markets had on the construction and public 
works sector. Between 1978 and 1983, the number of private construction and publics 
works companies increased by thirty-two percent. In 1983, 7,564 private companies 
                                                
254 Highlighting the general spirit within the FLN, Leca and Vatin note the problems the Mouhafedha had 
with Secretary of Kasma 6, in Victor Hugo, who was considered “Pro-Soviet” (Leca and Vatin 1978: 45). 
255 Before the 1981 law, local party branches, and Kasmat theoretically elected the Mouhafedh. In practice, 
they were nominated by the President or recommended by one of the Heads of the Military Regions. 
256 To the East, Annaba experienced similar developments once the El Hadjar steel complex was online. 
See el-Kenz 1987. 
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employed more than one hundred thousand workers – the majority directly involved in 
housing, or municipal public works projects (Dillman 2000: 116-118).  
Table 7.1: Construction and Public Works, Private Sector 
 1969 1974 1977 1983* 
Workers Comp. Employees Comp. Employees Comp. Employees Comp. Employees 
> 5 1,014 2,315 2,045 3,681 2,299 4,139 6,577 28,612 
< 5 1,317 86,597 1,542 90,379 1,734 101,374 987 78,474 
Total 2,331 88,912 3,587 94,060 4,033 105,512 7,564 106,966 
Source: Bennoune1988: 171; Dillman 2000: 116 
* 1988 figures are for nineteen or fewer and more than twenty employees. 
 
With liberalization, the local political economy split into distinct markets. Large 
and medium entrepreneurs went into the construction sector, or the Wilaya public sector 
market (I-25; I-28). Smaller contractors focused on the municipal public works market (I-
23; I-26; I-32). The FLN controlled the distribution of building permits, municipal land, 
municipal public works contracts, and apartments. The new markets also shaped the new 
political division of labor. The evolving local market and impact of Bendjedid’s 
economic philosophy on the Oran Federation encouraged a semi-divorce between local 
economic elite and the party organization, increasing the autonomy of each group.  
By the 1980s, the local business elite was no longer threatened by state efforts to 
nationalize their private property. Managers from the public construction and heavy 
public works sector actively solicited them to outsource some of their work (I-25; I-28). 
Their interactions with the party organization followed their decreasing dependence on 
the Municipal Council. They no longer needed to directly place allies on the Oran APC, 
nor did they necessarily need to be party members. Instead of placing clients, they 
solicited associates in the APC or with the Mouhafedh directly (I-23; I-25; I-32). Many 
business elites laid the foundations of their empires during this period: Cherif Athmane 
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developed the core of the Eden Group; the Bourokba family purchased the Café Riche257 
and its building to create the Hôtel Timgad, laying the groundwork for Plaza Immobilier, 
which emerged in the 2000s.  
The majority of companies entering the sector were small. In 1985, eighty-seven 
percent of the private contracting and public works companies had fewer than twenty 
employees (Dillman 2000: 116). These smaller contractors did not have the start-up 
capital for the heavy investment required of Wilaya public works or large construction 
projects, and relied on municipal contracts. They negotiated with friends in the local 
party branches and Kasmat for APC permits and markets (I-23; I-26). Their contributions 
filled local party coffers. A militant from Kasma 7, in Medioni, explains how the 
business-party relationship continues to work: 
As militants, we know lots of people in the business community. When someone 
is interested in a municipal market but is having problems getting access, they talk 
to us. We258 talk to the Councilor in the relevant post – either a Vice President or 
Commission member. If they think the project is promising, they ask for the 
dossier and “do us a favor.” Everyone wins. For example, the entrepreneur 
doubles the cost and the Councilor takes say five to ten percent of the real cost. 
As facilitators, we also get something, but not much. We have to work our way up 
the ladder. But word gets out that we can get things done and others solicit us and 
want to be like us (I-26). 
In contemporary terms, the size of the markets the militant refers to is usually 
small – ranging from two to twenty thousand Euros. The rent generated from permits and 
public works contracts financed the party network, in addition to the symbolic patronage 
it earned by distributing Municipal owned housing to poorer families or through contracts 
in the OPGI. Between 1975 and 2004, seventy-five thousand OPGI requests were made 
                                                
257 A vacated good belonging to a founding member of the Oran section of the radical settler group, the 
OAS, Athanase “Tassou” Georgopoulos, and privatized to the Bourokba family in the early 1980s (Fleury 
2003). Ironically, the Hôtel Timgad is located directly across from the Oran FLN Mouhafedh, on Boulevard 
Emir Abdelkader. 
258 By “We,” he meant the FLN. Unless a specific Councilor is from a militant’s Kasma, the militant will 
contact the Kasma secretary, who will directly contact the Councilor. 
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in the Wilaya of Oran. Many of those were directly routed through the Kasmat.259 In 
1990, the Oran city OPGI branch managed close to two thousands apartment buildings 
and fifteen thousand apartments (Temmar 2009: 15). The APC owned another 1,900 
buildings.260  
Our former Mayor explains the relationship between the party and these markets: 
“The party distributes prebends: protection, impunity, local responsibility and influence, 
markets, real estate. This is to attract militants. If the party stops access to material and 
social goods, the militants stop coming” (I-8). Securing contracts for the party, the local 
militant builds a reputation and eventually becomes a candidate for higher local party 
office, increasing his personal piece of the rent (I-26). Commenting on the role these 
markets play in keeping together local FLN asabiyya, a militant from Kasma 2, in Centre 
Ville, said: “The principal motor that pushes people is the promise of promotion” (I-32).  
Table 7.2: Kasmat in Oran 
Kasmat Neighborhood 
Kasma I Sidi el Houari 
Kasma 2 Centre Ville 
Kasma 3 St. Antoine 
Kasma 4 Gambetta 
Kasma 5 St. Eugène 
Kasma 6 Victor Hugo 
Kasma 7 Medioni 
Kasma 8 Choupot 
Kasma 9 Cité Petit 
Source: Interviews; Local Press 
 
The structure of the local economy, the location of rent accumulation 
opportunities, and Bendjedid’s protection shaped an insular local political-economy arena 
during the 1980s, to the detriment of Algiers. Like the Europeans inhabitants of colonial 
                                                
259 El Watan, 7 July 2007. “Après étude de recours de l’habitat: les listes de logements connues 
aujourd’hui.”  
260 El Watan, 20 November 2007. “Le spectre de l’abstention fortement redouté.” 
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Oran, participants in the local political economy were independent of Algiers. Algiers 
was not a focal point for local actors. Nor, as discussed in Chapter Six, did the APN 
recruit local representatives. Nation-wide, Councilors and Kasma Secretaries only won a 
combined six percent of seats in the 1977 ANP (Leca and Vatin 1978: 31). Only two of 
the 253 seats went to former Orani Municipal Councilors.261 The disjunction is more 
clearly seen over time. Between 1977 and 1990, Algiers organized three National 
Assembly elections, only recruiting four members of the Oran APC.262  
Interviews with local militants and Councilors reveal that in as much as they were 
excluded from those lists, they were not interested. When asked about tangible benefits of 
having a local patron in the National Assembly, the former Mayor exclaimed: “Oran is 
the wealthiest APC in all of Algeria. Ha! What can they give us? Prestige? Ha! That’s 
nothing compared to what we have to offer: protection, property, markets, licenses” (I-8). 
Even the Regional Council (APW, Assemblée Populaire de Wilaya) was of little interest. 
When asked about the APW, he replied: “The APW? It deals with the countryside. We 
deal with the city, with markets. We make our own choices and have an autonomous 
budget.263 APW representatives have do deal…with the Wali” (I-8). 
A current Councilor made a similar comparison of today: 
For the [Oran] FLN, it is the APC that is at stake, not the APW, not the APN. It’s 
the real estate. It’s the markets. We work with businessmen. We don’t work well 
with other elected officials, up the ladder (I-20). 
With increased autonomy over its own affairs, the local party hierarchy developed 
under the watch of the Mouhafedh. And as long as he did not defy major economic 
                                                
261 Ahmed Semmache, a Nedromi cadre from the national gas company, SONELGAZ, who was elected to 
the 1967 and 1971 APC. And Mohamed Sahraoui, a Bechari FLN Auditor, who was elected to the 1967 
and 1971 APCs and 1974 APW. Source: Author’s representative database. 
262 Source: Author’s representative database. 
263 By autonomous, he means in allocation of resources. The largest APC in Algeria, Oran is an exception. 
Most APC budgets are more closely overseen by the local District Chief. 
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interests, the Mouhafedh had an increasingly free hand in organizing candidates for the 
APC elections. Whereas in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the party lists reflected a 
coterie of individual interests, by the 1980s, the lists were the Mouhafedh’s. The 
Mouhafedh’s role in the local machine was to protect local militants and Councilmen 
from undue pressure from local notables or Algiers, and to ensure the tacit agreement 
with the emerging business community was not interrupted. His job was to walk a fine 
line between competing interests outside and within the party. A militant from Kasma 7 
(Medioni) claimed a good Mouhafedh always: “knows how to keep the wolf from 
growing hungry, while avoiding the ire of the shepherd” (I-26). 
Table 7.3: Mayors of Oran, 1962-Present 
Year Municipal Title  
1962-1965 Special Delegate Boudrâa Bel Abbès 
1965 Special Delegate Hadj Brahim Tayeb Mokhtar 
1965-1967 Special Delegate Seghier Ben Ali 
1967-1971 Mayor, FLN Seghier Ben Ali 
1971-1975 Mayor, FLN Seghier Ben Ali 
1975-1979 Mayor, FLN Abdelkader Briki 
1979-1980 Mayor, FLN* Seghier Djillali 
1980-1983 Mayor, FLN* Lahouari Benamar 
1983-1984 Mayor, FLN* Tayeb Benkoula 
1984-1988 Mayor, FLN* Kaddour Arif 
1988-1990 Mayor, FLN* Abdelkader Tounsi 
1990-1992 Mayor, FIS* Boualem Bouslah 
1992-1995 DEC Merouane Henni 
1995-1997 DEC Habib Benguenene 
1997-2002 Mayor, RND Tayeb Zitouni 
2002-2004 Mayor, FLN* Noureddine Djellouli 
2004-2007 Mayor, FLN* Noureddine Boukhatem 
2007-2010 Mayor, FLN* Sadek Benkada 
2010- Mayor, FLN* Zineddine Hassam 
* Mayors who did not complete full mandates. 
 
During the 1980s, hierarchical power shifted from the Mayor and Municipal 
Council to the Mouhafedh. Councilors were in a position to re-wire rent they generated 
away from the party and directly into their pockets. To ensure no Councilor grew too 
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strong, the Oran Federation discouraged the development of local party notables.264 The 
former Mayor notes: 
In Oran, militants seek social and economic protection. It’s political clientelism, 
and its origins are in the colonial period. Most militants prefer to be in a machine, 
or apparatus, rather than in elected positions. This is because elected officials are 
more open to attack. In the FLN265, clientelism if more linked with the party than 
a given man. The party wants apparatchiks, not notables (I-8). 
The Mayor’s explanation plays out in the numbers. As shown in Table 7.3, from 
1979 to present, only one Mayor has served an entire mandate – a member of the rival 
RND party, Tayeb Zitouni (1997-2002). Municipal elections in Oran have been marked 
by a decreasing turnover rate since 1967: sixteen members of the 1967 APC were elected 
in 1971; eight members of the 1971 Oran Municipal Council were re-elected in 1975.266 
The high turnover trend would increase in the 1979 and 1984 elections.267 Backed by a 
president and an autonomous corps of militants plugged into the local political-economic 
arena, during the 1980s the Oran Mouhafedh was sometimes as powerful as the Wali (I-
25; I-27). 
 
7.1.4 Local Elites and Party Militants During the Political Vacuum, 1992-1997 
The 1989 Constitution, which guaranteed multiparty elections, changed the rules 
of the game. The FLN could no longer count on automatic control over the APC. The 
1989 FLN National Congress, led by Bendjedid’s brother-in-law Abdelhamid Mehri, 
tried to encourage local party dynamism and further loosened Algiers’ tenuous hold on 
the local party organization. In 1990, the Oran Federation elected Secretary of the Arzew 
                                                
264 This may have also discouraged Algiers from nominating local party cadres for higher office. 
265 By FLN, he means Oran Federation. 
266 La République, 4 April 1975. “Les élus de la commune d’Oran.” 
267 El Moudjahid, 23 December 1979. “APC: Oran;” El Moudjahid, 10 December 1984. “Oran: Dans le 
respect des critères.” 
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Kasma, Khadra Brahma Djelloul, Mouhafedh. The reforms did not work. In June, the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS, Front Islamique du Salut) defeated the FLN in the APC 
elections, winning twenty-four of the thirty-three seats (Arun 1991: 48). A year and a half 
later, the military took power, dissolved the APC, and replaced FIS Mayor Bouslah 
Boualem with Executive Municipal Delegate (DEC) Merouane Henni, a well-respected 
local lawyer (1993-1995).  
During the FLN’s exile, the Oran real estate and land market turned chaotic. The 
business elite that had de-coupled with the party during the 1980s transformed their 
earning into construction empires. State agents parachuted to Oran to replace the FIS 
controlled Town Hall illegally privatized land and real estate. Appropriating and 
transferring public real estate to their friends and allies, these agents took advantage of 
the near state collapse and the administrative chaos that resulted from the rapid series of 
institutional reforms in the real estate and land sectors during the late 1980s. With no 
political or state oversight,268 the Algerian population also participated in the devolution 
of beylic. The land was transferred from theoretical state ownership into private hands 
through illegal sales. 
The local FLN apparatus was excluded from power and rent for the next seven 
years. It only partially returned to power as junior coalition partner in the 1997 APC. 
Excluded from control over the Municipal Land Registry, building permits, and public 
works contracts, the local FLN withered. It kept itself from disappearing altogether by 
resorting to a tried and tested model: a strong Mouhafedh, the rent it made from local 
party properties, and stipends from the national party organization and regime. 
 
                                                
268 Hopefully, at this point I have stressed that state and local party oversight were not congruent. 
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The Orani Business Elite 
The chaos of the 1990s profited business elite, and private sector construction in 
particular. Private sector contribution to construction and public works grew from thirty-
five to sixty-one percent between 1989 and 1994. Over the same period, the state 
participation in the sector dropped precipitously. A crunch in government spending led to 
massive public sector lay-offs. Between 1995 and 1997, ninety thousand public sector 
construction workers were laid off as state companies were liquidated (Dillman 2000: 
127). Terrorist groups also targeted public sector companies (Touati 1995; Tlemçani 
1999; Martinez 2000). The private sector took advantage of weakened public sector 
company competition for state-sponsored construction and public works projects, 
building eighty percent of housing and ninety percent of construction by 1998 (Dillman 
2000: 127). 
Local notables who had already begun to operate in construction during the 1980s 
expanded their operations exponentially during this period. Generous credit lines from 
public sector banks and cash made on black market commercial operations (trabendo) 
financed their projects. During this period, Cherif Athmane turned Eden Groupe into a 
major regional player, building a range of hotels during the 1990s,269 before turning to 
upscale construction a decade later.270 His empire now spans several Wilaya. Using cash 
generated by the Hôtel Timgad and a series of large supermarkets271 that had access to 
the strictly regulated import sector, the Bourokba family too expanded into upscale 
construction. Its group, Plaza Immobilier, is currently building a series of commercial 
                                                
269 Shems Hotel, 1990; Eden Village 1996; Eden Airport and Eden Phoenix 2003; Eden Palace 2004. See: 
Libération. 23 December 1996. “Dans Algérie en guerre (1). Pendant trois jours, trois regions, trois 
situations. Les rêves de Riviera d’Oran la frivole relativement épargnée par le terrorisme, la ville cherche à 
developer le tourisme.” 
270 Cherif Athmane Promotions 2007; Eden Résidence 2007; Résidence Zabana 2008.  
271 Plaza Superettes. 
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officers and high-end apartments just east of the Sheraton Hotel, and directly across from 
the languishing SNASCO project discussed in Chapter One. 
 
Appropriation of Public Land and Real Estate 
Local state agents at the Municipality and Wilaya took advantage of the situation 
to make their own property deals, illegally privatizing land and real estate belonging to 
the Municipal Land Reserves and OPGI (Bendjaballah 1997). Shortly his arrival in Oran, 
Wali Bachir Frik (1994-1999) pressured Oran DEC Merouane Henni to transfer 
municipal land and real estate to his friends and family. Henni quit in protest in 1995,272 
and was replaced by Habib Benguenene (1995-1997). The same year, the Wali replaced 
the Director of the OPGI with a friend, former DEC of Jijel Chaabane Makhloufi.273 
Assisted by Tayeb Laoufi, Director of the Municipal Land Reserves, the three men 
transferred close to fifty thousand square meters of municipal land to friends and local 
allies over the next three years. Recipients would then parcel and resell property at up to 
ten-times the state-subsidized price.274 Hundreds of apartments, and many of the 310 
OPGI buildings that were sold during the period were illegally attributed (Temmar 2008: 
15). The four men were brought to trial and convicted in 1999. They appealed and lost in 
2005. The appeal opened up new leads and the court ordered prosecutors to re-open the 
investigation. A year later, mid-investigation, the Municipal Land Registry was broken 
                                                
272 El Watan, 21 October 1999; El Watan, 21 April 2004. 
273 Frik was Wali in Jijel before his transfer to Oran. 
274 Le Quotidien d’Oran, 23 April 2005. “Dilapidation du foncier: La version de Bachir Frik;” Le 
Quotidien d’Oran, 23 April 2005. “Grand déballage au process de l’ex-wali d’Oran;” El Watan, 24 April 
2005. “Procès de l’ex-wali d’Oran, Frik accuse des généraux;” El Watan, 27 April 2005. Le process de 
l’ex-wali d’Oran à pris fin hier;” Liberté, 17 July 2007. “La justice allege la peine de Bachir Frik.” 
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into and a large collection of land titles that had been modified during the 1990s was 
stolen – along with the safes that stored them.275  
During the same period, the population liberated beylic by its own means 
(Bendraoua and Souiah 2008: 280-288). Many of Oran’s EAC and EAIs were illegally 
divided and sold, including land that once surrounded the nursery in Bir el Djir. A census 
of EACs and EAIs in 2005 identified more than a thousand illegal sales from the 
combined 1,366 EAC and EAIs in the Wilaya.276 Public land was also occupied. During 
the 1990s, the forest on the eastern slope of Mont Murdjadjo was squatted, parceled, and 
sold to refugees fleeing the violence of the countryside. During the colonial era, the land 
belonged to the Hadj Hassan family. It was expropriated at independence and integrated 
into Oran’s land portfolio as public forest. By the end of the 1990s, it had become 
Algeria’s largest shantytown, Les Planteurs. With 100,000 inhabitants, the neighborhood 
represents close to an eighth of the urban population. Efforts to transfer part of its 
inhabitants to a series of Haï Sabah, a new public housing district built on the city’s 
eastern periphery, resulted in riots in 2006 and 2008, causing millions of dollars in 
damages. The state has temporarily halted its relocation strategy.277 
                                                
275 El Watan, 8 November 2006. “Mystérieux vol d’archives à l’inspection des Domaines d’Oran.” 
Coincidentally, administrators in Remchi reported that their own land registries were lost in transport to 
Oran (I-10; I-14). 
276 L’Expression, 15 February 2005; “La Gendarmerie ouvre une enquête: Foncier agricole à Oran;” El 
Watan, 3 June 2006. “256 EAC et 1110 EAI passées au peigne fin à Oran;” Liberté, 14 February 2007. 
“Une centaine d’exploitations agricoles détournée: Les services de la Gerndarmerie ouvrent une enquête à 
Oran.” 
277 While the total estimated damages were never released, in 2008 the newly built Oran gondola was 
attacked and burned. The project itself cost the city close to 2.5 million Euros. Infosoir, 18 July 2006. “Plus 
de 549 000 bidonvilles recencé: trois millions de citoyens y habitent;” El Watan, 19 July 2006. “Les 
Planteurs (Oran): l’opération de relogement tourne à l’émeute;” Le Soir d’Algérie, 25 June 2007. “Oran: 
Mise en marche du téléphérique, en attendant le tramway;” Le Soir d’Algérie, 18 December 2007. 
“Recencés dans toute la capitale: 40 000 bidonvilles à Alger;” La Voix d’Oranie, 02 July 2008. “Oran: 
Émeutes aux Planteurs et la station du télépherique incendiée;” L’Expression. 6 April 2009. “Quartier des 
Planteurs à Oran: Ne nous rappelez pas les mauvais souvenirs.” 
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All of the new titles created from plots of land illegally partitioned from the 
Municipal Land Reserves, EAC and EAI holdings, and Les Planteurs, are illegal. The 
circulation of false titles in the expanded real estate market has accentuated the old 
disputes over Algerian property and its rightful owner. In 2008, there were thirty-six 
thousand false title court cases pending.278 
 
The FLN: A Local Party Machine Without Resources 
The FLN did not occupy executive posts during the FIS’ short tenure (1990-
1992). It was excluded from discretionary authority over the market under DEC 
leadership. From 1990 to 1997, local party membership dropped precipitously: it no 
longer controlled the APC, the back entrance to the local construction, land, and real 
estate markets. Lacking control over those markets, the party was no longer the vital 
interlocutor it had been for small and medium entrepreneurs looking to secure public 
works projects (I-21; I-25; I-26). And without access to a cut of this rent, it could not 
maintain a militant corps (I-32). It lost the source of its asabiyya. 
Lacking municipal resources, Mouhafedh Brahma Djelloul had to rely on rent 
from local party properties and subsidies from the national party structure and state. The 
local party, for the first time since independence, was dependent on the national party 
structure and the state. One militant from Kasma 5, in St. Eugène, admiringly (and 
exaggeratingly) remarked that at one point in the early 1990s Djelloul was the only man 
still going to the FLN Mouhafedha (I-23). He nevertheless kept the empty hull afloat by 
keeping track of FLN properties and staying in close contact with former militants, party 
cadres, and business associates during the long years out of power (I-23).279 His 
                                                
278 El Watan, 27 June 2005. “Foncier agricole à Oran: Une EAC au Coeur des convoitises;” Echorouk, 6 
December 2008. “Algeria: New Law to Settle Landowner’s Situation?” 
279 Many of them had rallied to the RND in 1997. 
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perseverance gained him local and national respect in the party (I-20; I-23). Djelloul was 
reinvested the Mouhafedha in 1998. 
 
7.1.5 CONCLUDING PART ONE 
Houari Boumediene’s two-tiered state building experiment sought to expand 
central authority and control from Algiers to the provinces and the countryside. The 
experiment relied on creating new or integrating old elites into the FLN. Elected into the 
APCs, agent-representatives would fill the empty space between the Wilaya and District 
(the limits of the top-tier) and the ground. Knowing the terrain better than cadres from the 
Ministry of Interior, the Councilors and Mayors could apply the new regime’s law at the 
lowest, most personal level. To re-wire the source of authority from the local to the 
national political arena, the agent-representatives needed to be dependent on Algiers. 
With local agents in place, the state would finally have the authority to exclusively define 
the use and transfer of property. It would have the power to recuperate the hypothetical 
beylic that it claimed.  
The experiment backfired. State-control over beylic land and real estate was an 
APC responsibility. As discussed above, however, that responsibility shifted to the very 
men who rejected state claims to beylic. In the countryside, as discussed in Chapter Six, 
this mainly pertained to agricultural land. In large former colonial cities such as Oran, the 
stakes were over the real estate occupied by a new population that replaced the departed 
settlers.  
Between 1967 and 1990, the Oran Federation would participate in a booming 
APC controlled real estate market. In the early 1980s, a changing local economy laid the 
legs of a new political division of labor. Under the new system, city notables and 
entrepreneurs divested their participation in the local politics in exchange for assurances 
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that the party would not unduly block access to the new construction and public works 
markets. The agreement strengthened both.  
The structure of the construction market strengthened local party institutions. 
Without contacts in the APC, upstart public works and construction contractors 
approached the base: party militants. The shape of the market also reinforced hierarchy 
deference. Militants increasingly submitted to the authority of the Kasma. To be effective 
intermediaries, most they required the good services of the Kasma Secretary, who could 
access the Councilor in charge of a specific market. Larger contractors directly contacted 
the Mouhafedh or APC Councilor, placing a premium on occupying these posts. Winning 
a position on the Council required good relations with the Mouhafedh. At the same time, 
since the Mouhafedh required the acquiescence of the party, he needed to make sure 
power did not concentrate in a body of permanent Councilors. He needed good relations 
with the Kasma Secretary corps so that he could rotate APC representatives in and out of 
power on a regular basis. As the militant from Kasma 7 claimed, a good Mouhafedh 
always: “knows how to keep the wolf from growing hungry, while avoiding the ire of the 
shepherd” (I-26). 
The motor that drove party membership and structured the hierarchy was the 
opportunity for promotion, and that was fueled by the party’s guardianship of the local 
market. By October 1988, the political-economic arena was a closed circuit of 
entrepreneurs who monopolized the construction and public works sectors, and of party 
militants and cadres who monopolized access to Municipal permits. When the FLN lost 
the 1990 APC elections, it lost the basis of its asabiyya. While Mouhafedh Djelloul kept 
the machine afloat during the local party’s long exile from power, by 1999, the 
organization had been reduced to ten semi-occupied buildings280 and a reduced militant 
                                                
280 The nine Kasmat and the Mouhafedha. 
 259 
structure. Moreover, the local party was dependent on state largess and assistance from 
the national party organization for the first time since independence. 
 
7.2 INSULAR LOCAL ARENAS AND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL INTERVENTION, 2002-
PRESENT 
In 1997, the FLN joined the RND as a junior coalition member. It actively 
returned to the scene during the 1999 Presidential election,281 campaigning for Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika.282 Bouteflika’s campaign strategist, Ali Benflis was promoted to Prime 
Minister in 2000. In 2001, Benflis took over the party and began planning an ambitious 
comeback for the 2002 APN, APW, and APC elections. Algeria’s fifty-four 
Mouhafedh283 were a central part of Benflis’ strategy. FLN Circulaire 43 required the 
Mouhafedh to present lists of party militants drawn from the regional notability: 
academics, members of the liberal professions, and the relatives of beloved historical 
party militants. It also mandated the Political Bureau’s final approval before lists were 
made public.  
Based on Circulaire 43, the campaign strategy reflected mutual dependence 
between the FLN national organization and the regional Federations – a first time 
relationship in the case of Oran. Out of power and in quasi-opposition to military and 
                                                
281 One might argue that the shift occurred in 1996, when the FLN Central Committee replaced Secretary 
General Abdelhamid Mehri with party apparatchik Boualem Benhamouda. 
282 Former member of the Revolutionary Council, FLN Political Bureau, and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1963-1979). 
283 The number of Mouhafedha grew from 48 to 54 sometime after Mehri took over the party. Four of the 
six Mouhafedha are located in France, another for the Arab world, while the last represents North America, 
reflecting a growing Algerian migrant community in the New World. Most Algerians living in the United 
States, especially in Boston, New Jersey, and New York are from Sig (St. Denis du Sig) – where “Houari 
X” was accosted by armed youth in 1962 – and the neighborhood of Gambetta, which hosts Kasma 4 in 
Oran. The percentage of visa applications from Sig is so great that in 2008 the Consul-General of the 
American Embassy in Algiers visited the village. Unsurprisingly, he learned migration patterns from Sig 
follow the general trend of migration to the United States and elsewhere: people follow friends and family. 
In the late 1970s, a group of Sigli pioneers debarked in Boston. 
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later RND rule during the previous twelve years, the national leadership had withdrawn 
to its bunker in the posh Hydra suburb of Algiers and lost track of the base. During the 
same period, local federations like the Oran Mouhafedha lost access their primary source 
of financing and had become dependent on subsidies sent from the national party 
organization and state. In 2002, their campaign finance came from the national party, and 
so at least temporarily the Political Bureau could have its say over the broad contours of 
the local lists. The mutual dependence between the local and national FLN organizations 
during the 2002 campaign marked perhaps the first time since independence that the two 
aligned and plotted the same course.  
Part Two of this chapter discusses explores the dynamic between the Political 
Bureau and Oran Mouhafedha from 2002 to 2009. The cozy relationship developed in the 
lead up to the 2002 elections was based on different sets of interests, located in different 
arenas. FLN Secretary General Ali Benflis hoped to create a national party structure that 
would eventually lead to a presidential mandate.284 The Oran Federation needed access to 
APC resources, its life-source. Unsurprisingly, the relationship was called into question 
less than a year after the FLN won the APC. In 2003, Ali Benflis announced his 
ambitions to run against Bouteflika in the 2004 campaign. The decision split the national 
organization and regional Federations into two camps. 
The ensuing presidential campaign highlights the changing importance of local 
arenas in Algerian national politics. While during the presidencies of Boumediene, 
Bendjedid, and Liamine Zeroual (1995-1999) the Oran Federation had been left to 
develop an insulated local arena, in 2003 it was a major arena within which national 
battles were fought. Across Algeria, intra-FLN battles were waged to take physical 
                                                
284 While I have never read anything indicating Benflis was already planning a presidential run at the time 
of the October 2002 APC and APW elections, he led the party into opposition less than five months later at 
the 8th FLN National Congress. 
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control over Federation buildings in “the Mouhafedha Wars.” In Oran, the stakes were 
situated in the APC and Mouhafedha. While pro-Bouteflika troops never took the Oran 
Mouhafedha, Benflis’ regional campaign manager Mayor Noureddine Djellouli was 
jailed for property embezzlement before the end of the campaign. A few days later, 
Mouhafedh Djelloul, who maintained a neutral position during the crisis, resigned. 
On 9 April 2004, Bouteflika won the elections. Benflis quit the Secretariat and 
Political Bureau. Bouteflika allies created a provisional executive and announced a new 
8th FLN National Congress.285 They dispatched a series of Wilaya Commissions to the 
provinces to redraw the Kasmat and Mouhafedha. At the local level, Bouteflika allies 
seized local party structures across the country. Their interests and those of the party 
national elite preparing the “8e Congrès-bis,” diverged. The national leadership focused 
on the new 8th National Congress. They lobbied to ensure a seat in the new Central 
Committee, Political Bureau, if not Secretariat, and attempted to block their enemies’ 
efforts to do the same. In Oran, focus was on the Mouhafedha. Pro-Bouteflika Kasmat 
Secretaries fought for control of the Mouhafedha Secretariat. 
 The flames of bitter local conflicts were stoked from above. Instead of seeking 
intra-party reconciliation, the official FLN program, national heavy weights entered the 
local conflicts, promoting “the Kasmat Wars.” The goal was to impose a client in the 
Mouhafedh whose delegation would be a sure ally at the new 8th National Party Congress. 
With delegate allies, national elites could ensure entry into the Central Committee and 
Political Bureau. In Oran, pretenders to the Mouhafedh entered these expedient alliances 
hoping national patronage would undermine rivals to the throne. The wars spun out of 
control. Notwithstanding the brief 2002-2003 interlude, national party leaders have never 
been able to control Orani politics. And back in control of the APC, the local party was 
                                                
285 The Ministry of Interior annulled the March 2003 8th National Congress in January 2004. 
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financially insulated and autonomous. None of the proxy warriors took the Mouhafedh 
before the 2005 National Congress. Still divided, Oran sent two delegations.  
 The national leaders who used “the Kasmat Wars” to secure a leadership position 
at the 8th National Congress were integrated in the executive leadership. After the 
meeting, they no longer needed to engage in the costly and troublesome “Kasmat Wars.” 
They withdrew their support following the Congress. Unfortunately, the withdraw of the 
national patrons did little to assuage the antipathy the different Kasmat Secretaries had 
developed for each other during the lead up to the Congress. The battles continue to this 
day. Bitterly realizing the extent to which they had been used by the FLN national party 
leadership, these men now reject national efforts to fix the broken Mouhafedha. In 2011, 
the historical relationship between Oran and Algiers has been re-established: the Oran 
Federation, though extremely divided, has withdrawn into its near hermetically sealed 
local political-economic arena. Oran controls Oran, not the State. Property rights may be 
nationally legislated, but beylic still belongs to the Oran FLN. 
 
7.2.1 Preparing the 2002 Lists 
2002 was a time of change in Orani local politics. For more than twelve years, the 
FLN had been absent from Municipal leadership. Mouhafedh Khadra Brahma Djelloul 
kept the ship afloat during these long years and his perseverance gained him local and 
national respect in the party (I-20; I-23). Working with Benflis under the framework of 
FLN Circulaire 43, Djelloul played a major role in organizing party lists for the 2002 
local, regional, and National Assembly elections. He used his knowledge of the local 
political arena to select winning names falling at the nexus of personality and party 
loyalty. 
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The 2002 Oran National Assembly FLN candidature lists represented a dream 
team of sorts. Anxious to take back the legislature from the RND and Movement for a 
Peaceful Society (MSP, Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix),286 the FLN built its 
electoral strategy on education and local notability. Its list of top-five ANP candidates 
underscore this strategy: 1) Tayeb Ferahi, a well-respected local lawyer; 2) Leila 
Hammou, daughter of an revolutionary martyr and esteemed Professor of cardiology; 3) 
Boukessessa Belkheir, a local academic; 4) Fatima Seghier, relative of Oran’s longest 
serving and most beloved Mayor, Ben Ali Seghier; 5) and Mohamed Bachir Bouyadjra, 
local mandarin and former Vice President of the APW (1969-1974).287 Only two of the 
fifteen candidates were party dinosaurs, and only one of these was ranked in the top-five 
slots.288 
The lists angered local former combatant groups, which had hoped to see a larger 
share to the ANP list dedicated to their own members, as FLN lists had done so often in 
the past. Anger generated by exclusion from party lists was not specific to the FLN in 
2002 – the RND experienced similar problems289 – nor was it a new phenomenon in 
Algeria (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970: 224-225; Grimaud 1973: 340; Leca and Vatin 1975: 
120; Dillman 1990: 34). And it certainly did not seem to affect FLN turnout. On 30 
March, the party captured nine of the fifteen seats allotted to Oran.290  
The party organized local and regional assembly lists along the similar lines. At 
the APW, Mouhafedh Brahma Djelloul took the top slot. Djelloul incorporated the most 
popular members of the Orani FLN Kasmat into the lists, including Colonel Redouane 
                                                
286 The MSP came in second in the 1997 national elections. 
287 Information from El Moudjahid, 27 May 1969; and Achour Cheurfi. 2001, 2004, 2007. 
288 Mohammed Raïs, UGTA bigwig and head of the FLN list for the ANP in 1997 (and only member to be 
elected) was positioned in the ninth slot. El Watan, 25 July 2002. 
289 El Watan, 21 April 2002. 
290 APN website: http://www.apn.dz. 
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Abid and Mohammed Belabbès (Kasma 7, Medioni). The list was generally accepted as 
both fair and representative. It rewarded faithful party cadres and former municipal 
officials, who represented the broad spectrum of the interests in the different Kasmat. The 
head of the municipal list was FLN veteran Noureddine Djellouli, an associate and long-
time friend of Ali Benflis. From 1979 to 1985, Djellouli led the National Union of 
Algerian Youth (UNJA), had been the Mouhafedh in Skikda (1985-1988), and a party 
regional coordinator for the Constantinois (1989).  
The Municipal Council lists generated far greater opposition than APN or APW, 
despite Djelloul’s efforts to create a balanced selection.291 It broke with tradition. 
Parachuted from the East, Noureddine Djellouli’s arrival was seriously contested in the 
West, especially by the candidates in second and third position: Noureddine Boukhatem 
(Kasma 2, Centre Ville), a local derbouka performer, and former DEC Merouane 
Henni.292 The Mouhafedh was menaced by factions of his own party who asked Wali 
Kouadri Mustapha Mustafaï (1999-2004) to intervene,293 and solicited by the National 
Former Combatant Organization (ONM, Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine) and 
disgruntled militants from the RND who had hoped that by rallying to the FLN they 
would make the lists.294  
In early fall, local pressure on the Mouhafedh was so great that rumors of an 
eminent coup by disgruntled Kasma Secretaries had begun to circulate in Algiers. This 
led Benflis to hold a special press conference to show his support for Djelloul the 
                                                
291 See El Watan and Le Matin, August to October 2002. 
292 Angry that he was not named head of the list, Henni threatened to quit the party two days after the list 
was made public. El Watan, August 22, 2002. 
293 Thirty-five local FLN personalities wrote a letter to the Wali asking for his personal intervention. El 
Watan, 22 August 2002. 
294 El Watan, 10 August 2002. 
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Mouhafedh and Djellouli his friend.295 As one Councilor put it: “At first, everyone was 
up in arms. When they finally realized that Djellouli was Benflis’, if not Bouteflika’s 
man, they backed down and kept quiet in their own interest, though they never forgot” (I-
20). Begrudgingly, party members admitted that the Federation was tied, at least 
temporarily, to the partial dictates of the national party.  
Most local militants also realized Djelloul had done his best to defend local 
interests: “His wide national level support – the defender of the FLN in Oran against the 
FIS and RND – made him a valuable ally for different national cadres wanting his 
support in the 2003 National Party Congress. Brahma is tried and tested; Brahma can 
deliver” (I-26). As one former FLN municipal council member notes: “Everyone likes 
Djelloul – he was a strong Mouhafedh. He doesn’t force his opinion; he’s supple. He 
knows how to get his way while pleasing all. And he wasn’t parachuted, he’s local” (I-
21).  
Election results were released on October 11, 2002. The FLN won sixteen of the 
thirty-three APC seats, and Noureddine Djellouli became the tenth Mayor of independent 
Oran. The FLN won twenty of the fifty-one slots in the APW. Reflecting his local 
popularity, Djelloul was elected President of the APW by a 49-2 vote. 
 
7.2.2 Viewed from Above: Ali Benflis versus Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
Before 2003, Ali Benflis was one of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s closest 
allies. Benflis ran Bouteflika’s presidential campaign in 1999. He managed Bouteflika 
Presidential Cabinet for a little more than year and replaced Ahmed Benbitour as Prime 
                                                
295 Fearing these rumors would upset his careful local balance of power, Benflis announced his full support 
for Djelloul in a September 2003 press conference. El Watan, 5 September 2002. 
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Minister in 2000. Who would have known that Bouteflika’s final gift, the leadership of 
the FLN, would have caused so many problems? 
When on 19 September 19 2001, Algerian Ali Benflis became Secretary General 
of the FLN, he inherited a former apparatus-cum-party that was severely bruised, if not 
fatally wounded. In 1997, the FLN competed in the first national legislative elections 
since the annulled 1990 and 1991 polls, losing badly to a party that had only been created 
a year prior, and falling seven seats behind a pro-regime Islamist party (Roberts 1998). 
With little charm, but a clever electoral strategy that depended on Mouhafedh 
knowledge of the local terrain, and lots of presidential caprice, Benflis reversed his 
fortune (Roberts 2002). The party won the 30 May 2002 National Assembly elections, 
taking 199 seats in the 389-member assembly. A few months later, the party won all but 
five of the forty-eight Regional Assemblies, and 668 of the 1,541 APCs. Ali Benflis paid 
back his gift by transforming the apparatus-cum-moribund party into the most powerful 
political machine in the country. The gift would ensure Bouteflika’s 2004 re-election. 
The gift was poisoned. At the 20 March 2003 8th National Congress,296 standing 
before a podium that lacked the image of Bouteflika as a backdrop, Benflis addressed a 
raucous congress of several thousand militants representing delegations sent from the 
fifty-four Mouhafedha. Having successfully placed key allies on the FLN Political 
Bureau and evinced potential rivals and notables close to the President a day before, 
Benflis announced that the FLN would trace its own line in Algerian politics.   
On 5 May, Bouteflika fired Prime Minister Benflis, replacing him with RND 
President Ahmed Ouyahia.297 In September, six pro-Benflis ministers were summarily 
                                                
296 Sixth since independence: 1964; 1979; 1985; 1989; 1998; 2003, (2005), 2009. 
297 Prime Minister (1996-1998) under President Liamine Zeroual. 
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dismissed; seven others quit out of solidarity.298 On 3 October, an extraordinary Central 
Committee meeting was convened and nominated Ali Benflis FLN candidate for the 8 
April 2004 presidential elections. 
Symbolically, institutionally, and politically, the Benflis-dominated 8th National 
Congress and subsequent break between the party and executive announced what many 
considered to be a critical juncture in Algerian politics. The international and local press 
spoke of reforma-pactada, ruptura-pactada.299  
 
Strategy One: Annul the 8th National Congress 
By June 2003, the FLN heavyweights who had been marginalized at the 8th 
National Congress coalesced into a group popularly known as “Les redresseurs,” or the 
Redressers.300 Their aim: to redress the 8th National Congress, return to the upper 
echelons of the party, and usher Bouteflika into his second mandate. Their initial strategy 
was top-down: they would get the 8th National Congress annulled.  
The Redressers filed a lawsuit against the organizers of the 8th National Congress. 
The task was relatively straightforward in semi-authoritarian Algeria; the 1997 Law 
Governing Political Parties gives the Ministry of Interior oversight of party activities. 
Then Minister of Interior Yazid Zerhouni (1999-2010) was a long-time Bouteflika ally.301 
                                                
298 Immediately after the six were sacked, the FLN warned the government that replacement ministers had 
to come from the ranks of the FLN. Ouyahia complied, promoting men who would form the hard core of 
opposition to Benflisistes: Abdelaziz Belkhadem, Said Barkat, Amar Tou, et cetera. 
299 Ironically, many of the same people who viewed the FLN as a façade just a few month earlier, now saw 
it as a leading force in Algerian politics. See the editorial and commentary columns of the 2-9 April 2004 
editions of French-language Le Monde (France), El Watan, Le Matin, Le Quotidien d’Oran, Liberté, and 
Arabic-language Al-Khabar. 
300 Initially, they referred to themselves as the Local Committees to Support the President (Comités locaux 
de soutien du president). See El Watan. 2 June 2003. 
301 Both men are from families that originate in or around Nedroma; both men grew up in Oujda, Morocco. 
Following Bouteflika’s 1999 election, negotiations between le pouvoir and the president stalled over the 
proposed nomination of Zerhouni to the Ministry of Defense. During the War of Independence, Zerhouni 
was in the MALG (see fn 156 and 157, Chapter Six). At independence, he followed the half that was 
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The Ministry of Interior promptly conducted an investigation and sent its findings to the 
Ministry of Justice. On 30 December, the Court of Algiers annulled the 8th National 
Congress, and placed a freeze on all party activity. 
 
Strategy Two: Seize the Base 
The cancellation of the 8th National Congress was a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition to end the real threat of a Benflis presidency. In addition to cancelling the 8th 
National Congress and freezing party activities from the top, in late May, the Redressers 
began to attack and occupy Mouhafedha bureaux across the country. To do so, they used 
fists, knives and clubs, tear gas and in the case of Mostaghanem, Doberman Pinschers.302 
The majority of the attacks were organized over the summer, and the psychological effect 
was immediate: By September, fifty-three of the FLN’s 199 ANP deputies openly 
supported Bouteflika.303 Because of conflicting local media coverage, it is difficult to say 
which Mouhafedha fell, when, and whether they stayed in Redresser or “Benflisiste” 
hands.304 While several Mouhafedha had been taken by the poll, speaking a month before 
the election, President of the National Assembly and outspoken Benflis proponent Karim 
Younes claimed the support of all fifty-four Mouhafedha, 1,641 Kasmat, and more than 
30,000 militants.305  
                                                
integrated into the Sécurité Militaire (SM). A close associate of Kasdi Merbah, head of the SM, Zerhouni 
was number two at Boumediene’s death. His political fortunes changed with the increased power of the five 
Military Region commanders under Bendjedid, who also sidelined Merbah. Those same generals, many of 
whom initially supported Bouteflika, strongly opposed Zerhouni at the Ministry of Defense. A compromise 
placed Zerhouni at the Ministry of Interior, while Bouteflika took Defense for himself. Zerhouni was 
promoted to Vice Prime Minister in July 2010, replaced by Daho Ould Kablia. Ironically, Kablia was also 
in the MALG, though he was recruited into the administration at independence, and in 1969 was Wali of 
Oran. 
302 El Watan, 20 May 2003; El Watan, 22 May 2003; El Watan, 2 June 2003. 
303 El Watan, 17 September 2003. “Appel à la désertation des rangs de Benflis.” 
304 El Watan, 20 July 2004. “Remours autour de la Mouhafadha d’Oran.” 
305 El Watan, 6 March 2004. 
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Making Sense of the Two Responses: Political Science Literature on Algerian Politics 
Taken together, the two strategies give us a fuller picture of the role the FLN 
plays in Algerian politics, and addresses several lacunae in political writings coming 
from “Algerian Studies,” discussed in Part 3.2, Chapter Six. Were the FLN simply a 
symbol or a mere tool to relay elite decisions to party militants and the masses (Entelis 
1986: 16; Quandt 1998: 7; Ruedy 2005: 250), the top-down strategy to annul the 8th 
National Congress should have sufficed the Bouteflika campaign. The Ministry of 
Interior’s decision, and the Ministry of Justice’s ruling should have ended Ali Benflis’ 
presidential ambitions. The power that lay behind the decision should have made the 
outcome perfectly clear.  
Werenfels and Liverani note that the intensity of the 2004 campaign and election 
represented a divided first order elite – the military. They argue that these fissures 
penetrated to second (e.g. FLN and RND political bureaux) and third order elites (e.g. 
press, civil society) (Werenfels 2007: 59, 67; Liverani 2008: 127). Viewed from this 
macro-level perspective, elite fractionalization at the upper echelons of power fissured 
down to the local level; the crisis came from the top. Following this logic, one would 
have expected the local level problems to evaporate following the return to consensus 
(Bouteflika’s second and third mandates): top-level stability would trickle down to the 
second and third order, and certainly to the local level.  
This is precisely not the case, and the outcome surprised more than one close 
observer of Algerian politics. Institutionally, the party apparatus has traditionally been 
described as a transmission belt used in conjunction with national unions and 
associational groups to channel the regime’s policies to the provinces, à la Neo-Destour 
(El Kenz 1991; Quandt 1998; Ruedy 2005; Liverani 2008). With few exceptions (Leca 
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and Vatin 1975; Roberts 1983; Hachemaoui 2003), analysis of the FLN’s role in Algerian 
politics has been elite-driven, macro-institutional, and contextualized in a “top-down” 
framework that misses the second half of Boumediene’s two-tiered state building 
strategy.306  
As a result, while revealing the broad contours of the Algerian political system, 
macro-level studies offer conflicting and sometimes confusing analysis of the party’s 
gravitas and role in the political system. On the one hand, scholars underscore the FLN’s 
inherent weakness. The party is weak due to internal rivalries dating to the anti-colonial 
struggle (Quandt 1969; Harbi 1980) or the “clannish” and divided nature of Algerian elite 
politics (Quandt 1998; Werenfels 2007). On the other hand, the FLN has been widely 
considered as the third leg of the so-called “iron triangle” of military, bureaucracy, and 
party (Entelis 1986: 16; Quandt 1998: 7; Ruedy 2005: 250; Penner Angrist 2006: 119). 
Viewed exclusively from the “top-down” perspective, these narratives are irreconcilable 
(i.e. iron pillar of the regime or myth / façade) and create a false debate that obfuscates 
the nature of Algerian politics, if not the Algerian state and regime. Regime weakness has 
simply been accredited to corruption or conspiracy. The mechanisms of the two are 
always assumed. 
As Chapter Six and the first half of this chapter have tried to stress, while local 
party branches, Kasmat, and Mouhafedhat were organized and implanted in the 
countryside as early as 1964, the “transmission belt” model of top-down articulation so 
frequently presented in the literature has been more assumed than shown. Instead of 
displacing the local political arena to the advantage of the central regime, the local party 
joined and then monopolized the local political economy, insulating local actors from 
                                                
306 This is not the case for Tunisia, where Moore (1965, 1970), Ashford (1967), and Rudebeck (1967), did 
extensive studies on the local structure of power. 
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pressure coming from the top. The effects of local of the development of these local 
political-economic arenas are not inconsequential to Algerian political and economic 
development. Algerian policy makers and political actors are keenly aware of this last 
point,307 but because the national elite had historically been so divided (Quandt 1969; 
Werenfels 2007), it has never been in a position to globally intervene.  
Faced with loss of the presidency in 2004, Bouteflika and his supporters 
intervened in the local arenas – a rare case of post-independence Algerian political risk 
taking. They began “the Mouhafedha Wars.” 
 
7.2.3 Ground Zero: Oran and the Mouhafedha Wars 
On 22 May 2003, eight hundred pro-Benflis FLN elected officials, cadres and 
militants from Oran, Mascara, Mostaghanem, Relizane, and Tiaret organized a region-
wide meeting at the Mouhafedha of Mostaghanem.308 Armed with knives, clubs, and 
Doberman Pinschers, a group of men violently disrupted the meeting. Led by ANP 
Representative Abdelhamid Si Affif (from Sidi Ali, Maître Benabdallah’s old stomping 
ground) and Mostaghanem APW President Mohammed Lazrag (a prominent member of 
the Madjaher tribe from Mesra, ex-Aboukir), the group claimed to represent the real 
FLN.309 Attacks simultaneously occurred on the Mouhafedhat of Blida, Msila, El Tarf, 
Biskra, and Naama. On 2 June, Algerian Ambassador to Iran Abdelkader Hadjar 
announced the creation of the Local Committees to Support the President, popularly 
called the Redressment Movement (les Mouvements de Redressement).310  
                                                
307 And they are always pleasantly surprised when a foreign analyst describes the situation in those terms. 
308 El Watan, 20 May 2003. 
309 Abdelhamid Si Affif was elected to the ANP in 2002. Known as the party strongman, he is not said to 
be popular with most FLN militants in Mostaghanem, despite belonging to the Si Affif maraboutic tribe 
from near Sidi Ali (Cassaigne) (I-33). He was re-elected to the 2007-2012 Assembly in May 2007.  
310 El Watan, 2 June 2003. 
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Worried that the Oran Mouhafedha would be infiltrated, Mayor Djellouli 
reinforced security and mandated identity badges, usurping Djelloul’s prerogatives. 
Djellouli also helped organize security arrangements for the Mouhafedha of 
Mostaghanem and its thirty-two Kasmat.311 His actions identified the Mayor as Ali 
Benflis’ key campaign coordinator in Western Algeria.   
When the Mayor of Oran declared his open support for Benflis, Oran was thrust 
to the center stage. And all eyes turned to the Mouhafedh. Historically, the Mouhafedh of 
Oran had protected the Federation and its markets from encroachment from Algiers. This 
included the APC. But the Mayor was an outsider. And Benflis, the party chief with 
whom he had only recently collaborated and from whom he had received support in fall 
2002, was openly defying a sitting president. His position in the dispute would directly 
affect the Oran FLN, and local cohesion of the party. On the one hand, he might be 
making the wrong choice by supporting either Benflis or Bouteflika – both were in a 
strong position in early 2003 and the wrong choice would affect party affairs and his 
political career. On the other hand, if he supported Bouteflika, the local party might split 
and he would lose control over the APC. Djelloul masked his position in an institutional 
framework – as Mouhafedh, he had to maintain a position of neutrality vis-à-vis party 
militants and abide by party rules.312  
A local FLN militant describes the period:  
In Oran, it was difficult for the Bouteflikistes, even though Bouteflika remained a 
popular figure. Why? Because Djellouli was playing the effective role of 
Mouhafedh, he was from the Political Bureau and had a clear position. The 
redresseurs did not have a similar figure. Brahma [Djelloul] never really chose a 
side. He kept relying on ‘legalism.’ He was neutral, waiting for more clarity. 
Nobody knew who was supporting whom at the national level, where le 
                                                
311 El Watan, 21 June 2003. “Comités de vigilance à Mostaganem.” 
312 For a feel, see his long interview in El Watan, August 2003. “FLN à Oran: L’administration mise à 
l’index.” 
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pouvoir313 would go, and so many people, like Djelloul, just waited. This does not 
mean that the Oran FLN was pro-Benflis – Bouteflika supporters just did not have 
a leader (I-20).314 
In late June, pro-Bouteflika forces rallied behind former DAS-turned-Councilor 
Merouane Henni and formed their own Redresser group. A tract war erupted around the 
same time: each side claimed Djelloul’s support.315 Unhappy with Djelloul’s neutral 
position, the Redressers tried to force the issue at a special 25 June 2003 Mouhafedha 
meeting. They threatened a vote of no confidence if he refused to articulate his position. 
Hoping silence translated into tacit sponsorship, the Benflisistes, who still represented a 
narrow majority of Kasma Secretaries and APC and APW Councilors, voted in favor of 
Djelloul.316   
Though the violence that was occurring elsewhere had not yet spread to Oran, 
Djelloul could not keep the peace forever. As Oran had become a focal point in the 
campaign, and the Redresser activity in the Federation grew. In August, Djelloul warned 
pro-Benflis militants against disturbing a regional Redresser meeting organized by Si 
Affif at Les Andalouses holiday resort complex.317 Ignoring the Mouhafedh, Mayor 
Djellouli led his troops to the meeting, which ended in a brawl. On 11 August 2003, 
Djelloul organized a reconciliation meeting at the Mouhafedha, proposing rival militants 
to take their cases to court. In exchange for a peaceful settlement, the Mouhafedh would 
amnesty militants who had broken party (Djelloul’s) rules.318 
                                                
313 A vague Algerian term used to explain occult power. In the Orani context, it could equally describe the 
nexus of economics and politics, the former composition of the Wilaya Commissions (1967, 1971, 1975), 
or the central government and its shadow military advisors. 
314 Informant I-21 concurred. 
315 El Watan, 25 June 2003. 
316 El Watan, 25 June 2003. 
317 El Watam, 9 August 2003. “Affrontements entre militants du FLN: Bataille à Oran. 
318 El Watan, 11 August 2003. 
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On 5 September, Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia fired six pro-Benflis ministers; 
another seven quit out of solidarity. Six days later, the regional Redressment movements 
created a unified national structure and voted the Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem 
as its representative. Prominent members included Abdelkader Hadjar,319 Boudjemma 
Haïchour320, Rachid Harroubia,321 Tayeb Louh,322 Abdelkader Messahel,323 Abdelhamid 
Si Affif, and Amar Tou.324 Messahel and Tou were brought into the government less than 
a week before. On September 17, fifty-three of the 199 FLN deputies in the National 
Assembly announced their support for the Bouteflika candidacy.325 
Oran was the major theatre of battle during “the Mouhafedha Wars.” Not only 
were national battles fought within its arena, but political decisions made in Oran had 
national repercussions. In early September, al-Islah, an opposition Islamist party that had 
come in third place in the 2002 ANP elections and had nine seats in the APC, called for a 
vote of no confidence. It claimed Djellouli had an authoritarian concentration of power in 
the municipal executive posts. By this point, the Mayor’s hold over Oran had begun to 
slip. Eight FLN Redresser Councilors supported the call. Combined with the ten RND 
and MSP representatives, Djellouli ran the risk of losing his seat.326 The loss would 
undermine Ali Benflis’ most ardent supporter in Western Algeria, and put his presidential 
campaign at risk.327 This local level problem had national level implications. Benflis and 
al-Islah party leader Abdallah Djaballah directly negotiated a solution. The FLN would 
give al-Islah an executive post in the APC in exchange for support its nine Councilors in 
                                                
319 Ambassador to Iran. 
320 Named Minister of Sports and Youth. 
321 Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. 
322 Minister of Work and Social Security. 
323 Delegate Minister for Maghrebi and African Affairs. 
324 Minister of Telecommunications. 
325 El Watan, 17 September 2003. “Cinquante-trois deputes rejoignent Belkhadem.” 
326 According to the Municipal Code, a vote of no confidence requires two-thirds of the APC. 
327 El Watan, 20 September 2003. “Les élus dans la tourment à Oran.” 
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the vote of no confidence.328 The incident primed greater dialogue between Benflis and 
Djaballah, who organized a series of joint press conference during the 2004 presidential 
campaign. 
Mouhafedh Djelloul’s refusal to choose sides eventually cooled relations with the 
Benflis camp. Djelloul planned to run for Senate in the December 2003 elections in 
anticipation of political retirement. Benflis called for a primary. In previous elections, 
open Senatorial slots always went to the top ranked FLN APW member, in this case 
Djelloul. A primary would force Djelloul to choose sides by default. Djelloul would have 
to coordinate with one or more candidates of either group to get the nomination, and his 
colors would finally be revealed. In addition to Brahma Djelloul, the names of two pro-
Benflis candidates from the Municipal Council were floated: Hamou Bachir329 and Tayeb 
Hassam. Redresser candidates included Colonel Mustapha Abid (Si Redouane), formerly 
a Major330 in the Sixth Military Region, and Abdelatif Dif from the APW. Refusing to be 
sucked into a battle that was not his own, he withdrew his candidacy, claiming Oran 
wanted him to stay at the APW.331  
As of early January, it was still not clear in which direction the political winds 
would blow. This changed on 29 January 2004, when the regime decided to wash the 
municipality’s dirty laundry. A week before President Bouteflika’s scheduled visit to 
Oran, the judicial police questioned Djellouli over several real estate and market 
concessions approved by the Municipal Council, and took him into custody. As discussed 
in the first half of this chapter, property and markets are at the heart of Orani politics. The 
                                                
328 El Watan, 23 September 2003. “Sursis pour le P/APC d’Oran.” 
329 No relation of Leïla Hammou in the APN. 
330 Before President Bendjedid, Colonel was the highest rank in the Algerian army. Majors were high 
officers at the time. Today, Colonels are the base of the military regime. Generals are dependent on their 
Colonels, like Senators in Oran are clients of their APW and APC representatives. 
331 El Watan, 6, 14, 28 December 2003. 
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probe risked blowing up into an investigation of the entire council and could possibly 
unravel the local political-economy arena. Protecting the local political market, twenty-
six of the thirty-three Councilors, including three from the RND, voted to express their 
support for the Mayor during an extraordinary APC session.332 Though the APC was 
divided over the best national leader, it was united to protect its own interests against 
incursions from Algiers. The counter-intuitive, unified vote sent a signal to the authorities 
to limit the scope of the inquiry.  
During the President’s weeklong visit to Oran,333 Bouteflika organized a meeting 
with the Wali in Djellouli’s mayoral office, adjourned with a photo-session and press 
conference. On 9 February, as Bouteflika announced his candidacy to the Presidency in 
Oran, followed by a concert by beloved Raï singer Cheb Mami, Djellouli and two APC 
deputies were charged with abuse of power, dilapidation of public goods, and use of false 
documents.334 Six days later, while Djellouli remained in preventative detention, the APC 
voted celebrated Orani derbouka player Noureddine Boukhatem Oran’s eleventh mayor 
since independence.335 Benflis lost his key ally in the West and the local FLN took the 
mayorship back from the intruder of the East. 
Brahma Djelloul resigned from the Mouhafedha on 17 February 2004, hoping to 
salvage his political career.336  
On April 8, 2004, President Bouteflika won 84.99% of the popular vote (Parks 
2005). 
                                                
332 L’Expression, 3 February 2004. “A quelques jours de la visite de Bouteflika à Oran: les élus soutienne 
le maire.” 
333 5-9 February 2004. 
334 El Watan, 9 February 2004. 
335 El Watan, 15 February 2004. 
336 El Watan, 17 February 2004. 
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The story of the build up to the 2004 presidential election in Oran underscores the 
importance of understanding local political arena to get a broader perspective of how 
Algerian politics, the FLN party, state, and regime function. That part of the Bouteflika 
campaign strategy relied on seizing pro-Benflis Mouhafedhat, or in the case of Oran, the 
APC, underscores the importance of local level politics in the national level chessboard – 
at least in the multiparty era. The minor story of the FLN-al-Islah alliance also shows 
how local events can trigger larger, national political phenomena. The case also reveals 
the importance FLN politicians and militants place on the Mouhafedh to arbitrate intra-
FLN problems at the local level and to protect them from external threats. The next 
section looks at the central role the struggle over the vacated Oran Mouhafedha played in 
both national and local politics in the lead up to the 2005 8th FLN Congress.   
 
7.2.4 Oran and the Kasmat Wars 
The Mouhafedh plays a role in the Political Bureau. The Mouhafedh is for placing 
men, high and low; he is a veritable player on the FLN national political 
chessboard (I-8) 
 
On the day Ali Benflis resigned from the Political Bureau, a group of armed men 
stormed the Mouhafedha building in Oran.337 Colonel Mustapha Abid, Mohamed 
Belabbès from Kasma 7 (Medioni), and Abdelatif Dif from the APW, led the group. The 
three had become increasingly prominent in Oran in the months immediately preceding 
the elections. They explained the action as a temporary measure that would be lifted once 
the FLN organized its new 8th National Congress.338 A counter-attack was organized by 
the dwindling Benflisiste troops shortly thereafter, and the gates of the building, which 
                                                
337 El Watan, 19 February 2004. 
338 L’Expression, 4 May 2004. “Des compromis pour la survie du parti.” 
 278 
housed Barclay’s Bank during the colonial period, were padlocked to prevent the 
Redressers from returning.  
In early June, members of the 7th National Congress Political Bureau339 
announced a National Preparatory Commission for a new 8th National Congress. To 
mark reconciliation, the Commission would include Redresser leader Abdelaziz 
Belkhadem and Abdelkrim Abada, a former Benflis ally. In September 2004, the duo 
called for Wilaya Commissions to reorganize the local Kasmat and Mouhafedha to 
choose delegates for the new 8th National Congress.340 Because the Preparatory 
Commission was a mixture of cadres who either supported Benflis or led the 
Redressment movement, militants on both sides feared political retribution and took 
preventative defensive measures.341 
During the summer of 2004, Mouhafedha bureaux across the country were 
attacked and counter-attacked by Benflisiste (now called “Legalists”) and Redresser 
militants. In Oran, the Mouhafedha split along Kasma lines and personal cleavages. 
Whoever controlled the Mouhafedha building, it was thought, would be in a strong 
negotiating position to send his men to the Congress. Part of the collateral damage from 
the Mouhafedha attacks had been the theft of membership lists, virgin member cards, 
FLN stamps, and official letterhead.342 Groups purged the Kasma of real and potential 
enemies, printing new (or counterfeit) membership cards for allies who would support 
                                                
339 Elected in 1998. The 8th National Congress had been declared null and void in January 2004. 
340 El Watan, 17 September 2004. “Belkhadem réunit l’état-majeur du FLN.” 
341 El Watan, 22 August 2004. “Front de Libération Nationale: La crise s’aggrave;” El Watan, 23 August 
2004. “Le congers réunificateur divise le vieux parti.” 
342 El Watan, 1 April 2004. “La base militant du FLN monte au créneau.”  
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them during the negotiations that would determine the lists:343 in numbers, comes 
power.344 
 
Photo 7.1: FLN Mouhafedha of Oran 
 
  Source: Author’s Photo. The gates are padlocked. 
 
                                                
343 Le Temps d’Algérie, 14 December 2010. “Oran: Le FLN se fissure.” 
344 Which is also why I could not get estimates of Kasmat membership. While militants were happy to 
discuss the politics of the Mouhafedha and Kasma wars, they became information-shy when questions 
revolved around membership. 
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Not all 7th Congress members were keen on reconciliation. Key national 
Redressers hostile to Belkhadem’s reconciliation actively encouraged the local battles. 
On 12 August, Abdelhamid Si Affif, who led the Doberman attack on the Mouhafedha in 
Mostaghanem, organized a press conference in Oran with Colonel Abid to reject the 
composition of the National Preparatory Commission. During the conference, Si Affif 
called Abada a party traitor and claimed the Commission was a ploy to strengthen 
Belkhadem’s political position in the FLN.345 Amar Tou also contested the Preparatory 
Commission, demanding that Benflisistes be removed from the list altogether: 
“Reconciliation does not mean confiding the organization of the 8th National Congress to 
those who were at the source of its failure [referring to the annulled 8th National 
Congress].”346 Two days later, Si Affif moderated his stance, noting he had merely 
warned Belkhadem against a possible Benflis takeover. He also stressed that Amar Tou, 
the most senior Redresser to attend the meeting, was not in conflict with Belkhadem.347  
With the tacit support of Abdelkader Hadjar, Si Affif, and Tou, on July 20, Tayeb 
Yenoune, Mouhafedh of Bab el Oued, announced a parallel Preparatory Commission 
called the “Free Coordination Movement.”348 From late August to early September, the 
Movement organized a series of sit-ins at the entrance of the FLN national headquarters. 
It also and sent a letter to President Bouteflika, asking for his personal intervention.349 In 
December, Yenoune announced the backing of 2,000 militants and called on former 
Political Bureau members Belaïd Abdesselam,350 Ahmed Ben Bella,351 Mouloud 
                                                
345 El Watan, 14 August 2004. “Les choix de Belkhadem contestés.” 
346 El Watan, 15 August 2004. “Crise au FLN autour du 8e congrès.” 
347 El Watan, 15 August 2004. “Crise au FLN autour du 8e congrès.” 
348 El Watan, 23 August 2004. “Le congrès réunificateur divise le vieux parti.” 
349 El Watan, 28 August 2004. “Sit-in devant le siège du parti: la dissidence du FLN sort dans la rue;” El 
Watan, 12 September 2004. “La dissidence du FLN multiple ses actions.” 
350 Former Minister of Industry (1965-1977), Prime Minister (1992-1993). 
351 Former President (1962-1965). 
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Hamrouche,352 and Abdelhamid Mehri353 to lead the 8th FLN Congress.354 The core anti-
reconciliation Redresser group, which had initially encouraged the movement, never 
really joined up, however. While a certain amount of pressure from a confederated, 
national movement would help their position, they were more interested in the localized 
battles and the ways in which their outcome would play out in the 8th National Congress. 
Unable to maintain momentum, the movement dissolved and Yenoune dropped off the 
radar following the Congress. 
Over the course of that autumn, Amar Tou appeared with anti-reconciliation 
groups in Constantine, Oran, Sidi Bel-Abbès, and Tiaret,355 and his name was 
increasingly associated with the radical Redresser wing of the party. At the same time, 
Tou publicly defended Belkhadem and occasionally made public appearances with 
former Benflis supporters.356 The perception of party cadres in Oran is that Tou was 
engaging in a double game (I-8; I-15; I-21). Tou was not a member of the government, 
nor was he a particularly powerful figure in the FLN before “the Benflis moment”. By 
encouraging local dissent groups that could take over key Wilaya, he would have enough 
votes at the 8th National Congress to negotiate entry into the Political Bureau, and 
possibly take the leadership of the FLN from Belkhadem. This measure was important 
because by now Belkhadem had rallied the support of many Benflisistes. A militant from 
Kasma 7 (Medioni) put it this way:  
The support of the Wilaya is important for the renewal of the Central Committee 
and the Political Bureau. Whoever can claim the support of a big Wilaya like 
Oran or Constantine can force his position (I-26). 
                                                
352 Former Prime Minister under Bendjedid (1989-1991). 
353 Former head of the FLN (1989-1996). 
354 El Watan, 9 December 2004. “Une conference nationale fin septembre.” 
355 El Watan, 29 October 2004. “Les militants dans le doute à Constantine;” El Watan, 1 December 2004. 
“Les élus FLN sous pression;” El Watan, 25 January 2005. “FLN: Une federation à l’Ouest?;” El Watan, 
25 May 2005. “Crise au FLN: l’arbitrage de Belkhadem souhaité.’ 
356 El Watan, 24 August 2004. “Crise au FLN: Amar Tou conteste le qualificatif d’ultra.” 
 282 
In repost, Abada and Belkhadem toured the same Wilaya contested by Tou, 
attempting to rally Benflisiste and pro-reconciliation Redressers into a common group.357 
They also went on the attack. During an October speech before 158 members of the FLN 
Central Committee, Belkhadem’s new working partner, Benflisiste Abdelkrim Abada, 
accused Amar Tou of sabotaging preparations for the 8th National Congress. Clairvoyant, 
he also raised the specter of a return to the pre-election crisis between FLN groups, 
should Tou’s efforts prevail in disrupting local reconciliation efforts.358  
Tou played the extremist role late into the game. At a December 2004 meeting 
organized by Belkhadem and Abada to introduce the National Preparatory Commission 
to party cadres, Tou publicly questioned the Commission’s legality. While Tou himself 
remained silent, later in the meeting the anti-reconciliation Redressers with whom he was 
seated interrupted Belkhadem as he took the podium to address the crowd, shouting: 
“FLN à Bouteflika! Vive le Président! Khaouana!”359 Tou moderated his stance at the 30 
January 2005 8th National Congress, and in late February 2005 was co-opted into the 
nine-member Executive Secretariat360 of the FLN.361   
 
                                                
357 El Watan, 2 November 2004.  
358 El Watan, 29 October 2004. “Les militants dans le doute à Constantine.” 
359 El Watan, 22 December 2004. “Le FLN tiendra son congrès en janvier 2005.” 
360 The National Congress eliminated the Central Committee and Political Bureau. They were replaced it 
with the National Council, composed of 450-550 members. Under the new format, the National Council 
elects the 95-105 man-strong Executive Committee. To prevent party cadres from completely dominating 
elected officials, National Assembly deputies would have a quota in the National Council. To ensure equal 
Wilaya representation, each Wilaya is reserved five seats. To avoid a Political Bureau-style coup in the 
future, the National Council also determines the party’s Presidential candidate. The Executive Committee 
votes for a nine-member Executive Secretariat, which is collegially run. The post of Secretary General was 
eliminated, and the Executive Secretariat elects a Secretary General of the Executive Secretariat, whose 
only role is that of spokesman. 
361 El Watan, 21 February 2005. “Le FLN n’ira pas au musée.” 
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Battling Kasmat Secretaries 
With real local interests at stake, and believing they had the support of party 
bigwigs, the Orani anti-reconciliation Redressers rejected the Wilaya Commissions sent 
from Algiers. In Oran, there were initially three contenders for the Mouhafedha: former 
Mouhafedh Djelloul, Colonel Abid, and Mohammed Belabbès (Kasma 7, Medioni), 
another of Djelloul’s rival from the APW.362 In late July, a Commission sent from Algiers 
named former Wali Mahmoud Si Youcef head of the local bureau. Abid and Belabbès 
refused to see him, each arguing to represent the majority of FLN militants. Djelloul, 
though hardly an anti-reconciliation Redresser was also cool to the idea, commenting: 
“They [the Preparatory Commission] want to move too quickly. I prefer to wait to 
dialogue with all the parties in conflict, including banned militants.”363 As noted above, 
Djelloul’s experience as Mouhafedh – the regional fulcrum of center-periphery and intra-
militant pressure – taught him to play the middle of the road. By giving the situation time 
to play out, he could better understand the newly forming alliances, and eventually rally 
support from the opposition.  
Lacking a Mouhafedh to structure the local political arena, the situation in winter 
2005 was remarkably similar to the state of local party affairs in 1968 and 1971, when 
Cherif Belkacem and Kaid Ahmed tried to organize the local party apparatus, and were 
blocked by personal interventions from the national, regional, and local level. 
In early December, the Preparatory Commission sent Minister of Vocational 
Training El Hadi Khaldi364 to Oran to initiate dialogue between the feuding factions. The 
meeting was at the Mouhafedha, which had been reopened specifically for the talks. As 
                                                
362 Lacking a strong group of personally loyal supporters, Dif dropped out of the contest early on. 
363 El Watan, 25 July 2004. “FLN: un émissaire pour réactiver le bureau d’Oran.” 
364 In 2010, Khaldi would lead his own rebellion against Belkhadem, using the still unresolved Kasmat 
Wars and warlords to support his claims. 
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soon as it had begun, the meeting was adjourned. Troops loyal to Colonel Abid invaded 
the building, armed with knives and clubs. While all sides peacefully evacuated the 
building and agreed to hold the meeting the following day at a salle de fête in Chtaïbo 
(Haï Nedjma), Abid ordered the Mouhafedha bureau door welded shut.365 The following 
day, Khaldi was able to convince Belabbès to rally to Djelloul, though Colonel Abid 
remained intransigent.366 A few days later, the Preparatory Commission dispatched Vice 
President of the National Assembly Messaoud Chiboub and five deputies to Oran. 
Alerted that Djelloul’s partisans were attempting to un-weld the door to the Mouhafedha, 
Colonel Abid’s troops attacked Djelloul’s men, sparking an mêlée front of the 
Mouhafedha building. In response, Djelloul and the Commission moved the meeting to 
Kasma 3. Abid organized a parallel meeting at Kasma 5, where he claimed to be in 
permanent contact with Harroubia, Si Affif, and Tou.367   
Unable to reach a compromise by late January, Djelloul and Abid announced that 
they would send parallel lists of delegates to the 8th National Congress, each composed 








                                                
365 El Watan, 2 December 2004. “Tentative du putsch à Oran.” 
366 El Watan, 3 December 2004. “La commission de toutes les convoitises.” 
367 El Watan, 9 December 2004. “Une conference nationale fin septembre.” 
368 El Watan, 17 January 2005. “A Oran, deux listes inconciliables.” 
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Figure 7.3: Neighborhood Kasmat 
 
Adapted from: Bendraoua and Souiah 2008:184. 
 
Table 7.4: Oran’s Kasmat Wars * 
Kasmat Neighborhood Leader 
Kasma I* Sidi el Houari - 
Kasma 2* Centre Ville Mohamed Freha 
Kasma 3* St. Antoine - 
Kasma 4 Gambetta - 
Kasma 5 St. Eugène - 
Kasma 6 Victor Hugo - 
Kasma 7* Medioni Mohammed Belabbès 
Kasma 8 Choupot - 
Kasma 9* Cité Petit - 
* Opposed to Colonel Abid at the Mouhafedha in 2007. 
Source: Author Interviews; Local Press 
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Two points should be made concerning the Oran crisis. First, the three party 
Wilaya Commission delegations were composed of political lightweights. Given the 
importance of Oran, this is surprising. Support of a unified Orani delegation would 
considerably strengthen the negotiation power of Political Bureau candidate “X”. 
However, for political reasons neither Tou nor Belkhadem could become too closely 
implicated in the local level chaos. Belkhadem’s intervention would draw the ire of the 
anti-reconciliation Redresser group. While Belkhadem’s alliance with Abada kept Tou 
and company in a minority position, the extremists could easily disrupt what Belkhadem 
hoped would be a unifying Congress. And while Tou clearly stoked the embers of local 
level dissent, he could not afford to be seen as overly divisive and run the risk of getting 
kicked out of the party: his actions were calculated to enter the Political Bureau. As a 
result, the Preparatory Commission sent political lightweights to deal with a heavyweight 
problem.  
The Orani groups differed in their negotiation strategies with the emissaries from 
Algiers. Djelloul was careful to court the party representatives sent from Algiers, whereas 
Abid claimed the support of heavy hitting Redressers and largely ignored the 
commissions: each was supported by a rival national level political heavyweight. To 
support his claims, on 17 January 17 2005, Abid revealed a fax of support he alleged was 
sent from Belkhadem.369 Fearing the fax was an original, on the same day, Djelloul led 
another failed attempt to seize the Mouhafedha. None of Algiers’ ambassadors could 
force a compromise, and the national elite knew it. The Oran conflict was the elephant in 
the FLN’s room that nobody wanted to acknowledge. 
                                                
369 El Watan, 17 January 2005. “A Oran, deux listes inconciliables.” 
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Second, in Oran and elsewhere,370 the Mouhafedha bureau played a central role in 
the local level struggles. All sides wanted to occupy the office. Two local militant put it 
nicely: “The Mouhafedha is the White House” (I-32); “It is the crown. Legal 
sovereignty!” (I-26). Whoever controlled the Mouhafedha at the time of the 8th National 
Congress would be in the most legitimate position to claim the participation of his 
militants. This in turn might signal to local dissident groups that the occupant had support 
from the Political Bureau, and possibly end the crisis. Moreover, the legitimacy incurred 
by participation in the Congress would strengthen the local leader’s hand in claiming the 
Mouhafedh once new votes were called. A former Councilor stated: “Whoever controls 
the Mouhafedh can control the FLN: the APC, the APW, and by extension the Senate” (I-
21). A local former FLN mayor went further: “The Mouhafedh plays a role in the 
Political Bureau. The Mouhafedh is for placing men, high and low; he is a veritable 
player on the FLN national political chessboard” (I-8). 
It was not until late January 2005, when Colonel Abid finally succeeded in 
occupying and holding the Mouhafedha that an important delegation arrived from 
Algiers. Amar Tou and Rachid Harroubia, both anti-reconciliation Redressers organized a 
meeting with Abid and Djelloul. Abid’s statement following the meeting was simple, 
with little more than a week before the 8th National Congress and multiple groups 
arriving from Oran, the FLN leadership would have to make a decision: “The problem is 
in the hands of the Direction.”371 
 
                                                
370 Notably, Annaba, Batna, Constantine, Mascara, Medea, Setif and Skikda.  See El Watan, December 21, 
2004; “Deux commissions parallèles et des interrogations (Mascara); El Watan, January 10 2005. “A 
l’approche du congrès du FLN: les redresseurs réticents;” El Watan, 15 January 2005; and El Watan, 16 
January 2005. 
371 El Watan, 26 January 2005. “FLN: Une fédération à Oran?” 
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7.2.5 Post 8th National Congress Chaos 
Colonel Abid’s rebellion created deep cleavages in the party base. Today there 
needs to be a veritable house cleaning to short-circuit the parallel Kasmat that 
have no relationship with the party. Certain parallel Kasmat operate with two or 
three official stamps and that needs to stop.372 
 
Though the Medea, Oran, and Tizi Ouzou Federations each sent two delegations, 
and though 3,310 delegates attended, while only 2,700 were invited, by most accounts, 
the 8th National Congress was considered a success.373  
At the national level, the FLN had officially reconciled the Benflis, Belkhadem, 
and Tou camps. The national party structure was at peace with itself. 
The same was not the case at the local level. The 8th National Congress did not 
play out to the advantage of Oran. First, the two delegations at the 8th National Congress 
hurt Orani representation by dividing its overall impact. Second, Brahma Djelloul was 
neither among the thirteen Orani members of the National Council, nor the three seated 
on the Executive Committee.374 This weakened his position in the eyes of his local 
opponents, and increased the likelihood of prolonged local level conflict.375 Third, the 8th 
National Congress solved many of the national level intra-FLN disputes: Amar Tou was 
promoted into the party’s inner-circle. However, the logic of supporting various local 
level factions, no longer held. While this officially ended the local-national tactical 
partnerships, it also reduced national elite bargaining power in future efforts to get the 
local factions to dialogue, including that of potential party heavyweights, which until this 
                                                
372 Anonymous member of the Oran Mouhafedha. Le Temps d’Algérie, 14 December 2010. “Oran: Le FLN 
se fissure.” 
373 See El Watan, January 30 2005. “FLN: Le congrès s’ouvre ce matin;” El Watan, 31 January 2005. 
“Ouverture hier du 8e congrès: un retour difficile;” El Watan, 31 January 2005. “Le vert, l’orange et les 
guafrettes;” El Watan, 1 February 2005. “FLN: Une page se tourne.” 
374 El Watan, 14 February 2005. “Initiatives sur fond d’embûches.” 
375 He was a member of the Central Committee of the first 8th National Congress. 
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point had not intervened. Finally, on 21 February 2005, the National Council voted to 
dissolve party Kasma and Mouhafedhat, and to replace them with Provisionary Councils 
in anticipation of local party elections.376 The future Council would have to deal with two 
problems: first, identify militants; second, organize the votes. The problem is that 
Djelloul brought the membership lists and virgin cards with him when he quit the 
Mouhafedh in 2004, while Colonel Abid had been printing and distributing cards to 
loyalists.377 
In May 2005, for the first time since the Oran Mouhafedha crisis began, the party 
sent a heavy weight to lead the Oran Provisional Council: ex ANP Lieutenant Colonel, 
former executive of the National Former Combatant Organization (ONM, Organisation 
Nationale des Moudjahidine) and former Health Minister (1979-1984) Abderrezak 
Bouhara. During the first meeting, organized in the Abid-controlled Mouhafedha, 
Bouhara stated: “Oran is the keystone to solving the problems that mine the FLN.” 
Following the statement, Abid’s troops began chanting his name, at which point Djelloul 
promptly walked out.378 The second meeting was organized on neutral grounds – at the 
Chtaïbo (Nedjma) Salle de fêtes. Abid organized a parallel meeting at the Mouhafedha 
and called for Belkhadem’s intervention, noting that since the Bouhara meeting was not 
held at the Mouhafedha, he was operating an illegal session.379 In repost, Bouhara rented 
the top floor of the Mouhafedha building, which was owned by the Hôtel Timgad, located 
across the street.380 Angry with this, and the fact the Bouhara was making inroads with 
former combatant groups – the bedrock of FLN dinosaurs – Abid composed an open 
                                                
376 El Watan, 29 March 2005. “Le parti veut assainir son conseil national.” 
377 El Watan, 2 April 2005. “FLN: La commission de la dernière chance.” 
378 El Watan, 6 May 2005. “Le conflit perdure à Oran.” 
379 El Watan, 25 May 2005. “Crise au FLN: l’arbitrage de Belkhadem souhaité.” 
380 Ironically the Hôtel Timgad is owned by a relative of Bendjedid, who fashioned the independent Oran 
FLN, and Mehri, who de-couple the Federations with the center. Both men had been instrumental in 
creating the Oran FLN asabiyya. 
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letter to Belkhadem titled, “The Over-Stepping of Bouhara.”381 Following several months 
of failed attempts to start local dialogue, Bouhara quit the Council in mid-December 
2005.382 
In late February 2006, Madani Houd, Vice President of the Senate, arrived to pick 
up where Bouhara left off: at scratch. Houd visited Colonel Abid first and convinced him 
to attend a meeting with Djelloul that ended in impasse.383 In early March, Belkhadem 
agreed to receive Abid, Djelloul, and Mohamed Freha in a series of inconclusive 
meetings held at the Hôtel Mouahidine, nine kilometers outside of Oran in the 
Municipality of Es-Senia.384 Bouhara and Mayor Noureddine Boukhatem (Kasma 2, 
Centre Ville) had recently convinced Mohamed Freha, president of the local ONM 
chapter and Secretary of Kasma 2, to open a third and unifying front in the local war.385 
He entered into dissidence with the national bureau when Houd announced that all 
official activity prepared under Bouhara was invalid.386 By May, Abid had also entered 
dissidence with Houd, proposing an alliance with Freha and against Djelloul to unify 
their respective Kasmat.387 Following Hout’s resignation in August 2006, Djelloul 
stepped back from the local Mouhafedha war.388 
By December 2006 – more than a year and a half after the FLN National Council 
announced its plans to renew the Mouhafedhat, only twenty-three of the fifty-four 
Federations had been restructured. Head of the Provincial Council Restructuring Group 
and Executive Secretariat member, Said Bouhadja commented on the problem: 
                                                
381 El Watan, 31 May 2005. “Bataille à Oran: La bataille d’Oran et la guerre des organisations.” 
382 El Watan, 15 December 2005. “Belkhadem fortement sollicité.” 
383 El Watan, 27 February 2006. “Conflit du FLN: Retour à la case de départ.” 
384 El Watan, 3 March 2006. “Belkhadem jeudi à Oran: A l’écoute des antagonistes du FLN.” 
385 El Watan, 22 May 2006. “Alliance entre les deux ailes rivales.” 
386 El Watan, 27 March 2006. “Houd veut récupérer ses prérogatives.” 
387 El Watan, 22 May 2006. “Alliance entre les deux ailes rivales.” 
388 El Watan, 17 August 2006. “Alliance présidentielle: le FLN s’enlise dans la crise à Oran.” 
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We still need to solve the Mouhafedha problem. During our visits to the Wilaya, 
we see that the designation process is anything but a question of militant or 
political conviction. Rather, we encounter local barons, circles or regional 
influence, people used to controlling local FLN politics and who don’t understand 
that sometimes one needs to step aside. We’re seeing family relations, tribal and 
historical alliances, but we’re seeing very little related to fidelity to the party and 
its ideals.389 
One wonders whether Cherif Belkacem and Kaid Ahmed had made similar 
analysis following their failed attempts to organized the Oran Federation in 1967 and 
1971. 
In the lead-up to the 8th National Congress, national players encouraged the 
Mouhafedha wars in the hopes of generating votes for the Political Bureau at the 8th 
National Congress from the eventual victor. Their withdrawal from the Mouhafedha wars 
did not stop the conflict, however. It intensified them, as both national and local channels 
of mediation evaporated: the latter during the struggles leading up to the National 
Congress, the former at the closure of the Congress. In some cases, the local-national 
game succeeded in placing proxy Mouhafedh. Where they did not result in a conclusive 
settlement, the primacy of the party over the individual eroded. In places like Oran, the 
party-qua-party ceased to exist. It was replaced by local strongmen and their troops, each 
operating from their Kasma. In Oran, the limits of national party control over the local 
political arena were once again revealed: having taken the APC in 2002, placing one of 
their own at mayorship two years later, though divided, the local chieftains had access to 
and control of the local markets. They were no longer financially dependent on Algiers. 
And once they realized playing the national heavyweights’ ambitions to enter the 
Political Bureau to reinforce position in the inter-Kasmat balance of power was no longer 
an option, their link to national-level sponsors was ruptured. 
                                                
389 El Watan, 2 December 2006. “FLN: Sur un terrain glissant.” 
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Photo 7.2: Kasma 2, Centre Ville, Blvd. Khemisti 
 
Source: Author’s Photo 
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Case Study: Mouhafedh Brahma Djelloul 
In many ways, Brahma Djelloul was an ideal-type Mouhafedh. He carefully 
balanced personal ambition and Federation interests. His entry and effacement from the 
local Mouhafedha wars were perfectly calculated. By entering the fray after he had quit 
the post, he maintained local visibility, and was able to measure his local popularity in 
the quality and quantity of local militant visits. His temporary deactivation from the 
Mouhafedha struggle also allowed him to move above the fray and to channel local 
frustration onto Abid and Freha. He used this time to re-establish order in the APW, 
which he still presided, in order to prepare his long nourished ambitions to get elected to 
the Algerian Senate and retire. Djelloul was a strong candidate. Having served as 
Mouhafedh for more than a decade, he was still viewed by many as the real Mouhafedh 
of Oran. FLN APW members, and many Councilors in the APC owe their political 
careers to Djelloul, who put them on the 1990, 1997, and 2002 lists. As the head of the 
FLN, Djelloul knew all the ins and outs of local politics, and was able to negotiate with 
rival parties in the APW. As one militant noted, “Djelloul is the Oran FLN workhorse” 
(I-26). Djelloul worked his best to appear impartial to both sides during the 2004 
presidential campaign. Finally, his decision to resign from the Mouhafedha in 2004 
allowed the pro-Bouteflika campaign to take the city – a fact that was not forgotten 
higher up. In late December, he was elected to Senate.390   
 
7.2.6 Elections without a Mouhafedh: the Center Imposes a Mayor 
By April 2007, Oran still did not have a Mouhafedh to organize lists for the May 
APN elections. Senator Djelloul, Freha and Abid sent separate lists to the Wilaya 
                                                
390 El Watan, 6 December 2006. “Brahma Djelloul en lice à Oran;” El Watan, 28 December 2006.  
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Commission.  The commission sent back a new list with Amar Tou at its head, followed 
by Colonel Abid in second position and Mohamed Freha listed at number four. Tou’s 
presence on the list is surprising. A native of M’sirda (Tlemcen), and a registered voter in 
Sidi Bel-Abbès, legally, he could not run for a seat in Oran. Three FLN informants 
seemed to believe that he was imposed because of and as a solution to the lack of local 
level consensus over the lists (I-23): “He was nominated by the Center to solve local 
problems” (I-21). A militant from Kasma 2 (Centre Ville) puts it this way:  
Amar Tou was put at the head of the list to avoid local problems. In the short 
term, meaning during the period before everything was finalized, it was to bring 
everyone together against him. Once together, they would fall in line and support 
the list in order to win the elections” (I-15).  
At least part of the explanation works: they all opposed the lists. 
Abid eventually relented, commenting: “We’re going to run an electoral 
campaign, even if we contest certain names on the list.”391 Angered that he was listed 
below Abid, and not even in third position, Freha backed out, and threatened a boycott.392 
The final top six candidates on a lackluster list were Tou, Abid, Djamel Benhaddou (son 
of Revolutionary Council member, Colonel Othman), Mohktaria Reguieg (related to a 
1969 APW representative and a 1975 Councilor),393 and Khelil Mahi (a local tax 
collector). One local militant complained: “the candidates don’t have any link with the 
party. They’re neither militants, nor competent!”394 
The campaign was as uninspiring as the list. Freha did not activate his troops for 
the campaign,395 and Abid found it difficult to motivate his troops as so many of his men 
                                                
391 El Watan, 28 April 2007. “Installé hier au siège de l’APC: La CCISEL rejetée par les anti-Amar Tou.” 
392 El Watan, 9 April 2007. “Grands manoeuvres;” El Watan, 29 April 2007. “Le FLN sur la touché 
(Oran).” 
393 El Moudjahid, 27 May 1969; La République, 4 April 1975. “Les élus de la commune d’Oran” 
394 El Watan, 8 April 2007. “La contestation gagne les députés sortants du FLN.” 
395 El Watan, 29 April 2007. “Le FLN sur la touché (Oran).” 
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were ranked below number ten on the lists. Disgruntled militants in Bir el Djir (the 
Kasma is not far from the EAC-nursery discussed in Chapter Six) actively campaigned 
with the head of the Algerian National Front (FNA, Front National Algérien) list, 
Fathallah Chabbi.396 Amar Tou announced a campaign strategy in the cafés and 
hammams.397 And little more than a week before the election, Tou noted: “We have to 
wait until the week before the election, the party program still isn’t finalized.”398 A local 
militant, worried about the outcome in a climate marked by a divided local militant base, 
the absence of a coordinating Mouhafedh and overall lack of concern from the national 
structures lamented:  
Because types of solidarity such as tribes and clans aren’t really operable in Oran, 
the level of participation – whether the figures are exaggerated or real – will be 
much lower than usual. Look at all these photos (campaign posters), we don’t see 
a local [presumably FLN] notable.399 
Almost to a word, the militant predicted the outcome. On May 18, election results 
were released. Official turnout for Oran was 31.40% – more than five points lower than 
the national average, 36.51%. The FLN lost four of its ANP seats, while the FNA picked 
up three.400 
Abid, Freha, and Djelloul worked hard to prove the legitimacy of their lists in the 
months working up to the November APC elections. Whichever group could take the 
Municipality would have access to valuable markets. But to take the APC meant writing 
the lists and controlling the Mouhafedha. On 20 August 2007, Abid and Freha organized 
parallel meetings, with the Federation’s forty parallel Kasma voting each leader 
Mouhafedh. Freha announced:  
                                                
396 El Watan, 9 May 2007. “Des militants du FLN font campagne pour le FNA à Bir el Djir.” 
397 El Watan, 29 April 2007. “Le FLN sur la touché (Oran).” 
398 El Watan, 10 May 2007. “Nouvelles d’Oran.” 
399 El Watan, 8 May 2007. “C’est la déprimé à Oran.” 
400 Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités locales/DGLPAJ/DOEE, 18 May 2007. 
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“We’re the most legitimate. We have more than 15,000 militants structured in our 
Kasma. And we’ve sent more than four billion centimes [40,000.00 €] to the 
party to cover our militant charges.”401  
Both men called on Belkhadem to make a decision. 
While on September 5, Abid announced Belkhadem has officially declared him 
Mouhafedh, the appointment was declared invalid by competing factions: because no 
inclusive vote had been held at the local Kasmat, Belkhadem’s decision broke party rules. 
In late September, Algiers dispatched Si Affif, one time Abid supporter, to Oran to head 
the Provisional Committee, and to draw up the local lists. None of the three contenders 
received him, preferring to organize rival meetings. Brahma called on Belkhadem to 
make a choice; Freha warned the FLN to avoid a repeat of the legislative elections;402 
whereas Abid remained intransigent: “I don’t have anything against him [Si Affif], but 
legally, he has no right to supervise list confection. That right belongs to the Mouhafedh 
alone.”403 Again, each group sent its own list to Algiers. 
Si Affif pieced together what has been called the worst list in Orani history – in 
terms of names and overall strategy (I-8; I-21; I-32). Broadly, it accorded everyone a 
piece of the APC. In the context of a profound struggle for the Mouhafedha, this ran the 
risk of putting together either a losing ticket or a paralyzed town hall. Worried about the 
effects this would have on local stability, the Ministry of Interior contacted the party and 
told them to add five men proposed by Wali Tahar Sekrane (2005-2010), who were 
ranked in positions two to six. Incumbent Mayor Noureddine Boukhatem led the ticket, 
and was followed by: 2) Dr. Saddek Benkada, former Secretary-General of the APC of 
Sidi Bel-Abbès; SONATRACH cadre and local historian;404 3) Kouider Metair, Sound 
                                                
401 El Watan. 20 August 2007. “La crise repart de plus belle.” 
402 El Watan, 29 September 2007. “Si Affif veut sauver le parti à Oran.” 
403 El Watan, 8 October 2007. “La contestation s’amplifie au FLN à Oran.” 
404 Benkada’s website gives a full account of his professional careers, which has swung between academic, 
administration, and politics: http://www.saddekbenkada.com/. 
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Engineer for ENTV and head of Association Bel Horizon, a popular local NGO; 4) 
Mustapha Soufi former director of Zabana Museum; 5) Dr. Kamel Briksi, head of Santé 
Sidi Houari, a popular local NGO; and 6) Azri Ghaouti, the head of the Municipal 
Theater. The five share a common background: they all have university diplomas, have 
worked in the public sector, and have some sort of personal engagement with the city of 
Oran. Slots seven to thirty-three were divided between Djelloul, Freha, and Abid’s men, 
as well as several Benflisistes that had been politically recuperated.  
The lists enraged the three groups. None of “the five” are militants attached to a 
local Kasma and only one has FLN membership (I-8; I-21; I-26; I-32). When Si Affif 
arrived to explain the list to Freha, Djelloul and his men, accompanied by Senator Tayeb 
Hassam,405 confronted him. The confrontation turned violent. During the mêlée, Senator 
Hassam and Si Affif exchanged blows. By the time militants were able to separate them, 
Hassam was on the ground with a broken shin. Clearly flustered after the event, Si Affif 
hastily tried to gain the upper hand, revealing a document sent by one of the factions 
proposing a 200,000 € payment in return for the right to designate the Municipal lists. 
Putting the letter back in his pocket, and wiping his brow, Si Affif coolly noted: “There 
are some heavy interests in Oran.”406 
The FLN won thirteen seats in the Oran Municipal Council. Following the 
election, the FLN issued a Circulaire to FLN controlled town halls, mandating the Mayor 
slot for the head of list. The Wali’s five rejected the order, arguing that the Communal 
Code mandated an internal party vote, proposing number two on the list, Sadek Benkada 
as mayor (I-20). One Abid supporter, two former Benflisistes (who Freha has since 
captured), and five Freha militants filled the remaining eight seats, and pledged their 
                                                
405 Hassam is the Benflisiste who won the December 2003 Senatorial elections, after Mouhafedh Djelloul 
withdrew from the contest. 
406 El Watan, 10 November 2007. “Grave incident à Oran.” 
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support to Boukhatem (I-8; I-21). The evening before the vote was held, the Ministry of 
Interior sent a judicial police brigade to Oran to probe possible financial irregularities in 
the 2002-2007 Municipal Council. It should be remarked here that the 2007-2012 APC 
has several re-elected officials. The following day, the council voted Sadek Benkada 
Oran’s twelfth post-independence Mayor by a vote of 8-to-5. 
 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
Since Boumediene’s era, local control of and access to the market via the APC 
has been the Achilles heel of the regime. Initially conceived as a way of displacing local 
authority with regime sanctioned agent-representatives, the strategy itself was subverted. 
First local notables and entrepreneurs controlled Town Hall, blocking regime 
programmed land and property reform. During the 1970s and early 1980s, those notables 
shifted out of the political and into the construction, land, public works, and real estate 
markets. The FLN, which had slowly been developing as an institution under the ward of 
Chadli Bendjedid, asserted control over the local political-economic arena. It structured 
its own hierarchy and raison d’être along the contours of this changing local economy. 
At the top, sat the Mouhafedh, who negotiated access to the market with important local 
entrepreneurs, who coordinated the Kasmat Secretaries, who appointed faithful party 
militants to elected office, and who protected the local Federation from outside 
interference. 
In the 1990s, this changed. Multipartism and close to twelve years in exile 
seriously wounded the former single party by cutting it from its financial asabiyya.  
The events leading up to the 2007 APC elections reveal the important role the 
Mouhafedh played in protecting in the Oran Federation from outside interference. Once 
Djelloul quit the Mouhafedh in 2004, local order broke down, party hierarchy was 
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subverted, and the hermetic seal that kept Algiers at arm’s-length was broken. A national-
level regime crisis sparked the Kasmat wars. National-level party efforts to intervene in 
local affairs afterward only enflamed the crisis, showing the limits of its penetration into 
the provinces. Taking advantage of the local political chaos, in October 2007, the regime 
imposed its own list of candidates to the APC elections, seizing Town Hall with its 
markets. 
While the state was strong enough to intervene in local affairs in October 2007, its 
will to expend time and energy in maintaining its hold over the Municipal Assembly 
waned over time. The warring Kasmat factions coalesced against “the Wali’s five” and 
waged a relentless battle to have them removed. Over the next two years, they sabotaged 
the Mayor’s political program and arrested the economic and cultural development of the 
city. On 22 April 2009, the local Federation, though still divided, united with the local 
sections of rival political parties seated in Town Hall. Together, they called for a vote of 
no confidence. After much hesitation, the Wali refused to accept the paperwork.407 By the 
eve of the 16th International Liquefied Natural Gas Congress that was to showcase Oran 
as an international city, the Wali regretted his decision. The APC was still blocked and 
the Wilaya had to intervene to ensure the city was ready to welcome the 3,000 
international delegates the conference hoped to attract.  
In July 2010, a new Wali, Mohammed Boudiaf, was named to the province. 
Calculating his political strength and choosing his battles wisely, in November 2010, 
Boudiaf relented to the local FLN, signing a twenty-six to seven vote of no confidence 
that removed Benkada from the mayorship. For the second time in eight years, an 
                                                
407 L’Expression, 16 April 2009. “Du rififi à l’APC;” La Tribune, April 18 2009. “Retrait de confiance au 
maire, affaires gelées et élus partagés: Sale temps sur la commune d’Oran;” El Watan, 18 April 2009. 
“Retrait de confiance au maire d’Oran: Des prétendants se bousculent au portillon; El Watan, 22 April 
2009. “Retrait de confiance au Maire d’Oran: Blocage sur fond de spéculation;”La Tribune 23 April 2009. 
“Sadek Benkada conserve le fauteuil de maire d’Oran.”  
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outsider had been placed on the Council: the first time by the party; the second time by 
the regime. And for the second time during the same period, he was ousted while in 
office and replaced by a local Federation militant. While Mayor Zineddine Hassam 
(2010-present) has co-opted two former Mayors408 and members from all the Kasmat into 
the municipal executive, rival FLN factions continue to contest the Mouhafedha.  
In an amusing parallel with segmentary theory, the divided Oran Federation unites 
to protect its local political-economic arena from external interference, in a system that 
Mohammed Hachemaoui calls “tribalism without tribes” (Hachemaoui 2011). In 2011, 
the struggle between Oran and Algiers is still over “mutually exclusive definitions of 
what the maximum political unit ought to be” (Charrad 2001: 19). These struggles 
underscore the still disarticulated character of Algerian politics, where local groups are 
strong, and central authority weak. In Oran, beylic and authority still belong to the local 
arena, not the state. 
                                                
408 Boukhatem and Henni. 
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Conclusion: Vertical and Horizontal Institutions 
 
Throughout this study, I have shown that the contractual, demand, and supply side 
models collapse contractual and property rights institutions into a single body with the 
following characteristics: 1) Contracts are micro-level transactions; 2) Property rights qua 
property rights originate at the macro-level, when individual contracts are aggregated into 
marketplace rules; 3) Whether originating in the market or the state, property rights 
enforce contracts. Taken together, the three points form a splendidly circular logic: 
Micro-level contracts constitute macro-level property rights and macro-level property 
rights enforce micro-level contracts. We are not told where, when, or how enforcement 
shifts from the micro- to the macro- or vice-versa. In all three models, enforcement, like 
the state, is assumed.409 
In a 2005 article, Acemoglu and Johnson unbundle the two phenomena. 
Contractual institutions are apolitical; running, however, horizontally, they regulate 
transactions between private parties. Property rights are vertical institutions “intimately 
linked to the distribution of political power in society because they regulate the 
relationship between ordinary private citizens and the politicians or elites with access to 
political power” (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005: 950-951).  
With this in mind, we might look more clearly at the relationship between 
property and the state: if property rights regimes reflect the distribution of power in a 
society, then state institutions are built in order to enforce this distribution. Indeed, as I 
have shown the political and economic origins of the Algeria and Tunisian regimes lie in 
the layered state building processes that pitted local groups against centralizing elites, 
                                                
409 Though the different reasons for these assumptions are outlined in Chapter Two. 
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where authority was exercised to exclusively define the ownership, use, and transfer of 
property. 
Ultimately, property rights are not the marketplace interactions we see in North’s 
portrayal of the Zambian village market or the High Atlas suq (1991). Studying 
horizontal contractual relations in the absence of a centralized state, North misses the 
political underpinning of these local pre-state institutions and the importance they played 
in maintaining the asabiyya of local communal structure (and thereby the political 
arenas). This is a crucial gap in the literature. Inherently and deeply political, property 
rights are those sets of rules that reflect the distribution and legitimacy of power in a 
society, whatever the level (Brenner 1976, 1982; Knight 1992). For transhumant groups 
of the Orani Plains or Tunisian Central Steppes, rights over arch land were the bedrock of 
the moral economy that maintained intra-tribal solidarity. In the words of Lila Ben 
Salem: “Belonging to a [tribal] group necessarily implies possession of land. It is a sine 
qua non condition of group identity” (1996: 303). Land was the glue that bound the 
group, and enabled it to maintain its sovereignty. In the eyes of the Muslim population, 
shuyukh-legitimacy derived from the authority to enforce tribal rights over arch land. The 
ramifications of this are enormous: Tribal property rights were the economic and moral 
foundation of kin-based asabiyya, just as control over the access to property markets was 
the raison d’être of the Oran FLN Federation.  
Therefore, looking at the relationship between property and the state is a 
necessary element towards understanding these outcomes. For state building is not just 
about constructing buildings, railways, roads, and telephone networks, but rather is about 
re-wiring power from the periphery to the center, and in the process creating a “direct 
conflict between local solidarities based on primordial ties…and a nation-state.” Each has 
“mutually exclusive definitions of what the maximal political unit ought to be” (Charrad 
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2001: 19). Property rights reflect the arena within which power is structured and 
legitimated. For the Madjaher in Mostaghanem and the Majeur in the Tunisian Central 
Steppe, land tenure(s) created the political boundaries of local (group) and localized 
(migration pattern) authority. Like the central authorities of today, the shuyukh claimed 
exclusive authority to define the rules of ownership, use and transfer of property. The 
sheikh’s authority derived from his ability to negotiate and protect arch from internal and 
external appropriation, underscoring Herbst’s claim that struggles over “land tenure is, 
not surprisingly, the most contentious issue between central states and local leaders” 
(Herbst 2000: 181). The centralizing ambitions of Algiers, Constantine, Mascara/Oran, 
and Tunis called into question the sheikh’s authority and tribal prerogatives. The battles 
were violent, and without paying attention to this, we will never understand the structure 
and strategies of the state today. 
Indeed the multi-faceted account of state building is a crucial element of 
understanding the complexity of political outcomes, evoking Jeanne Favret’s 
prescription: 
To explain this phenomenon it has been necessary to use both micro- and 
macrosociological factors, as well as diachronic and synchronic ones, since 
research on any one of these levels by itself has proved misleading .If we study 
nothing but hamlets and villages, we run up against insuperable contradictions 
that can’t be explained just by invoking the decapitation of their local political 
organization: changes at the top do bring significant changes at the lower levels. 
Likewise, macrosociological analysis remains sketchy because of uncertainty 
about the cultural variable (Favret 1973: 324). 
Regimes are the norms, rules, and procedures that govern decision-making; the 
political and economic institutions that run between the center and the periphery are the 
outcome of varying state building strategies. Importantly, rulers adopt those strategies in 
response to the relative strength of local elites (Boone 2003). As discussed in Chapters 
Three and Four in Tunisia, local elites were largely incorporated into the national, if not 
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regional, political economy before the French arrived and the Protectorate grafted itself 
onto the Beylic of Tunis. In Ottoman Algeria, the Beys never occupied the large swaths 
of space claimed by the Beys of Tunis. Geography, semi-transhumant communal 
structure, and unstable palace politics inhibited substantive state building in the 
periphery, as French colonial administrators discovered shortly after their arrival in 1830. 
While the Dar as-Sultan collapsed within weeks of the invasion, tribal resistance only 
formally ended with the surrender of Amir Abdelkader, seventeen years after French 
gunboats arrived in Sidi Fredj. Though militarily defeated, intra-tribal solidarity remained 
strong as long as the tribes themselves were autonomously organized. The sheikh and 
jema‘a were at the center of this local sovereignty, and in order to break them, the French 
attacked the land regime. 
The availability of administrative and party cadres at Algerian and Tunisian 
independence also conditioned the choice sets of local state building strategies available 
to the new ruling elites.410 As Chapter Five shows, in regions where the Neo-Destour was 
strong, the Tunisian regime chartered local municipalities. Elsewhere, it sought to 
develop local party branches before creating Town Halls. In regions like Béja, where the 
regime faced stiff opposition, the regime attacked the social basis of power – land – 
before implanting party branches and expanding local institutions. This could only be 
achieved with a large reservoir of administrative and party cadres. By the 1960s, the rural 
institutions of the Tunisian state were set in place.  
The regime had asserted the exclusive authority to define the rules of ownership, 
use, and transfer of land. Bourguiba, and later Ben Ali, offset declining urban party 
membership through controlled access to land through grants made to rural elites. The 
party, which had roughly served as an interest articulation mechanism linking local and 
                                                
410 Which, in turn, was directly related to the colonial situation.  
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national elites, increasingly developed into a patronage network defined by access to 
credits and inputs. To explain this, Henry and Springborg claim the Tunisian regime is 
“at once both more narrowly and broadly based” (Henry and Springborg: 162) than the 
Algerian “bunker” state. When compared to the exaggerated Algeria case, Tunisia’s 
regime shows signs of Peter Evans embedded autonomy (1995).411  
As discussed in Chapters Four and Six, rural institution building strategies in 
Algeria were more complex. State and property rights institutions departed with the 
French in 1962, for the French had imported administrative cadres, settlers, and a 
repressive security apparatus to protect settler property rights, crowding Muslims out of 
public space. As a result, the post-independence regime lacked both a party and trained 
administrative cadres. In 1962, the new regime inherited a remarkably disaggregated 
society with no discernable focal point like the Sahel in Tunisia.412 Boumediene chose a 
two-tiered rural state building strategy, which relied on local agent-representatives in the 
Municipalities to fill in the agent deficit between the District and the ground. However, as 
Chapters Six and Seven show, while this may have been the most logical political 
strategy in the decade immediately following independence, the process ultimately 
undermined state goals of redirecting parochial power away from the local political arena 
and creating networks that depended on the central state. The bottom-up vertical 
powersharing agreement, which the regime had hoped would foster this dependence, 
                                                
411 I need to again stress that this is only when Tunisia is compared to Algeria. 
412 A partial exception might be Kabylia, which had been densely settled and increasingly plugged into the 
French colonial administration, especially the workforce, the local levels of administration, and education. 
The degree of Kabyle predominance in the colonial administration is best summed in the translation of the 
title of Morizot’s 1962 work, “Algeria Kabylized.” For ethnic reasons – Kabyles are Berbers, not Arabs – 
the Kabyle option was not on the table for the 1962 regime. Thanks to Clement Henry for pointing out 
Morizot’s work. Jean Morizot. 1962. L’Algérie Kabylisé. Paris: Cahiers de l’Afrique et l’Asie. 
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instead flipped on its side. This ultimately reinforced the local arenas Boumediene sought 
to displace, if not destroy. Property rights in Algeria, like central authority, are weak. 
Understanding that in disarticulated Algeria the state created society and vice-
versa problematizes the state-society relationship, but at the same time gives us a better 
understanding the Algerian regime, which Germaine Tillion classically characterized as a 
“république des cousins” (1966). Lacking a party and trained administrative cadres at 
independence, the state created the two in tandem. As a result of this weakness, minority 
groups do not need to seize the state apparatus in Algiers. Instead, local networks like the 
Oran FLN are powerful enough resist encroachment from the center into their almost 
hermetically sealed local political-economic arenas. This affirms Henry and Springborg’s 
characterization of the Algerian regime: Algeria has underdeveloped property rights 
institutions because “132 years of colonization pulverized social forces… [t]he society is 
‘folded into its State and vice-versa’” (Henry and Springborg 2010: 113-114; citing Leca, 
foreword to Liverani 2008: xii). Moreover, Algeria cannot enforce its own laws because 
the agents assigned to the task themselves are a part of society that resists the state: oddly 
enough, “the state of the state” is resistance to the state. Ironically, the lack of autonomy 
of the “bunker” state from social forces is both the strength and the Achilles heel of the 
regime. A change in president has little effect on control of the local political economic 
arenas. Boumediene, Bendjedid, and Zeroual have come and gone. The FLN Federation 
still controls Oran. 
 
8.1 VERTICAL INSTITUTIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This focus on localized political-economic arenas opens up more interesting, 
comparative venues of research on the political anthropology of economic development. 
And it might help break with the tendency of using the “state” as the primary unit of 
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analysis when studying the politics of the MENA region. Here, a central point of 
departure can be drawn from comments Jeanne Favret made fifty years ago. In Algeria, 
she commented: “social discontinuity is more marked than in any other country recently 
freed from colonial rule” (Favret 1973: 308).413 The Algerian regime did not have just a 
few social groups to compete with at independence; instead it was a highly disarticulated 
nation-in-formation. Post-independence political processes often failed to appreciate this: 
Boumediene’s state building strategy did not vary from region to region because the 
regime barely had enough cadres with technical training to run the Wilaya. The top-
down, bottom-up, two-tiered state building strategy reveals the limits of Algerian 
administrative de-concentration from the center.414  
Chapter Six argued that the localized politics that resulted from the two-tiered 
state building strategy define the broad contours of local-national relations in Algeria. 
The argument goes a long way in helping explain why property rights are so weakly 
applied and enforced in that case. As North reminds us, institutions are “the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction” (North 1990: 3). Boumediene’s bottom-up strategy of creating an army of 
agent-representatives that would fill in the gap between the District and the ground 
transformed the Municipal Councils into “the field on which the battle for control of its 
decision-making is fought” (North 1979: 252). The central state lost the battle. 
At the same time, Chapter Seven argued that the specificities of Bendjedid’s 
tenure on the early development of the Oran FLN Federation, along with changes in the 
local economy in the 1970s and 1980s, contributed to the specific contours of the Orani 
                                                
413 Charrad introduced me to Favret in her 2001 work. Charrad also cites this passage. Charrad 2001: 24. 
414 Of course, variation did occur at a very micro-level via the different agrarian regimes formalized during 
this period (e.g. the self-managed farms, the cooperatives, et cetera). However, most of the northern 
provinces contained multiple agriculture sectors, blurring any variation in sub-regional institutional 
development. 
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political-economic arena. Favret is again instructive here as we can compare the case of 
Oran with other localized political arenas. Moreover, using Boone’s set of variables – the 
form of communal structure (e.g. outside the ideal-type post-colonial city, looking at 
villages, tribes), type of local economy (e.g. agrarian, importation, smuggling) – among 
others more specific to the case shows that while the institutional settings may be the 
same, the politics and location of those battles vary. Taken together these analytical 
frames reinforce the importance of the synchronic / diachronic approach. 
One of the big variables determining the autonomy of the Oran political-economic 
arena is the nature of the local economy, which shifted from agriculture to construction, 
public works, and real estate in the 1970s and 1980s. Importantly, Orani entrepreneurs 
and FLN militants did not need Algiers to defend rent extraction. This was not the case in 
Mostaghanem. Whereas Orani political and economic elite engaged in the construction 
and real estate markets that came on line in the 1970s and 1980s, the Mostaghanemi elite 
seized changing opportunities in the agricultural sector, especially after Bendjedid’s 
liberalizations in the 1980s and 1990. Old families that had been nationalized in the 
1970s reclaimed their hold over agriculture, “re-activated” tribal links, and entered 
politics. Because of the types of credits and infrastructural investments required in 
capitalist agriculture (e.g. cold chambers, irrigation, silos, transportation infrastructures), 
the local political focal point is on the Regional Council, not Town Hall. Unlike Oran, 
where the FLN Federation cultivates party-clientelism, the Mostaghanem Federation is 
composed of rural notables and charismatic personalities that attend to patron-client 
relationships with peasants, businessmen, zawiyya, and most importantly, the Madjaher 
confederation that dominates the western half of the Wilaya. 
The character of Mostaghanemi politics, moreover, helps us understand why the 
region was quick to support President Bouteflika’s campaign in the summer of 2003. 
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While the Mouhafedh supported Ali Benflis for ideological reasons (I-33), his control 
over the Mostaghanem Federation was weak. In Mostaghanem, power lies in the hands of 
the President of the Regional Council, which at the time was controlled by now Senator 
Mohammed Lazrag from Mesra (ex Aboukir). Lazrag is a member of a leading family of 
the Madjaher confederation, whose fortune comes from down-stream agricultural 
services in the early 1990s. He entered politics to protect his investments. Dependent on 
the state for access to credits to finance their agro-business interests and political 
clienteles, the individuals that compose the Mostaghanem FLN Federation quickly rallied 
to the Bouteflika campaign. Agrarian property rights are strong in Mostaghanem, because 
the interests of the local elites and the state are so often very congruent.415 
State institutions can only project enforcement where they are strong enough to 
co-opt or re-wire local elites. In Algeria, this capacity has always been variegated across 
space and across time. Therefore, tracing the local-national relations and the origins of 
power in Algeria from the 1930s to the present sheds new light on the function and 
dysfunction of local and national institutions. This comparison between temporal and 
spatial variation is crucial to understanding contemporary Algeria.416  
 
8.2 HORIZONTAL INSTITUTION AND AVENUES OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
The World Bank Doing Business study ranks Algeria at 160th out of 183 countries 
for property transactions; it is clear that property rights are weak. Tunisia scores a 
respectable 59th place: property rights are relatively strong. Yet the average growth rate 
for the two states over the last fifteen years is strikingly similar: 3.84% in Algeria, 3.70% 
                                                
415 Of course, this is in light of the agrarian reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s. During 
Boumediene’s regime, opposition to land reform was high, and local-national relations were sour.  
416 This is the central focus of a larger study James McDougall, Mohammed Hachemaoui, and I are putting 
together. 
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in Tunisia. Surely, part of Algeria’s average growth rate is traceable to the bust and boom 
effect of the 1990s. However, this growth rate is also reflective of the service-based 
nature of the Algerian economy. Outside of oil production, the service industry is the 
largest sector of the Algerian economy, generating thirty percent of GDP in 2007 
(POGAR 2011). How can we account for sectoral robustness in the light of weak 
property rights institutions?  
To return to Acemoglu and Johnson’s work, they find that formal contractual 
institutions have little impact on economic development (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). 
Indeed, contractual institutions in Algeria are also weak. One measure of contractual 
institutions is contract intensive money, or CIM. CIM is the ratio of non-currency 
money.417 Figure 8.1 shows the evolution of CIM in Algeria and Tunisia from the 1960s 
to present. In 2008, close to thirty-one percent of Algerian money circulated in cash – this 
in an economy where thirty percent of GDP, sixty percent of the government’s budget, 
and ninety-five percent of export revenues are generated by hydrocarbons.  
 
 
                                                
417 M2 minus the money outside the official banking system divided by M2. See: Clague, Christopher, 
Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack, and Mancur Olson. 1995. “Contract Intensive Money: Contract 
Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance.” Mimeo. College Park: University of Maryland 
at College Park. 
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Small marketplace transactions occupy an increasingly large percentage of the 
non-hydrocarbon economy in Algeria, and yet market operators have little legal recourse 
to protect them from defective contractual agreements. How do market operators protect 
their property? They go informal: a substantial part of Algeria’s economic growth has 
been occurring at the local level, in the booming informal economy. At the peak of state-
society violence in 1997, the International Labor Organization estimated that the informal 
sector generated twenty-six percent of GDP (ILO 2002: 24). In 2004, the Algerian 
Ministry of Commerce estimated an annual fiscal loss of $US 600 million418; three years 
later, the Ministry of Finance placed the number at $US 1.41 billion.419 In 2008, close to 
seventy percent of goods and services were in the informal economy420 – a sector that 
according to some estimates now represent sixty percent of the salaried workforce.421  
‘Going informal,’ however, tells us very little about the mechanisms that sustain 
horizontally organized networks. One of my upcoming projects is studying the methods 
by which small entrepreneurs ensure their property rights outside of the legal system. 
Specifically, I am looking at a transportation network that links Oran and the District of 
Ighil Ali, in Kabylia. The network transports the three factors of production: people, cash, 
and the fruits of arboriculture in the Soummam Valley – olive oil and honey. The 
booming million dollar a year market services the Eastern Kabyle population, which 
according to local sources makes up close to twenty percent of the population of the city 
of Oran.  
One service the drivers offer is money transfers. In Algeria, wire services through 
the banking system or post office are cumbersome and can take several days. The drivers 
                                                
418 El Watan, 24 October 2004. “Le commerce parallèle en plein essor: L’état perd 60 milliards de dinars 
par an.”  
419 El Watan, 26 February 2007. “Conséquences des dysfonctionnements de l’éconmie nationale.” 
420 El Watan, 27 August 2007. “Marchés publics: le réquisitoire de l’UGCAA.” 
421 El Watan, 11 June 2008. “L’informel represent 60% du marché national.” 
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can deliver cash made in Oran to a village in the Ath Abbès (where the 1871 Mokrani 
uprising occurred) in less than eight hours. The sums are considerable. ‘Arezki’ claims to 
have once transferred an envelope of four million dinars, close to $US 42,000.00. Most 
transfers, however, are between $US 5-10,000, more than the average annual earning. 
When asked about how people protect their transfers three drivers, who are also brothers, 
cried in unison: “friends and family.” The drivers cannot abscond with the cash because 
they are from the same region, tribe, and villages as the men and women who give them 
the money in the first place. Reminiscent of Greif’s study on the Geniza (1993), the 
drivers have created a moral economy that protects their market and the goods they 
transport for their clientele based on reputation, kith, and kin. 
While a compelling anecdote, the real story is in the political salience of state-
society relations. In the absence of state control, society takes matters into their own 
hands, and the impact of this self-sufficiency on political life is ubiquitous. The different 
responses of two drivers when asked about their relationship with the state are prescient. 
‘Mohand’ exclaimed: “Why bother, brother? I make money as a clandestine. I don’t need 
to give those jokers a centime.” ‘Ramdhan’ puts it this way: “The state is absent from 
society. The state does not want to know why we work, why there is a market, and how 
that market operates. The state is absent. And because of this, we’re clandestine in our 
own country!” 
Ultimately, the state is absent from society because society refuses it entry; 
simultaneously, the fate of society is inextricable from that of the state. The Algerian 
paradox calls into question the total nature of Gramsci’s hegemony, while at the same 
time challenging Hegel’s formula of citizen, state, and property. The ensuing battles 
between state and society for the authority to exclusively define the ownership, use, and 
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transfer of property has led to a quagmire. As ‘Mohand’ and ‘Ramdhan’ so eloquently 
show, neither state nor society is legitimate in Algeria. In 2011, all property is still theft. 
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Appendix A: Research Design and Methodology 
This project is an inquiry into the mechanisms that outline the process of state 
building in Algeria and Tunisia through each respective property rights regime. As 
Hedstrom and Swedberg note, this is not a purely descriptive endeavor, but rather a way 
to get closer to answering the more pressing questions in social sciences that are often 
eschewed in favor of more predictive, ‘parsimonious’ forms of analysis. It is crucial, 
when understanding the processes of state building, to ask ourselves: “’Why do these 
people act in this way? Why does social order change in that way?’” (1996: 282). This 
study aims to go deeper into comparative case analysis, moving away from large N 
aggregate studies that often accompany research into property rights, where state and 
state formation are expunged from the analysis altogether. King, Keohane and Verba’s 
dictum that “the differences between the qualitative and quantitative traditions are only 
stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant” (1994: 4) is 
increasingly acknowledged as “simplistic, misleading, and inappropriate as a guide for 
designing social inquiry” (Mahoney 2010: 122; also see Gerring 2007 and Ragin 2008). 
Likewise, the utility of political ethnography and interpretive methods is slowly but 
surely entering the mainstream of political studies (Finnemore 2001; Schatz 2009), 
expanding the parameters of methodology to include approaches more traditionally 
considered the domain of anthropology or sociology. Comparative politics has perhaps 
finally caught up with Przeworski in the value of methodological opportunism (1996: 
16). 
My point of departure is a small N case study design, following from Mill’s 
method of difference (1872), designed to examine “situations in which the [outcome] is 
not the same for all cases” (Liberson 1991: 312). The questions I pose are answered using 
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a combination of participant observation, secondary source material, and both directed 
and semi-directed interview schema. I follow a “structured, focused comparison” 
advocated by George and Bennett in developing the theoretical framework (2004: 69). 
While I heed George and Bennett’s advice in developing an analytically sound approach, 
I equally approach these difficult subjects by using the snowball sampling method 
(Goodman 1961). This method does not generate random sampling. Instead, it relies on 
chain-referral networks. By diffusing uniform questionnaires and allowing for the 
respondents to take these as a departure point for potential referrals, I limit the scope of 
the sample to a manageable size and pool – avoiding the potential pitfalls Heckathorn 
outlines (1997). Because the subject matter itself is a matter of tracing and exploring the 
development of informal networks operating at the boundaries / periphery of the state, 
interpersonal networks are more than just a convenient methodological option. Rather, it 
is an ontological position that is demonstrated in the analysis, aligning ontology and 
methodology (Hall 2003). 
My interviews focused on the development of the FLN party in Western Algeria 
from 1962 to present. I identified twenty-five former and current local, regional, and 
national leaders who were willing to participate in my study. This body included former 
militants, branch and federation leaders, as well as Municipal Council and Regional 
Assembly representatives during the single and multiparty era. Additionally, I prepared a 
list of thirty-five questions to bring to each interview, though I did not expect to receive 
exhaustive responses. Indeed, many of my questions treat my subjects as informants 
rather than as respondents in order to put my interviewees at easy with my questions as 
well as more willing to recommend me to their colleagues. Given the nature of the 
questions involved, preoccupation with ‘selection bias’ in subjects is much less important 
than the richness of my findings.  
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As this study has shown, in post-colonial states the legitimacy of property rights, 
power, and wealth are hotly debated within and between the local, regional, and national 
levels. The questions are sensitive and documentation – as the case of the former Wali of 
Oran shows – is scant. This required me to move closer to ethnographic and interpretive 
methods – approaches with which I was initially unfamiliar. However, doing so expanded 
the toolkit of comparative research to employ participant observation as well as more 
traditional political science fieldwork. Nordstrom is correct when she notes that it is 
difficult to study ‘the shadows,’ and that in response to her inquiries as to “why there is a 
death of empirical studies of extra-state realities: such work is dangerous…the 
implication is that…you might end up as one of the statistics you were collecting (2005: 
232).422 While the case of property rights might seem far removed from more exciting 
subjects such as radical Islamist movements, terrorism, and civil war, it is no less a 
sensitive subject. As examples of the property scandals and archival theft in Chapters Six 
and Seven hopefully made clear, who owns what and where in Algeria is an 
exceptionally contentious and politicized issue.  
Indeed, property rights are a red line in Algeria. If, as I concluded, that in Algeria 
in 2011 ‘all property is still theft,’ then it is no laughing matter ‘to walk into the den of 
thieves’ with a recorder, pen, or paper in hand. Anthropological methods were of great 
use in this case. As Yanow notes: “if the research question calls for sensitivity to 
contextually-specific meanings, it is likely to be addressed more usefully by some form 
of interpretive method” (2003: 14). This extends to include the understanding that events 
and processes will be remembered directly by different participants depending on the 
social position and space they occupy (and occupied) in the course of both the event 
being recounted as well as the interview itself (see Wood 2003: 34-35). Engaging both 
                                                
422 Italics in original. 
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subject matter and subject is paramount and results in findings that reinforce Lisa 
Wedeen’s contention that ethnographic methods can be used to help establish causal 




Appendix B: Defining Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable: Property rights enforcement. 
A number of variables have been used to measure property rights. Most scholars 
approach the property rights from the perspective that property is a good that should 
freely circulate from one individual to another via marketplace transactions. 
Subsequently, the measurement used to gauge the strength of property rights is the degree 
to which the government is constrained from appropriating the property of its own 
citizens. To this effect, scholars have used the Heritage Foundation’s assessment of 
private property protection, Political Risk Service’s assessment of protection against 
government expropriation in a country, and the Polity IV constraint on the executive 
measure. For reasons outlined in Chapter Two (pp. 20-27), these inherently normative 
measurements miss the important question of enforcement.  
To be sure, there is probably some overlap between a “high probability of 
government expropriation” and the “capacity of a state to enforce property rights as it 
defines them.” As Chapters Three through Seven underscore, the capacity to enforce 
property rights reflects character of the state-society relationship. Where national 
institutions are viewed as the legitimate arenas with the authority to define the ownership, 
use, and transfer of a property, property rights are enforced on the ground. States that 
unilaterally expropriate citizens’ property are usually not characterized with a strong 
state-society relationship. Where the legitimacy of those institutions remains a 
contentious debate, property rights enforcement is weak. If this is the case, instead of 
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looking a “constraint on the executive,” we should look for a reflexive set of variables 
that generates a better measure of the tenor of the state-society relationship.423 
Henry and Springborg’s financial characterization of MENA regimes seems to 
underscores this. They describe “bunker” states such as Algeria as: “Fierce and 
authoritarian…they lack institutional roots in their respective societies, and the people 
shy away from banks, associated as they are with distant and feared public authorities 
(Henry and Springborg 2010: 82). An indicator of these relationships might be “Contract 
Intensive Money,” discussed in the conclusion. As Lewis Snider remarks:  
“Where institutions are highly informal, i.e. where contract enforcement and 
security of property rights are inaccurate, and the policy environment is uncertain 
transactions will generally be self-enforcing and currency will be the only money 
that is widely used. Where there is a high degree of public confidence in the 
security of property rights and in contract enforcement, other types of money that 
are held or invested in banks and other financial institutions and instruments 
assume much more importance” (Snider 1996: 9, cited in Henry and Springborg: 
82).  
 Part of the problem is that property rights enforcement, as this thesis has shown, is 
an outgrowth of state building and projection into the provinces. The outcome of the 
long-running battles between local and national elites to situate the location of exclusive 
authority to define the rules of property ownership, transfer, and use of property are not 
easily measured. While, as Henry and Springborg note, CIM might also simply be 
measuring the lack of horizontally running contractual institutions instead of property 
rights (Henry and Springborg 2010: 82),424 CIM is the only reflexive measurement that 
captures state-society relations via the market. And the measurement seems to nicely 
                                                
423 Using Polity IV’s “constraint on the executive” measurement actually places Algeria (5) at a higher 
ranking than Tunisia (3). This is silly – of course the Algerian executive is constrained: since 
independence, he has been placed and removed by the military. 
424 Stephen Knack, who pioneered CIM, told me just the same at an APSA meeting in 2004. 
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overlap the broad contours of state capacity measured by the various Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, as shown in Figures A and B, below. 
Figure A: Bertelsmann Transformation Index, State Capacity, 2008* 
 
Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010 
* Algeria is the blue, brown, and violet line in the interior. Tunisia is in red to the exterior. 
 
Figure B: Contract Intensive Money, 1990-2008 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, 2002; POGAR 2010 
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Independent Variables: Mass-mobilizing political party. 
Clement H. Moore proposes six criteria necessary to define a mass-mobilizing 
political party (Moore 1965: 1): 
 
1. After winning independence, the party exercises a virtual monopoly of power, 
either directly or indirectly through the new state administration that it staffs, 
though weak opposition parties may persist. 
2. While depending for its cohesion after independence mainly upon the personal 
power and prestige of a leader-hero, the party is a national symbol sharing his 
prestige as a founder of the new state. 
3. The party is open to (almost) all nationals. 
4. Its leaders and cadres are selected primarily on the basis of their loyalty and 
political achievements rather than social position. 
5. Its well-articulated structure, supplemented by a network of ancillary 
organizations, actively sustains a mass following and aims at integrating the 
society. 
6. Though the party does not have a total ideology, it communicates a broad 
message of social and economic modernization. 
 
Henry F. Jackson proposes a similar set of criteria (Jackson 1977: 75-76): 
 
• The party enjoys popular legitimacy, which is ordinarily a carryover from the role 
the party or its leaders in the struggle against the ancien régime. 
• The party has a national leader, or a group of leaders, maintaining a monopoly of 
power, usually by control of the government bureaucracy and by exclusion of 
political competitors outside the party. 
• Procedures are established for the recruitment, selection, and training of leaders. 
• The party maintains an organized constituency of all, or almost all, social and 
economic groups in order to implement party decisions and to gather information 
concerning the demands and interests of the various groups. 
• The party articulates an ideology and a program of political and economic 
objectives to promote the general welfare and engage the public in various aspects 
of the political process, such as voting, running for electoral office, canvassing, 
etc. 
• The party commands a mechanism for disciplining its members in accordance 
with particular decisions, policies, and doctrinal positions. 
• The party possesses a capability of financing its operations, usually through 
membership dues, donations, and government subsidies, or some contribution of 
these sources. 
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Independent Variable: Incentive set. 
As discussed in Chapter Two (pp. 46-51), state attempts to monitor agents with 
strictly negative mechanisms result in more shirking and cheating.  
Vertical political mobility opportunities within representative or party institutions 
are a strong positive incentive for local actors. In addition to increased salaries with 
increased authority, in developing states, material accumulation opportunities often 
increase as the distance from the nodes of access to distribution decreases. Power also 
generates positive feedback and accrues the higher one travels up the ladder. Agents with 
low vertical mobility opportunities or other positive incentives seek out other forms of 
reward, such as stature, private accumulation strategies, or both. Seeking stature, agents 
embed themselves in the local political arena and informal institutions, seeking patrons 
and clients. As patrons/clients, they use their political position to distribute/receive first- 
and second-order resources.  
One gauge of whether vertical mobilization opportunities exist is simply by 
looking at the institutional organization within a party or state. Are there intermediate and 
national institutions? Are there opportunities for upward promotion? Are local elites 
upwardly promoted? In the case of Algeria and Tunisia, we use the timing of national, 
regional, and local elections during the post-colonial area state and party building 
processes. Another gauge is to let the local elites express how they view their incentives 
in their own terms. Elite interviews help identify the institutional mechanisms that 
inhibited closer coordination between national and local party leaders during both the 
single and multiparty eras. Interviews also help us better understand how the timing and 
sequencing of institutional development created multiple spheres of politics (e.g. local, 
regional, national). 
Below is the questionnaire used with current and past political-economic actors: 
 323 
1. Expliquez les structures organisationnelles différentes du FLN. 
2. Expliquez les structures organisationnelles différentes de la Fédération d’Oran du 
parti du Front de Libération National (FLN) 
3. Expliquez comment les branches (kasmat) et fédérations (mouhafedha) du FLN 
sont organisées. 
4. Décrire la différence entre un membre et un militant du FLN. 
5. Comment sont les personnalités locales recrutées dans les branches du FLN ? 
a. Est-ce que ceci a toujours été le cas ? 
b. S’il y avait eu de changements, pourriez vous les expliquer ? 
6. Comment est-ce qu’un branche sélection les membre pour devenir militants ? 
7. Quels sont les rôles et prérogatives des branches du parti dans la politique locale ? 
a. Comment est-ce que ceci a évolué à travers le temps, par exemple. depuis 
l’ère du parti unique ? 
8. Comment sont les dirigeants des branches choisis ? 
a. Est-ce que ceci a toujours été le cas ? 
b. Si le processus a changé, comment est-ce que ces changements ont 
affectés la façon dont le parti local fonctionne ? 
9. Comment sont les dirigeants des fédérations choisis ? 
a. Comment change-t-il la façon dont le parti local fonctionne ? 
b. Est-ce que ceci a toujours été le cas ? 
c. Si les procédures ont changé, comment est-ce que ces changements 
affectent la façon dont le parti local fonctionne ? 
10. Quel est le rapport entre les branches et la fédération dans une localité ? 
a. Est-ce que ce rapport a toujours été la même ? 
b. Si non, veuillez expliquer. 
11. Comment est-ce que le leadership du parti local a maintenu la solidarité dans les 
branches ?  Dans la fédération ? 
a. Pourriez vous me donnez quelques exemples des bénéfices disponibles 
aux militants qui ne sont pas aux simples membres ou aux citoyens non 
affiliés avec le parti ? 
12. Quel est le rapport entre la fédération régionale et le Congrès national du parti ? 
a. Est-ce que ce rapport a toujours été la même ? 
b. Si non, veuillez expliquer. 
13. Quel est le rapport entre les branches locales et le Congrès national du parti ? 
a. Est-ce que ce rapport a toujours été la même ? 
b. Si non, veuillez expliquer. 
14. Quel rôle joue-t-il le dirigeant d’une branche dans l’organisation de la branche ? 
15. Quel rôle joue-t-il le dirigeant d’une fédération dans l’organisation de la 
fédération? 
16. Quel rôle joue-t-il le dirigeant d’une fédération dans l’organisation des branches 
dans sa fédération? 
17. Comment as-t-il, le multipartisme, affectait le parti ? 
a. Au niveau du militant ? 
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b. Au niveau de la branche ? 
c. Au niveau de la fédération ? 
d. Au niveau du Congrès national ? 
18. Quel est le rapport entre la branche et l’assemblée municipale ? 
19. Quel est le rapport entre la branche et l’assemblée régionale ? 
20. Lequel est plus important pour la fédération du FLN d’Oran, gagner les sièges 
dans : 
a. L’assemblée municipale ? 
b. L’assemblée régionale ? 
c. L’Assemblée nationale ? 
d. Le Sénat ? 
21. Veuillez expliquer votre réponse à la question numéro 20. 
22. Lequel est plus important pour la carrière d’un homme politique dans la politique 
algérienne : 
a. L’assemblée municipale ? 
b. L’assemblée régionale ? 
c. L’Assemblée nationale ? 
d. Le Sénat ? 
23. Veuillez expliquer votre réponse à la question numéro 22. 
24. Quel est le rapport entre le dirigeant de la branche et : 
a. Le sous-préfet (chef de daïra) ? 
b. Le préfet (wali) ? 
25. Quel est le rapport entre le chef de fédération et le préfet ? 
a. Est-ce que ce rapport a évolué à travers le temps ? 
b. Si oui, comment et pourquoi ? 
26. Comment sont les listes du parti pour les élections municipales déterminées ? 
27. Comment sont les listes du parti pour les élections régionales déterminées ? 
28. Comment sont les listes du parti pour les élections nationales déterminées ? 
29. Comment sont les candidats  pour les élections sénatoriales déterminés ? 
30. Quel rôle joue-t-il la fédération du FLN d’Oran dans la politique nationale ?  
Veuillez expliquer. 
31. Quel rôle joue-t-il la fédération du FLN d’Oran dans la politique nationale du 
parti du FLN ?  Veuillez expliquer. 
32. A quel niveau est la fédération du FLN d’Oran important au militant ?  Pourquoi ? 
33. Quel rôle joue-t-il le dirigeant de la fédération du FLN d’Oran dans les rapports 
des branches locales ? 
34. Comment est-ce que vous étiez recruté par le parti du FLN ? 
a. Est-ce que ceci diffère de la façon dont d’autres militants ont été recrutés ? 
b. Si oui, comment ? 
35. Veuillez décrire l’évolution de votre carrière politique. 
36. Quels sont les postes de responsabilité à l’intérieur du parti ou des institutions 
politiques que vous avez occupé ? 
37. Lequel a été le plus important à votre carrière politique ?  Pourquoi ? 
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 Appendix C: List of Interviews 
(NB: Names and specific titles of most of the informants are not disclosed to protect the 
identities of the informants. Interviews not cited have been omitted) 
 
I-1: Ahmed Mestiri, Tunis, 6/14/2008. Member of Neo-Destour Political Bureau, 1952-
1968; 1970-1971; Representative in National Assembly, 1956-1973; Minister of Justice, 
1956-1958; Minister of Commerce and Finance, 1958-1060; Ambassador to USSR, 
1960-1961; Ambassador to Egypt, 1961-1962; Ambassador to Algeria, 1962-1966; 
Minister of Defense, 1966-1968; President of the Socialist Democratic Movement, 1978-
1989. 
I-2: Said Benabdallah, Oran, 12/23/2010. Captain, Armée de Libération Nationale; Sub-
Prefect, Sid Ali, 1962-1964 (formerly Cassaigne, Wilaya of Mostaghanem); founding 
member of Croissant Rouge-Algérie; Lawyer (agrée au Cours Suprême); founding 
member of Association des juristes algériens. 
I-3: Former ANL ranking officer, Oran, 12/24/10. 
I-4: Former ALN ranking officer, Oran, 12/24/10 (during same interview as I-3). 
I-5: Former Special Delegate, Wilaya of Mostaghanem, Oran, 12/26/10 
I-6: Former Special Delegate, Wilaya of Mostaghanem, Oran, 12/26/10 (during same 
interview at I-5) 
I-7: Former cadre in the Wilaya of Oran, Oran, 12/27/10. 
I-8: Former Mayor of Oran, Oran, 12/27/10. 
1-9: “Houari X,” former officer in the ALN; Special Delegation Member, 1962, City of 
Oran, Oran, 12/28/10. 
I-10: Former Mayor of Remchi (Cavaignac), Remchi, 1/05/2011. 
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I-11: Former Self-Management Farm Worker, Domaine Lenoir, Remchi, 01/05/2011. 
I-12: Former Self-Management Farm Supervisor, Domaine Lenoir, Remchi, 01/05/2011. 
I-13: Son of a large property owner, Remchi, 01/06/2011. 
I-14: Cadre in Veterinary Service, Wilaya of Tlemcen, Remchi, 01/06/2011. 
I-15: FLN Militant, Kasma 2, 01/06/2011. 
I-16: Real-Estate Manager, Owner’s son, Oran 1/08/2011. 
I-17: Real-Estate Manager, Friend and son of competitor of I-16, Oran, 1/08/2011. 
I-18: Real-Estate Manager, French and Algerian Offices, Paris, 1/08/2010 – Telephone. 
I-19: Owner of land restituted by Law 90-25, Oran, 1/09/2011. 
I-20: City Oran FLN Councilor, Oran, 01/10/2011. 
I-21: Former City FLN Councilor, Oran, 1/11/2011. 
I:23: Former FLN Militant, Kasma 5, Oran, 1/12/2011. 
I-24: Former Chef de Daïra, Wilaya of Oran, Oran, 1/12/2011. 
I-25: FLN Militant, Retired Contractor, Wilaya of Oran, 1/13/2011. 
I-26: FLN Militant, Kasma 7, Oran, 1/14/2011. 
I-27: Son of former Chef de Daïra, Wilaya of Mostaghanem, Sidi Bel Abbès, 1/15/2011. 
I-28: Former FLN Militant, Industrial Contractor, Oran, 1/16/2011 
I-32: FLN Militant, Kasma 2, Oran, 1/17/2011 
I-33: FLN Militant, Mostaghanem, 1/19/2011 
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Glossary of Terms425 
‘Addate: Local usage. 
‘Adlun radi: Tunisian term for a witness to a transaction of land without a formal title. 
Agha:  Head of the military council of janissaries; district power-holder, senior to qaid in 
French colonial period (TUR). 
Amal: Locally defined norms. 
Ardh al-bey / beylic: Private domain of the Ottoman Sultan (TUR). 
Arch: Tribal land. 
Asabiyya: Tribal or group solidarity. 
Azel: Land grants to encourage tribal settlement. 
Bachaga: Regional power-holder, senior to agha, in French colonial system (TUR). 
Bey: Ottoman governor (TUR). 
Beylic: Ottoman province governed by a Bey (TUR). 
Beylic: Term used in contemporary Algeria to describe state property (TUR). 
Bled al-makhzan: Government controlled land. 
Bled es-siba: Land outside of government control. 
Daira: Algerian District, 1968-present. 
Dey: Military leader of the Deylic of Algiers, co-opted by the janissaries (TUR). 
Douar: Hamlet or settlement grouping a tribal sub-division. 
Ech-chaab: The people. In Algeria, this refers to the popular classes. 
Fellaga: Literally Bandit, refers to Tunisian mujahidin. 
al-Hogra: Literally disdain, the lack of justice. 
Henchir: Large tract of unused land. 
                                                
425 Tur: Turkish origin, used in Arabic. Kb: Kabyle Berber term. 
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al-Hawz: Possession of land. 
al-Hogra: Disdain. 
Hubus: Religious endowment. 
Ihyaa: Rendering land productive. 
Inzel: Maliki practice of allowing short-term leases for hubus property. 
Iqta: One time, non-transferable land grant. 
Jema‘a: Tribal or village assembly. 
Kasma, pl. kasmat: FLN administrative level grouping several branches. 
Khammeset: Sharecropping regime, peasant keep one fifth of produce in return for land 
and inputs. 
Khassat as-sultan: Land belonging to the “Prince.” 
Madhab: Sunni Islam school of jurisprudence. 
Madrasa, pl. madaris: Quranic school. 
Masheikhat: Sector led by a sheikh. 
Mahalla: Military tax collection parade. 
Mawlat: Un-worked land. 
Melk: Private property. 
Miri / ‘Amiri: Land belonging to the “Prince.” 
Mouhafedh: FLN Party Federation Commissioner. 
Mouhafedha: FLN Part Federation. 
Mu‘awada: Hanafi practice of exchanging a plot of hubus with another plot of land. 
Mujahidin: Combatant. 
Nif: Dignity. 
Oued: River. Usually a dried creek bed. 
Orf: Local custom. 
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Pasha: Direct representative of the Ottoman Sultan (TUR). 
Qadi: Muslim judge. 
Qaid, pl. qaiyad: Governor of a rural zone or sub-beylical province. 
Qanun: Local customary rules. 
Ra’yat: Vassal (taxable) / tributary tribes. 
Saff, pl. Sfuf: Segmentary alliance. 
Sharia: Islamic Law. 
Sharif, pl. Shurfa: Descendents of the Prophet Muhammed. 
Shefa‘a: The right of pre-emption governing collective, private land. 
Sheikh, pl. shuyukh: Tribal or village representative. 
Shudud: Algerian term for a witness. 
Tadjmat: Village assembly (KB). 
Ta‘hum: “Theirs.” 
Ta‘na: “Ours.” 
Tariqa: Islamic order or brotherhood. 
‘Umda: Sector chief nominated by the Tunisian Neo-Destour party, 1969-1987. 
Wali: Algerian governor, 1968-present (TUR). 
Watan: A beylical administrative unit. 
Wilaya: Algerian Department, 1968-present (TUR). 
al-Yad: Custom of legitimacy of land. 
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Acronyms 
ALN: National Liberation Army, Armée de Libération Nationale (Algeria) 
ANP: National People’s Army, Armée Nationale Populaire (Algeria) 
APC: People’s Municipal Assembly elections, Assemblée Populaire de Commune 
(Algeria) 
APN: National Assembly, Assemblée Populaire Nationale (Algeria) 
APW: Regional Assembly, Assemblées Populaires de Wilaya (Algeria) 
BNBV: National Office of Vacated Goods, Bureau National pour la Protection et 
Gestion des Biens Vacants (Algeria) 
CAPRA: Agricultural Production Cooperative, Coopérative Agricole de Production de la 
Révolution Agraire (Algeria) 
CAPCS: Multi-Functional Agricultural Service Cooperatives, Coopérative Agricole 
Communale Polyvalent de Service (Algeria) 
CDRA: Regional Agricultural Development Commission, Conseil Régional de 
dévelopement agricole (Tunisia) 
CGEAV: Self-Management Workers Committees / Comités de Gestion dans les 
Entreprises Agricoles Vacants (Algeria) 
CMPV: General Assistance Cooperatives, Coopératives de mis en valeur et de 
polyculture (Tunisia) 
CRA: Regional Credit Union, Caisses Régionales de Crédit (Algeria) 
DAS: Socialist Farms, Domaines Agricoles Socialistes (Algeria) 
DEC: Executive Municipal Delegates, Délégué Exécutif de Commune (Algeria) 
EAC: Collective Farm Corporation, EAC, Entreprise Agricole Collective (Algeria) 
EAI: Individual Agricultural Enterprises, Entreprise Agricole Individuelle (Algeria) 
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ENA: National Administration School, École Nationale d’Administration (Algeria) 
FIS: Islamic Salvation Front, Front Islamique du Salut (Algeria) 
FLN: National Liberation Front, Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria) 
FNA: Algerian National Front, Front National Algérien (Algeria) 
GPRA: Provisional Government of the Algeria Republic, Gouvernement Provisoire de la 
République Algérienne (Algeria) 
INA: National Agronomy Institute, Institut National Agronomique (Algeria) 
MALG: Ministry of General Liaisons and Armament, Ministère d’Armement et des 
Liaisons Générales (Algeria) 
MSD: Social Democratic Movement, Mouvement Démocratique et Sociale (Tunisia) 
MSP: Movement for a Peaceful Society, Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (Algeria) 
OAIC: Office for Cereals, Office Algérien Inter-professionnel des Cereales (Algeria) 
OAS: Secret Armed Organization, Organisation de l’armée secrete (Algeria) 
OFLA: Office of Algerian Fruits and Vegetables, Office des Fruits et Légumes 
Algériennes (Algeria) 
ONM: National Former Combatant Organization, Organisation Nationale des 
Moudjahidine (Algeria) 
ONRA: National Office of the Agrarian Revolution, Office National de la Révolution 
Agraire (Algeria) 
OPGI: Office of Real-Estate Management and Promotion, Office de Promotion et de 
Gestion d’Immobilier (Algeria) 
OPHLM: Public Office for Subsidized Rent, Office Public d’Habitation à Loyer 
Modéré. (Algeria) 
OTD: State Domains Office, Office des terres domaniales (Tunisia) 
PSD: Socialist Destourian Party, Parti Socialiste Destourien (Tunisia) 
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RCD: Constitutional Democratic Rally, Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique 
(Tunisia) 
RND: National Democratic Rally, Rassemblement National Démocratique (Algeria) 
SCAI: Native Administration Control Service, Service du Contrôle de l’Administration 
Indigène (Tunisia) 
SMVDA: Agriculture Development Companies, Sociétés de Mis-en-Valeur et de 
Développement Agricole (Tunisia) 
UCP: Cooperative Production Units, Unités cooperatives de production (Tunisia) 
UFIA: Union of Free Farmers, Union des Fellas Indépendents d’Algérie (Algeria) 
UGTA: Algerian General Workers Union, Union Générale de Travailleurs Algériens 
(Algeria) 
UGTT: General Union of Workers from Tunisia, Union Générale de Travailleurs de 
Tunisie (Tunisia) 
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